Kenneth Okpalanwaka

Preliminary Matters

Privacy application

1.    The HCPC representative applied for the hearing to be held partly in private, if necessary, due to a health condition experienced by one of the HCPC witnesses. The Registrant’s representative did not object.

2.    The Panel heard and accepted legal advice. It was mindful of the open justice principle but determined that any discrete aspect of the hearing touching upon private health matters should be held in private. 

Amendment of Application

3.    The HCPC applied to amend the application to change the date at Particular 1 from 1 February 2023 – 27 February 2023 to 1 January 2023 - 27 February 2023. The reason for this was the Registrant’s job application would not necessarily have been received by Trust A after 1 February 2023 and the HCPC wanted to ensure that it did not fail due to a technicality as to the time scale. There was a further application to add the word ‘Care’ to Health and Care Profession’s Council, as the initial charge erroneously read ‘Health and Profession’s Council’ rather than ‘Health and Care Profession’s Council.’ 

4.    The Registrant’s representative did not oppose either application.

5.    The Panel accepted legal advice and was mindful that it needed to balance fairness to the Registrant with its overarching duty to protect the public. It determined that there was no unfairness to the Registrant in respect of either amendment, as the substance of the allegation remained unchanged, and it was important that the name of the Regulator was accurately recorded. Accordingly, the Panel allowed both amendments to the Allegation. 

Application to admit hearsay evidence

6.    The HCPC applied to admit a witness statement as hearsay. This statement was from a former member of staff at the HCPC and simply produced and exhibited the Registrant’s Interim Order of Conditions. 

7.    Having taken instructions from the Registrant, the Registrant’s representative did not object to this application.

8.    The Panel accepted legal advice and had regard to the HCPTS Practice Note ‘Evidence’ dated October 2024. It determined that the statement was not the sole and determinative source of evidence against the Registrant. The Panel noted that the maker of the statement did not have personal knowledge of the matters referred to and was simply exhibiting and producing documentary evidence. The Panel determined this documentary evidence could be adduced by another member of HCPC staff from the records and considered that the admission of this evidence as hearsay would not unfairly affect the Registrant. The Panel therefore determined to admit this statement. 

Background

9.    The Registrant is a Radiographer registered with the HCPC. 

10.    On 2 March 2023, the HCPC fitness to practise team received an email from CH, a Services Manager at Liverpool Women’s Hospital, which was then part of Liverpool Women’s NHS Foundation Trust (Trust A). This indicated that the Registrant had applied for a role as a Radiographer, but had not disclosed his interim conditions of practice as part of this application.

11.    The HCPC had previously made an application for an interim order to a panel of the Investigating Committee on 22 November 2022, in respect of an unrelated matter. The Registrant was present at that hearing. At that hearing, the Investigating Committee imposed an Interim Conditions of Practice Order for a period of 18 months. The conditions included a requirement as follows: 

8 “You must inform the following parties that your registration is subject to these conditions… 

c)    any prospective employer in respect of an employment that requires registration with the HCPC.” 

12.    As a result of the enquiry received by CH, the HCPC investigated this matter. On 5 September 2024, a panel of the Investigating Committee determined that there was a case to answer. This substantive hearing was subsequently arranged. 

The HCPC Case

13.    The HCPC representative set out that the Registrant had failed to comply with the Interim Conditions of Practice Order (IOC) that had been imposed on 28 November 2022. It was submitted that the Registrant had not disclosed the conditions of practice to a prospective employer when he submitted his application to Trust A, as he had been obliged to do. The HCPC case was that the Registrant was aware of these conditions and had concealed them with the intention of obtaining employment. 

14.    CH attended the hearing and gave evidence under affirmation. She explained that when a job application is made, she would not know specifically the date that it has been made due to the process and systems for NHS Jobs. However, CH was able to say that she holds a post open for two weeks. She stated that the only way an application would be closed earlier than two weeks was if there was likely to be a high volume of applications for a job, which was not the case for the post the Registrant had applied for. CH produced documentary evidence, including the Registrant’s application form and an email thread, including an email inviting him for an interview on 27 February 2023. The Registrant had not been able to attend on that date and had offered an alternative date on which the interviewing panel was not available. 

15.    CH explained that all job applicants are anonymised until shortlisted for interview. Her process is to check the HCPC register at the stage at which shortlisting occurs, to avoid wasting time. This was the stage at which she noticed the Registrant’s conditions of practice. As the advertised role would require any successful applicant to work independently and unsupervised, CH took advice from ‘HR’ (Human Resources) before rescinding the offer of an interview to the Registrant. She confirmed that this occurred at around the same time that she had contacted the HCPC about the matter.

