Candice Price

Preliminary Matters:

Clarification of nomenclature

1. The Registrant explained that although she had been registered in the name of Price with the HCPC, that this was her married name. She had reverted to using her maiden name: Pask. She clarified that she was known both as Mrs Candice Price and Miss Candice Pask, and that these were one and the same person. She indicated that she was content to be referred to by either name.

Private

2. The Panel was conscious that although neither party had applied for the hearing to be in private that it had the discretion to move into private should this be required to protect the private life of the Registrant or others. Sensitive matters have been alluded to in the background of this case and, if it was necessary for parts of the hearing, the Panel would exercise its discretion to move into private session. This would mean that no sensitive matters raised in private would form part of a public decision.

Amendment of the Allegation

3. The HCPC applied to amend the Allegation as originally drafted in the following way:

i) Amending Particular 2 of the Allegation so that the figure “£1077.22” is replaced with the words “up to £1,198.49”;

ii) To not proceed with Particular 3 of the Allegation which covered not providing information that the account was opened;

iii) To insert in the renumbered Particular 3 (which had originally been drafted as Particular 4), “in a timely manner” in respect of reporting matters to the HCPC;

iv) To replace in the renumbered Particular 4 (which had originally been drafted as Particular 5), the words “Failed to” with the words “Did not adequately”;

v) To amend the sub-paragraph (b) of the renumbered Particular 4, so that “Informed SWAS that the fraud case against you had been closed” has the word “informed” removed, and replaced with the words “Incorrectly gave” and the words “the impression” are inserted between “SWAS” and “that”.

vi) To renumber particulars 6, 7, and 8 as 5,6, and 7 to take account of the removal of Particular 3 and to indicate that any of the facts could be found to be dishonest or misleading individually or collectively by inserting “and/or” in the newly numbered particular 5 when referring to the other particulars;

vii) To amend references within the renumbered particulars 5, 6, and 7, to take account of the renumbering.

4. This would mean that the Allegation would change in the following way, with text in bold being used to indicate new wording, and strike through indicating removed wording:

Whilst registered as a Paramedic, you:

1. On or around 1 March 2016, opened an account with Next PLC using Person A’s name and details without their knowledge and/or consent.

2. Used the account referred to in paragraph 1 above to spend £1077.22 up to £1,198.49 on items from Next PLC.

3. On or around 8 July 2018, in an email to the HCPC, did not inform them that you had opened the account referred to in paragraph 1 above without Person A’s knowledge and/or consent. [HCPC intend to offer no evidence to this allegation at the Final Hearing]

4. 3. Failed to notify the HCPC in a timely manner when you were charged with fraud by false representation on 16 January 2018.

5. 4. Failed to Did not adequately cooperate with South Western Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust’s (“SWAS”) investigation into the matters referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, in that you:

a) Between 6 April 2018 and 24 July 2018 did not provide SWAS with copies of your court documentation after being asked to do so;

b) Incorrectly informed gave SWAS the impression that the fraud case against you had been closed.

6. 5. Your conduct at paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and/or 4 and/or 5 above was:
a) Misleading;
b) Dishonest.

7. 6. The matters set out in paragraphs 1 – 6 5 above constitute misconduct.

8. 7. By reason of your misconduct your fitness to practise is impaired.

5. The reasons given for these changes were that these better reflected the evidence insofar as the amount of money spent was concerned, and reflected what had occurred in terms of the Registrant’s behaviour, particularly in her dealings with the HCPC and SWAS. The removal of Particular 3 as originally drafted reflects that there is no obligation to report the actual opening of the account to the HCPC. The duty the Registrant was under in terms of reporting the matter to the HCPC is already covered at Particular 4 as originally drafted. These changes were ones that the HCPC had notified the Registrant of in advance.

6. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor that it had a discretion to permit an amendment if it was in the interests of justice, and could be done fairly without prejudice to the Registrant. The Panel was of the view that given the evidence before it, it was satisfied that the evidence better supported the amendments. It took into account that the Registrant had been put on notice of the amendments and had not objected. Further, it noted that in the context of the original Particular 3, that this was not an under-prosecution, as the gravamen of the matter was accurately captured by the remainder of the Allegation, as amended, and in particular, Particular 4 as originally drafted. It was clear that each particular of the Allegation could be misleading and/or dishonest.

7. Accordingly, the Panel permitted the amendments to be made.

Background:

8. The Registrant was employed as a Paramedic at South Western Ambulance Service Trust (‘SWAS’) at the material time.

9. It is alleged that in March 2016, the Registrant opened an account with Next PLC in the name of Person A and used it to purchase over £1,000 of goods. When the Registrant stopped re-paying the money due on the account, Next PLC reported her to the police.

10. On 16 January 2018, the Registrant was charged with the criminal offence of fraud by false representation.

11. The Registrant notified the HCPC on 8 July 2018 that she had attended court for a fraud allegation.

12. It was alleged that the Registrant did not cooperate with her employer when it requested court documents about the status of the case and that she gave her employer the impression that the case against her had been closed.

13. The criminal case was diverted to allow the Registrant to repay the money to Next PLC, but it was only on 10 October 2018, when all of the money had been repaid, that the offence was withdrawn with no further criminal action pursued.

Witness evidence

14. Two witnesses gave evidence under affirmation on behalf of the HCPC. Each confirmed their written statement.

15. Witness GS indicated that he worked freelance now but at the relevant time had been a Senior Manager at SWAS. He said that the first he knew of this matter was when Person A telephoned his Personal Assistant. In an irate telephone call Person A demanded to know how SWAS could continue to employ someone like the Registrant given the fraud she had perpetrated. Person A said that the Registrant had opened an account in his name. GS had provided the options of a further telephone conversation with more detail or advised Person A to contact the police. He said that it was not unusual for family members to contact SWAS with complaints about employees.

16. GS said that the first that he knew of the matter going to court was when it was raised in a weekly Operations Meeting. Under “Any Other Business” someone had asked if he was aware of these events concerning the Registrant. He had already got a meeting set up about another matter with the Registrant for 6 April 2018 and in that meeting gave her the opportunity to say anything that she wanted about the court proceedings. GS asked the Registrant specific questions which she answered. He thought it fair to do this because of some rumour, speculation and gossip at the station, fuelled by a newspaper article dated 10 March 2018, that had been shown to him by more than one person. He took the view that, given some contradictory information circulating at the station, talking to the Registrant was the preferred option in order to discover what had really happened.

17. GS recalled the Registrant indicating that she did not know about the matter being dealt with by the court in this way until it was in the newspaper. This recollection is borne out by the record of that meeting, albeit unsigned and undated. GS’s evidence was that it would not be routine for this record to be given to the Registrant for signing and dating because it mainly concerned another matter where his signature would be more relevant than hers. He accepted that the version of the record before the Panel was not signed or dated by him and said that his usual practice would have been to sign and date such documents and that was probably what he had done in this case. GS said the copy in the HCPC bundle was probably unsigned because a saved unsigned copy had been printed out. This was due to his change in employment and him having no access to his SWAS email account or documents.

18. GS said that he was aware of the HCPC and SWAS documentation which sets out obligations and disciplinary procedures respectively but that he did not consult them regularly. He said that he would have expected the Registrant to have brought this matter to him or to a line manager, rather than to have read about it in the papers first.

19. GS was specifically asked whether he gained the impression that the Registrant was being misleading. He indicated that he never thought she was trying to mislead. He said that the Registrant’s name was not one that cropped up often in terms of his involvement as a senior manager being required, and that his impression of her was as a personable and confident individual who could be forthright in how she expressed herself. He confirmed that because of changing his job, he did not see this matter through to conclusion and that others took over its management.

