Mrs Rebecca Delaney

Preliminary Matters

Service

1. The Notice of Hearing was sent to the Registrant, by email, to her registered email address on 20 January 2026 informing her that there would be a final hearing commencing on 23 March 2026.

2. The Practice Note requires proof of sending rather than proof of receipt to effect good service. It is the responsibility of the Registrant to keep her contact details up to date with the HCPC.

3. The Panel was satisfied that service had been effected in accordance with the Procedure Rules and Practice Note on Service of Documents.
Proceeding in absence

4. The Panel considered whether it was appropriate and fair to conduct the hearing in the absence of the Registrant. The Panel had regard to the representations made by Mr Khan on behalf of the HCPC.

5. The Panel considered the HCPTS Practice Note on ‘Proceeding in the Absence of the Registrant’ and accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor. The Panel was mindful that the hearing was a final substantive hearing of the Allegations with witnesses in attendance virtually.

6. Having found good service of today’s hearing, the Panel noted that the Notice of Hearing gave the Registrant the opportunity to attend, submit written representations or seek an adjournment. The Panel was aware that the Registrant had responded through her representative by email dated 05 February 2026 advising :-
‘Please note that the Registrant does not intend to engage with the HCPC proceedings due to the continued impact the investigation and proceedings are having [Redacted]. Consequently, we have been instructed by the Registrant’s Trade Union to come off record as legal representatives’. [sic]

7. The representative made no application for an adjournment.

8. The Panel considered the guidance given by the courts in R v Hayward [2001] EWCA Crim. 168 as qualified by the House of Lords in R v Jones [2002] UKHL 5 and was satisfied that the HCPC had taken all reasonable steps to notify the Registrant of the hearing. The Panel was mindful of the need to proceed expeditiously where it was appropriate to do so and was also aware that there were witnesses in attendance virtually.

9. In all the circumstances the Panel decided that it was fair and in the interests of justice to proceed with the hearing in the absence of the Registrant, as it concluded that the Registrant had deliberately and voluntarily absented herself, and that no useful purpose would be served by an adjournment as it would be unlikely to secure the Registrant’s attendance.

10. The Panel decided that there was a strong public interest in proceeding which outweighs any prejudice caused to the Registrant by proceeding in her absence, especially given the age of some of the Allegations. The Panel concluded that the Registrant should not be permitted to frustrate the regulatory process through her lack of engagement.
Application for the hearing to be held partly in private

11. Mr Khan on behalf of the HCPC applied for the hearing to be held partly in private to protect the health and/or private life of the Registrant where such matters were referred to. Mr Khan indicated that the references to the Registrant’s health may be made during the hearing.

12. The Panel referred to the HCPTS Practice Note on ‘Conducting Hearings in Private’, which states that as a general rule hearings are to be heard in public in accordance with the ‘open justice’ principle. However, in certain circumstances it may be in the interests of justice for the hearing to take place wholly or partially in private.

13. The Panel considered the representations made and determined that it was appropriate for the hearing to be heard partly in private to protect the health and/or private life of the Registrant where such matters were referred to as health issues should not be in the public domain.

Application to partially discontinue and amend the allegation

14. Mr Khan on behalf of the HCPC applied to partially discontinue and amend the Allegation and he referred to the case summary, which was dated 02 March 2025, but which should read 02 March 2026.

15. Mr Khan applied for partial discontinuance of Particulars 1, 4, 5 and 6. The Panel was reminded by Mr Khan that as only partial discontinuance was being proposed, it must consider firstly, whether it was appropriate and in the public interest to do so, and secondly, whether those elements of the allegation which remain amount to a viable allegation.

16. Mr Khan submitted that despite making all reasonable efforts to obtain supportive evidence, the HCPC has been unable to secure anything to support the factual Particulars of 1, 4, 5 and 6 being found proven. The HCPC attempted to obtain conflict of interest declarations from the Employer A throughout the investigation, to require a statement be provided exhibiting the documents and explaining the procedures for providing these declarations.

17. Mr Khan indicated that enquiries revealed that AM, Trust Secretary, would be able to provide the information required. He was contacted via email and phone on a number of occasions since November 2024. He advised on 25 November 2024 that he required legal advice from the Trust solicitors prior to providing the relevant information. On 13 January 2025 he stated that he was waiting for an update from the Trust legal team and was reluctant to provide a statement without being apprised of the context. No response has been received from AM since this date.

18. Mr Khan invited the Panel to consider that where some Particulars were not pursued, there was no risk of the concerns being under-prosecuted given the collective seriousness of the remaining Allegation. It was submitted that there was a strong public interest in allowing a partial discontinuance to take place, and that it did not affect the context under which the remaining allegations can be tested.

19. Mr Khan indicated that should the Panel not be satisfied that partial discontinuance was appropriate, then the HCPC would offer no evidence in relation to those allegations.

20. Mr Khan also invited the Panel to permit the following amendments:
a. Removing of the allegation that the Registrant worked ‘whilst unfit to do so’ (as per Particular 2);
b. By substituting ‘dishonesty’ with ‘lack of integrity’ in respect of working whilst on sick leave and not being open with Employer A about it (as per Particular 3);
c. By alleging that on 16 February 2021 the Registrant confirmed by virtue of signing a declaration to the effect that she had not had any other form of employment during a period of sickness absence;
d. By alleging that the incident detailed in paragraph (c) above constituted dishonest behaviour;
e. By amending a typographical error in Particular 12.

21. In relation to Particulars 2 and 3, the HCPC submit that the removal of the wording regarding working ‘whilst unfit to do so’ is a matter of fairness to the Registrant as it cannot be proved that the Registrant was unfit to work, in that she was not capable of safe practice on any occasion. Further, it was submitted that the standard text of fit notes recognises that individuals may be well enough to work during periods of certified sickness.

22. It was submitted that this ties into the proposed redrafting of Particular 3 as the HCPC’s position is that this is demonstrative of a lack of integrity as opposed to dishonesty. In that, had the Registrant worked for Employer B on days when she should have been working for Employer A, but was off sick, that would go towards dishonesty, as she would have been lying to Employer A when she claimed to be unfit to work.

