Stephanie Allen

Preliminary Matters

Service
1. The Panel saw an unredacted copy of the Notice of hearing email dated 31 January 2025 sent by the HCPTS to the Registrant at her registered email address. The Notice of hearing informed the Registrant of the date and time of the hearing, and that it was a final hearing which would be conducted virtually.

2. The Panel also saw a redacted delivery email from Microsoft Outlook to the HCPTS of the same date which had the identical time as the time shown on the Notice of hearing email sent to the Registrant and made reference to the same email ‘subject’ as was on the email sent to the Registrant. The Panel inferred that this email confirmed delivery of the Notice of hearing email to the Registrant at her registered email address.

3. Based on these documents, the Panel was satisfied that the Registrant had received proper notice of the hearing in accordance with the relevant Rules.
Proceeding in the absence of the Registrant

4. Ms Bernard-Stevenson applied for the hearing to proceed in the absence of the Registrant. She submitted that there was a general public interest in proceedings being heard expeditiously. Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted that the case had had a protracted history. She reminded the Panel that the Investigating Committee had found a case to answer and referred the Allegation on 22 November 2023, and that the matter had originally been listed for a final hearing on 10 and 11 October 2024 when it had been adjourned.

5. Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted that there was limited evidence of the nature and circumstances of the Registrant’s absence which appeared to be because of ill health. This was despite the Registrant having been invited to provide medical evidence for the Panel. Ms Bernard-Stevenson reminded the Panel that the Registrant had been told that reasonable adjustments could be made bearing in mind her ill health to accommodate her attendance, but the Registrant had not responded.

6. Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted that an adjournment was unlikely to secure the attendance of the Registrant on a later date [Redacted] and it was unclear whether a date could be arranged when she was likely to be well enough to attend. Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted that if the matter was to be adjourned, it was unclear when it might be relisted for hearing. She referred to the previous adjourned hearing in October 2024 which had taken over a year to be relisted for this hearing.

7. Ms Bernard-Stevenon accepted that there would be some disadvantage to the Registrant if the case proceeded in her absence but submitted that the Registrant had been given the opportunity to submit documents and provide a written witness statement but had chosen not to do so. Ms Bernard-Stevenson informed the Panel that the Registrant had earlier submitted some documents relating to training records which the Panel could see if it wished to do so.

8. The Panel received and accepted legal advice. It considered the various factors set out in the HCPTS Practice Note, “Proceeding in the Absence of the Registrant”.

9. The Panel was satisfied that all reasonable steps had been taken to inform the Registrant of the hearing. The Panel noted that the Notice of hearing, dated 31 January 2025, set out the date and time of the hearing and that it would be conducted virtually. Importantly, the notice also informed the Registrant that the hearing might proceed in her absence and provided her with a link to the HCPTS Practice Note, “Proceeding in the Absence of the Registrant”.

10. The Panel also noted that the Registrant had not applied for an adjournment, and it concluded that an adjournment would serve no useful purpose as it was unlikely [Redacted] to secure her attendance on a later date.

11. The Panel decided that the Registrant had deliberately and voluntarily absented herself, thereby waiving her right to attend. The Registrant had given no indication that she wished to be represented at the hearing. The Panel noted that the Registrant was aware of the proceedings as she had responded to the Notice of hearing [Redacted].

12. In reaching its decision, the Panel balanced fairness to the Registrant with fairness to the HCPC and the wider public interest.

13. The Panel considered that there was a public interest in these proceedings being resolved expeditiously. The Panel concluded that if the matter was further adjourned, there could be no guarantee as to when the Registrant would be well enough to attend. It was now over a year since the final hearing in this case had been first adjourned and the Panel had received no medical evidence to suggest that the Registrant’s health would be improved to such an extent that she could attend on a later date.

14. The Panel accepted that there would be some disadvantage to the Registrant by not being present and participating in the hearing. It considered that the extent of the disadvantage to the Registrant was relatively low and that this was outweighed by the public interest in proceedings which related to matters in 2022, being heard when scheduled. The Panel would be careful to consider all matters which are in the Registrant’s favour throughout the proceedings.

15. Accordingly, the Panel has decided that it is in
the interests of justice to proceed in the absence of the Registrant.

Conducting the hearing in private
16. Ms Bernard-Stevenson applied for part of the hearing to be conducted in private to protect the Registrant’s private life on grounds that there might be reference to her health during the hearing. Ms Bernard-Stevenson made it clear that she would not be referring to the Registrant’s health “in depth” during the hearing, and that her application was out of an abundance of caution as the Registrant was not present.