20. Witness PT also gave oral evidence. He indicated that he was an Operational Manager for some of the period that is relevant to this case and left SWAS at the end of May 2018. He said that he was first made aware of some allegations of fraud due to crew-room discussions. He had been asked if he’d seen the local newspaper on 10 March 2018. He believed that it concerned a possible court appearance by the Registrant involving fraud at the time but he took the view that there are always two sides to every story and needed to know more, and this was the consensus at the following Operations Meeting.

21. PT said that when he saw the newspaper he was shocked and thought that “we could have helped more if we had known sooner”, albeit he could understand why someone would not want to tell their managers about this. When asked about the SWAS and the HCPC expectations of behaviour, he indicated that paramedics have a duty and responsibility to act as a person of trust when they go into people’s houses. He said he was aware of the relevant paragraphs of the HCPC Code of Conduct concerning trust, co-operation with investigation and informing the HCPC about criminal charges.

22. PT said that he became a point of contact in April 2018, to assist in securing documentation from the court to establish the status of the case. PT stated, following a meeting with the Registrant, that a staff Meeting Form with minutes of the meeting was signed and dated by him and the Registrant on 15 May 2018. He said he was asked in April 2018 to follow up ‘on the required paperwork,’ and wanted to “check if there were any difficulties in obtaining this from court”.

23. PT said the impression that SWAS had been given was that the matter was closed. When pressed he said that this impression was one that he had obtained from GS, who had in turn, he understood, received this impression from a conversation held with the Registrant. PT believed that this was the impression that GS had formed. He said that GS indicated that he wanted confirmation of the court’s position.

24. PT admitted unprompted in cross-examination that SWAS could have given the Registrant more support, “than perhaps we did”. He explained that he had known that she had experienced some challenges in obtaining information from the court because of a meeting that he stated had taken place in the back of the ambulance on 15 May 2018. He said that he had seen the Registrant’s telephone at this meeting and could see that the Registrant had sent emails to the court on three separate occasions, but he had not read these emails. PT said that when he spoke to the Magistrates Court, on the morning of 15 May 2018, he was informed that if the Registrant emailed or attended court with identification, the relevant paperwork could be printed out.

25. PT said that he left SWAS at the end of May 2018 and started work in a new post at the CCG on the first Monday in June 2018. Prior to his new post he took some leave. Given that timetable he accepted that he would not have been at work for SWAS on 25 May 2018 (this being the deadline given to the Registrant for producing court documents), and that NB was due to take over from him.

26. In cross examination, it was put to PT that he had spoken to the Registrant regularly about the issue and had stated that, when her name appeared in the newspaper article, she was the only person with that name at that address. He said that he did not recall this. He said that his first recollection about events was from the crew room by another colleague. It was put to him that he was aware of the accusation long before the newspaper article. PT reiterated that he only knew about the court hearing from the newspaper article. It was put to him that a colleague married to a police officer had also had information from their spouse and this had been shared with station colleagues. PT said that he could not recall this. It was put to him that the details of the Community Resolution Order were known to SWAS. PT said that his only involvement was as a point of contact to collect from the Registrant paperwork supplied by the court. He acknowledged that as a result he had from time to time asked her how she was getting on with the paperwork from the court.

27. PT said his understanding was that any closure of the case was conditional on full payment. When it was suggested to him in cross-examination that these two positions were not substantially different where there was an intention for payment to be made, he indicated that he believed that any misunderstanding was due to the interpretation of the words used.

28. PT said that he did not recall seeing the emails of 24, 25, and 26 April 2018 to the court before the meeting of 15 May 2018. He indicated that he was the Operational Officer dealing with the issue on 15 May 2018 and indicated that “NFA” as documented on the meeting notes at the time was meant to indicate that SWAS was taking no further action at this time rather than the Registrant needed to do nothing; she was expected to get paperwork from the court by 25 May 2018 to confirm the status of the case.

Registrant’s evidence
29. The Registrant gave evidence under affirmation. She adopted the document she had produced as her evidence. She supplemented this with further information, in providing some admissions and denials.

30. The Registrant admitted that she opened a Next PLC account in Person A’s name without his consent or knowledge. She indicated that she had subsequently told him about the Next PLC account, and some purchases were for him. She said that the Community Resolution Order meant that as long as the payments were made as agreed this would be the end of the matter. She had initially made payments but at one stage Person A and Next PLC made it difficult for her to have access to the account to continue to do this. She however accepted that it was dishonest to use someone else’s name in this manner and misleading.

31. The Registrant said that she had not notified the HCPC because she did not know she had been charged. GS had told her that if the HCPC contacted her, she should refer the matter to him. The magistrate had told her that once the monies were paid, the case would be dropped. She did not therefore think the HCPC needed to be informed because she did not think she had been charged.

32. The Registrant said that Person A had behaved irrationally. More than a year had elapsed between him being told about the Next PLC account and when he took issue with it. It was only when he realised that the Registrant was seeing someone else that he began to threaten her, indicating at different times that he was, ‘going to ruin my life’, ‘I should watch out’ and even that ‘he was going to re-marry me’! She shared this detail with GS and was open about her private life. She told him about the Community Resolution Order and he asked if she could afford to make up the payments.

33. The Registrant said that it was her ignorance that led to her not informing the HCPC. She said that it was not her intention to be dishonest to the HCPC. She did not deliberately not tell the truth or withhold information. She said that she told Person A about the Next PLC account three months after opening it. She said that she and Person A used to use each other’s names to open accounts to take advantage of discounts being offered. However, on this occasion she did not tell him specifically about the Next PLC account at the time she opened it.

34. In respect of not adequately co-operating, the Registrant said that she was operating in a situation where Person A had left and she was receiving support from SWAS. PT was asked to be her Welfare Officer. It however got to a stage where he was texting her daily, sometimes at 1am in the morning, or turning up at her house unexpectedly for coffee. The Registrant told SWAS that she did not want PT to be her Welfare Officer any longer and asked for an alternative Welfare Officer which SWAS agreed to.

35. The Registrant said that the very frequent questions being asked by PT about the letter from the court were not about the letter itself but more about the situation about him being her welfare officer. She said that PT’s evidence that NBr and NB being asked to take over the case within SWAS was not true as they did not have any conversations with her.

36. In regard to the meeting on 15 May 2018, the Registrant stated she told PT she regularly rang the court to ask for documentation.

37. The Registrant was clear that she did not say: “The case was closed” but “Once the full-balance is paid, the case is closed.” She said that she thought that PT’s understanding was the same as hers because the court gave the same information to him as to her when he phoned the court. The Registrant had nothing to give SWAS because the courts did not give out letters routinely. She said that she had spoken to a person called CF at court, and told CF that she needed something to give to her Operational Officer. The Registrant said nobody at court told her to attend with identification in order to obtain written confirmation of the status of the case.

38. The Registrant stated that Next PLC made it very difficult for her to make the payments and the court apologised on behalf of Next PLC. Evidence was provided to the court that payments were initially being made from the Registrant’s account. The Registrant stated that there were regular conversations with PT, and GS had checked that monthly payments were affordable. She said the conversations at SWAS were informal in the main and the HCPC code of conduct was never discussed. In fact, GS indicated that he did not think contacting the HCPC was required. The record of her meeting with GS on 6 April 2018 was not signed as she did not see the record herself.