23. It was submitted by Mr Khan that the evidence is clear that the Registrant did not work for Employer B on days when she should have been working for Employer A. [Redcated]. The HCPC’s position was that, notwithstanding the fact that the Registrant always appeared to feel well enough to work on self-employed days (with Employer B) as opposed to employed days (with Employer A), there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that she was well enough to work on all the days she was off sick from Employer A. The HCPC also consider that there was no evidence of any other dishonest representations being made (except where specifically alleged elsewhere). The HCPC assert that the Registrant was not sufficiently transparent with Employer A about the fact that she was regularly working for Employer B in the middle of periods of sickness absence.

24. Mr Khan invited the Panel to include new Particulars 7 and 8 on the basis that there was a need to particularise a further example of dishonesty, reinforcing the seriousness of the case overall. Further, it was submitted that the underlying facts of the new Particulars are covered within the existing evidence, and if proven, it was submitted would result in a strong likelihood of misconduct being found proven.

25. Mr Khan applied to amend the typographical error in the Particular 12, which it was submitted was self-explanatory and cosmetic in nature.

26. The Panel was invited to exercise its case management powers and to have regard to the decision of PSA v HCPC, Doree [2017] EWCA Civ 329
para. 54, which confirms that the Panel has the ability to amend allegations, even after considering the evidence.

27. Mr Khan submitted that the Panel can properly deal with this application and continue to deal with the final hearing on the remainder of the Allegations. It was submitted that this did not give rise to any unfairness to the Registrant as the Panel is a professional panel who can disregard any irrelevant material when making its final decision on the allegations (Mahfouz, R (On the application of) v General Medical Council [2004] EWCA Civ 233.

28. Mr Khan identified that the Registrant had been put on notice of the application by email dated 07 January 2026 and had raised no objection. It was submitted that no unfairness or prejudice to the Registrant would arise as a result of some of the Particulars not being pursued.

29. The Panel received and accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor and was referred to the HCPTS Practice Notes on Discontinuance of Proceedings’ and ‘Case Management, Directions and Preliminary Hearings’. The Panel was aware that it cannot simply agree to discontinuance without due inquiry. It needs to be satisfied that the HCPC’s rationale for seeking discontinuance is sound and, in particular, does not amount to ‘under- prosecution’.

30. The Panel considered whether the HCPC had proper grounds for discontinuing part of the Allegation, i.e., that there was no realistic prospect of the Allegation, or part of it, being established, and whether it had provided an objectively justified explanation for doing so.

31. The Panel considered whether it was appropriate to discontinue the relevant Particulars and also whether it was in the public interest to do so, taking account of whether what remained would be sufficient to establish the statutory ground of misconduct.

32. The Panel noted that the HCPC had failed to obtain the evidence to support the Particulars being discontinued and it was satisfied that the reasons for discontinuance advanced by the HCPC were well reasoned and objectively justified as there was no realistic prospect of the Particulars being found proven.

33. The Panel was further satisfied that the HCPC had comprehensively reviewed the matter, such that discontinuing in part could not be characterised as an under prosecution, and that no unfairness would be caused to the Registrant who was on notice of the application. The
remaining allegations reduce the scope of what is alleged but are viable and accurately reflect the totality of the misconduct alleged.

34. The Panel agreed to grant the application to discontinue the allegation in part in relation to particulars 1, 4, 5 and 6.

35. The Panel was aware that the HCPC rules are silent on amendments, but it is within its jurisdiction to consider such applications. The Panel considered whether any unfairness or prejudice would arise should it permit the amendments. The Panel carefully considered the submissions in relation to the proposed amendments and the documents contained within the hearing bundle.

36. The Panel noted that the Registrant was on notice of the proposed amendments, when she was also represented, and no objection had been raised. The Panel was satisfied that the Registrant had had adequate time prior to the substantive hearing to prepare her case and respond. In addition, the amendments proposed do not increase the seriousness of the case against her and any potential for prejudice to the Registrant was outweighed by the public interest in ensuring that the Allegation reflects the evidence.

37. The Panel was satisfied that the HCPC rationale was sound and that the proposed amendments could be made without any unfairness or injustice to the Registrant. The amendments better reflect the evidence, are sensible, easier to understand and make matters clearer for the Registrant and the Panel to understand. The nature of the case against the Registrant has not materially changed.

38. Accordingly, the application to amend would be granted in its entirety.

Background

39. The Registrant is a HCPC registered Podiatrist who was employed as a Band 6 Chiropodist/Podiatrist by Mersey Care NHS Foundation Trust (Employer A) from 22 June 2015, until her resignation on 25 November 2021.

40. The Registrant had a private Saturday job with Kathryn Grace & Associates (Employer B) which her line manager, RH, will state had not officially been notified to her by the Registrant. RH will state that she was aware of this employment from general conversations at work.

41. The Registrant began working on a self-employed basis for Employer B from 11 March 2017, initially on Saturday mornings only, and on Fridays from 19 July 2019.

42. Employer A required a member of staff who had secondary employment (including self-employed engagements), to make a conflict-of-interest declaration.

43. On or around 10 June 2019, the Registrant completed a Flexible Working Request Form, seeking to change her working hours from Monday to Friday 8:30 – 16:45, to Monday to Thursday 8:30 – 16:45, [Redacted]. This request was approved, albeit that a medical diagnosis was never formally made at the time.

44. During the Registrant’s employment with Employer A, the Registrant had a number of sickness absences.

45. At the start of the Covid-19 Pandemic, private practices ceased operation. Around this time, RH heard rumours that the Registrant had been losing money due to private practices being shut. RH asked another podiatrist where else the Registrant was working, and was advised that she worked at a private business in Warrington.

46. A referral was made to the NHS Counter Fraud Authority on 16 November 2020. The Registrant was interviewed under caution on 17 August 2022, and a Final Investigation Report was produced dated 31 August 2023. The criminal case was closed.

47. The Notice of Allegation was sent to the Registrant by letter dated 11 July 2024.

48. It is understood that the Registrant denies the Allegation.

Evidence

49. The Panel reviewed the documentary evidence contained within the 348-page hearing bundle, and a case summary of 14 pages. The Panel heard live evidence on affirmation from RH who was the Registrant’s line manager with Employer A. Her witness statement was admitted in evidence after she corrected paragraph 9 and clarified that she was only aware of the name and details of the Warrington firm after she googled the practice having been told that the Registrant was working there by a colleague.