17. The Panel received and accepted legal advice and had in mind the guidance set out in the HCPTS Practice Note on Conducting Hearings in Private. The Panel understood that all substantive hearings should be conducted in public unless there were compelling reasons for the entire hearing, or parts of it, to be heard in private. The Panel was satisfied that it was appropriate to direct that if there was to be any reference during the hearing to the detail of the Registrant’s health, these should be heard in private. This was to protect the Registrant’s private life. The rest of the hearing would be heard in public.
Application to discontinue in part and to amend the Allegation

18. Ms Bernard-Stevenson applied to discontinue in part Particulars 2 and 3 of the original Allegation, and to amend the Allegation.
Discontinuance in part

19. Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted that Particular 2 which alleges “Between the date of your conviction, 23 June 2022 and 3 July 2023 you did conceal the conviction and did not disclose to the HCPC that you had been convicted of the offence set out in Particular 1”, should be discontinued as there was no realistic prospect of the HCPC successfully proving it. Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted that the HCPC would have to prove that the Registrant actively deceived the HCPC by concealing her conviction. Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted that as there was no active HCPC renewal requirement at the time which required a registrant to disclose any convictions, it could not be said that the Registrant had actively deceived the HCPC. Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted that the HCPC’s case was more appropriately an allegation that the Registrant had breached Standard 9.5 of the HCPC’s Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics.

20. Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted that Particular 3 which alleges “Your conduct at Particular 2 above was dishonest in that you failed to disclose your convictions to the HCPC, knowing that you were required to do so”, should be discontinued as the HCPC considered that there was no prospect of successfully proving dishonesty under the tests set out in the case of Ivey v Genting Casinos [2017] UKSC 67. Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted that when looking at the subjective test of deciding on the evidence what the Registrant’s state of mind was at the material time, it was not possible based on the documents in the case to demonstrate that the Registrant knew of the requirement to notify the HCPC of her conviction as soon as possible. She also submitted that the Registrant was not present to be cross-examined in relation to dishonesty.
Proposed amendments to the Allegation

21. Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted that the proposed amendments were matters of form and did not alter the substance of the case against the Registrant.

22. The first proposed amendment was to delete the words “your fitness to practise is impaired by reason of misconduct and/or lack of competence” from the preamble to the Allegation as (i) the words were unnecessary as they were repeated in Particular 4 and Particular 5, and (ii) the reference to “lack of competence” was incorrect as this was not alleged in this case.

23. The second proposed amendment was to correct the wording of Particular 1 so that it was more grammatically correct.

24. The third proposed amendment related to a newly worded Particular 2 which would allege “You did not disclose your conviction at Particular 1 to the HCPC as soon as you possibly could have done”. Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted that this would clarify the HCPC’s case against the Registrant and was no more serious than the matter originally alleged in Particular 2.

25. Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted that if the discontinuance in part application and the proposed amendment to Particular 2 was made, there would be consequential amendments to the numbering of the paragraphs and to remove the reference to original Particular 3 in original Particular 4.

Decision on discontinuance in part and on amendments to the Allegation

Discontinuance in part
26. The Panel received and accepted legal advice. It considered the HCPTS Practice Note, “Discontinuance of proceedings” and in particular the need to ensure that proposed discontinuance did not result in an “under-prosecution” of the Registrant. It took account of Ms Bernard-Stevenson’s submissions.

27. The Panel was aware that it must make ‘due enquiry’ into the reasons given by the HCPC for its decision to apply to discontinue in part the Allegation. The Panel understood that it was not part of its role to make any findings of fact. It must satisfy itself that viewed objectively, the reasons advanced in this hearing by the HCPC for discontinuance were justified in respect of Particulars 2 and 3 of the Allegation.

28. The Panel noted that the Registrant had been informed in an email from the HCPC’s external lawyers, Blake Morgan LLP, dated 23 September 2024, that it would not be pursuing the dishonesty allegation against her and that this was repeated in a further email from Blake Morgan LLP, dated 6 October 2025. The Panel was only shown the latter email which refers to the former email. It did not see the first email. However, it was satisfied that prior to the original hearing dates in October 2024, the Registrant was on notice that the dishonesty allegation in Particular 3 would not be pursued. The Panel also noted that it was clear from the email of 6 October 2025 that it was proposed that the original Particular 2, which would require proof of a deception by the Registrant, would not be proceeded with but would be replaced by a simple allegation that she did not disclose her conviction to the HCPC as soon as she possibly could have done. The Panel noted that no objections had been received from the Registrant to the proposals regarding Particulars 2 and 3.

29. The Panel acknowledged that as it was proposed to discontinue Particulars that alleged a deliberate concealment (Particular 2) and dishonesty (Particular 3), it must consider whether this would amount to an under-prosecution of the case. It noted that the only evidence it had regarding the Registrant’s state of mind at the material time came from the Registrant herself in her email of 6 June 2023 and letter of 27 June 2023. It accepted Ms Bernard-Stevenson’s submission that it would not be possible based on those documents to show that the Registrant knew of the requirement to notify the HCPC of her conviction as soon as possible. The Panel did not accept as a valid consideration Ms Bernard-Stevenson’s submission that the Registrant’s absence from the hearing which meant that she could not be cross-examined about dishonesty. The onus of proving a case rests, at all times, on the HCPC and there was no requirement on any registrant to give evidence and submit to cross examination.