39. The Registrant was taken to a letter that she had written before 14 February 2018 to indicate that she could not attend court on that date due to work commitments. She stated that Police Constable K told her that a later date would be set if she wrote to the court. She stated that Police Constable K had told her about a Charge Notice dated 16 January 2018 (which she maintained she had not seen) but she did not understand that she had been actually charged. She assumed she could only be charged at court. As the Registrant failed to attend court on 14 February 2018, a warrant was issued for her arrest and the police attended her house when she was at work. The Registrant then self-presented at the police station the following day and she was required to attend court on 19 February 2018.

40. It was put to her that she was told about the court processes by the duty solicitor who was representing her on 19 February 2018. She reiterated that her understanding was that unless someone in court said “you are charged with fraud” and gave her the opportunity to plead guilty or not guilty, she had not been formally charged. She stated she “didn’t know the law”. She indicated that the duty solicitor had told her that the Community Resolution Order would very likely be reactivated.

41. The Registrant said that she now understood from talking to the Presenting Officer and the Legal Assessor at the start of the hearing that she had actually been charged. She can now accept that it was her professional responsibility to inform the HCPC. Prior to this, her senior managers at SWAS had not told her to report the matter to the HCPC.

42. The Registrant accepted that she had presented to court on 19 February to explain her non-attendance on 14 February 2018, and that a further court date on 4 April 2018 had been listed but that she had only written to the HCPC in July 2018. In her letter to the HCPC she mentioned court proceedings but not being charged. She explained that this was because she did not know at the time that she had been charged, but that she did make contact with the HCPC, notwithstanding the other matters going on in her life to keep them abreast of relevant events.

Submissions

43. The HCPC provided its submissions in written form. In essence its submission was that the evidence before the Panel was sufficient for it to find all factual particulars proved given the burden and standard of proof. Ms Collins ran through the relevant evidence for each of the factual particulars.

44. The Registrant did not provide written submissions, but submitted that there was no deliberate holding back of information on her part. She said that there was only a single document which she understood to have been sent to her, namely the postal requisition of 16 January 2018 but that she had not received this. There was no Community Resolution Order in a physical format that she had signed, or that the HCPC had identified. As a matter of context she indicated that she had informed Person A of the Next PLC account in May 2016, which he had been content with, but only in March 2017 went to the police when he found out about her new relationship. She said that she had received no physical documents from the court and that there was no proof of posting.

45. The Registrant submitted that the Magistrates accepted that it had not been her fault that payments for the Community Resolution Order were halted. She was able to evidence that she had been paying off the Next PLC account, until Person A stopped her from doing this, by preventing access to that account. Instead, Person A complained to the police about fraud and the police advised him to speak to Next PLC. The Magistrate was satisfied that there should be a reversion to the Community Resolution Order with the Registrant being permitted six months to make payments and the case adjourned. She indicated that she still did have random communication with Person A, who is not here to be cross-examined.

46. The Registrant submitted that until she had had a discussion with Ms Collins at the start of this hearing, she had not understood that she had been charged. She said that she did not have a criminal conviction and had understood that charge and conviction were the same thing. Her letter written to the court informing it that she would not be able to attend the hearing on 14 February 2018, was based on the advice of Police Constable K from Wiltshire Police. Insofar as SWAS and the HCPC were concerned, she had discussed this with an Operational Manager (GS) who is two grades above her line manager. He told her to get in touch with him if the HCPC contacted her and she had accepted this advice. She recognised that she should have done something different but said that her actions were directed by those at grades very senior to her.

47. In respect of what was said in SWAS meetings, the Registrant said that the signing of Meeting Notes is not a formal process. It is usually an informal chat which needs to be typed up, but there should be a signature from all parties to confirm that they are a true record of events. She said that she did not have court documents posted to her. (The HCPC intervened at this point to clarify that it was not suggested that documents were posted to the Registrant by the court.) The Registrant said that she had not told SWAS that the case was dropped but rather that the closure of the case was dependent on monies being paid. She said that her understanding of not being charged was communicated openly to the court by her in her email of 25 April 2018. She submitted that she had been honest with SWAS.

48. The Legal Assessor provided the following written legal advice:

a) The Panel will need to consider the evidence in relation to each particular of the allegation separately.

b) The burden of proving each charge in dispute is on the HCPC. The Registrant has to prove nothing, nor to disprove anything.

c) Where there is doubt, it should be resolved in the Registrant’s favour. The Registrant does not have to incriminate themselves.

d) The standard of proof required is the civil standard of proof, that is, proof on a balance of probabilities. A fact will be established if it is more likely than not to have happened. It is for the Panel to decide upon that.

e) The evidence in this case must be considered carefully. The HCPC case involves evidence given by a number of witness and documentary evidence. The Panel must decide the case only on the evidence heard or is properly before it.

f) The Panel have heard what the HCPC witnesses have said. Some witnesses have acknowledged how they gained their “impressions”. The positive or negative characterisations of the Registrant from witnesses does not change the fact that it is for the Panel alone to determine what facts are made out and it must consider what weight to give to the impressions of those who know the Registrant better than it does.

Misleading.

g) Something that is misleading would give another person an inaccurate impression, that is something that is not true. It is possible to be misleading without being dishonest. However, that is different from deliberately attempting to mislead someone knowingly. In instances of the latter, dishonesty should be considered.

Dishonesty

h) The Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal in the case of Barton and Booth v R [2020] EWCA Crim 575 has held that the correct test for dishonesty is that as set out in Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd t/a Crockfords [2017] UKSC 67. While the direction on dishonesty in Ivey had previously been given by the Supreme Court in observations that were strictly obiter, the five-judge panel in Barton found Lord Hughes' reasoning in Ivey "compelling".

i) The ruling of Barton clarifies the position, aligning the criminal test for dishonesty with the test under civil law in Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn v Tan [1995] UKPC 4, and confirms that defendants can no longer rely on the second, subjective limb of the previous two-phase objective and subjective test for dishonesty in Ghosh.

j) In the case of Ivey v Genting Casinos [2017] the Supreme Court said:

“When dishonesty is in question the fact-finding tribunal must first ascertain (subjectively) the actual state of the individual’s knowledge or belief as to the facts. The reasonableness or otherwise of their belief is a matter of evidence, going to whether they held the belief, but it is not an additional requirement that their belief must be reasonable; the question is whether it is genuinely held.

When once her actual state of mind as to knowledge or belief as to facts is established, the question whether his conduct was honest or dishonest is to be determined by the fact-finder by applying the (objective) standards of ordinary decent people. There is no requirement that the defendant must appreciate that what he has done is, by those standards, dishonest.”

k) In essence this means that a tribunal can consider a defendant’s state of mind but that ultimately whether she has been dishonest should be assessed against the standards of ordinary decent people.