16.    RM is an employee of the HCPC in Operations Management. She also gave evidence under affirmation, and exhibited the statement of AU, which in turn exhibited the Registrant’s previous conditions of practice. RM confirmed that she had known AU as a colleague within her department, as he had worked within her team. Both RM and AU had no personal knowledge of the case and were simply producing the interim conditions of practice from HCPC records.

Submission of no case to answer

17.    The Registrant’s representative submitted that the HCPC had not factually presented cogent concrete evidence in support of the allegation. He submitted that the evidence was inherently very weak so as even taken at its highest the Panel could not find the facts proved. It appeared that the submission related to the wording of the condition and what was meant by ‘prospective employer’.

18.    The HCPC representative submitted that the Panel should have regard to the relevant practice note. There was clear evidence focusing on the relevant allegations and a documentary basis for this. It was submitted that condition 8c) of the Interim Conditions of Practice Order places a clear positive obligation on the Registrant to disclose the existence of the Order itself, and there was cogent evidence that he had not done so before the Panel. There was therefore a case to answer.

19.    Further, it was submitted that an assessment of dishonesty requires an assessment of the surrounding evidence. Although the Registrant may have an explanation, it was a legitimate inference that the decision not to disclose was a purposeful decision. There was therefore sufficient evidence of a case to answer for both Particulars. If the HCPC case against the Registrant was found proved, dishonesty was clearly a matter that could amount to misconduct.

20.    The Panel heard and accepted legal advice, including references to R v Galbraith 1 WLR (1981), 1039 and regulatory case law. It noticed that it was not able to take into account any defence at this stage. It determined that, taking the documentary and oral evidence at its highest, there was a case for the Registrant to answer. The Panel further determined that this was not the type of case that would not amount to misconduct if found proved, given the allegations of dishonesty. The Panel therefore determined to proceed with the case. 

The Registrant’s case

21.    The Registrant gave evidence under affirmation, assisted by his lay representative. He answered questions under cross-examination from the HCPC representative and answered Panel questions. The Registrant confirmed that his mother tongue is Igbo, but that he was taught in English to post-graduate level in Nigeria. He said that he qualified as a Radiographer 12 years before the application to the Trust was made. The Registrant gave evidence that he had submitted several applications for employment and always disclosed the IOC when the question was asked on the application form. For the application to the Trust, he did not disclose it as the form did not ask the question.

22.    It was explained by the Registrant that the IOC did not specify when he should make the disclosure. He explained that his mode of operation when searching for a job was to disclose it on the form if asked, or at interview, or both. He explained that this disclosure happened a minimum of ten times. The Registrant said it was not possible to hide the information, as the IOC was in the public domain, and he was aware that NHS employers would all check the HCPC website and see it. He disputed that he had hidden the IOC in a dishonest way and said that he took full responsibility for his error of judgement. Under cross-examination, the Registrant continued to dispute that his behaviour had been dishonest. He confirmed he knew about the IOC but said it did not specify when the disclosure should be made to a prospective employer. 

23.    The Registrant was not able to recall exactly when his application to the Trust was made but did not dispute that he was subject to the IOC at that time, although the IOC was later revoked at the first review. The Registrant indicated that he had been poorly represented at the IOC hearing. He said that he did not deliberately hide the IOC from the Trust, that he had not deliberately refused to disclose the IOC, and that he sincerely apologised if this led to a misunderstanding. He acknowledged completing the ‘supporting information’ part of the application to the Trust and denied that he was hoping the Trust would not check.

24.    The Registrant was not able to respond immediately to a question from the Panel about the other job applications he had made, or the timing of these, explaining that he would need time to locate that information. He was released from oath for a brief period to discuss with his lay advisor as to whether he wished to use documentation previously submitted to the HCPC (at the investigation stage) as an aide memoire. The HCPC representative agreed to this course of action and assisted by sharing his screen of the relevant documentation. This confirmed other Trusts that the Registrant indicated he had applied to for roles, disclosing the IOC on the paperwork and still being called for interview, or disclosing it at interview. The Registrant did not provide further detail as to the dates or times of these applications. 