30. The Panel noted that paragraph 3 of the Practice Note on “Discontinuance of Proceedings” states, “As a public authority, the HCPC should act in the public interest and should not seek to pursue an allegation that has no realistic prospect of success.”. The Panel was satisfied that the reasons advance by the HCPC for discontinuing in part the Allegation were objectively justified as it was appropriate to discontinue the concealment and the dishonesty allegations where the HCPC had “no realistic prospect of success”. The Panel was also satisfied that the partial discontinuance could not be regarded as an “under-prosecution”. It could never be an “under-prosecution” where there was no prospect of success and no suggestion that further evidence could be obtained.

31. The Panel considered the viability of the remaining parts of the Allegation and was satisfied that, subject to a proposed amendment in relation to Particular 2 being accepted, the Allegation was viable and coherent.

32. The Panel also noted that in paragraph 12 of the Practice Note, it suggests that where there has been a partial discontinuance, the final hearing should be before a different panel who would not be aware that partial discontinuance had been approved. The Panel was satisfied that it was unnecessary in this case for the matter to be adjourned to be heard by a different panel. The Panel did not consider that by discontinuing Particular 2 and replacing the original allegation with a less serious allegation in respect of the same matter and on the basis of the same evidence, it should recuse itself from continuing to hear the case. Similarly, the Panel did not consider that the discontinuance of the dishonesty allegation in Particular 3 required it to recuse itself from continuing to hear the case.

33. Accordingly, the Panel granted the HCPC’s application to discontinue the Allegation in part.

Proposed amendments

34. The Panel received and accepted legal advice. It considered each of the proposed amendments separately. The Panel noted that the Registrant had been put on notice of the proposed amendments in an email dated 6 October 2025 and had not indicated any objections.

35. The Panel was satisfied that each of the proposed amendments could be made without prejudicing the Registrant and none of them impacted adversely on the fairness of the proceedings.

36. The Panel was satisfied that the removal of the words from the preamble of the Allegation which were later repeated in original Particular 4 and/or Particular 5, aligned with current HCPC drafting practice. It would remove repetitious wording and confirmed that the Panel’s approach to its consideration of the Allegation would be in an appropriately sequential manner with statutory ground and impairment following matters of fact. The proposed amendment would also remove the incorrect reference to the statutory ground of “lack of competence”. The Panel was satisfied that these proposed amendments would not cause the Registrant any prejudice nor would they result in any unfairness in the proceedings.

37. The Panel noted that proposed amendments to Particular 1 were to correct the grammar in relation to the allegation of conviction. The Panel was satisfied that the proposed amendment would not cause the Registrant any prejudice nor would it result in any unfairness in the proceedings.

38. The Panel, having decided that it was appropriate to discontinue the original Particular 2, was satisfied that the proposed new wording of Particular 2 clarified the HCPC’s case against the Registrant. It was also satisfied that as it did not result in a more serious allegation against the Registrant regarding the non-disclosure of her conviction to the HCPC, it did not prejudice her in any way. The Panel was also satisfied that the proposed amendment would not result in any unfairness in the proceedings.

39. The Panel accepted Ms Bernard-Stevenson’s submissions that the proposed amendments would also result in renumbering of the paragraphs of the Particulars so that original Particulars 4 and 5 would become Particulars 3 and 4, and that there would be a few consequential grammatical changes. It was satisfied that none of these would cause prejudice to the Registrant or result in any unfairness in the proceedings.

40. Accordingly, the Panel granted the HCPC’s application to amend the Allegation in full.
Background

41. The Registrant is a registered Speech and Language Therapist (“SLT”). At the material time, the Registrant was employed by North Bristol NHS Trust as a Space Manager Commissioner in the Estates and Facilities Department, a role for which the Registrant did not require HCPC registration.

42. On 3 July 2023, the HCPC received a self-referral form from the Registrant in which she notified the HCPC that, on 23 June 2022, she had been convicted of driving with excess alcohol on 8 June 2022. Prior to submitting the self-referral form, the Registrant had been in contact with the HCPC by email on 6 June and by letter on 27 June 2023, in connection with her drink-driving conviction and had informed the HCPC that she had only become aware very recently that she was required to notify it of her conviction.