Adverse inference

l) The Panel will judge the Registrant’s evidence by precisely the same fair standards that it applies to any other evidence in the case. The Panel will judge the evidence of each relevant witness carefully, using common sense. It can accept the whole of the evidence of a witness, or reject the whole of the evidence of a witness, or decide to accept some but not all of what they say. While the Tribunal will consider the evidence in relation to each charge separately it will also resolve any head-on clash or conflict of evidence, where this is relevant, bearing in mind the burden and standard of proof defined.

m) The Panel will take into account that people do not always tell the truth, or tell the truth about everything, and that there may be myriad reasons for this. The passage of time, or emotion, and other motives, may colour their evidence. The credibility of those witnesses will need to be considered whether accounts differ.

n) The Panel will decide the case only on the evidence it has. It is entitled to draw inferences, that is to say, to come to common sense conclusions based on the evidence it accepts. An inference is a reasonable deduction drawn from the evidence, as opposed to mere conjecture or speculation.

o) If an adverse inference is to be drawn, the Panel will consider the extent to which the Registrant has been given an opportunity to respond to the same, and take all the evidence into account in making any decision

The reliability of evidence given by witnesses orally (Dutta v GMC; Kimathi v FCO)

p) The Panel can only make factual findings against a Registrant which are based on an interpretation of events that has previously been disclosed to them and in respect of which they have been provided with adequate opportunity to investigate, call evidence and make submissions.

q) The Panel should base factual findings on inferences drawn from documentary evidence and known or probable facts and use oral evidence to subject the documentary records to critical scrutiny and to consider the witness’s personality and motivation. The Panel will need to assess the calibre of the evidence.

r) The Panel should not assess a witness’s credibility exclusively on their demeanour when giving evidence. A witness’s veracity should be tested by reference to the objective fact(s) proved independently of their testimony, where this is possible, in particular by reference to the documents in the case.

s) The Panel should make a rounded assessment of a witness's reliability, rather than approaching their reliability in respect of each charge in isolation from the others.

t) The Panel will bear in mind the case of Dutta and the case of Kamathi which the Dutta judgement refers to. In doing this it will be conscious that demeanour alone is not determinative of the truth. It will avoid an assessment of witness credibility based largely, if not exclusively, on demeanour, as this is “discredited method of judicial decision-making” [para 42].

Mr Justice Warby referred to Kimathi v Foreign and Commonwealth Office [2018] EWHC 2066 (QB) which distilled key aspects of lessons of experience and of science in relation to the judicial determination of facts [para 39]:

(Dutta) “Two specific common errors have been identified which are “to suppose (1) that the stronger and more vivid the recollection, the more likely it is to be accurate; (2) the more confident another person is in their recollection, the more likely it is to be accurate”

u) Simply because a recollection is vivid and confident is not to be taken by the Panel as a shortcut to decision making. The Panel will bear in mind that in some circumstances it is possible for an honest witness to construct an entirely false “memory” inadvertently. Just as it is possible for people to forget because of the passage of time. Where there is a conflict between what is remembered and what is documented, the tribunal will carefully consider the objectivity provided by documentary evidence, to the extent that this exists. Where explanations are provided for any discrepancy between the two the Tribunal will assess this.

Inconsistent statements

v) This will be relevant to the Panel given that what has been said in witness statements and what has been said in oral evidence may lack consistency in the Panel’s view. Any inconsistencies are for the Panel to consider. The Panel is to bear in mind that human memory is not a simple mental record of a witnesses event that is fixed at the time of experiences and fades over time. Rather it should acknowledge that memory can be fluid in that it concerns a past experience and therefore may be vulnerable to being altered by a range of influences.
Reliability

w) The Panel will need to consider any discrepancies and address these head on in instances where they are relevant to the particulars of the Allegation. The Panel may also consider reasons that witnesses have to remember or not, events, and what was routine, or unusual for parties respectively.

x) The Panel may wish to return to motive and consider why any individual may wish to tell anything but the truth as they remember it, and what they have to gain or lose.

y) The Panel will take into account what documentary evidence that was contemporaneous indicates, and whether any gloss provided on this is subsequent. Any inclusion or omission needs to be considered in light of any explanation provided for these, or the Panel applying its own assessment in the absence of this.

Failure vs. Culpability

z) Failure means did not do something which there was an accepted duty to do. A duty to act, generally refers to one of two things:

• People have a duty to act in a particular manner and if they do not this may be indicative of negligence because how they are obliged to act is clear.

• Where there is not necessarily an obligation to act, but nonetheless an expectation, involves consideration of how that expectation comes about and whether it is reasonable, for example by reference to what the HCPC Code of Practice sets out,

• In considering whether there is the existence of an obligation, the circumstances need to be examined.

Submissions

You have heard submissions but the Panel will need to make their own decision that reflect the evidence. Finally, neither the seriousness of the charges, nor the seriousness of the consequences, if found proved, should make any difference to the standard of proof to be applied in determining the facts. The Panel should ask itself “Is what we have decided clear?” If the Panel comes to the conclusion that it needs to explain the reasons for a particular finding or findings of fact, then that is what you should do. As Dame Janet Smith put it in the Fifth Shipman Inquiry Report;

“It is important that the parties and the public should understand why decisions have been reached. I do not suggest that elaborate reasons should be given, nor should it be necessary for the Panel to deal with every disputed fact. However, Panels ought to explain their findings on the crucial factual issues and it should be possible for this to be done in a few sentences.”

49. The Panel accepted the Legal Advice and made the following decisions as set out below.

Decision on Facts:

Particular 1:

On or around 1 March 2016, opened an account with Next PLC using Person A’s name and details without their knowledge and/or consent.

Admitted, and found proved.

50. The Panel was presented with evidence of the details of the account. Documents which covered the opening of the account in Person A’s name by the Registrant were seen.

51. The Registrant made full admissions to this.

52. The Panel was satisfied that the documentary evidence submitted by the HCPC proved this fact. This was also supported by the Registrant’s admissions. The Panel found this particular of the Allegation proved.

5. Your conduct at paragraph 1 … was:

a) Misleading; (admitted and found proved)
b) Dishonest (admitted and found proved)

53. The Registrant stated that she did inform Person A of the existence of the Next PLC account but only sometime after it had been opened. She accepted that using Person A’s name without their permission was misleading in that Next PLC would anticipate that the person who had opened the account was Person A when this was not the case. The Panel had sight of documents from Next PLC. The Panel was satisfied that these actions were misleading.

54. With regards to dishonesty, the Registrant admitted that she did not have Person A’s consent to open the account and that Next PLC would have expected that the person opening the account was Person A. The Panel is satisfied that this was therefore a deliberate act and that an ordinary member of the public would also conclude that this was dishonest. The Panel was therefore satisfied that dishonesty was proved.

55. Given the burden and standard of proof, the Panel finds this particular proved.

Particular 2:

Used the account referred to in paragraph 1 above to spend up to £1,198.49 on items from Next PLC.

Admitted and found proved.

56. The Panel was presented with evidence of orders, and delivery notes indicating that a number of goods up to the value of £1,198.49 had been ordered and delivered to the address where the Registrant resided. It was satisfied that the Registrant had ordered these goods. Further, the Registrant accepted that the ordering had been done by her.

57. Given the documentary evidence and the Registrant’s admissions, the Panel found this particular of the Allegation proved.

5. Your conduct at paragraph … 2 … was:

a) Misleading; (admitted and found proved)
b) Dishonest (admitted and found proved)

58. The Registrant accepted that using a credit facility that had been fraudulently obtained was both misleading and dishonest. The Panel was satisfied that, as Next PLC would have assumed that the person making the purchases was Person A, the Registrant’s actions were misleading.

59. With regards to dishonesty, the Registrant admitted that she did not have Person A’s consent to use the account and that Next PLC would have expected that the person operating the account was Person A. The Panel is satisfied that an ordinary member of the public would also conclude that this was dishonest. The Panel was therefore satisfied that dishonesty was proved.

60. Given the documentary evidence and the Registrant’s admissions, the Panel found this particular of the Allegation proved.

Particular 3:

Failed to notify the HCPC in a timely manner when you were charged with fraud by false representation on 16 January 2018.

Admitted in part and found proved.