HCPC application

25.    The HCPC representative applied to adjourn the proceedings to adduce further evidence. This included documentary evidence and witness evidence from the HCPC as to the Registrant’s evidence on oath regarding his first language. The Registrant’s representative objected to the adjournment, indicating that he was concerned by it, and that it was a ‘red herring’.

26.    The Panel heard and accepted legal advice. It determined not to allow the HCPC time to produce additional evidence at this stage of proceedings. The Panel considered that the additional evidence was not fundamental to the case before it or the decisions that it was required to take. It therefore refused the HCPC application for an adjournment.

Closing Submissions on behalf of the HCPC

27.    The HCPC representative submitted that the HCPC had the burden of proof in respect of proving each Particular. It was submitted that the documentary evidence demonstrated the fact of the Registrant’s application, and that the oral evidence of CH made clear that it was more likely than not that the application was received within the time period set out in the Particular. It was stated that the Registrant had not disputed that the role applied for required HCPC registration.

28.    It was submitted that the Registrant had not complied with the IOC in making Trust A aware of it. Trust A became a prospective employer at the time the Registrant made the application, and the IOC placed a clear and positive obligation on the Registrant. It was submitted that whether the Registrant was intending to make the disclosure later was not relevant at this stage of the proceedings. 

29.    The HCPC representative submitted that evidence given in the context of being accused of being dishonest is such that the Panel should be conscious of its self-serving potential. There was no suggestion that the Registrant did not understand the IOC, and he had accepted that registrants are expected to act in a way that is open, honest, and trustworthy. It was submitted that it was unclear how the Registrant thought poor representation had resulted in a purposeful decision to hold back information from a prospective employer. The relevant information as to conditions should have been disclosed at an early stage in the process. It was submitted that the Registrant was aware of the IOC and the positive duty to disclose, and the Panel was invited to find his conduct dishonest by the standards of ordinary or decent people.

Registrant’s closing submissions

30.    The Registrant’s representative submitted that the Registrant had not acted dishonestly and had made an error of judgement. The Registrant believed he was complying and looked into the wording of the conditions. It was submitted that the Registrant had applied to several other organisations, and the HCPC would have been bombarded with referrals if he had failed to disclose the IOC to these organisations either at interview or during the application process. The Registrant’s oral evidence that he had been invited to interview even when he had disclosed the IOC on an application was highlighted. 

31.    It was submitted that the Registrant knew NHS hospitals definitely checked information, and a dishonest person would not hide something where it would have been seen immediately. It was submitted that the Registrant did not have in mind to deceive or hide the information. Further, negligence is not a failure of core honesty. The Registrant had apologised and acknowledged that the HCPC as a body did a good thing in protecting the public. 

32.    The representative suggested that CH may have forgotten the date that she received the form as she has forgotten it was a diagnostic Radiographer role that was advertised. The Registrant’s state of mind was that he would disclose the conditions whenever asked or at interview, and that there was no evidence to contradict what he had said.

Legal Advice

33.    The Legal Assessor reminded the Panel of the Equality Act 2010 and the public sector equality duty. The Panel was reminded that it should assess the weight of any hearsay evidence admitted. Advice was provided as to the burden of proof, including that any doubt should be resolved in the Registrant’s favour. The Panel was taken to helpful case law to assist it with assessing evidence. The test for dishonesty as set out in the case of Ivey v Genting Casinos (2018) 2 All ER 406 was explained, along with additional case law. The Panel was directed to the HCPTS Practice Note ‘Making decisions on a Registrant’s state of mind’ dated August 2025. A good character direction was provided. 

Decision on Facts

34.    The Panel acknowledged the Registrant’s good character and accepted the legal advice received. It carefully considered each Particular in turn.

35.    The Panel noted that the date the IOC was made was not contested by the Registrant. It accepted the clear documentary evidence of the existence of the IOC, the date it was made, and the date it was later revoked. The Panel also noted that the Registrant accepted his application to Trust A as adduced by the HCPC was correct. There was nothing additional provided as to disclosures to Trust A other than the HCPC evidence. The Panel accepted CH’s evidence as to the timing the application was received on the balance of probabilities. 

36.    Accordingly, the Panel found that the Registrant did not disclose to Trust A either the IOC or the conditions that he was subject to. It was the view of the Panel that Trust A became a prospective employer at the time the Registrant’s application for employment was made. The Panel had clear documentary evidence that the Registrant had not disclosed the IOC or its conditions within the time parameters as set out in Particular 1. The Panel therefore determined that Particular 1 a) and b) were both proved. 

