Stephen Spencer

Preliminary Matters

Service

1.    The Panel was satisfied on the basis of the documents before it that the Registrant had been properly served with Notice of this hearing. It had sight of the letter sent by email to the Registrant’s registered email address on 30 April 2026 informing him of the date and time of the remote hearing. The Panel was aware, in view of the legal advice it received, that 28 days’ notice is required and that all that is required of the Regulator is to evidence that notice has been sent to the Registrant’s address as held on the Register. The Health and Care Professions Council (Coronavirus) (Amendment) Rules 2021 allow for the service of documents by email. The Panel had sight of the email delivery receipt and the Registrant’s Certificate of Registration, which confirmed his email address. The Panel determined that good service had been effected.

Proceeding in absence

2.    Ms Bernard-Stevenson made an application to proceed in the Registrant’s absence. She submitted that the Panel could be satisfied that the Registrant was aware of this hearing and had chosen not to attend. She informed the Panel that his last contact with the HCPC had been in June 2025. She submitted that in these circumstances an adjournment was unlikely to result in his attendance at a future date. As to disadvantage, there would necessarily be some disadvantage, but the Panel did have information as to his position on the Allegation from the internal investigation documentation included in the bundle. The Registrant had had opportunity to submit written representations and had chosen not to. Finally, she submitted that the hearing was already three to four years after the alleged events giving rise to it, and delay would further impact on the memories of witnesses. She invited the Panel to proceed in the Registrant’s absence.     

3.    The Panel was aware that in accordance with Rule 11 of the Conduct and Competence Committee Rules it had a discretion to proceed in the Registrant’s absence. In determining whether in all the circumstances it was fair to do so, the Panel took into account the HCPTS Practice Note on ‘Proceeding in the absence of the Registrant’. It was aware, in view of the legal advice it received, of the factors which should inform its decision, as set out in R v Jones [2003] UKPC 34. It had regard to the case of General Medical Council v Adeogba [2016] EWCA Civ 162 where the judge summarised the position as follows: “Where there is good reason not to proceed the case should be adjourned; where there is not however, it is only right that it should proceed”. 

4.    The Panel considered that all reasonable steps had been taken to serve notice on the Registrant and the information sent to him informed him of his right to request an adjournment or make written submissions. He had done neither and the Panel concluded that he had chosen not to participate and hence waived his right to attend. There was nothing to suggest he would attend at a future date. Whilst there was an obvious disadvantage in that he could not give the Panel his version of events, this was the inevitable consequence of his decision not to attend. There was a public interest in dealing with the matter expeditiously given the time that had already elapsed, and in addition to the inconvenience to witnesses who were planning to attend this hearing, the impact on memory of further delay could not be ignored. The Panel determined that in all the circumstances it was fair to proceed in the Registrant’s absence. 

Privacy application

5.    Ms Bernard-Stevenson made a privacy application relating to submissions she planned to make in an application for discontinuance in part. The witness who would not be attending the hearing was unable to do so due to [redacted]. Aspects of her submissions in relation to the discontinuance application would therefore need, she submitted, to be heard in private. Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted that whilst the starting point is always that matters are dealt with in public to ensure transparency of the process, issues going to health or private life are an exception to that general principle.

6.    The Panel was aware, in view of the legal advice it received, that it has a discretion to hold parts of a hearing in private where, in accordance with Rule 10(1)(a) of the Conduct and Competence Committee Rules, matters of the private life of an individual arise. The Panel was aware that in such circumstances there are competing interests; the public interest in transparency or open justice, the means through which confidence in the process is maintained, and the interests of the individual in privacy regarding matters of health and their private life. In the circumstances before the Panel, it determined that the interests of the witness in maintaining privacy with regard to [redacted] outweighed any public interest in those matters being heard in public. The application to hear references to those matters in private was granted.

Application for discontinuance in part

7.    Ms Bernard-Stevenson made an application to discontinue three particulars of the Allegation, as set out in the extract of the Original Allegation above.

8.    She submitted that the HCPC was able to offer no evidence as the witness who supported those was unable to attend the hearing due to [redacted]. 