61. The Panel was satisfied that the Registrant was charged with fraud in the postal requisition dated the 16th of January 2018. It was further satisfied on the basis of NBe’s statement from the HCPC that the Registrant did not refer the matter to the HCPC until 8 July 2018.

62. The Panel had sight of an undated, handwritten letter from the Registrant to the Chief Constable, informing him that she was unable to attend court on 14 February 2018 due to work commitments. In it she says that she disagreed with the case being sent to court and referred twice to the postal requisition. The first time she said that no one had contacted her prior to “this Charge letter” and also that she had forgotten about setting up a standing order until the “Charge notice on 16 January 2018”.

63. The Panel was satisfied that the Registrant was in possession of the postal requisition letter, when she wrote this letter and that she knew it charged her with the offence because of her two descriptions of it as “this Charge letter”, and the “Charge notice”. The Panel concluded that this was the information in the postal requisition that was important to her and she understood the seriousness of it. In addition, due to her failure to set up a standing order or direct debit, she had lost the opportunity to have the matter dealt with informally and criminal proceedings had started. Her understanding of the situation is stated in her handwritten letter to the Chief Constable, Wiltshire Police, in which she writes “its with deepest regret and my sincere apologies [sic] it has reached this stage”.

64. Further, the Registrant in the above letter pleads “guilty to opening up the account…”. In her evidence she stated that she believed she could only be charged in court and where she was given the opportunity to plead guilty or not guilty. The postal requisition stated that the Registrant was required to attend court on 14 February 2018 to answer the charge set out in it. The Panel is satisfied by pleading guilty in this letter the Registrant was answering the charge that had been set out in the postal requisition because she would not be able to attend court to enter a plea.

65. The Panel was also influenced by the fact that the postal requisition clearly stated that it was charging the Registrant with fraud. The postal requisition is headed “written charges”, and contains a summons to court on 14 February 2018. It states in bold type, “you are charged with the offence below” and it includes a statement that the charges are authorised by the Chief Constable. The Panel did bear in mind that the Registrant’s explanation that Police Constable K had advised her what to put in the letter. It however considered that this had no bearing on its finding and, on the contrary, tended to support its conclusion that she understood that she had been charged because Police Constable K explained it to her.

66. The Panel asked itself the reasons why the Registrant insisted that she had not been charged when in fact she had been. The following was considered:

• If she had admitted to being charged, this would have triggered her duty to notify SWAS as per 33.1 of her terms and conditions of employment. This could have resulted in disciplinary action.

• As stated in her handwritten letter she did not agree with the matter going to court.

• If she had admitted to being charged, this would have triggered her duty to notify the HCPC which would have resulted in a Fitness to Practice investigation.

• In the Registrant’s emails to the police about the delay in the matter concluding, she was concerned about getting a criminal record and the effect this would have on future employment. This was demonstrated in her email of 1 October 2018 to the court about getting the case closed as soon as possible as it was delaying the start date of her new job.

67. Given the above, the Panel concluded that the Registrant wanted to minimise the seriousness of her situation and this gave her a reason to conceal or not disclose that she had been charged.

68. The Panel considered the email of 25 April 2018 from the Registrant to the court, asserting that no charge was brought against her at the court hearing on 4 April 2018 and asking for confirmation of this as “my work are asking for evidence of no charge”.

69. The Panel asked itself whether this email supported the Registrant’s account that she did not believe she had been charged. The panel accepted that it could be interpreted in this way, especially as it could have resulted in an adverse outcome for the Registrant. (As it happened, the court’s response did not answer the question directly, but merely said the case had not been concluded and had been adjourned until 22 August 2018).

70. However, the Panel noted that the Registrant was asking for this information because her employer had obliged her to. In any event, the Panel notes that the Registrant’s statement in the email that she had not been charged on the 4 April 2018 was correct. She had not in fact been charged at the court on that date but on the 16 January 2018 in the postal requisition and her later attendances at court were in relation to that charge.

71. Overall, after careful consideration, the Panel was satisfied that none of the Registrant’s submissions undermined the evidence that she had received the postal requisition around the 16 January 2018 and understood from it that she had been charged.

72. The Panel was satisfied that this delay between charge and referral was not timely and therefore this fact is proved.

5. Your conduct at paragraph … 3 … was:

a) Misleading; (admitted in part and found proved)

b) Dishonest (not admitted and found proved)

73. The Panel took the view that whether this particular was proved turned on the point at which the Registrant knew she had been charged. The Registrant knew she had been charged at around 16 January 2018 and had not notified the HCPC until July 2018. The Registrant had two opportunities within that time to notify the HCPC, namely on readmission to the Register in February 2018 when she completed her application and when she spoke to the HCPC about it on the telephone. The Panel found that the failure to notify the HCPC of the charge on both these occasions was misleading.

74. With regards to dishonesty, the Registrant was aware in January 2018 that she had been charged and failed to notify the HCPC until July 2018. This was a professional obligation of which she was reminded in February 2018 in her readmission application. The Panel is satisfied that this was therefore a deliberate omission and that an ordinary member of the public would also conclude that this was dishonest. The Panel was therefore satisfied that dishonesty was proved.

Particular 4

Did not adequately cooperate with South Western Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust’s (“SWAS”) investigation into the matters referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, in that you:

a) Between 6 April 2018 and 24 July 2018 did not provide SWAS with copies of your court documentation after being asked to do so;

Admitted in part and found proved.

75. In respect of sub-paragraph 4a), the Panel accepts, on the basis of the April and September 2018 emails that the Registrant sent to the court, that the Registrant made some attempts to obtain information. Nevertheless, she did not at any stage provide the documentation that was requested.

76. The Panel took the view that although the Registrant indicated that nobody at SWAS spoke to her about the matter after mid May 2018, this did not absolve her of the obligation to comply with SWAS’s request.

77. The Registrant did not provide copies of her court documentation to SWAS and so this particular is proved.

5. Your conduct at paragraph … 4a) … was:

a) Misleading; (admitted in part, found not proved)

b) Dishonest (not admitted, found not proved)

78. While the Panel finds the fact proved, in the absence of documentary evidence, it does not consider that there is sufficient evidence to prove that the Registrant was being misleading or dishonest in not obtaining and supplying court paperwork. Indeed, there was some evidence that she had attempted to obtain information for her employer from the court.

79. The Panel found this not proved.

4b) Incorrectly gave SWAS the impression that the fraud case against you had been closed.

Not admitted and found not proved.

80. In respect of paragraph 4b) of this Particular the Panel considered whether the Registrant incorrectly gave SWAS the impression that the fraud case against her had been dropped. It had regard to both the evidence of the HCPC witnesses and what the Registrant had said, along with documentary evidence as supplied in the form of minutes of meetings.

81. It noted that the Registrant was not recorded anywhere as having said that the fraud case against her had been dropped. Rather, the Registrant had indicated that the case would be closed if she paid the monies owed.

82. PT indicated both in his statement and in his oral evidence that his belief that the Registrant said the case was closed was the impression which SWAS had received. He said that this had been influenced by what GS had shared. GS’s record of the meeting that he had with the Registrant on 6 April 2018 stated that the Registrant said that “the case was going to be dropped”. It follows from this that the case was ongoing and that the Registrant did not therefore give an incorrect impression about it.

83. The Panel did not consider that this particular of the Allegation was made out. In the absence of finding this fact proved, the Panel did not need to go on to consider whether it was dishonest or misleading.