43. The Registrant’s conviction related to being stopped in the early hours of 8 June 2022 by police who had observed the Registrant driving erratically. The Registrant was asked to provide a roadside breath test which she failed. The Registrant was arrested and later took a further breathalyser test at Basingstoke Police Station. The lower of the two readings at the police station was 66 micrograms of alcohol in 100 millilitres of breath which exceeded the prescribed limit. The Registrant was charged with a drink driving offence contrary to section 5(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and Schedule 2 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988.

44. On 23 June 2023, at Basingstoke Magistrates’ Court, the Registrant pleaded guilty to the drink driving offence and was disqualified from driving for 17 months (which could be reduced by 17 weeks if the Registrant completed a rehabilitation course by 20 May 2023). The Registrant was also fined £461, ordered to pay £85 towards the Crown Prosecution Service (“CPS”) costs and a £46 victim surcharge. The financial amounts were subject to a collection charge order and due to be paid by 21 July 2022.
Decision on Facts

45. In reaching its decision on the facts, the Panel considered all the documentary evidence presented by the HCPC in the case and Ms Bernard-Stevenson’s submissions. The Panel also received and accepted legal advice. It was aware throughout that the burden of proving the case was on the HCPC and that this was to the civil standard of proof, namely on the balance of probabilities.

46. The HCPC did not call any live evidence and provided the Panel with a bundle of documentary evidence which totalled 86 pdf pages. This bundle included:

a) a Memorandum of Conviction dated 1 September 2023,
b) correspondence between the HCPC and Basingstoke Magistrates’ Court,
c) an email dated 6 June 2023 from the Registrant to the HCPC,
d) a letter dated 27 June 2023 from the Registrant to the HCPC,
e) a character reference dated 15 June 2022 from KS, Head of Capital Planning, Space and Property Management for whom the Registrant worked which was prepared for the Magistrates’ Court,
f) a Police Report with police officer witness statements and details of the drink driving offence,
g) a Notice of Financial Penalty.

Particular 1 was found proved

47. In finding Particular 1 proved, the Panel followed the legal advice that it could rely on the Memorandum of Conviction dated 1 September 2023 from Basingstoke Magistrates’ Court, as conclusive proof that the Registrant was convicted of the offence set out in Particular 1 of the Allegation. The Panel therefore relied on the Memorandum of Conviction which showed that on 23 June 2022, the Registrant had pleaded guilty to having, on 8 June 2022, driven a motor vehicle on a road in Hampshire after consuming so much alcohol that the proportion of it in her breath, namely 66 micrograms of alcohol in 100 millilitres of breath, exceeded the prescribed limit. This was contrary to section 5(1)(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and Schedule 2 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. The Memorandum of Conviction showed that the Registrant was disqualified for a period of 17 months (which could be reduced by 17 weeks if the Registrant completed a rehabilitation course by 26 May 2023). The Registrant was also fined £461 and ordered to pay £85 Crown Prosecution Service (“CPS”) costs and a £46 victim surcharge. A collection order in respect of the financial penalties was made, payable by 21 July 2022.

48. Accordingly, the Panel was satisfied, based on the Memorandum of Conviction, that Particular 1 was proved.

Particular 2 was found proved

49. The Panel noted that the date of the Registrant’s conviction was 23 June 2022. Although the HCPC did not call any witnesses from the HCPC to confirm that the Registrant had not disclosed the conviction until approximately a year later, the Panel was satisfied that it was more likely than not that she had not done so. In reaching its decision, the Panel relied on the Registrant’s own documents, namely an email dated 6 June 2023, and a letter dated 27 June 2023 address to the Fitness to Practice Team. In both documents the Registrant had stated,
“On 23rd June 2022, I was convicted of a drink drive offence. I hadn’t realised that I needed to notify the HCPC and only came across something a couple of weeks ago which meant that I should have notified the HCPC”.

50. The Panel was satisfied that the Registrant did not notify the HCPC of her conviction until, at the earliest, 6 June 2023. This was almost a year after the conviction. The Panel was also satisfied that in taking a year to make a notification which was required of HCPC registrants under the HCPC Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics (2016) Standard 9.5 (“the HCPC Standards”), the Registrant had not notified the HCPC of her conviction “as soon as she possibly could have done”. The Panel was not aware of any evidence of any intervening factors which made it impossible for her to have made the required disclosure to the HCPC at any stage during that year. It was also of the view that being ignorant or unaware of the requirement for prompt notification of convictions was not a defence.

51. Accordingly, the Panel found Particular 2 proved.

Decision on grounds:

HCPC submissions
52. Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted that in accordance with Rule 10 (d) of the Health and Care Professions Council (Conduct and Competence Committee) (Procedure) Rules 2003, the Memorandum of Conviction was proof of the statutory ground of conviction in relation to Particular 1.

53. Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted that there was evidence of the statutory ground of misconduct in that it had taken the Registrant about a year in which to disclose the conviction to the HCPC which was a serious falling below the standards expected of an SLT.