37.    The Panel then moved on to consider Particular 2. It bore in mind the test as set out in the case in ‘Ivey’ and considered each limb in turn. 

38.    The Panel acknowledged that the documentary evidence made clear that there was not a box on the application form that the Registrant sent to the Trust asking about fitness to practise history or conditions of practice. However, it determined that the IOC clearly placed a positive obligation upon the Registrant to disclose his conditions of practice to all potential employers when applying for roles for which HCPC registration was required. 

39.    It was the Registrant’s evidence that he understood the IOC, and he had also accepted during his evidence that the Trust was a potential employer. The Panel noted the evidence that the Registrant was making multiple job applications and was aware of both the IOC and the obligation upon him to disclose it. It also noted that there were emails sent by the Registrant to Trust A during the time scale referred to in Particular 1. Further, the documentary evidence was clear that the Registrant had not referred at any point to the IOC within these emails, once his application had been made.

40.    The Panel found that the Registrant would have had the IOC at the forefront of his mind because he was making multiple job applications, and due to the strict requirements of the IOC which would have had an impact on the ability of any prospective employer to employ him. It considered that as a registered healthcare professional, he understood the duty to be trustworthy, honest, and transparent. What was in the Registrant’s mind was therefore that he knew he had a positive duty to disclose and was fully aware of the IOC. The Panel noted that the Registrant had inserted a significant amount of positive information into the supplementary box on the application Form to Trust A. It was not simply the case that he had only filled in basic information and ticked boxes on the form. The Panel determined that in these circumstances, the Registrant had made a positive decision not to disclose the IOC within that supplementary box, knowing that to do so would harm his employment prospects.

41.    The Panel then moved on to consider limb 2 of Ivey. It found that ordinary decent people would consider the conduct of the Registrant in failing to proactively put forward information about the IOC in accordance with its conditions to be dishonest, in circumstances in which he had a positive obligation to do so. 

42.    It was the determination of the Panel that Particular 2 a) was found proved on the basis that the Registrant had deliberately concealed information that he knew he had a positive duty to disclose to Trust A, as he had not disclosed this on the application form or in his email correspondence. 

43.    Further, the Panel determined that Particular 2 b) was made out on the basis that the Registrant had presented incomplete information to Trust A with a view to obtaining employment, as the purpose of his job application was clearly to obtain employment with Trust A. 

Decision on Grounds

Submissions on behalf of HCPC

44.    It was submitted that it was for the Panel to decide if the proven facts amount to the statutory ground of misconduct. An important aspect was the harm or risk of harm that might result from the proven facts. The Representative directed the Panel to the relevant section of the HCPC Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics (in effect from January 2016 until August 2024) (the Standards), which it was suggested that the Registrant had breached.

45.    It was submitted that a fundamental aspect of an interim order is protecting both the public and the wider public interest. If a condition was not complied with, the risk is that the condition which an independent panel had considered necessary was at risk of not being achieved. Further, it was submitted that these issues were enhanced when there were findings of dishonesty. It was submitted that dishonest non-compliance with an IOC was a serious matter.

Submissions on behalf of the Registrant

46.    It was acknowledged that the Panel had found the facts proven but submitted that the Panel had not identified deep-seated behaviour. It was stated that this was an isolated incident, even though the Panel may be considering the impact on the reputation of the profession.

47.    The Registrant’s representative submitted that the incident on its own should not be regarded as reaching the threshold for misconduct on its own, in all the circumstances. The Panel was invited to determine the threshold for misconduct had not been reached.

Panel Decision

48.    The Panel heard and accepted legal advice. It was mindful that misconduct is a matter for its own professional judgement, there being no burden or standard of proof.

49.    It was the finding of the Panel that dishonesty is a serious failing. The IOC was imposed on the Registrant to protect the public and protect public confidence in the profession. The failure to disclose this to Trust A therefore undermined the role of the Regulator.

50.    The Panel’s findings of fact were that there was an element of concealment of the IOC and the specific conditions of practice for the Registrant’s personal gain. It considered that the Registrant’s failure to disclose the IOC was likely to be attitudinal, as it was a deliberate act.

51.    It was accepted by the Panel that this was an isolated incident and related to a failure to provide information rather than providing false information. Nevertheless, there was a clear breach of the Standards demonstrating a lack of integrity and a failure to comply with the regulatory process. The Panel found that the conduct found proved clearly crossed the threshold into serious professional misconduct.