Reconvened Hearing on 25 July 2022

Preliminary Matters:

Service & Proceeding in the Absence of the Registrant

84. The Registrant was not present at the reconvened hearing.

85. Service documents evidenced that on 8 June 2022, the Registrant had been served with a notice of Hearing notifying her of today’s date. A confirmation delivery email was automatically generated at this time. The email address was confirmed to be the registered email address of the Registrant as held by the HCPC and used by the Registrant to communicate with the HCPC in this case.

86. The Panel found that good service had been effected.

87. Mr Bridges on behalf of the HCPC applied for the case to proceed in the absence of the Registrant. In terms of proceeding with the hearing in the absence of the Registrant, the Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor that referred to the principles set out in R. v Jones (Anthony William), (No.2) [2002] UKHL 5, and subsequent case law (GMC v Adeogba and GMC v Visvardis [2016] EWCA Civ 162, Davies v HCPC EWHC 1593 (Admin), R (Johnson and Maggs) v Professional Conduct Committee of the Nursing and Midwifery Council [2008] EWHC (Admin) and Abdalla v Health Professions Council [2009] EWHC 3498 (Admin)).

88. The Panel noted that its discretionary power to proceed in the absence of a registrant is not absolute and is one that should be exercised “with the utmost care and caution”. In exercising its discretion, the Panel was mindful to balance fairness to the Registrant with fairness to the Regulator, bearing in mind its overarching statutory objective. The Panel had careful regard to all of the circumstances of the case in light of the factors to be taken into consideration in R v Jones and GMC v Adeogba, which states:

“3. The trial judge has a discretion as to whether a trial should take place or continue in the absence of a defendant and/or his legal representatives.

4. That discretion must be exercised with great care and it is only in rare and exceptional cases that it should be exercised in favour of a trial taking place or continuing, particularly if the defendant is unrepresented.

5. In exercising that discretion, fairness to the defence is of prime importance but fairness to the prosecution must also be taken into account. The judge must have regard to all the circumstances of the case including, in particular:

(i) the nature and circumstances of the defendant's behaviour in absenting himself from the trial or disrupting it, as the case may be and, in particular, whether his behaviour was deliberate, voluntary and such as plainly waived his right to appear;

(ii) whether an adjournment might result in the defendant being caught or attending voluntarily and/or not disrupting the proceedings;

(iii) the likely length of such an adjournment;

(iv) whether the defendant, though absent, is, or wishes to be, legally represented at the trial or has, by his conduct, waived his right to representation;

(v) whether an absent defendant's legal representatives are able to receive instructions from him during the trial and the extent to which they are able to present his defence;

(vi) the extent of the disadvantage to the defendant in not being able to give his account of events, having regard to the nature of the evidence against him;

(vii) the risk of [the jury] reaching an improper conclusion about the absence of the defendant;…

(ix) the general public interest and the particular interest of victims and witnesses that a trial should take place within a reasonable time of the events to which it relates; …”

89. As per the case of Davies v HCPC, the Panel was guided by the main statutory objective of the regulator; the protection, promotion and maintenance of health and safety of the public. It considered that the fair economical, expeditious and efficient disposal of allegations made against a Registrant is of very real importance. The Panel considered that fairness includes fairness to the practitioner and also fairness to the regulator.

90. The Panel noted that there had been an application for an adjournment which had not been granted but considered this matter afresh at this time.

91. The Panel had careful regard to the principle of equality of arms (R (Johnson and Maggs) v Professional Conduct Committee of the Nursing and Midwifery Council [2008] EWHC (Admin)) and also noted that a balance has to be struck between the parties to ensure fairness, noting that notwithstanding the absence of the Registrant or a legal representative in attendance at this hearing, this did not equate automatically with breach of Article 6(1) right to a fair hearing as set out in Abdalla v Health Professions Council [2009] EWHC 3498 (Admin).

92. The Panel considered the relevant criteria in turn before reaching its decision.

93. The Panel considered that while the Registrant previously applied for an adjournment of the hearing, this was not granted because the reason provided for this request (she had a short work contract in South America) was not sufficiently compelling and it had not been made in a timely fashion. It noted that there had since been no further application for an adjournment.

94. It did consider whether an adjournment would be likely to secure the Registrant’s attendance. The Panel found that it would, given that the Registrant had attended and represented herself at the first part of her hearing and expressed a wish to do so for the remainder of the hearing, because she was only abroad for a three-week period. However, notwithstanding this, the Panel was of the view that the Registrant’s behaviour in deciding to go on a work opportunity to South America, before knowing the outcome of her adjournment application, meant that she had voluntary absence from these proceedings.

95. It noted that there was likely to be some disadvantage in not being present either virtually, or via the representation of a Legal Representative. The disadvantage was considered to be mitigated by the fact that an early draft of the Panel’s decision had been provided to the Registrant on 31 May 2022 to provide her with time to instruct a lawyer should she wish. It noted that the Registrant had been provided with opportunities to act differently and there were choices that the Registrant had voluntarily made – e.g. she could have decided not to go to South America, or instruct a legal representative.

96. The disadvantage in not being present was further mitigated by the brief representations that the Registrant had subsequently put before the Panel as an electronic document as well as the character reference she had previously provided. This confirmed the position that she had outlined at the first part of her fitness to practise hearing in May 2022. It further noted that the Registrant had expressed a wish for the hearing to conclude referencing the stress that she had been under for the last six years.

97. In all the circumstances, the Panel concluded that the Registrant had voluntarily absented herself, and that it was fair and in the interests of justice for the case to proceed in the absence of the Registrant.

Decision on Grounds: Misconduct

98. Mr Bridges on behalf of the HCPC submitted that the Panel should consider the facts it had found proved. He reminded the Panel that it had found that the Registrant was both misleading and dishonest in not informing the HCPC that she had been charged with a criminal matter in a timely manner. The Council submit that this can only be misconduct. It is an omission that falls short of what would be proper. The Registrant is in breach of Standard 9 of the HCPC Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics (2016).

99. The Panel also took into account the Registrant’s representations as contained in her most recent email.

100. The Panel accepted the legal advice of the Legal Assessor who took them through the relevant principles as set out in the following case law:

• Roylance v GMC (no.2) [2000] 1 A.C. 311;
• Remedy UK v General Medical Council [2010];
• Nandi v GMC [2004] EWHC 1245 (Admin);
• Bolton v Law Society [1993];

101. The Panel took the approach that misconduct must be serious and fall short of what is proper in the circumstances. It recognised that not all wrongdoing will be sufficient to meet the statutory ground. The Panel was conscious that membership of a profession has both its rewards and its responsibilities.

102. The Panel finds that the statutory ground of misconduct is made out. This is because the Registrant breached the duty to “be honest and trustworthy” (Standard 9), HCPC Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics (2016), and specifically:

• 9.1 - You must make sure that your conduct justifies the public’s trust and confidence in you and your profession.

• 9.5 - You must tell us as soon as possible if: – you accept a caution from the police or you have been charged with, or found guilty of, a criminal offence; – another organisation responsible for regulating a health or social-care profession has taken action or made a finding against you; or – you have had any restriction placed on your practice, or been suspended or dismissed by an employer, because of concerns about your conduct or competence.

• 9.6. - You must co-operate with any investigation into your conduct or competence, the conduct or competence of others, or the care, treatment or other services provided to service users.