9.    Ms Bernard-Stevenson acknowledged that there was a statement from this witness, Colleague C, within the bundle. However, this was hearsay evidence due to her non-attendance. The HCPC’s position was that this was the sole and decisive evidence relating to particulars 5, 6, and 7 and had taken the view that it was therefore unlikely that the Panel would admit it into evidence. Without the evidence of Colleague C there was no realistic prospect of particulars 5, 6, and 7 being proven. 

10.    Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted that discontinuing these particulars would not amount to under-prosecution because the majority of the Allegation remained and the HCPC would be calling three witnesses in respect of those allegations. 

11.    The Panel considered that it would have been of assistance to have up-to-date information as to [redacted]. However, it understood the HCPC’s rationale for not contacting her again, in view of [redacted]. The Panel considered that it would have been unlikely to grant a hearsay application in respect of her evidence, and having reviewed the evidence bundle, there was no other evidence to support particulars 5, 6, and 7. As such, the Panel determined that there was no realistic prospect of these particulars being proved. The Panel considered that discontinuing this part of the Allegation would not amount to under-prosecution because there were other allegations of a similar nature, with conduct which was alleged to have been sexually motivated and of a sexual nature. As such, the Panel granted the application. 

Consideration of bias of the panel due to sight of inadmissible material

12.    At the Panel’s request, in view of the decision on discontinuance, Ms Bernard-Stevenson addressed the issue of whether the Panel was able to hear the case, having had sight of Colleague C’s witness statement and exhibits (internal meeting notes).

13.    Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted that the evidence the Panel had seen did not give rise to actual or perceived bias, in line with the ‘test’ set out in Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357, as it was an experienced panel and the members were able to put irrelevant evidence out their minds. She submitted that a fair-minded informed observer would not think that there was a real possibility of bias in these circumstances. 

14.    The Panel heard legal advice referencing, in addition to Porter v Magill, Johnson v Johnson (2000) 210 CLR 448; R (Mahfouz) v Professional Conduct Committee of the GMC [2004] EWCA Civ 233; Murphy v General Teaching Council for Scotland 1997 SLT 1152; R (Short and ors) v Police Misconduct Tribunal and ors [2020] EWHC 385; and AB, a barrister v Bar Standards Board [2020] EWHC 3285 (Admin). It was aware that the question of a real possibility of actual or perceived bias turned on the nature of the inadmissible material and the Panel’s experience and ability to put such matters aside. 

15.    The Panel was satisfied that as an experienced Panel, members were able to put irrelevant material out of their minds and there was no possibility of actual bias arising from sight of Colleague C’s witness statement and associated evidence. The question of whether an informed member of the public would consider there to be bias impacting on the Panel’s decision with regard to the remaining particulars, the Panel had regard to the information such a person would have. This would include that the Panel had itself recognised this issue and asked for it to be addressed, and had received legal advice reminding it of the test and how the matter is approached by the courts. Such a member of the public would be aware of the Panel’s significant experience in the field of professional regulation, and that Panel members comprised a former Police Officer, a Solicitor, and a registered Operating Department Practitioner (ODP). An informed observer would not think there was a real possibility of bias by such a panel. The Panel determined that there was no requirement for it to recuse itself and it could proceed to hear the case.

Background

16.    The Registrant was, at the relevant time, employed as an Operating Department Practitioner by the Wrightington Wigan and Leigh Teaching Hospital NHS Foundation Trust (‘the Trust’). He had moved to Wrightington Hospital via internal transfer in February 2022.

17.    Following an internal investigation into, among other things, the matters which form the Allegation, the Divisional Director of Nursing made a referral to the HCPC.

18.    The Panel had sight of the internal investigation documentation and heard from the following witnesses called on behalf of the HCPC:

•    Colleague D, Senior Operating Department Practitioner;

•    Colleague B, Operating Department Practitioner (student at the time of events in 2022);

•    Colleague A, Nurse.

19.    Ms Bernard-Stevenson, having taken the witnesses through their evidence (summarised in relation to the particulars below), submitted that the Panel had evidence to find each particular proved. 

20.    With regard to particulars 1 and 2, the Panel was invited to accept Colleague A’s evidence over the account given by the Registrant during the Trust’s internal investigation.

21.    In respect of particulars 3 and 4, Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted that the Panel could accept the evidence of Colleague B, and this, combined with the partial admission made by the Registrant during the internal investigation, was also sufficient for the Panel to find dishonesty. 