50. RH confirmed that she took over responsibility for line managing the Registrant on 01 April 2019. Prior to that she was employed as a Caseload Holder within the Podiatry team and was at the same banding level as the Registrant. She stated that they were not close and that she had heard through general ‘chit chat’ that the Registrant had a Saturday job elsewhere.

51. RH confirmed that it was common and acceptable for Podiatrists within the team to have other private roles and that they were required to declare an interest. She believes this was done on the Trust intranet at that time. She stated that it was mandatory to make a declaration for anything that could be considered a conflict of interest.

52. RH stated that when the Covid 19 pandemic came about in March 2020 private practices ceased their work, and the NHS was only seeing emergency and urgent care cases. She described how the Podiatry team would come back to the health centre where the service was based to complete their notes. It was around this time that one of the administrative assistants advised her that the Registrant was losing ‘thousands’ due to the pandemic. RH indicated that she subsequently spoke with another Podiatrist who was friendly with the Registrant. She stated that it wasn’t ‘thousands’ she was losing and told RH where the Registrant was working. It was at this time that RH googled the private practice in Warrington.

53. RH indicated that she had telephoned the clinic (Employer B) on a couple of occasions. Initially she asked for an appointment with the Registrant and was told that she was ‘very busy’ and was ‘fully booked up’. On a second occasion she rang while the Registrant was on sick leave from Employer A and asked to speak with the Registrant. She was advised that the Registrant was busy with a patient and asked if she would like to leave a message. She terminated the call.

54. RH was referred to the return to work forms she completed with the Registrant following periods of absence. She confirmed that the Registrant was asked on each occasion whether she had undertaken any other form of employment during the period of absence, and she had confirmed that she had not. RH confirmed that the Registrant had never disclosed that she was working privately.

55. RH was referred to the flexible working request made by the Registrant. She confirmed that the request was stated to have been made on the basis of ill health alone, it was her belief that everything else would remain the same. RH confirmed that the request was granted to facilitate the Registrant remaining in work as she had a recent history of sickness absence. RH confirmed that she did not seek medical evidence as that was not required under the policy, and she indicated that the Registrant was under the occupational health team.

56. It was confirmed that whilst she suspected that the Registrant was working elsewhere, this was not explored as part of the flexible working request. She advised that as part of the process for considering the flexible working request she was accompanied by CD, a Human Resources Manager. She stated that it was suggested that the Registrant take Wednesday off rather than Friday to facilitate a break during the week, but this was not what the Registrant wanted. RH indicated that when asked about working Saturdays the Registrant responded, ‘You don’t pay me enough’.

57. RH explained the process for self-certified periods of absence and ‘trigger points’ in the sickness policy. She referred to the fact that a phased return was offered to the Registrant following a period of absence in excess of 6 weeks to ease her into her usual working pattern without triggering a further period of absence.

58. RH confirmed that at each return to work she was told that the Registrant hadn’t undertaken any other employment and she took her word for it.

59. RH confirmed that she considered that the Registrant would have been aware of her duty to declare her other employment as a potential conflict of interest, as this was part of the Trust induction, there was annual mandatory training, and employees were required to update their intranet profile annually. RH stated that ‘it was a given’ that an employee would make a declaration as part of their employment with the Trust, and she vaguely recalls that the Trust used to send out email reminders.

60. RH confirmed that during the return-to-work interviews there was ample opportunity for the Registrant to declare her employment or clarify her understanding of what that meant.

61. RH confirmed that her decision to grant the flexible working application was based solely on the health of the Registrant.

62. KG gave evidence on oath, and her statement was admitted as her evidence in chief. She clarified in relation to paragraph 13 of her statement that she was unsure whether the Registrant still worked with The Foot Company.

63. KG confirmed that the Registrant started working for her on a self-employed basis on Saturday mornings only in March 2017. The two had struck up a conversation while the Registrant had attended the clinic for a Physiotherapy appointment. KG stated that she had indicated that she was looking to expand and the Registrant expressed an interest.

64. KG recalled that the Registrant only worked Saturday mornings until July 2019 when she also started working Fridays. KG was unaware of any health concerns the Registrant may have had until she had been there a while. [Redacted]. She didn’t tend to work directly with the Registrant but could sometimes see that she was struggling.

65. KG explained that the Podiatrist who had worked for her on a Friday was going back to work for the NHS so she asked the Registrant whether she would be interested in doing another day. The Registrant explained that she would need to make a request to the NHS, which KG assumed meant that she would ask to drop a day to work privately. KG stated that she didn’t know what was involved but that the process seemed to take a while – maybe 2-3 months.

66. KG described the process for recording the days the Registrant worked so they could reconcile this with the invoices she submitted for payment.

67. KG did not recall the Registrant taking any periods of sick leave, stating that she was fairly reliable and although she may have been off for odd days there was nothing continuous.

68. KG described the types of work undertaken by the Registrant which included both clinical and domiciliary work. She stated that the Registrant didn’t like home visits, but it was something that they all did.

69. KG was referred to the reference which was provided prior to the Registrant commencing employment with her. She confirmed that she believed the Registrant may have been married so this was why there was a different name. She could not recall who the referee was other than it being someone who used to work with the Registrant. She did not know whether it was the Registrant’s line manager at that time.

70. CS gave evidence on affirmation, and her statement with exhibits was admitted in evidence.

71. CS confirmed that she had investigated an allegation that the Registrant had committed a fraud by false representation by working elsewhere during a period of sickness absence with the Trust. She stated that her findings were that the conduct was capable of amounting to a fraud if proven. The false representation being that she had stated she was unfit for work and had worked elsewhere during that period, and on her return to work, she had declared that she had not completed any other employment when she had.

72. CS confirmed that she had calculated the overpayment as £4,124.61 which has now been repaid in full.

73. CS confirmed that in interview under caution the Registrant made a lot of ‘no comment’ replies. She recalled that the Registrant was drinking water very fast and then had to step out a few times. CS understood that the flexible working request was made on health grounds and she stated that the Registrant had refused to take the Wednesday off as suggested by Occupational health to give her a natural break in the week.