103. Additionally, the Registrant breached the HCPC Standards of Proficiency for Paramedics:

• 3.1 - Understanding the need to maintain high standards of performance and conduct

104. The Panel considered that these standards had been breached by the Registrant in regard to each of the Particulars 1-3 of the Allegation. This was because the Registrant had not behaved honestly in using her partner’s name to open an account with Next, spending money on that account, and in failing to inform the HCPC that she had been charged with a criminal matter in a timely manner. This omission clearly falls short of what is proper and is serious.

105. It considered that dishonest conduct of the type admitted and found proved was so serious that this reached the statutory ground of misconduct.

Decision on Impairment:

106. In relation to Impairment, Mr Bridges on behalf of the HCPC submitted that this is a matter for the Panel but referenced the tests as set out by Dame Janet Smith in finding impairment. It was submitted the risk to others and the upholding of standards required a finding of impairment. It was submitted that a finding of impairment was required insofar as the wider public interest is concerned.

107. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor who took it through the relevant principles as set out in the following case law:

• Meadow v GMC [2006] EWCA 1390 (Admin);
• Cohen v GMC [2008] EWHC 581 (Admin);
• Zygmunt v GMC [2008] EWHC 2643 (Admin);
• Cheatle v GMC [2009] EWHC 645 (Admin);
• CHRE v NMC and Grant [2011] EWHC 927 (Admin) and;
• PSA v (1) GMC (2) Uppal [2015] EWHC 1304. This appeal was brought by the PSA to challenge a GMC Panel's decision not to impose any sanction upon a trainee GP who had admitted dishonesty and was guilty of misconduct. The High Court rejected an argument that a finding of dishonesty necessarily required a finding of impairment.

108. The Panel followed the approach which considered the Registrant’s current and future fitness to practise rather than imposing penal sanctions for things done incorrectly in the past. As to the meaning of fitness to practise, the Panel adopted that which is set out in the case of Zygmunt v GMC [2008] EWHC 2643 (Admin) where Mr Justice Mitting (at Para 29) in turn adopted the summary of potential causes of impairment offered by Dame Janet Smith in the Fifth Shipman Inquiry Report (2004, Paragraph 25.50). Dame Janet Smith considered that impairment would arise where a professional:

(a) presents a risk to patients;
(b) has brought the profession into disrepute;
(c) has breached one of the fundamental tenets of the profession;
(d) has acted in such a way that his/her integrity can no longer be relied upon.

109. The Panel considered the case of Cohen v. GMC [2008] EWHC 581 (Admin), where Mr Justice Silber identified criteria for assessing current impairment which can be summarised as follows:

• Is the conduct remediable?
• Has it been remedied?
• Is it highly unlikely to be repeated in the future?

110. The Panel was alive to the legal test to consider whether the Registrant is currently impaired, and was concerned with her current and future fitness to practise, as was confirmed in the case of GOC v Clarke [2018] EWCA Civ 1463.

111. The Panel considered the additional material provided by the Registrant at this stage of the hearing and also took into account her oral evidence and the written statement she had made earlier, along with her admissions. It gave the Registrant credit for admitting that her conduct fell below the standards expected of a registered healthcare professional and for her admissions.

112. The Panel considered that the Registrant had demonstrated little understanding of why she should not have acted as she did in obtaining credit in someone else’s name or why it was wrong. She had given little thought to the impact of her actions on Person A, whose credit record could have been affected by the opening of the account with Next PLC in his name, without his knowledge or consent. Person A would have had a financial liability for the spending on the account until it was paid off. The Panel accepted the Registrant had always intended to maintain payments on the account even before the fraud was detected.

113. The Panel also found that the Registrant had given little thought to the impact of the fraud on Next PLC. Next PLC had been put in a position where credit had been extended to someone posing as Person A, and whose credit worthiness and entitlement they had not been able to scrutinise. The Registrant had given little thought to the cost to Next PLC of having to investigate the matter and manage the payments after the fraud had been detected.

114. The Panel found that the Registrant’s focus was primarily on blaming Person A and Next PLC for actions that meant the matter ended up in the criminal court and in a HCPC fitness to practise hearing. The Registrant referred to Person A’s wish to damage her career by reporting the fraud over a year after he had become aware of it and she suggested this was only because he was unhappy she was in a new relationship. Her focus on Person A’s actions remains her preoccupation.

115. The Panel considered that the Registrant was minimising her wrongdoing. This may have been influenced by the decision of the police and court in allowing the disposal of the matter in a way that did not result in a criminal conviction given its domestic context. The Registrant has had some eight weeks to assimilate and reflect upon the Panel’s findings of fact. In spite of this, the Registrant’s recent submissions, where she apologises and states that she now knows her actions were wrong, unprofessional and against the code of conduct, still continue to attribute blame to Person A: “Sadly this was done through malice of [Person A] and not because of the fraudulent activity itself… it was done to destroy my career…”.

116. The Panel also saw little reflection in the Registrant’s submissions, on the Panel’s finding of fact, that she had been dishonest in not informing the HCPC in a timely fashion that she had been charged with a criminal matter. The Panel had not accepted that the Registrant was unaware that she had been charged. She had been in contact with the HCPC and missed opportunities to inform them of the charge.

117. The Panel consider that the remorse and apology expressed by the Registrant had limited depth and focused primarily on the impact of events on her rather than understanding the impact on the profession and the wider public interest. As far as her insight is concerned, the Panel found this to be limited. This is because her reflections did not focus on why her actions were wrong, what she has learned and why the Panel could be confident they or similar acts of dishonesty and misleading behaviour, would not be repeated.

118. Given all of the above, the Panel concluded that the Registrant is currently impaired on the personal component.

119. The Panel also considered that the public component is engaged. The Panel recognises that there has been no harm to service users. However, should a fully informed member of the public be aware of the findings of dishonesty and failure to notify the regulator that a criminal charge had been brought, they would expect there to be a finding of impairment in order to declare and uphold proper standards of behaviour and to maintain confidence in the profession and the regulator.

120. For all the reasons set out above, the Panel finds that the Registrant is currently impaired.

Decision on Sanction:

121. Mr Bridges on behalf of the HCPC has indicated that the matter of sanction is one for the Panel. He submitted that the HCPC do not ask for any particular sanction but commend to the Panel the HCPC Sanction Policy (HCPC SP), particularly paragraphs 56-58 which address dishonesty. He submitted that lack of insight is a significant feature.

122. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor as to the approach it should take.

123. The Panel acknowledged that the decision as to the appropriate sanction, if any, to impose in this case is a matter for the Panel exercising its own judgment. In reaching its decision, the Panel has taken into account the HCPC SP and borne in mind the overarching objective.

124. The Panel was aware that the main reason for imposing any sanction is to protect the public and that sanctions are not imposed to punish or discipline registrants, although they may have a punitive effect. In this case, the Panel identified a potential risk to service users if a situation were to arise in which the Registrant prioritised her own interests, over those of others. In these circumstances, she may feel justified in acting dishonestly or misleadingly (as she did when opening the credit account and failing to refer herself to the HCPC).

125. Throughout its deliberations, the Panel has applied the principle of proportionality, balancing the Registrant’s interests with those of the public.

126. The Panel took into account evidence received during the earlier stages of the hearing where relevant to reaching a decision on sanction.

Aggravating and mitigating factors

127. The Panel accepted as mitigation that the factual matters occurred at a time of great personal difficulty for the Registrant during the breakdown of a relationship. The Panel considered that the Registrant’s failure to have developed greater insight after having received the Panel’s findings of fact to be an aggravating feature.