22.    Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted that the evidence of Colleague D should be preferred over what the Registrant had stated during the internal investigation, particularly as she had written an account of the event on the day it took place. That was in evidence before the Panel. The Panel had, she submitted, evidence of sexual conduct, which had not been consented to, and which was sexually motivated, there being no other plausible explanation. Both Colleague D and Colleague A had given credible evidence as to how the Registrant’s conduct made them feel and the Panel could find particular 10 proved. She submitted that the Registrant’s actions were in part with a view to creating an intimidating or humiliating environment. 

23.    The Panel accepted the Legal Assessor’s advice and was aware that:

•    the burden of proof is on the HCPC and the standard of proof is the civil standard, the balance of probabilities;

•    the Panel’s role was to determine, on the evidence, whether each particular can properly be found proved. In doing so it should take into account the entirety of the evidence; its reliability, accuracy, and credibility;

•    the words of the Allegation should be accorded their usual meaning/ordinary interpretation;

•    the court in Dutta v General Medical Council [2020] EWHC 1974 advised panels to start with unchallenged documentary evidence. In that case the tribunal’s decision was found to be flawed because the panel started looking at credibility before considering unchallenged documents. The Judge emphasised that human memory is often unreliable and contemporaneous records are more likely to provide reliable evidence;

•    evidence in the bundle relating to Colleague C and the discontinued allegation, in addition to Trust documentation that was not relevant to the Allegation before the Panel, was to be disregarded;

•    in relation to sexual motivation, the Panel was referred to Basson v General Medical Council [2018] EWHC 505 (Admin). With regard to conduct being sexual, helpful guidance was given in General Medical Council v Haris [2020] EWHC 2518 (Admin) and Haris v General Medical Council [2021] EWCA Civ 763. Whether conduct is sexual or there is sexual motivation is to be inferred in the absence of explanation for conduct which is sexual in nature.

•    when determining dishonesty, the applicable test is that set out in Ivey v Genting Casinos UK Ltd [2017] UKSC 67. This provides for a two-stage process; first the Registrant’s actual state of mind is to be determined, then the objective standards of ordinary decent people are to be applied to the circumstances as he understood them to be.

Decision on Facts

Particular 1

1. On or around September 2022, you did not maintain professional boundaries in that you kissed Colleague A on the cheek - proved

24.    Colleague A stated that she worked with the Registrant but did not know him well. Her written statement for the hearing and her oral evidence included that she was working with the Registrant and they had a patient brought in on a trolley. She was stood near the patient’s feet and the Registrant was by the head of the patient. She was trying to speak to the Registrant about the patient when he moved and stood next to her. She thought that he was going to say something about the patient, but instead he kissed her on her right cheek. She considered his conduct to have been unprofessional.

25.    Colleague A said she was unsure if she was being oversensitive, so spoke to a friend and a male colleague shortly after the incident. They both agreed that the Registrant’s behaviour had been inappropriate. 

26.    This account reflected Colleague A’s internal interview with the Trust. The Panel therefore found Colleague A to be a credible and reliable witness.

27.    The Registrant’s account when interviewed by the Trust was:

“This was the incident with one of the girls where she alleged that I’d given her a kiss. It was just a peck. I was congratulating her on a new relationship.”

28.    It was then put to the Registrant that the kiss took place in Recovery while attending to a patient, and not in the circumstances he described. He said:

“I thought I kissed her on the forehead or the cheek. I don’t recall this but CMR told me. I can’t recall.”

29.    The Registrant had informed the Trust during the internal interviews that he had memory problems for which he was seeking medical help. 

30.    The Panel was satisfied, in view of the Registrant’s partial admission, that there was an occasion where the Registrant kissed Colleague A. The Panel found Colleague A to be more reliable than the Registrant as she was able to provide detail, namely that the kiss was whilst she was in Recovery caring for a patient and that the kiss had been on her right cheek. Indeed, she said in evidence that she could not recall the Registrant ever congratulating her on a relationship. She acknowledged in the internal interview with the Trust that she had, on one occasion, discussed her private life with colleagues including the Registrant. However she stated that the Registrant did not kiss her on that occasion. 