74. CS confirmed that the evidence supported an offence of fraud by false representation. She stated that usually the matter would be referred to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), however, there was a backlog due to the Covid 19 pandemic and there was guidance issued to encourage investigators to look at alternative routes. She was aware that a referral had been made to the HCPC and on that basis the Chief Finance Officer decided to close the criminal investigation. She stated that had the matter been considered now it would have been referred to the CPS.

75. CS was referred to the paragraph 6.6 of her report which details the declaration which the Registrant would have signed in her return-to-work interviews. Paragraph 6.9 was also highlighted where it refers to RH stating that ‘when the Registrant became aware of the investigation she asked her directly whether she worked elsewhere and her response was ‘no’.’

Decision on Facts

76. The Panel heard submissions from Mr Khan on behalf of the HCPC who invited the Panel to make a finding in relation to the facts. The Panel considered all of the written and oral evidence in the case to determine whether each particular of the allegation was found proved or not.

77. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor and was aware that the standard of proof in deciding whether the facts are proved is ‘on the balance of probabilities’. In other words, the Panel must be satisfied that the act or omission alleged is more likely than not to have occurred before it can find it proved.

78. The Panel was advised to look at each particular of the allegation independently and in reaching its decision consider whether the facts set out in the allegation are proved, assess the oral and written evidence, the credibility of the witnesses and attach such weight as they see fit to each piece of evidence.

79. The Panel was referred to the HCPTS Practice Note on ‘Making decisions on a Registrant’s state of mind’ and was aware that in considering dishonesty the test was as set out in the case of Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd t/a Crockfords (Respondent) [2017] UKSC 67. This case brought the test for dishonesty in criminal and regulatory proceedings in line with civil proceedings. The Panel considered the issue of dishonesty by asking itself:-
- What the Registrant’s actual state of knowledge or genuine belief as to the facts was;
- Whether the Registrant’s actions were dishonest by the objective standards of ordinary honest people.

80. The Panel noted that the Registrant was not present, had not given evidence on affirmation and had not been open to questions from the HCPC or the Panel. The Panel considered whether it was appropriate to draw an adverse inference from the Registrant’s failure to attend and give evidence. The Panel received and accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor and was aware that an adverse inference alone cannot be determinative of the allegation and is a factor to take into account in deciding whether the facts alleged are found proved.

81. The Panel was of the view that a prima facie case against the Registrant had been established through the oral and written evidence provided. The Panel was satisfied from the Notice of Hearing dated 20 January 2026 that the Registrant had been given notice that the Panel may draw an inference if she failed to attend and give evidence. Whilst the Registrant had cited the impact upon her as to why she did not wish to engage, the Panel was of the view that the Registrant could have provided written representations, or a reflective piece, in the absence of physical attendance. The Registrant has not provided any medical evidence to support her absence.

82. The Panel concluded that there was no reasonable explanation for the failure to attend and give evidence, and that there were no circumstances which would make it unfair to draw an inference. The Panel concluded that it was appropriate to draw an adverse inference from the Registrant’s failure to attend and give evidence, and it was satisfied that this may be due to the fact that the Registrant did not have a justifiable explanation for some, or all, of the facts alleged against her.
Particular 1 is found proved

83. The Panel considered the written evidence from RH which included her witness statement dated 03 January 2025 and a number of exhibits. The Panel also reflected on the oral evidence of RH which they found to be reliable, consistent and credible.

84. The Panel first considered whether the evidence supported the suggestion that the Registrant had worked for Employer B on one or more of the seventeen dates set out in Schedule A.

85. The Panel referred itself to the evidence from KG and the exhibits to her statement which included the records completed within the practice of the dates the Registrant had worked, and the invoices submitted to Employer B by the Registrant for payment. The Panel considered KG to be a credible and reliable witness who was able to give her evidence with reference to the documentary evidence.

86. The evidence provided by RH and KG was corroborated, independently verified, and reinforced by CS, who had undertaken an investigation into an alleged fraud by false representation. She gave evidence that she was satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to support an allegation of fraud by false representation being passed to the CPS. She also reported an overpayment to the Registrant in excess of £4,000 which the Registrant repaid.

87. The Panel was able to identify that, on each date within Schedule A, Employer B had recorded the Registrant as being in work, and the Registrant had submitted an invoice for work undertaken. Accordingly, the Panel was satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the Registrant had undertaken work for Employer B on all 17 dates set out in Schedule A.

88. The Panel next considered whether there was evidence to support the Registrant being on a period of sick leave on the dates set out in Schedule A.

89. The Panel referred itself to the self-certified sickness absence notifications and the GP ‘Statement of Fitness for Work’ which were exhibited to the statement of RH. The Panel was able to identify a self-certified absence notification or a ‘sick note’ to cover each of the seventeen dates set out in Schedule A. Accordingly, the Panel was of the view that the Registrant had been on a period of sick leave from Employer A on the dates set out in Schedule A.

90. The evidence was unchallenged during the hearing, and the Panel was satisfied on the balance of probabilities that this Particular was proven.
Particular 2 is found proved

91. The HCPC relied on the return-to-work interviews conducted by RH to support this Particular where it is said the Registrant failed to disclose her employment elsewhere during her absence.

92. The Panel first considered whether the Registrant had been open with Employer A about the fact that she had worked elsewhere while on sick leave.

93. The Panel considered the written and oral evidence of RH which was credible. RH gave a first-hand account of her interactions with the Registrant following periods of sickness absence. RH confirmed that there were annual reminders and mandatory training from the Trust in relation to conflict declarations.

94. The Panel considered the return-to-work forms dated 25 November 2020 (Exhibit RH22) and 16 February 2021 (Exhibit RH26). Both forms involved an interaction between RH and the Registrant when the Registrant was asked ‘Has the Colleague had any other form of employment during the period of absence?’. The response on both forms is recorded as ‘no’.

95. Additionally, the forms both contained the following declaration:-
‘I declare that the information I have given on this form is factually correct and complete and I confirm that, unless stated above, I have not had any other form of employment, be it part or in full, during the period that I have been unfit for work at the Trust. I understand that if I have knowingly provided false information this may result in disciplinary action and I may be liable for prosecution and civil recovery proceedings. I consent to the disclosure of information from this form and any associated documentation, to the NHS Anti-Fraud Specialist and/or NHS Counter Fraud Authority, for the purpose of verification and the investigation, prevention, detection and prosecution of fraud’.