54. Ms Bernard-Stevenson referred the Panel to the case of Roylance v. GMC [2001] 1 AC 311, where it was stated, “Misconduct is a word of general effect, involving some act or omission which falls short of what would be proper in the circumstances. The standard of propriety may often be found by reference to the rules and standards ordinarily required to be followed by a [medical] practitioner in the particular circumstances”.

55. Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted that not informing the HCPC of a conviction as soon as possible was a serious departure from the standards expected of a registered SLT. She referred to Standard 9.5 which of the HCPC’s Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics (2016) which states, “You must tell us as soon as possible, if…..you accept a caution from the police, or you have been charged with, or found guilty of, a criminal offence”.

56. Ms Bernard-Stevenson also submitted that the Registrant’s conduct was in breach of Standard 9.1 of the Standard: “You must make sure that your conduct justifies the public’s trust and confidence in you and in your profession”.

Decision

57. The Panel had regard to the facts it had found proved and to Ms Bernard-Stevenson’s submissions. It received and accepted legal advice.
Conviction

58. The Panel was satisfied, based on the Memorandum of Conviction, that the statutory ground of conviction was proved.

Misconduct

59. The Panel was aware that whether the conduct it had found proved In Particular 2 amounted to misconduct was a matter for its judgement. In considering this, the Panel had in mind that misconduct must involve a serious departure from the standards to be expected of a SLT.

60. In reaching its decision on misconduct, the Panel also considered the HCPC Standards, in particular Standard 9.1 and Standard 9.5.

61. The Panel concluded that it was a significant part of any registrant’s practice to keep their regulatory body informed of matters such as convictions. It considered that the public would take an adverse view of any regulatory body which took no action when a registrant did not keep it properly informed of matters such as criminal convictions, as this would mean that the regulatory body was tacitly accepting that such notifications did not really matter.

62. The Panel was satisfied that Standard 9.5 of the HCPC Standards was engaged and had been breached by the Registrant when she did not disclose her conviction as soon as possible. The Panel considered that the fact she did not do so for a period of around a year amounted to a serious departure from the standards expected of a SLT and that it therefore constituted serious professional misconduct.

63. The Panel also considered Standard 9.1 which
states, “You must make sure that your conduct justifies the public’s trust and confidence in you and your profession” and concluded that this Standard was not engaged and therefore had not been breached in this case. It considered that Standard 9.1 might have been engaged had there been findings in relation to dishonesty, but that allegation had been discontinued.

64. Accordingly, the Panel found misconduct in relation to Particular 2.

Decision on Impairment

Submissions
65. Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is impaired both by reason of her conviction and her misconduct, and a finding of impairment was required to protect the public and the wider public interest. She referred the Panel to the HCPTS Practice Note on “Fitness to Practise Impairment”.

66. Ms Bernard-Stevenson referred the Panel to the four tests set out by Dame Janet Smith in the 5th Shipman report and submitted that the Registrant’s conduct had brought the reputation of the SLT profession into disrepute.

67. In relation to the personal component, Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted that the Registrant had not produced a reflective piece to demonstrate that she had insight into her conviction and misconduct. Ms Bernard-Stevenson referred to the character reference from KS who had described the Registrant’s conviction as being “out of character” and which referred to the Registrant’s guilt and remorse. Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted that, apart from this, there was no other detailed character evidence.

68. Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted that there was limited evidence of remediation and no evidence that the Registrant had taken relevant courses which would address her conduct. Ms Bernard-Stevenson said it was unclear if the Registrant had, for example, refreshed her knowledge of the HCPC’s Standards.

69. In relation to the public component, Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted that there was a need to protect members of the public such as road users, even though the Registrant’s drink-driving offence had taken place outside the workplace and in the early hours of the morning. Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted that the conviction was for a relatively serious criminal offence. In relation to the misconduct, Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted that the Registrant’s late disclosure to the HCPC of her conviction made it difficult for the HCPC to perform its regulatory duties and therefore, undermining public confidence in the HCPC.

Decision
70. In reaching its decision on impairment, the Panel had regard to the HCPTS Practice Note on “Fitness to Practise Impairment”. The Panel took account of Ms Bernard-Stevenson’s submissions. The Panel received and accepted legal advice.

71. Prior to considering impairment, the Panel was provided with a Registrant’s bundle of documents (totalling 16 pdf pages), which had been submitted for the previous adjourned final hearing in October 2024. This contained the Registrant’s training records for dates between 2021 and 2024, and emails dated 12 to 15 August 2021 regarding the Registrant’s Covid-19 vaccinator work. The Panel had regard to these documents when considering whether the Registrant’s fitness to practise is impaired but noted that they were of limited value as the various training courses appeared to be related either to her then non-registered employed role or to being a Covid-19 vaccinator.