31.    The Panel was satisfied that the kiss took place in the presence of a patient and accepted Colleague A’s account of the event. The Panel had regard to the HCPTS Practice Note on ‘Professional Boundaries’. An example within that of behaviour which can be a breach of professional boundaries is sexual conduct towards colleagues. The Panel, having accepted Colleague A’s evidence that she did not do anything which may have indicated the kiss was wanted, found that this was a breach of professional boundaries. A kiss can be a form of sexualised conduct and the Panel was satisfied that the Registrant’s conduct towards Colleague A was inappropriate and went beyond what is considered acceptable in a work environment. 

Particular 2

2. Your conduct in relation to particular 1 was carried out:

a. without Colleague A’s consent, and - proved

b. without reasonable belief that Colleague A consented. - proved

32.    Colleague A’s evidence was that the kiss was very quick, and left her feeling shaken and uncomfortable. She said she had not wanted the Registrant to kiss her, that she did not consent, and that she did not behave in a manner that could have been interpreted as her wanting him to kiss her. There was no indication that the Registrant was going to kiss her, as they were discussing a patient. 

33.    In view of this evidence, the Panel was satisfied that the kiss had been without Colleague A’s consent and also without any reasonable belief that she had consented. This was because the Panel, as stated above, accepted her account as to the circumstances, which objectively did not give any indication that a kiss was wanted. The Panel therefore inferred that the Registrant was aware that as far as Colleague A was concerned, they were working together as colleagues, caring for a patient. The Panel did not accept the Registrant’s explanation, given in the internal investigation, that he was congratulating Colleague A, as she was clear, both with the Trust and the Panel that the Registrant had not congratulated her at any time, but had been present when her relationship was discussed.

Particular 3

3. On or around 1 September 2022, you made an incorrect entry in the Controlled Drugs Book in that you retrospectively recorded:

a. that the end of shift controlled drugs audit on 31 August 2022 was completed on the same day, when it had not been; - proved

b. that Colleague E had completed the first check for the controlled drugs audit, when he had not; - proved

c. a first checker signature purporting to be Colleague E’s signature - proved

34.    Colleague B said in evidence that she was, at the time of events, a student. She was undertaking an apprenticeship. Her evidence was that Colleague E was her allocated supervisor in the department, but he was on annual leave from 31 August 2022, so she shadowed other staff. She had worked with him on 30 August 2022. 

35.    Colleague B’s evidence was that she was familiar with Colleague E’s signature through working with him. She was able to identify his signature on the controlled drug book before the Panel. She explained that registered practitioners do not sign on behalf of colleagues, only for themselves. 

36.    Colleague B stated that on 1 September 2022 she was assigned to work with HC. HC was checking if the controlled drugs book had been completed that morning, which it had. However, HC saw that the end of shift audit for the previous day had not been signed for. Colleague B was stood with her and saw the empty boxes on the chart. The Registrant was present at the desk and stated that the drugs had been correct that morning. HC said she had not been on shift the previous day so would not be signing the book. After she left the area, Colleague B saw the Registrant sign the controlled drugs book. She did not realise at the time that he was signing for the previous day, or that the signature he entered was not his. 

37.    About a week later, Colleague B was approached by HC about the controlled drugs book, and said that she had seen the Registrant sign it on 31 August. HC showed Colleague B where the Registrant had signed. This was when Colleague B became aware that the signature entered was not the Registrant’s. The matter was escalated to the Team Leader, CW, and Colleague B was asked to provide a statement. That was in the bundle and was consistent with Colleague B’s account in evidence. 

38.    When interviewed about this, the Registrant said:

“I must have checked and the drugs were right. Someone said to me that [Colleague E] hasn’t signed for the drugs yesterday and pointed out where it was. I said I would sign as the drugs are correct and none are missing as I’ve already checked them this morning. So I copied [Colleague E]’s signature.”

39.    The Registrant went on to say that he was covering for Colleague E as he did not want Colleague E to get into trouble. 

40.    The Panel found, in view of the Registrant’s admission that he signed the controlled drug book in the name of Colleague E, and that this was done on 1 September as the book had not been completed in relation to the second check on 31 August, that the Registrant made a retrospective entry. The Panel found that the Registrant had no knowledge as to whether Colleague E or anyone else had checked the controlled drugs on 31 August, and the fact the book had not been completed would lead to a natural inference that the check had not been carried out. By signing the book, he made a record that the check had been carried out on the 31 August, when the objective evidence was that this had not been the case. As such, particular 3a is proved. 