96. Whilst the Panel noted that the first interview was face to face and the second was conducted over the telephone, both forms have been signed by the Registrant either by hand or electronically.

97. The Panel noted the flexible working application submitted by the Registrant dated 10 June 2019 made no reference to the Registrant’s employment with Employer B. The Registrant [Redacted]. She stated that it was becoming difficult for her to work a full 5 days [Redacted].

98. The Panel found that the flexible working application was submitted by the Registrant following a conversation with KG when she was asked if she could work on a Friday.

99. RH gave evidence that as part of her considering the flexible working request, Occupational Health and HR had suggested the Registrant take Wednesday off to give her a break in her working week. This was refused by the Registrant.

100. RH also gave evidence that she asked the Registrant directly if she was working privately, and she replied that she was not.

101. The Panel concluded from the oral and documentary evidence that the Registrant knew that she was not being open with Employer A about her work with Employer B. Additionally, the Panel noted that the Registrant had repaid the money she would not have received had she been open with Employer A about her employment with Employer B.

102. The Panel considered whether the lack of openness constituted ‘lack of integrity’. The Panel was aware that lack of integrity did not equate to dishonesty. In Wingate & Anr v Solicitors Regulation Authority and Solicitors Regulation Authority v Malins [2018] EWCA Civ 366 it was stated that in professional codes of conduct, the term “integrity” is a useful shorthand to express the higher standards which society expects from professional persons and which the professions expect from their own members.

103. The Panel was aware that the duty to act with integrity applies not only to what professional persons say, but also to what they do. The Panel was of the view that the Registrant had knowingly been less than honest in her declarations to RH, and it concluded that on the balance of probabilities the Registrant's actions had ‘lacked integrity’ as they did not meet the high standards expected on professionals.
Particular 3 is found proved

104. The Panel referred itself to the flexible working application (Exhibit RH1). The application completed by the Registrant was clear that the Registrant sought a reduction in her hours as ‘it is becoming difficult for me to work a full 5 days now due to pain’.

105. The application made no reference to the Registrant taking up Podiatry employment elsewhere.

106. The Panel heard evidence from RH regarding the considerations she gave to the request which she believed was due to health reasons. RH indicated that the Trust sought to support employees in remaining in work. RH confirmed that OH had suggested the Registrant take a Wednesday as her non-working day to create a natural break mid-week. This was refused by the Registrant who wished her non-working day to be a Friday.

107. The Panel also considered the evidence of KG which was clear that following a conversation with the Registrant, the Registrant had planned to reduce her hours with the NHS to take up more private work with Employer B on a Friday.

108. The documentary evidence produced by KG as exhibits support the assertion of the HCPC that immediately following the granting of the flexible working request, the Registrant commenced work on a Friday with Employer B. In particular, the Panel noted that the days which the Registrant worked for Employer B prior to 19 July 2019 were all Saturdays (09 June 2018, 16 June 2018, 23 June 2018, 05 January 2019, 12 January 2019, 19 January 2019, 26 January 2019, 02 February 2019, 09 February 2019, 11 May 2019, 18 May 2019 and 25 May 2019).

109. Following the granting of the flexible working request dated 10 June 2019 the dates the Registrant worked for Employer B included the following Fridays and Saturdays – 13 July 2019, 19 July 2019, 20 July 2019, 26 July 2019, 27 July 2019, 02 August 2019, 09 August 2019, 10 August 2019, 16 August 2019, 17 August 2019, 23 August 2019, 24 August 2019, 06 November 2020, 07 November 2020, 13 November 2020, 14 November 2020, 20 November 2020, 21 November 2020, 27 November 2020, 28 November 2020, 08 January 2021, 09 January 2021, 15 January 2021, 16 January 2021, 22 January 2021, 23 January 2021, 05 February 2021, 06 February 2021, 12 February 2021, 13 February 2021, 19 February 2021, 20 February 2021, 26 February 2021 and 27 February 2021.

110. The Panel considered that health reasons could not have been the reason the Registrant sought to reduce her hours with Employer A. It took account of the fact that the Registrant had repeatedly worked a six-day week across the two employers following the request being granted. The Panel also noted that the Registrant did not appear to have any periods of prolonged absence from her employment with Employer B. The Panel concluded that the reduction in hours with Employer A which resulted in a significant uptake in work with Employer B was to facilitate another income stream.

111. The HCPC evidence was not challenged or undermined by the Registrant and the Panel was satisfied that the Registrant did not make Employer A aware that she sought to take up additional employment with Employer B. The Panel was satisfied on the balance of probabilities that Particular 3 was found proven.
Particular 4 is found proved

112. The Panel was aware that when making decisions involving alleged dishonesty, it needed to determine whether the Registrant acted as an honest person would have acted in the circumstances.

113. The Panel noted in paragraphs 97 - 101 and 104 – 110 above the circumstances surrounding the flexible working application as to the Registrant’s knowledge and belief of the circumstances in which the alleged dishonesty arose.

114. The Panel noted that the Registrant had worked for Employer B more frequently after the granting of the flexible working request, and she had refused the suggestion from Employer A to take a Wednesday off on the advice of OH, which was designed to support her in remining in work. Additionally, Employer A had ceased the domiciliary visits by the Registrant, yet she continued with these for Employer B.

115. The Panel concluded that the Registrant knew what she was doing. The Registrant requested a reduction in her hours on the grounds of ‘health’ which was more likely to be looked upon favourably, when she planned to take up more work with Employer B on the Fridays she was no longer working with Employer A. The Panel was of the view that this was financially motivated as the Registrant had the potential to earn more money with Employer B.

116. The Panel noted that the Investigation Report of CS concluded that the facts were capable of amounting to a fraud by false representation which involves an element of dishonesty.

117. The Panel asked itself whether, taking account of the Registrant’s understanding of the circumstances, an ordinary decent person would find the conduct to be dishonest, which is purely an objective test. The Registrant’s own standards of honesty are irrelevant; they are held to the standards of society in general.