Decision on Impairment

Submissions on behalf of HCPC

52.    The HCPC representative endorsed the relevant HCPTS Practice Note and reminded the Panel it was considering fitness to practise today. It was submitted that the Panel decision did not appear to fall into the rejected defence case as envisaged by the case of Sawati. 

53.    The general principles of fitness to practise impairment were set out, and the HCPC representative addressed both the personal and public components. It was submitted that serious attitudinal behavioural issues are more difficult to remediate. Further, dishonesty circumventing public protection engaged the public component. There is a fundamental public trust issue raised if a purposeful breach of an interim order is not robustly addressed.

Submissions on behalf of Registrant

54.    The Registrant’s representative submitted that the Registrant is a family man. The Registrant understood the error that he had made and that the Panel had found proven. The Registrant understood what he had gone through, the impact on his profession and his career. It was submitted that the Registrant had openly expressed remorse and promised such a thing would never happen again. 

55.    It was submitted that the Registrant had not been able to practise his profession for four years, so the public would conclude that four years of punishment was enough. The Registrant’s representative submitted that this was an isolated incident that happened once, and attitudinal issues should not be defined by a single incident. The representative submitted that the Registrant’s attitude towards honesty and integrity can only be measured by looking at the totality of his behaviours across many situations. 

56.    The Registrant’s representative submitted that the Registrant had learnt through his experience of the regulatory process and there was no risk of repetition. He invited the Panel to find that the Registrant’s fitness to practise was no longer impaired, and that the Registrant was ready to go back to the profession.

Panel Decision

57.    The Panel heard and accepted legal advice. As well as the submissions, it had regard to the documents submitted by the Registrant, which consisted of a reference from Nigeria dated 22 November 2022 (so prior to the time of the facts found proved), a two-page handwritten letter from the Registrant completed on day four of the hearing, and a number of recent clinical CPD certificates. The Panel considered the HCPTS Practice Note ‘Fitness to Practice Impairment’ dated August 2025. It was mindful that it was considering the Registrant’s current fitness to practise, and that its role was not to punish him for past misconduct. 

58.    The Panel accepted that this was an isolated incident. It determined there was no direct harm caused to patients or colleagues, and no clinical concerns. However, the Panel considered that there was a risk of harm occurring had the Registrant started work without complying with the IOC, which was there to protect the public. His omission to disclose this therefore had the potential to put the wider public at risk.

59.    The Panel noted that the Registrant had apologised and expressed remorse for his behaviour. It accepted that there was not a pattern of dishonesty or a pattern of attitudinal issues. It was the view of the Panel that dishonesty is attitudinal, and on this occasion, it involved a deliberate omission. The Panel concluded that the Registrant’s insight was not fully developed, as he had failed to fully consider and understand his responsibility to disclose the conditions and the impact his omission could have had on the public or the wider profession. 

60.    It was the conclusion of the Panel that the Registrant had breached a fundamental tenet of the profession, as he had acted dishonestly. The Panel had no doubt that the Registrant had learnt a lesson, but it appeared that he viewed the ongoing proceedings as a punishment, rather than fully appreciating the seriousness of his omission to disclose an IOC to a potential employer, in breach of conditions imposed by his Regulator. 

61.    It was the finding of the Panel that although the Registrant’s actions are remediable, he had not yet taken full responsibility for his conduct or shown fully developed insight. This meant that the risk of repetition remained. The Panel therefore concluded that the personal component was engaged, and that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is impaired on this component.

62.    The Panel also considered the test as set out in CHRE v NMC (and Grant) (2011) EWHC 927 (Admin). It considered that an ordinary member of the public would expect the Regulator to act in a case in which a registrant had dishonestly breached conditions imposed by that Regulator. It found that public confidence in both the profession and the Regulator would be undermined if there was no finding of impairment. Accordingly, the Panel determined that the public component was also engaged and necessitated a finding that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is currently impaired. 

Decision on Sanction

Submissions on behalf of HCPC

63.    The HCPC representative confirmed that the HCPC did not make any submission for the Panel to impose a particular sanction in this case. He referred the Panel to the HCPC Sanctions Policy updated on 2 March 2026 and helpfully took the Panel through the guidance in relation to mitigating and aggravating features, together with the guidance in relation to dishonesty. He reminded the Panel of the overarching aim of protecting the public, maintaining public confidence in the profession, and upholding proper professional standards.