72. The Panel also took note of the character reference from KS but, as it was prepared for the Magistrates’ Court, could only give it limited weight as it did not cover the misconduct found in relation to Particular 2.

73. The Panel had well in mind that the purpose of this hearing was not to punish the Registrant for past misdoings but was to protect the public against the acts and omissions of those who are not fit to practise. The Panel noted that there were no clinical competency issues regarding the Registrant and no actual harm had been caused to any service user or member of the public because of her conviction or misconduct. The Panel also noted that the Registrant has not practised as an SLT for a number of years despite keeping her registration live.

Personal component
74. In relation to the personal component, the Panel concluded that both the conviction and the misconduct found in this case, were capable of being remedied. However, the Panel was not satisfied that the Registrant had taken steps to remedy either the conviction or the misconduct, or that she had developed proper insight into them. The Panel could not therefore rule out the possibility of repetition in the future.

75. In relation to the Registrant’s conviction, the Panel noted that the Registrant had completed the 17-week rehabilitation course within the required timeframe. The Panel also noted that both the Registrant and KS said that the drink-driving conviction was a “one-off”. The Panel saw from the Registrant’s statement in the Police Report dated 20 June 2022, that at the time of the conviction she had been very stressed at work, that she had consumed the alcohol during the evening of 7 June 2022 and had set off in the early hours of the morning to drive to work as she could not sleep. The Panel was aware that the reading of 66 micrograms of alcohol in 100 millilitres of breath was just under double the prescribed limit of 35 micrograms of alcohol in 100 millilitres of breath.

76. The Panel took the view that there was no evidence that the Registrant had fully understood the reason why she had driven whilst so far over the prescribed limit. The Panel noted that the Registrant had expressed her remorse and shame to KS and to the Magistrates’ Court but considered that she had not shown the Panel that she had properly reflected on and had understood the significance of her conviction and how this impacted on service users, colleagues, her profession and the wider public.

77. The Panel also noted that there was no evidence that the Registrant had expressed any remorse for her misconduct when it had taken approximately a year for her to disclose the conviction to the HCPC. The Panel noted that the Registrant’s email and letter in June 2023 referred only to her having just realised that she should have made a disclosure, and about how terrified she had been when she had discovered this. However, the Registrant had not, for example, apologised to the HCPC for the late disclosure or provided any reflections on how the misconduct would impact on service users, her profession or on the HCPC as its regulatory body.

78. The Panel noted that while the Registrant had provided training records relating to the period 2021 to 2024, she had not produced any independent evidence to demonstrate that she had taken positive and
verifiable steps to remedy the misconduct by, for example, taking a refresher course on the HCPC’s Standards.

79. The Panel did not consider that the Registrant had been “wilful” in relation to either the conviction or misconduct [Redacted]. The Panel considered that although the Registrant had engaged to some extent with these proceedings, it appeared that she had largely “buried her head in the sand”.

80. The Panel was therefore of the view that there was no evidence before it to show that the Registrant had fully reflected on either the conviction or misconduct or taken any appropriate steps to remedy them.

81. The Panel was satisfied that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is impaired on the personal component.

Public component
82. In relation to the public component, the Panel was satisfied that it had a duty to protect the public, particularly road users. The Panel had no doubt that public confidence in the SLT profession and in the HCPC as its regulator, would be undermined if there was no finding of impairment in this case. The Panel was satisfied that a reasonable and informed member of the public would be shocked if there was no finding of impairment where the Registrant had, over a period of approximately a year, not informed her regulatory body of a conviction for drink-driving where the level of alcohol in her breath was almost twice the legal limit.

83. The Panel concluded that the Registrant’s conviction and misconduct had brought the SLT profession into disrepute. Registered professionals are required to maintain certain standards of conduct, performance and ethics as a condition of registration with a professional body such as the HCPC. The public expect that registrants should live up to the standards set by their regulatory bodies.

84. The Panel was also satisfied that it would be failing in its duty to declare and uphold proper standards of conduct and behaviour in the SLT profession if it did not find impairment in this case. SLTs should be in no doubt that a conviction for drink driving and then not disclosing this to the HCPC as soon as possible is unacceptable.

85. The Panel was satisfied that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is impaired on the public component.

86. The Panel therefore found that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is impaired on both the personal and public component. Accordingly, the Panel found the Allegation was well founded.
Decision on Sanction

87. In considering the appropriate and proportionate sanction the Panel was referred to, and took account of, the guidance set out in the HCPC’s Sanctions Policy. The Panel received and accepted legal advice. The Panel was aware that the purpose of any sanction it imposed was not to punish the Registrant, although it might have that effect, but it was to protect the public, to maintain confidence in the SLT profession and to uphold its standards of conduct and behaviour. The Panel also had in mind that any sanction it imposed must be appropriate and proportionate bearing in mind the nature and circumstances of the conviction and misconduct involved.
Submissions

88. Ms Bernard-Stevenson referred to possible mitigating and aggravating features of the case and set out the relevant principles regarding the imposition of a sanction but, as is the HCPC’s usual approach at the sanction stage, did not advance any specific sanction.