118. The Panel found that an ordinary decent person appraised of the full circumstances would find the conduct to be dishonest. Accordingly, the Panel was satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the Registrant’s conduct in Particular 3 was dishonest.
Particular 5 is found proved

119. The Panel referred itself to the return-to-work meeting form dated 25 November 2020 (Exhibit RH22) and the evidence of RH.

120. The meeting was undertaken face to face, and the form details the question ‘Has the Colleague had any other form of employment during the period of absence?’. The response recorded is ‘No’.

121. Further, on the last page of the form there is a Colleague Declaration which is detailed at paragraph 95 of this decision which the Registrant has signed and dated.

122. The Panel was satisfied that this Particular was found proven.
Particular 6 is found proved

123. The Panel again considered the circumstances surrounding the Allegation with the Registrant reducing her hours with Employer A and taking up more work with Employer B.

124. The Panel considered that the meeting took place in the middle of a period of employment with Employer B and was of the view that there was no room for the Registrant misunderstanding the question. The Registrant gave a direct response which was not truthful.

125. The Panel found that an ordinary decent person appraised of the full circumstances would find the conduct to be dishonest. Accordingly, the Panel was satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the Registrant’s conduct in Particular 5 was dishonest.
Particular 7 is found proved

126. The Panel referred itself to the return-to-work meeting form dated 16 February 2021 (Exhibit RH26) and the evidence of RH.

127. The meeting was undertaken over the telephone, and the form details the question ‘Has the Colleague had any other form of employment during the period of absence?’. The response recorded is ‘No’.

128. Further, on the last page of the form there is a Colleague Declaration which is detailed at paragraph 95 of this decision which the Registrant has digitally signed and dated.

129. The Panel was satisfied that this Particular was found proven.
Particular 8 is found proved

130. The Panel again considered the circumstances surrounding the Allegation with the Registrant reducing her hours with Employer A and taking up more work with Employer B.

131. The Panel considered that the meeting took place in the middle of a period of employment with Employer B and was of the view that there was no room for the Registrant misunderstanding the question. The Registrant gave a direct response which was not truthful.

132. The Panel found that an ordinary decent person appraised of the full circumstances would find the conduct to be dishonest. Accordingly, the Panel was satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the Registrant’s conduct in Particular 5 was dishonest.

Decision on Grounds

133. The Panel next went on to consider whether or not the facts found proved amounted to misconduct.

134. The Panel heard submissions from Mr Khan and accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor.

135. The Panel was referred to Roylance v General Medical Council (No 2) [2000] 1 A.C. 311 where the Privy Council defined “misconduct” as “a word of general effect, involving some act or omission which falls short of what would be proper in the circumstances. The standard of propriety may often be found by reference to the rules and standards ordinarily required to be followed by a medical practitioner in the particular circumstances”.

136. The Panel noted that the dishonesty was not a one-off isolated incident and occurred over a prolonged period when the Registrant was receiving a financial benefit. It is a fundamental tenet of the profession to act with honesty and integrity, and the Registrant has not behaved in a manner which would justify the public’s trust.

137. The Panel considered the HCPC Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics and Standards 2016 and found that the facts found proved amounted to breaches of standards:-
‘6.3 - You must make changes to how you practise, or stop practising, if your physical or mental health may affect your performance or judgement, or put others at risk for any other reason.
9.1 - You must make sure that your conduct justifies the public’s trust and confidence in you and your profession.
9.4 - You must declare issues that might create conflicts of interest and make sure that they do not influence your judgement’.

138. The Panel was of the view that the findings establish that the Registrant acted in such a way that her conduct fell far short of what would be proper in the circumstances, and what the public would expect of a HCPC registered Podiatrist. Additionally, fellow professionals would find the conduct deplorable. The Panel determined that the facts found proved did amount to serious professional misconduct on the Registrant’s part.

Decision on Impairment

139. Mr Khan on behalf of the HCPC submitted that, having found the facts proved, the Panel should find that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is impaired.

140. In relation to the personal component, it was stated that there was no evidence of insight or remediation to mitigate any risk of repetition. Mr Khan invited the Panel to consider that the harm caused from the misconduct was the overpayment made to the Registrant which came from public funds.

141. Mr Khan invited the Panel to consider that the misconduct found proven was so serious that finding that the Registrant’s fitness to practise was not impaired would undermine both public confidence in the profession and in the regulatory process.

142. The Panel heard nothing from the Registrant and could not therefore find that she had any insight into her dishonesty and misconduct.

143. The Panel heard submissions from Mr Khan on behalf of the HCPC on the issue of impairment, accepted legal advice and was referred to the Practice Note on ‘Fitness to Practise Impairment’.

144. The Panel considered the case of Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence (CHRE) v Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC) and Grant [2011] EWHC 927 (Admin) which adopted and clarified the test for impairment of fitness to practise, which was formulated by Dame Janet Smith in the Fifth Report of the Shipman Inquiry with reference to the following questions:-
a. Whether the Registrant has in the past acted and/or is liable in the future to act so as to put a service user at unwarranted risk of harm;
b. Whether the Registrant has in the past breached and/or is liable in the future to breach a fundamental tenet of the profession;
c. Whether the Registrant has in the past and/or is liable in the future to act dishonestly;
d. Whether it is highly unlikely that the conduct will be repeated.

145. The Panel found all four limbs of the test to be engaged. It was of the view that whilst there was no evidence of direct service user harm, the Registrant’s conduct had the potential to cause harm to the public as she was fraudulently claiming funds which were derived from taxpayers’ money.

146. The Panel found that the Registrant had breached a fundamental tenet of the profession, to be honest and act with integrity. Her actions would be considered deplorable by fellow professionals, and she had brought the profession into disrepute by her actions. Due to the fact that the Registrant had not engaged with Employer A, the fraud investigation or the regulatory proceedings, the Panel had no evidence before it that she had acknowledged her shortcomings, had undertaken remedial action or reflected to ensure that the conduct would not be repeated in the future.

147. The Panel found that the Registrant had acted dishonesty over a prolonged period, it was not a one-off isolated incident, and there was an element of planning and premeditation. Whilst the Panel acknowledged that the Registrant had repaid the money she was overpaid, there was no admission of guilt such that the Panel could be satisfied that she has demonstrated insight into her behaviour to rule out the risk of future repetition.