41.    The Panel was further satisfied that Colleague E had not checked the controlled drugs on 31 August, because had he done so, he would almost certainly have signed the book. This was the procedure, and as a registered practitioner, Colleague E would have been aware of the importance of following the procedure. The Registrant, in copying Colleague E’s signature, retrospectively recorded that Colleague E had carried out a check, when he had not. The Panel found particular 3b proved. 

42.    As to particular 3c, the Registrant admitted signing the controlled drugs book as Colleague E, and this particular is therefore proved. 

Particular 4

4. Your actions in relation to particular 3 were dishonest in that:

a. you knew that an end of shift controlled drug audit had not taken place on 31 August 2022 and intended any subsequent reader to believe such an audit had taken place - proved

b. you knew that Colleague E had not completed a first check for the controlled drugs audit and intended any subsequent reader to believe he had done so - proved

c. you knew you did not have Colleague E’s consent to sign for him and intended any subsequent reader to believe he had conducted a first check, for which he had signed - proved

43.    The Panel began by assessing the Registrant’s subjective state of mind. The likely inference to be drawn from the fact that the controlled drug book had not been signed during the late shift on 31 August was that the check had not been conducted. There was nothing said by the Registrant when interviewed by the Trust which would indicate a belief otherwise. He said he did not want Colleague E to get into trouble; however, it was apparent that he simply did not know what the circumstances of the previous shift had been. Indeed, the evidence of Colleague B was that Colleague E was not, in fact, working on 31 August. 

44.    The Registrant therefore would have considered it likely that no check had been carried out during the late shift on 31 August, and by signing the book intended that anyone reviewing it would believe that an audit had taken place. 

45.    The Panel considered that ordinary decent people would view such an act as dishonest, because the intention was to mislead. The Registrant could (and indeed should) have highlighted the issue to management so that it could be investigated. The Panel found particular 4a proved. 

46.    In the Panel’s view, particular 4b was very similar in nature to particular 4a. There was no dispute that the Registrant had signed the controlled drugs book as Colleague E. He admitted this when questioned by the Trust. For the same reasons as set out in particular 4a, the Panel therefore found particular 4b proved. 

47.    The Registrant, when interviewed by the Trust, did not say or imply that Colleague E had consented to the book being signed on his behalf. There was nothing to suggest that any communication took place between the Registrant and Colleague E about the issue, or that there was any background agreement to this effect between them. The Panel therefore found that the Registrant knew that he did not have Colleague E’s consent to sign the book for him, and that in signing in the name of Colleague E, any subsequent reader would believe that Colleague E had conducted a first check of the drugs and signed for this. This would be considered dishonest by ordinary decent people, in view of the intention to mislead. As such, particular 4c is proved. 

Particular 5

5. On 8 July 2022, on one or more occasions you did not maintain professional boundaries in that you touched Colleague D’s waist and/or neck - proved

48.    Colleague D gave evidence that on 8 July 2022 she had been asked to help out in the Upper Limb Unit, and had assisted with a shoulder replacement. After the operation, the patient was to be moved from the operating table to a bed. She was stood at the top end of the patient, by their head, ready to perform the lift. She said the Registrant came up to her, put his hand on her waist and physically moved her to the foot end of the patient. She could not remember if he had asked her to move prior to this, but did not think he had, because she would have moved if asked. She assumed he wanted to be near the patient’s airway. She did not think much of the incident at the time, as some people are naturally tactile. 

49.    However, after the patient had been transferred and Colleague D was about to remove her theatre gown, the Registrant came up behind her, unfastened the top part of her gown at her neck, and stroked her neck. The contact lasted 2-3 seconds but felt longer at the time. She did not need assistance taking off her gown and did not do anything that could have been interpreted as a need for assistance. 

50.    Colleague D went on to say that after she told the Registrant to stop, and said she could take off the gown herself, the Registrant slipped his arm across the base of her waist, undid the gown at the waist, and squeezed her waist. 

51.    When the Registrant was asked about this as part of the internal investigation, he said:

“I do recall this incident. We were about to lift the patient so I wanted to get in so I said ‘Can I get in there please love?’ We got patient over and I went to undo her gown with one hand whilst still trying to concentrate on the patient and my role during extubation. I reached over to untie her but I missed. I forgot the gowns didn’t need opening and they could be ripped off as I’m used to cloth gowns, not paper.”