Decision
89. The Panel considered mitigating and aggravating factors. The Panel first looked at the mitigating factors. It found the following mitigating factors:
- the Registrant’s previous good character, including that there are no previous regulatory findings against her,
- the Registrant informed her line manager, KS, of her arrest for a drink driving offence on the day of arrest,
- the Registrant expressed remorse for her drink driving offence to her line manager,
- the Registrant completed a rehabilitation course in respect of the drink driving offence.

90. The Panel considered the following to be aggravating factors:
- the Registrant’s lack of insight into her conviction and misconduct,
- the Registrant’s lack of remorse and apology for her misconduct,
- the Registrant’s lack of remediation for her misconduct,
- the potential harm to road users arising from the actions which led to the Registrant’s conviction,
- the potential reputational harm to the Registrant’s profession.

91. The Panel considered the available sanctions in ascending order of seriousness.

92. The Panel decided that to take no action or impose a Caution Order in this case would not be appropriate or proportionate given that neither the conviction nor the misconduct could be described as “relatively minor in nature”. The Panel could not rule out the risk of repetition because the Registrant had yet to develop full insight into the conviction and into the causes of her misconduct and had provided no evidence of having remedied either. The Panel had in mind paragraph 83 of the Sanctions Policy which states, “Likewise, if a registrant has a conviction or caution for a less serious offence which nevertheless had an impact on fitness to practise, typically panels should not permit the registrant to resume unrestricted practice”. The Panel was satisfied that to ensure public confidence in the SLT profession was not undermined, it must consider a more severe sanction.

93. The Panel then considered a Conditions of Practice Order and in particular the matters set out in paragraph 106 of the Sanctions Policy which states:
“A conditions of practice order is likely to be appropriate in cases where:
• the registrant has insight;
• the failure or deficiency is capable of being remedied;
• there are no persistent or general failures which would prevent the registrant from remediating;
• appropriate, proportionate, realistic and verifiable conditions can be formulated;
• the panel is confident the registrant will comply with the conditions;
• a reviewing panel will be able to determine whether or not those conditions have or are being met;
• the registrant does not pose a risk of harm by being in restricted practice”.

94. The Panel has also had in mind paragraph 107 and 108, which state: 107 “Conditions will only be effective in cases where the registrant is genuinely committed to resolving the concerns raised and the panel is confident they will do so. Therefore, conditions of practice are unlikely to be suitable in cases in which the registrant has failed to engage with the fitness to practise process or where there are serious and persistent failings”.
108 Conditions are also less likely to be appropriate in more serious cases for example those involving…..criminal convictions for serious offences.”

95. The Panel found that the conviction and misconduct in this case were capable of being remedied. The Panel was also satisfied that there were no persistent or general failings that would prevent the Registrant from remedying them. However, the Panel had no evidence from the Registrant that she had developed proper insight into either the conviction or misconduct. Nor was there was any evidence that she had taken any steps to remediate the misconduct.

96. The Panel was aware that the Registrant had not worked as an SLT for some time. There was no evidence as to the Registrant’s current employment situation or any independent medical evidence as to the current state of her health. The Panel was concerned about the Registrant’s limited engagement with these proceedings notwithstanding her health issues, and despite being offered reasonable adjustments to accommodate these so that she could attend the hearing. The Panel concluded that it did not have sufficient confidence that the Registrant would comply with conditions of practice. The Panel therefore decided that it would not be appropriate at this stage to impose a Conditions of Practice Order.

97. The Panel also concluded, given the nature of the misconduct and conviction, the imposition of a Conditions of Practice Order would not address the fundamental issue that the concerns in this case do not involve the Registrant’s clinical competence.

98. The Panel next considered whether to impose a Suspension Order. It had in mind the following guidance from the HCPC’s Sanctions Policy:
“121 A suspension order is likely to be appropriate where there are serious concerns which cannot be reasonably addressed by a conditions of practice order, but which do not require the registrant to be struck off the Register. These types of cases will typically exhibit the following factors:

• the concerns represent a serious breach of the Standards of conduct, performance and ethics;
• the registrant has insight;
• the issues are unlikely to be repeated;
• there is evidence to suggest the registrant is likely to be able to resolve or remedy their failings.”