148. In the absence of anything from the Registrant the Panel considered that there was a real risk that the conduct would be repeated in the future.

149. The Panel next considered the factors affecting the seriousness of the concerns. The Panel reminded itself of the reasons why it had found the facts proven and was of the view that there was a significant departure from the standards expected of a professional such that the impact on public confidence in the profession had been undermined. The conduct was repeated in nature and involved dishonest conduct which had resulted in a personal financial gain. There was no evidence of any insight, remediation, remorse or reflection from the Registrant.

150. In reaching its decision the Panel considered both the personal and the public component and whether the Registrant’s fitness to practise was impaired at the current time.

151. In considering the personal component, the Panel was persuaded by the arguments advanced on behalf of the HCPC. The Panel found that dishonesty is remediable. However, there has been no acceptance by the Registrant that her behaviour fell below the standards expected of a HCPC registered professional. Additionally, at this time there is no evidence of insight or remediation on the part of the Registrant, and therefore the Panel found that there is a risk of repetition in the future.

152. The Panel concluded that on the personal component the Registrant is currently impaired.

153. The Panel next considered the public component and looked at the ‘critically important public policy issues’. The public is entitled to expect Registrants to be professionally competent and act with decency, honesty and integrity.

154. Due to the lack of engagement by the Registrant the Panel had no evidence that she had developed insight such that there was no likelihood that the conduct would be repeated. Accordingly, there is a future risk of repetition which places the public at a risk of harm from the Registrant defrauding the public purse.

155. The Panel found that the Registrant’s behaviour amounted to serious professional misconduct and fell far short of what would be expected of a professional. The misconduct found proved is sufficiently serious that a finding that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is not impaired would undermine public confidence in the profession and the regulatory process.

156. The Panel found that the misconduct was so serious that the public interest demands a finding of impairment. On any view, a finding of dishonesty which was repeated, and defrauded the public purse, is serious and would cause concern to the public if there was no finding of impairment.

157. The Panel found that the Registrant had breached a number of the Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics, and had failed in one of the fundamental tenets of the profession, to act with honesty and integrity, which brings the profession into disrepute. The regulatory process is in place to ensure professional standards are maintained and to ensure the public has confidence in the profession and its regulation.

158. The Panel was satisfied on the public component that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is currently impaired.

159. The Panel found the Registrant’s fitness to practise to be currently impaired on both the personal and public components.

Decision on Sanction

160. Mr Khan on behalf of the HCPC made representations on sanction with reference to the Sanctions Policy and confirmed that the HCPC remained neutral on the issue of sanction and left this as a matter of judgement for the Panel.

161. The Panel was referred to the Sanctions Policy dated 02 March 2026 and accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor. The Panel was aware that the primary purpose of any sanction is to protect the public and that it should give appropriate weight to the wider public interest which includes the deterrent effect to other registrants, and the need to maintain public confidence in the profession and the regulatory process.

162. The Panel accepted the advice it received as to the proper approach to the making of a decision on sanction. A sanction should never be imposed with the intention of punishing a registrant against whom a finding has been made. Rather, although a sanction might have a punitive effect, it should only be imposed, if required, to protect the public, to maintain a proper degree of confidence in the registered profession and regulation of it, and to declare and uphold proper professional standards. It being the case that a finding that an allegation is well founded does not of itself require the imposition of a sanction, the first decision to be made is whether the particular circumstances of this case require a sanction.

163. The Panel was aware that if a sanction is required, then the available sanctions must be considered in an ascending order of gravity until one that sufficiently addresses the proper sanction aims just identified is reached. Once the Panel reached a tentative view that an appropriate sanction had been identified, it then considered the next more severe sanction to the one identified in order to ensure that it sufficiently addressed the aims of a sanction. The Panel also acknowledged that it must be satisfied that the sanction is proportionate in the sense that it is no more severe than is required.

164. The Panel reminded itself of the principle of proportionality, balancing the Registrant’s interests against the public interest and was mindful that the purpose of a sanction was not to punish the Registrant, but to protect the public from harm and to maintain public confidence in both the profession and in the regulator. The Panel recognised that sanctions can be punitive in character and effect.

165. The Panel referred itself to the Sanctions Policy and found the following mitigating features present:-
a. The lack of any previous fitness to practise / regulatory concerns;
b. The money has been repaid in full by the Registrant.
166. The Panel found the following aggravating features present:-
a. The repeated nature of the dishonesty with an employer over a period of 3 years;
b. The lack of any evidence of insight, remediation, remorse or apology;
c. The dishonesty resulted in personal financial gain to the Registrant and a loss to the public purse;
d. The lack of engagement with Employer A, the fraud investigation and the regulatory process.

167. The Panel considered paragraphs 76 and 77 to be relevant where it is stated:-
’76. A repetition of concerns, or a pattern of unacceptable behaviour, leads to greater potential risks to the public, for a number of reasons such as:
• the fact the conduct or behaviour has been repeated increases the likelihood it may happen again; and
• the repetition indicates the registrant may lack insight.
77. Repeated misconduct or unacceptable behaviour, particularly where previously addressed by employer or regulatory action, is likely to require more restrictive sanctions to address the risks outlined above’.

168. The Panel noted that dishonesty fell under the category of case identified as ‘serious’ and referred itself to paragraphs 87-89 of the Sanctions Policy where it is stated ‘Dishonesty undermines public confidence in the profession and can, in some cases, impact the public’s safety’.

169. In considering dishonesty the Panel reminded itself of the factors that it should take into account in this regard which include:
• whether the relevant behaviour took the form of a single act, or occurred on multiple occasions;
• the duration of any dishonesty;
• the nature of the dishonesty;
• the actual or potential impact of the dishonesty;
• whether the registrant took a passive or active role in it;
• any other relevant aggravating factors; and
• any other relevant mitigating factors.

170. The Panel found the dishonesty to be serious, it occurred over a prolonged period in the workplace, was premeditated and caused a loss to the public purse. The Panel was mindful that the Registrant had not engaged by attending the hearing and had not provided evidence of insight or remediation.