52.    He denied untying the gown or putting his hand around Colleague D’s waist.

53.    The Panel found Colleague D not overly sensitive because she initially did not think anything of the first part of the touching and assumed that the Registrant was simply a tactile person. However, the subsequent touching made her re-think that assumption. Further, it was, in the Panel’s view, unlikely that Colleague D would have found a simple untying of the gown something sufficiently serious to report. 

54.    The Panel found the Registrant’s statement that he helps people take off gowns odd, since evidence presented to the Panel indicated that people will usually remove their own gowns. In addition, the Panel did not find the Registrant’s account consistent in that he said both that he thought the gown was cloth and also that, on his account, it would be easy to rip off. The distinction was that cloth gowns need to be untied, whereas the more modern gowns have Velcro fastenings that can be torn apart. 

55.    The Panel preferred the evidence of Colleague D. She was balanced and, importantly, she had written a statement on the day of the incident, as requested by her manager when she verbally reported at the end of her shift. Her handwritten, near-contemporaneous statement was consistent with her subsequent evidence. 

56.    The Panel found that there was no need for the Registrant to touch Colleague D either to move her or when unfastening her gown. Further, the Registrant persisted to touch Colleague D when she had told him to stop and expressly said that she did not need assistance. Colleague D’s interpretation was that the manner of the touching felt intimate, in that the Registrant’s fingers lingered on her neck and he put his arm round her waist and squeezed it. This went further than giving assistance removing a gown. Colleague D considered that this went beyond what is expected at work, was uninvited, and crossed a boundary. The Panel agreed and was satisfied that this conduct breached professional boundaries. 

Particular 6

6 - Your conduct in relation to particular 5 was sexual and carried out:

a. without Colleague D’s consent, and - proved

b. without reasonable belief that Colleague D consented - proved

57.    Colleague D’s evidence was that she did not need assistance in removing her gown and did not do anything that may have indicated that she required such assistance. After the Registrant had stroked her neck she stepped forward (he was behind her) and told him that she did not need help and he should keep his distance. However, the Registrant then slipped his arm across the base of her waist and untied the gown where it fastens at the waist. He then squeezed her waist.

58.    Colleague D’s evidence was that this made her feel very uncomfortable. She said that she did not consent to being touched and did not act in a way that could have been interpreted as inviting this. 

59.    Colleague D felt that the touching was sexual because of the intimacy. She explained that there is no need to have contact with skin even if you are helping someone remove their gown (for example, if they had blood on their hands). The touch of the neck was lingering, not an accidental brush. Her perception was that the Registrant’s fingers were there quite deliberately, and the same with the squeeze of the waist. 

60.    Colleague D’s evidence was that after she told the Registrant to stop trying to take her gown off, he made the comment about ripping it off (below). She considered that his tone of voice was quite leery and due to the way he was behaving there was a sexual suggestion.

61.    The Registrant’s explanation was that he was trying to help Colleague D take off her gown. He said he would do the same for male colleagues. The Panel considered that whilst he may assist male colleagues in this way, the touching went beyond helping Colleague D and continued after she had told the Registrant to stop. The Panel found that Colleague D’s subjective perception was that the touching was sexualised, and that objectively this was the case. The Panel accepted Colleague D’s description of the touching and was satisfied that it went far beyond giving the assistance that the Registrant described. The Registrant denied the touching, relying on the presence of other staff, and said he would not do anything inappropriate in front of staff. 

62.    However, the Panel did not accept that the presence of other staff members meant that he did not, or would not have, acted as alleged, because Colleague D said that a colleague had told her that they had noticed the Registrant’s behaviour. The Panel found it more likely that the Registrant used the facade of assisting Colleague D with the removal of her gown as a cover for the inappropriate touching. In the absence of any plausible explanation from the Registrant as to the touching, the Panel found that there was no justification for this. 

63.    The Panel had regard to the guidance given by the High Court in the case of Harris. It found the nature of the touching, in the absence of justification, in the context of the words used at the time, namely that the Registrant would like to ‘rip it off’ (particular 7), to be sexual. 

64.    The Panel accepted the evidence of Colleague D that she did not consent because it found her a reliable witness for the reasons stated. The Panel found particular 6a proved.