64.    In relation to mitigating factors, he acknowledged that the Panel had found that the Registrant’s actions were an isolated incident and that no actual harm had been caused. However, he submitted that no harm was caused due to the issue being identified by the Trust and that there was an inherent risk of harm in that the Registrant had deliberately attempted to undermine an order that had sought to protect the public.

65.    In relation to aggravating factors, the HCPC representative submitted that insight, remorse, apology, and remediation are all factors for the Panel to assess. He acknowledged that there had been some apology and a degree of remorse expressed by the Registrant but asked the Panel to consider what that related to and submitted that it was not for dishonesty, as the Registrant had not accepted that during the proceedings. He also submitted that the Registrant’s lack of insight was an aggravating feature in this case and that an assessment of insight is a key consideration of the appropriate sanction. He reminded the Panel of its finding at the impairment stage that the Registrant’s insight was not developed and that he had not taken responsibility for his actions. In relation to remediation, he submitted that it was not possible for a person to remediate issues they have no insight into and therefore submitted that there was no evidence of remediation either. 

66.    In relation to dishonesty, he submitted that this was the most prominent misconduct in this case. He submitted that dishonesty is considered to be serious and evaporates trust, and that without trust there is no confidence, and without confidence in the profession the regulator is not achieving one of its objectives. He took the Panel through the spectrum of dishonesty in accordance with the guidance in the Sanctions Policy and submitted that the Registrant’s actions could be categorised as being at the higher end of that spectrum due to the following:

•    Duration of dishonesty - despite it being an isolated act, there were opportunities during the emails the Registrant had exchanged with the Trust where he could have notified them of the missing information, but the dishonesty was maintained during that period;

•    Nature of dishonesty - that this was a purposeful act of concealing information in order to undermine the regulator’s public protection measures and therefore a risk to the public naturally follows; 

•    The actual or potential impact of the dishonesty – that there was a wider public interest in assessing to what degree will the regulator or the profession be undermined if a robust response was not given to someone who attempts to undermine its public protection measures by dishonest means; and 

•    Whether the Registrant took a passive or active role - this was a deliberate act by the Registrant to conceal the information about the IOC from the Trust and not a negligent act on his behalf.

67.    The HCPC representative then took the Panel through the various sanctions available, submitting that the Panel must start at the least restrictive sanction and work upwards in seriousness in accordance with the concept of proportionality. He referred the Panel to the guidance in the Sanctions Policy in relation to Conditions of Practice Orders, Suspension Orders, and Striking Off Orders and outlined when they may be considered appropriate and proportionate to address the risks identified, protect the public, and meet the wider public interest.

Submissions on behalf of Registrant

68.    The Registrant referred the Panel to the bundle of documents consisting of 23 pages provided on 30 September 2026. He confirmed that he had nothing further to add other than what had already been provided.

Panel Decision

69.    The Panel heard and accepted legal advice. As well as the submissions from the HCPC representative, it read and considered the bundle of documents provided by the Registrant.

70.    The Panel acknowledged that punishment of the Registrant should form no part of the reason for the imposition of a sanction. Rather, protection of the public, the maintenance of public confidence in the profession and the regulation of it, together with the upholding of proper professional standards, are factors that should dictate whether a sanction is required, and, if it is, what that sanction should be. Any sanction decided upon should be the least restrictive to address the aims of the regulatory misconduct process. The various sanction options must be considered in an ascending order of seriousness.

71.    The Panel considered the mitigating and aggravating factors and identified the following as mitigating factors:

•    Isolated incident – the act of failing to disclose the IOC on the application form to the Trust was a single act, although the Panel considered this was a deliberate act on the Registrant’s behalf;

•    Short duration – although this was as a result of the Trust’s checks with the regulator which identified the failure to disclose the information, rather than the Registrant disclosing the information to them;

•    Insight – the Panel acknowledged that the Registrant had shown some insight, although it agreed that this insight was limited at this stage; and

•    Remorse – the Panel acknowledged the Registrant’s handwritten letter provided during the latter stages of the Substantive Hearing in which he said “I apologise for the situation that I found myself in and I regret dearly and which will never happen again”, although the Panel agreed this apology did not relate to the dishonesty found proven.