128. The Panel took account of the following factors:

• This was unsophisticated activity without any intention on the part of the Registrant to disadvantage anyone financially, given that the Panel accepted she always intended to pay the monies owed to Next PLC;

• The sum of money involved in the use of a credit facility in the name of Person A, was not a large amount;

• That the context of the wrongdoing was limited to a particular period of time, rather than indicating a pattern of behaviour.

• No previous regulatory history;

• No subsequent regulatory or other matters have arisen in the last six years which have elapsed since the index events;

• No physical harm or risk thereof was caused to anyone by the Registrant’s actions;

No action

129. The Panel determined that there were no exceptional circumstances to justify taking no action in this case. It considered that taking no action would neither be appropriate, proportionate nor in the public interest bearing in mind the seriousness of the Registrant’s behaviour in the absence of insight and remediation being demonstrated.

Caution Order

130. The Panel did not consider that this was a case where a Caution Order would sufficiently address the seriousness of the behaviour of the kind demonstrated by the Registrant. It was necessary for additional action to be taken to mark the gravity of the wrongdoing in view of the limited insight, risk of repetition and the fact that remediation has not yet been achieved.

Conditions of Practice

131. The Panel next considered whether it would be appropriate to impose conditions on the Registrant in this case.

132. The Panel reminded itself that conditions needed to be appropriate, proportionate, workable and measurable.

133. The Panel determined that in a case concerning dishonesty, conditions would be inappropriate and would not serve to address the Registrant’s wrongdoing. It was not practical or appropriate for conditions to be formulated that addressed dishonesty of the kind perpetrated by the Registrant.

Suspension

134. The Panel was alive to the principle that there is a public interest in not depriving the public of good caring individuals, as confirmed by the case of Giele v GMC [2005] EWHC 2084. Also in relation to proportionality, the Panel bore in mind that the Registrant had said that she was a single parent and acknowledged that there would be financial detriment to her if she were suspended from practice.

Panel Approach

135. The Panel reminded itself that it had found the Registrant to be impaired because of dishonesty without evidence that this had been remediated. It determined that the Registrant’s actions were serious and fell far below the standards required, and had not been remediated fully given the recent and incomplete insight evidenced.

136. The Panel considered that these proceedings will have been a salutary lesson for the Registrant. The Panel considered that over the course of the hearing, the Registrant had made admissions and some reflections had been presented, but the Panel concluded that there is still a risk of repetition given the incomplete insight exhibited by the Registrant and her failure to acknowledge how her behaviour could have impacted others, including the paramedic profession and the impact on public confidence.

137. The Panel accepts that there was no clinical failing or patient harm caused in this case. In balancing the interests of the public against those of the Registrant, the Panel was of the view that there is significant public interest in retaining the skills of a competent professional in the healthcare system. Given that the Registrant provided an apology and indicated a wish to place these matters behind her, it was of the view that dishonesty in this case, can be remediated. Accordingly, it considered that further time may allow this to occur and to be evidenced and she should have this opportunity.

138. Accordingly, the Panel was satisfied that a period of suspension would appropriately mark the seriousness of this dishonesty, which is considered to be at the lower end of a scale and would send a clear signal to the public and the wider profession that such behaviour is not acceptable.

139. The Panel was of the view that a fully informed member of the public would not wish to end the career of a paramedic in circumstances where there has been no repetition, and in view of the factors detailed above.

140. The Panel did consider the ultimate sanction of striking off from the Register. It determined that this sanction would be disproportionate in all the circumstances of this case. It was of the view that public safety, the public interest, including confidence in the profession and upholding standards of acceptable behaviour for the profession can be satisfied by imposing a period of suspension and that this would be sufficient.

141. The Panel was of the view that a six-month period of suspension should be long enough for the Registrant to fully reflect on her misconduct, and to develop further insight.

142. The Panel noted that the Registrant’s conduct was relatively short-lived and that it appears to be out of character, with no previous or subsequent complaints made. It took into account that this was not sophisticated offending.

143. The Panel determined to suspend the Registrant’s registration for a period of six months.

144. A future Panel may be assisted by the Registrant providing the following information:

• Testimonials from people who know her well in a professional or personal capacity and who have seen the Panel decision.

• A reflective piece comprehensively addressing her dishonesty, lack of insight at this time, remediation and the impact of her conduct on the profession, and the public.

• Steps taken to ensure that the risk of repetition of similar instances is reduced.

• A report from a mentor with whom she has explored issues of integrity and honesty

• Evidence of having attended a course on Self-Awareness

• Evidence of having maintained relevant Continuing Professional Development.

 

That the Registrar is directed to suspend the registration of Ms Candice Price for a period of 6 months from the date this order comes into effect.

Right of Appeal:

You may appeal to the High Court in England and Wales against the Panel’s decision and the order it has made against you.

Under Article 29(10) of the Health Professions Order 2001, any appeal must be made within 28 days of the date when this notice is served on you. The Panel’s order will not take effect until the appeal period has expired or, if you appeal, until that appeal is disposed of or withdrawn.

Interim Order Application:

1. After the Panel handed down its decision on sanction, it addressed the issue of an interim order pending the sanction coming into force.

2. It considered afresh whether it should proceed in the absence of the Registrant.

3. It applied the advice it had received from the Legal Assessor and considered whether it was fair to proceed without the Registrant being present to make submissions on the impact and necessity of an interim order. The Panel considered that the same factors applied as for its decision to proceed with the hearing, namely that the Registrant had voluntarily absented herself, and that it was fair and in the interests of justice for the case to proceed in the absence of the Registrant.

4. The Panel decided that it was appropriate to proceed in the Registrant’s absence. It was satisfied that the Registrant had been notified, in the notice of hearing documents for all of the hearing dates, including the present dates, that the HCPC may make an application for an interim order in the event that a sanction which removed, suspended or restricted her right to practise was imposed. This would have immediate effect.

5. The HCPC’s application for an interim order was based upon the Panel’s substantive decision to impose a Suspension Order, to protect the public and in the wider public interest.

6. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor which focused on Paragraphs 134-135 of the HCPC SP. It was aware that an interim order should not be considered as automatic.

7. The Panel considered whether the circumstances merited the imposition of an interim order. It did not consider that an interim order is the default position where a substantive order is imposed restricting the Registrant’s practice.

8. The Panel was of the view that although there would be a risk to public protection, if an interim order were not imposed, the risk was not serious and ongoing. However, the Panel considered that public confidence would be seriously harmed if the Registrant were allowed to remain in unrestricted practice pending the substantive sanction coming into effect in view of the findings it has made. In particular, those concerning dishonesty and insight.

9. The Panel considered an Interim Conditions of Practice Order, but deemed conditions were not appropriate for the same reasons as set out in the substantive decision.

10. Accordingly, the Panel decided to make an Interim Suspension Order for a period of 18 months. In deciding to impose an Interim Suspension Order of this duration, it took account of the fact that if the Registrant were to appeal, that process may take a considerable period of time.

Interim Suspension Order:
The Panel makes an Interim Suspension Order under Article 31(2) of the Health Professions Order 2001, the same being in the public interest.

This order will expire: (if no appeal is made against the Panel’s decision and Order) upon the expiry of the period during which such an appeal could be made; (if an appeal is made against the Panel’s decision and Order) the final determination of that appeal, subject to a maximum period of 18 months.

 

 

History of Hearings for Candice Price

Date	Panel	Hearing type	Outcomes / Status
25/07/2022	Conduct and Competence Committee	Final Hearing	Suspended
24/05/2022	Conduct and Competence Committee	Final Hearing	Adjourned part heard
10/05/2021	Conduct and Competence Committee	Final Hearing	Adjourned