65.    The Panel further found that the Registrant did not have a reasonable belief that Colleague D consented to any of the touching. Whilst she did not object to the first instance of her waist being touched, she made clear when the Registrant touched her neck that this was unwanted, and indeed, had done nothing to invite this touching before it happened. Notwithstanding that Colleague D told the Registrant to stop, he persisted and squeezed her waist. The Registrant, in those circumstances, had been directly informed that consent was not given and was aware that his touching was unwanted. The Panel found particular 6b proved.

Particular 7

7 - On 8 July 2022, while attempting to remove Colleague D’s surgical gown you stated that you would “rip it off” or words to that effect - proved

66.    Colleague D’s evidence was that when the Registrant slipped his arm around her waist and squeezed it, he made a comment that he would have liked to ‘rip it off’ her. Colleague D was asked whether the Registrant may have said something along the lines of the gowns not being easy to rip off. She strongly disputed this had been the case, saying the comment was that he would like to rip it off her. 

67.    The Registrant, when interviewed by the Trust said:

“Yes, I did say that it would be easy to rip it off, which is what we all do now as we do as this is much easier than untying them. I didn’t mean that I wanted to rip it off her so I’m not sure what she’s implying.”

68.    The Panel found that a comment along the lines alleged, namely a comment which included the words ‘rip it off’, was made. That was not in dispute. Nor was it disputed that the context involved removal of gowns. The Panel, having found the evidence of Colleague D more reliable than the account given internally by the Registrant, accepted her evidence as to the way the comment was said and its meaning; that he wanted to rip the gown off her. The Panel found this particular proved. 

Particular 8

8 - Your conduct in relation to particulars 5 and 7 was sexually motivated in that you were seeking to gain sexual gratification from your interactions with Colleague D - proved

69.    This particular had originally referred to Colleague A in addition to Colleague D. The Panel raised with Ms Bernard-Stevenson that there was no reference to Colleague A in particulars 5 and 7. She confirmed that was correct and particular 8 should refer to Colleague D only.

70.    The Panel had regard to the guidance given in the case of Basson, namely that sexual motivation means for sexual gratification or in pursuit of a future sexual relationship. There was both touching and the ‘rip it off’ comment, in respect of which the Panel had accepted Colleague D’s evidence. The comment referenced the gown as if it were an item of clothing. In the Panel’s view, the comment could be interpreted as implying that the Registrant would like to rip off Colleague D’s clothes. The Registrant having given no explanation for the touching, and an insufficiently plausible explanation for the comment. 

71.    In relation to the Registrant’s explanation for the comment, his account was that he meant it would be easy to rip off the gown. This appeared to the Panel to be contradictory to his position that he was being helpful by assisting Colleague D to remove her gown. Had it been the case that gowns were easy to rip off, that would be inconsistent with seeking to help Colleague D untie her gown.

72.    Further, the words were said whilst the Registrant squeezed Colleague D’s waist, unwarranted touching of a sexual nature. This and the lack of plausible explanation led the Panel to find that the conduct was for sexual gratification and hence sexually motivated. The Panel found the particular proved. 

Particular 9

9 - Your conduct at particulars 5 and 7 was of a sexual nature - proved

73.    The Panel, having found sexual motivation in relation to this conduct, was satisfied that the conduct was sexual. No other finding could logically be reached. The nature of the touching in circumstances where a sexualised comment was also made meant that the conduct was sexual. The Panel found this particular proved.

Particular 10

10 - Your conduct as particulars 1, 5 and 7 was:

a. Unwanted by Colleagues A and/or D; - proved

b. Had the purpose of violating Colleague A and/or D’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for Colleagues A and/or D Or - not proved

c. Had the effect of violating Colleague A and/or D’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for Colleagues A and/or D - proved

74.    Colleague A gave evidence that the kiss was unwanted. Colleague D’s evidence was that the touching and the ‘rip it off’ comment were unwanted. The Panel accepted their evidence, having found them to be credible witnesses. It found particular 10a proved. 

75.    Having found sexual motivation in relation to the conduct towards Colleague D, the Panel, being satisfied that the purpose was sexual gratification, did not find that the purpose was as alleged here. There was no clear evidence that the Registrant intended his conduct to have any of these effects. Likewise, the Panel, having found that a kiss can be a form of sexualised conduct, and there being no clear evidence as to the Registrant’s purpose in kissing Colleague A, was unable to infer that the purpose was as alleged. The Panel found particular 10b not proved.