72.    The Panel then identified the following as aggravating factors:

•    Duration of the act – the Panel agreed that the Registrant had opportunities within the emails exchanged with the Trust to notify them of the undisclosed information in his application form, yet failed to do so. It was the Trust that brought the dishonesty to an end when the Registrant’s failure to disclose the information was identified by the checks made with the regulator and the Registrant had not brought the dishonesty to an end himself;

•    Lack of sufficient insight – the Panel noted that the reflective piece provided by the Registrant in the bundle received on 30 September 2026 still suggested limited insight in relation to dishonesty, in that he still viewed his actions as being an error of judgement rather than an attempt to hide the fact he was subject to an IOC at the time of the application. The Panel also noted that at no stage had the Registrant demonstrated any insight in relation to the potential harm to the public; in fact, he appeared to consider his actions had caused no danger at all;

•    Insufficient evidence of remorse or a genuine apology for the conduct found proven - the only apology provided appeared to be for his situation in facing fitness to practise proceedings and not for his act of dishonestly in deliberately failing to disclose information that could have put the public at risk of harm. The Panel noted that, despite acknowledging the finding of dishonesty, the bundle provided by the Registrant for this hearing did not apologise for his dishonest action, placing the public at risk, or bringing the profession into disrepute;

•    Lack of reflection - the documents provided to the Panel on 30 September 2026 failed to provide sufficient reflection of the potential risk of harm to the public. The Panel noted that the reflection talked about public confidence but did not acknowledge or accept that the Registrant’s actions created a risk to the public. The Panel agreed that the reflection provided did not apologise or show any remorse. It accepted the Panel’s finding of dishonesty, although did not apologise for it and suggested that the Registrant did not understand the danger to the public or consider himself to be a danger; 

•    Lack of remediation – the Panel agreed that the Registrant’s actions are remediable but the reflection statement and completed CPD and short online courses did not demonstrate a genuine effort to remediate. The CPD was not focussed and, despite the 4-month adjournment of the hearing since June, it mostly related to clinical training and those relating to professional standards were few in number, had been completed in the days before the hearing, and involved online courses of a short duration. There was no evidence he had addressed the risk to the public or to public confidence in the profession and no acknowledgement that his actions had been wrong or dishonest;

•    Risk of repetition – the Panel considered that the limited evidence of insight and remediation was wholly insufficient for it to be satisfied that there was no risk of repetition. The Registrant had not provided evidence of how his conduct no longer poses a risk to the public or to public confidence and trust in the profession; and

•    Potential impact of harm – whilst no actual harm was caused, had the information not been discovered, there was a genuine risk to the public and also a potential wider impact on public confidence in the profession. The Registrant’s actions involved a deliberate attempt to undermine the regulator’s intention to protect the public by imposing restrictions on his practice, whether the Registrant felt those restrictions were justified or not.

73.    The Panel then considered the guidance within the Sanctions Policy in relation to dishonesty. The Panel considered that the Registrant appeared to accept his actions were untruthful, although he described them as “misleading”, and he had showed some acceptance of the dishonesty found proven and accepted the importance of integrity. The Panel noted the HCPC’s submissions that the Registrant’s dishonesty was at the higher end of the spectrum and considered the guidance in the HCPC Sanctions Policy, together with the different degrees of dishonesty and factors to be taken into account.

74.    The Panel considered the mitigating and aggravating factors and how they affected its assessment of seriousness. The Panel agreed that the Registrant’s actions were very serious as they involved dishonesty, but the lack of insight and remediation in particular caused the Panel concern as this increased the risk of repetition and therefore increased the risk to the public. 

75.    The Panel therefore agreed that this is a case that requires the imposition of a sanction. To take no further action would neither protect the public from the risk of future harm that has already been identified, nor would it maintain confidence in the profession or the regulator. For the same reason, a Caution Order would not be appropriate. 

76.    The Panel also agreed that, as the case involved attitudinal issues and not clinical shortcomings, it was difficult to formulate conditions of practice that can satisfactorily address the dishonesty demonstrated by the Registrant’s conduct. In any event, the Panel agreed that the Registrant’s actions undermined a public protection order, which pushed it into a more serious category, and therefore agreed that to impose a Conditions of Practice Order would not meet the public interest.

77.    The Panel then considered a Suspension Order and the guidance within the Sanctions Policy. The Panel agreed that the concerns were serious and considered whether a Suspension Order would adequately meet its overarching consideration of protecting the public. It also considered whether a Suspension Order would satisfy the wider public interest, including the maintenance of the public confidence in the profession and the regulatory process. 