171. The Panel did not think that the matter could be concluded with either no order or a caution. It did not consider these to be appropriate sanctions due to the serious nature of the concerns raised, in particular, the dishonesty was not isolated, there is a risk of repetition and due to the lack of any evidence of insight or remediation by the Registrant. Additionally, these sanctions would not be sufficient to satisfy the wider public interest.

172. The Panel considered a conditions of practice order and the circumstances in which it might be an appropriate sanction. It found that while the concerns found proved were capable of remediation, a conditions of practice would not be workable in this case because the failings were not clinical in nature, the Registrant had not engaged with the regulatory process, and there was no evidence that she had insight into her failings or had taken any action to remediate them. Further, dishonesty may be considered to be attitudinal in nature, which can be more difficult to remediate.

173. The Panel considered paragraph 154 of the Sanctions Policy which states
‘Conditions will only be effective in cases where the registrant is genuinely committed to resolving the concerns raised and the panel is confident they will do so. Therefore, conditions of practice are unlikely to be suitable in cases in which the registrant has failed to engage with the fitness to practise process or where there are serious or persistent failings’.

174. Further, paragraph 155 states
‘Conditions are also less likely to be appropriate in more serious cases, for example those involving:
• dishonesty …’.

175. The Panel concluded that it would not be able to formulate workable conditions which would address the issue of dishonesty as the Registrant was not present and was not engaging with the regulatory process. The Panel did not consider the misconduct to be minor in nature, or that the risk of repetition was low, accordingly, it did not consider conditions of practice to be an appropriate or proportionate sanction in this case.

176. The Panel next considered a suspension order and considered paragraphs 169 – 175 of the Sanctions Policy. The Panel found that, as there was no evidence of insight, it could not be satisfied that there was no risk of the behaviour being repeated. There is no evidence before the Panel to suggest that the Registrant is committed to remedying the failings.

177. The Panel was of the view that the dishonesty was serious for all of the reasons previously given, and that there was a high risk of it being repeated. The Registrant had not engaged fully in the fraud investigation interview by replying ‘no comment’ when asked certain questions and had not engaged with the regulatory proceedings. There was no medical evidence to support her non-attendance.

178. Whilst the Panel noted that the Registrant had repaid the money there was no admission of guilt or acknowledgement that her conduct fell below the high standards expected of HCPC registered professionals. The Panel also noted that the Registrant had avoided criminal proceedings being brought due to the referral to the HCPC.

179. The Panel did not consider that the circumstances of this case were compatible with the criteria set out for when a suspension order might be appropriate.

180. The Panel next considered a striking off order and referred to paragraphs 179 – 181 of the Sanctions Policy. The Panel noted that:-
‘A striking off order will be appropriate for serious, persistent, deliberate or reckless acts which may include (this list is not exhaustive):
• dishonesty;’.

181. The Panel found that the dishonesty was serious, persistent and deliberate in this case, involving harm to the public with the Registrant claiming money she was not entitled to from the public purse.

182. The Panel considered that the false declarations to Employer A, being untruthful when asked about other employment, her application for flexible working to reduce working hours for health reasons, when the result was an uptake in work, and the personal financial gain was fundamentally incompatible with continued registration.

183. The Panel had no evidence that the Registrant had insight into her actions, or was willing to resolve matters, and it found the gravity of the concerns to be such that any lesser sanction would be insufficient to protect the public, public confidence in the profession, and public confidence in the regulatory process.

184. The striking off order is both necessary and proportionate to protect the public from the risk of financial harm that the Registrant poses, and to meet the public interest in maintaining confidence both in the profession and the HCPC. The Panel considered that any lesser sanction was insufficient to mark the seriousness of the conduct, and to uphold public confidence in the profession and its regulator.

Order: The Registrar is directed to strike the name of Rebecca Delaney from the Register on the date this order comes into effect.

Interim Order

Application

1. Mr Khan submitted that the Panel should consider covering the appeal period by imposing an 18-month Interim Suspension Order on the Registrant’s registration. He submitted that such an order was appropriate and proportionate in the circumstances of the case.

Decision
2. The Panel heard and accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor.

3. The Panel noted that the Registrant had been informed by the Notice of Hearing dated 20 January 2026 that if this Panel found the case against her to be well founded and imposed a sanction which removes, suspends or restricts her right to practise, the HCPC may make an application to the Panel to impose an interim order to cover any appeal period. The Notice of Hearing clearly stated that, ‘An interim order suspends or restricts a registrant’s right to practise with immediate effect.’ For the reasons set out in its earlier decision to proceed with the hearing in the absence of the Registrant, the Panel determined that it would be fair and in the interests of justice to consider an interim order application in the Registrant’s absence.

4. The Panel paid careful regard to the Sanctions Policy and the HCPTS Practice Note on ‘Interim Orders’, which offer guidance on interim orders imposed at final hearings after a sanction has been imposed. The guidance states that registrants should be made aware of the potential for an interim order to be imposed on their registration after the panel has made a substantive order and should be given an opportunity to make representations in respect of an interim order.

5. The Panel recognised that its power to impose an interim order is discretionary and that the imposition of such an order is not an automatic outcome of fitness to practise proceedings in which a Striking Off Order has been imposed. The Panel took into consideration the impact of such an order on the Registrant. However, the Panel was mindful of its findings in relation to the Registrant’s dishonesty and misconduct and the risk of repetition if the Registrant were able to practise without restriction.

6. The Panel decided to impose an Interim Suspension Order under Article 31(2) of the Health Professions Order 2001. The Panel was satisfied that an Interim Suspension Order was necessary for the protection of the public and was otherwise in the wider public interest to maintain confidence in the regulatory process.

7. The period of this Order is for 18 months to allow for the possibility of an appeal to be made and determined.
Interim Suspension Order:
The Panel makes an Interim Suspension Order under Article 31(2) of the Health Professions Order 2001, the same being necessary to protect members of the public and being otherwise in the public interest.
This Order will expire: (if no appeal is made against the Panel’s decision and Order) upon the expiry of the period during which such an appeal could be made; (if an appeal is made against the Panel’s decision and Order) the final determination of that appeal, subject to a maximum period of 18 months.

History of Hearings for Mrs Rebecca Delaney