99. The Panel considered very carefully whether the Registrant’s lack of insight into her conviction and misconduct, and the risk of repetition albeit that this is low ruled this sanction out. The Panel found that the misconduct in this case did represent a serious breach of the Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics. However, the Panel was also satisfied that there was no evidence to suggest that the Registrant was unlikely to be able to resolve or remedy her failings. The Panel has already referred to the Registrant’s conduct as not being “wilful” and to what seems to be her “head in the sand” approach to these proceedings. It considers that if she is given some time for proper and focused reflection, the Registrant should be able to achieve good insight and take appropriate steps to remedy her misconduct.

100. The Panel was therefore satisfied that the appropriate and proportionate sanction in this case was a Suspension Order. The imposition of such a sanction would satisfy the public interest by maintaining confidence in the SLT profession and in the HCPC as its regulatory body.

101. The Panel then considered whether it should make a Striking Off Order. The Panel considered the Sanctions Policy where, in paragraph 130, it is stated that such a sanction is one of “last resort for serious, persistent, deliberate or reckless acts involving” e.g., for “criminal convictions for serious offences,..”. In this case, the Panel found that the Registrant’s drink driving conviction to be serious, but it was not premeditated or persistent.

102. The Panel also had in mind paragraph 131 which states:
“A striking off order is likely to be appropriate where the nature and gravity of the concerns are such that any lesser sanction would be insufficient to protect the public, public confidence in the profession, and public confidence in the regulatory profession. In particular where the registrant:
• lacks insight
• continues to repeat the misconduct
• is unwilling to resolve matters.

103. The Panel was not satisfied that to maintain public confidence in the SLT profession and in its regulatory process, and to uphold proper standards of conduct in the profession, a Striking Off Order was required in this case. The Panel concluded that such an Order would be punitive and therefore inappropriate and disproportionate in the circumstances of this case.

104. The Panel decided that the period of suspension should be for 4 months. The Panel decided that this period would allow the Registrant sufficient time to gain proper insight, to properly reflect on both the conviction and misconduct and to take any steps to remedy these. The Panel was satisfied that a Suspension Order for a period of 4 months would be appropriate and proportionate to maintain public confidence in the SLT profession and its regulatory body. Such an Order would send out an appropriate message to the profession about drink driving convictions and about this type of misconduct.

105. The Panel was aware that it could not bind a reviewing panel but considered that the following might be of assistance to it:
- attendance (virtually or in person) of the Registrant at the review hearing,
- a detailed reflective piece from the Registrant demonstrating her clear understanding of the seriousness of her conviction and its potential impact on other road users, and her clear understanding of the impact of her misconduct on service users, colleagues, her profession and the wider public interest,
- character references from any person by whom the Registrant is employed,
- evidence of any steps taken to remedy the misconduct including relevant reading, study and training.

ORDER: That the Registrar is directed to suspend the registration of Ms Stephanie Allen for a period of 4 months from the date that this Order comes into effect.

Interim Order

1. Ms Bernard-Stevenson applied for the Panel to proceed to consider an application for an Interim Order. Ms Bernard-Stevenson referred the Panel to the Notice of hearing dated 31 January 2025 in which the Registrant had been given notice that such an application may be made and to links in that notice to relevant information fact sheets.

2. Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted that given the Panel’s findings in relation to impairment and its reasons for imposing a Suspension Order for a period of 4 months, an Interim Suspension Order for 18 months was necessary to protect the public from the potential risk of harm, in particular the findings regarding lack of remediation and the risk of repetition. She also submitted that an interim order was in the wider public interest to maintain confidence in the profession and the regulatory process.

Decision

3. The Panel decided to proceed in the absence of the Registrant for the same reasons as set out in its determination above. The Registrant had received proper notice of the potential for such an application to be made in the email sent to her on 31 January 2025. The Panel was of the view that the Registrant had voluntarily waived her right to attend and that it was in the public interest that this application should be considered.

4. The Panel decided to make an Interim Order under Article 31(2) of the Health Professions Order 2001. It was satisfied, for all the reasons set out in its determination above, that an Interim Order was necessary to protect the public given the Registrant’s lack of insight, reflection, remediation and the risk of repetition albeit that this is low. The Panel was aware that the Registrant was not working in an SLT role but there would be nothing to stop her from doing so during the period between the date when the Suspension Order comes into effect or any appeal period is concluded. The Panel was also satisfied that it was otherwise in the public interest to maintain confidence in the SLT profession and to uphold its standards of conduct and behaviour.

5. The Panel was satisfied for the reasons set out in its determination that an Interim Conditions of Practice Order was not appropriate, and it therefore concluded that an Interim Suspension Order should be made in this case.

6. This Order will expire: (if no appeal is made against the Panel’s decision and Order) upon the expiry of the period during which such an appeal could be made; (if an appeal is made against the Panel’s decision and Order) the final determination of that appeal, subject to a maximum period of 18 months.

History of Hearings for Stephanie Allen