78.    The Panel agreed that a Suspension Order would protect the public from the risk of future harm for the duration of the Order and would satisfy the wider public interest. The Panel considered the length of a Suspension Order and agreed that the Registrant’s insight was extremely limited and that he had provided no evidence to suggest he has remedied his failings, despite having had the opportunity to do so. The Panel agreed that a Suspension Order of 12 months would give the Registrant a further opportunity to demonstrate insight and remediation. The Panel acknowledged that the Registrant had engaged with the regulatory proceedings so far and had started to show limited insight, although he needed to develop this further and demonstrate satisfactory remediation prior to any review hearing.

79.    The Panel agreed that a Striking Off Order was disproportionate at this stage and agreed that a Suspension Order for a period of 12 months would not only protect the public but would give the Registrant the opportunity over the course of a year to demonstrate sufficient insight and remediation to satisfy a panel that there was no longer a risk of repetition.

80.    The Panel therefore determined that the appropriate sanction in this case was a Suspension Order for a period of 12 months. The Panel considered its overarching objective is to protect the public and in this case such an order was necessary and proportionate.

81.    The Panel considered that the following would assist a future panel when reviewing the Suspension Order:

•    The Registrant’s continued attendance and engagement with the regulatory proceedings;

•    A detailed reflective statement from the Registrant to address the impact of dishonesty on both public protection and public confidence in the profession; and

•    Evidence of training that relates to the Registrant’s understanding and application of the professional standards expected of him.

82.    The Panel considered whether this sanction was a proportionate response and took into account the Registrant’s interests and how such an Order would affect him. However, the Panel agreed that the Registrant’s interests were outweighed by its overarching requirement to protect the public.

83.    The Panel was therefore satisfied that a Suspension Order was a proportionate response. It determined that no lesser sanction would protect the public from the risk of repetition or would sufficiently ensure public confidence in the profession or would send an appropriate message to other registrants of the unacceptability of the Registrant’s actions.

That the Registrar is directed to suspend the registration of Mr Kenneth Okpalanwaka for a period of 12 months from the date this order comes into effect.

Interim Order

Submissions on behalf of HCPC

1.    The HCPC representative made an application for an Interim Suspension Order for 18 months.  He pointed out that the primary order would not take effect for at least 28 days and the public would not be protected by any order until then. If an appeal were to be made by the Registrant, the primary order would not come into effect until that appeal had been withdrawn or otherwise disposed of.

2.    It was submitted that it was necessary that an Interim Suspension Order was imposed for reasons of public protection and that it is otherwise in the public interest.  He also submitted that it was proportionate to impose an interim order as it related only to the period prior to the primary order coming into effect or for any appeal being dealt with.

Submissions on behalf of the Registrant

3.    The Registrant confirmed that he understood the application made by the HCPC and that he had no submissions to make to the Panel.

Panel Decision

4.    The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor and took into account the guidance as set out in the HCPTS Practice Note entitled ‘Interim Orders’ updated in June 2026. In particular, the Panel had regard to the section relating to interim orders imposed at substantive hearings after a sanction has been imposed.

5.    The Panel was advised to consider whether such an order is necessary for the protection of the public, otherwise in the public interest, or if it is in the Registrant’s own interests. The Panel also considered the principle of proportionality, balancing the Registrant’s interests against the need to protect the public.

6.    The Panel considered whether to impose an Interim Order. In its findings on impairment the Panel concluded that there is a need to protect the public from the risk of harm.  The Panel decided that it would be wholly incompatible with those earlier findings and the imposition of a Suspension Order to conclude that an Interim Suspension Order was not necessary for the protection of the public.

7.    The Panel agreed there was no evidence to suggest that an interim order was necessary in the Registrant’s own interests.

8.    For the same reasons given in its determination on sanction, the Panel concluded that an Interim Conditions of Practice Order would not be appropriate. The Panel therefore determined that an 18-month Interim Suspension Order is appropriate and proportionate pending the expiration of an appeal period.

9.    The Panel took into account the Registrant’s interests, but decided that his interests were outweighed by the need to protect the public. The Panel concluded that an Interim Suspension Order should be imposed on public protection grounds and otherwise in the public interest.

10.    The Panel makes an Interim Suspension Order under Article 31(2) of the Health Professions Order 2001, the same being necessary to protect members of the public and is otherwise in the public interest.

This Order will expire:

i.    (if no appeal is made against the Panel’s decision and Order) upon the expiry of the period during which such an appeal could be made;

ii.    (if an appeal is made against the Panel’s decision and Order) the final determination of that appeal.

The maximum length of this order is 18 months.

History of Hearings for Kenneth Okpalanwaka