76.    However, both Colleague A and Colleague D gave credible evidence as to how the Registrant’s conduct made them feel. Colleague A said the kiss made her feel uncomfortable, violated, and intimidated. Colleague D said that she considered that the Registrant’s behaviour was inappropriate and made her feel sufficiently uncomfortable to speak to a senior sister. She felt violated and intimidated. The Panel accepted their evidence and found that the conduct had the effect of violating the dignity of these colleagues and creating an intimidating environment. The Panel found particular 10c proved.

Decision on Grounds

77.    Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted that the facts found proved individually and collectively were serious and amounted to misconduct. The Registrant had touched intimate areas of a colleague’s body without consent and made physical contact without consent. The colleagues had given evidence that they felt intimidated and violated. The Panel had found breaches of professional boundaries and the Practice Note gives guidance as to why this is serious. 

78.    It was further submitted that the Panel had heard evidence from Colleague B as to why the inaccurate entry in the controlled drug book was serious, namely that there is a legal requirement to account for controlled drugs and people have to be held accountable if a drug goes missing. 

79.    The Panel had found dishonesty and Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted that the Registrant had breached standard 9.1 of the HCPC Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics (2016).

80.    The Panel accepted the Legal Assessor’s advice that:

•    misconduct is a matter for the Panel’s independent judgement and there is no burden or standard of proof. 

•    there is no statutory definition, but guidance is given by the caselaw, including Roylance v GMC (No 2) [2000] 1 AC 31 where Lord Clyde said, “Misconduct is a word of general effect, involving some act or omission which falls short of what would be proper in the circumstances. The standard of propriety may often be found by reference to the rules and standards ordinarily required to be followed.....in the particular circumstances”;

•    Doughty v General Dental Council [1988] AC 164 described it as conduct that has “fallen short, by omission or commission, of the standards of conduct expected among dentists”, and emphasised that such falling short as is established should be serious;

•    Nandi v General Medical Council [2004] EWHC 2317 described misconduct as conduct which would be regarded as deplorable by fellow practitioners.

81.    The Panel began by considering the HCPC’s Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics (2016). It considered that the following were engaged:

6.1 You must take all reasonable steps to reduce the risk of harm to service users, carers and colleagues as far as possible.

6.2 You must not do anything, or allow someone else to do anything, which could put the health or safety of a service user, carer or colleague at unacceptable risk.

9.1 You must make sure that your conduct justifies the public’s trust and confidence in you and your profession.

10.1 You must keep full, clear, and accurate records for everyone you care for, treat, or provide other services to.

82.    With regard to particulars 1 and 2, kissing Colleague A without her consent or a reasonable belief in consent, standards 6.1 and 6.2 had been breached. The Registrant’s conduct had crossed a professional boundary, and Colleague A gave evidence that she felt uncomfortable in the moment and that the Registrant’s uninvited act had left her feeling violated. This was, in the Panel’s view, a serious breach of the standards and carried a clear risk of emotional harm. Colleague A stated that she had only ever had a professional relationship with the Registrant. They were discussing a patient and without any reason, the Registrant kissed her.

83.    The Panel found that breaching professional boundaries is conduct which falls far short of public expectations of registrants, and this conduct had therefore breached standard 9.1.

84.    The Panel determined that the conduct at particulars 1 and 2 was misconduct. 

85.    Particular 3 was a breach of standard 10.1. The Registrant had made a retrospective entry, in the name of a colleague, which indicated that a controlled drugs check had been carried out when the objective evidence was that this had not been the case. This was serious in view of the legal requirements as to the monitoring of controlled drugs. The Panel determined that this was misconduct. The Registrant was aware that it was wrong both to sign for a check which had not been performed and to sign in the name of a colleague. He had no regard for the necessary accountability when signing the book or the potential consequences.

86.    The Panel had found that the Registrant had acted dishonestly in its finding relating to particular 4. Honesty is fundamental to trust, both among colleagues and for the public to have confidence in the profession. The Registrant’s explanation had been that he acted as he did to protect a colleague. Dishonesty to cover up a failing was, in the Panel’s view, particularly serious as those responsible are not held to account and there cannot be learning from errors. The Panel was satisfied that the Registrant’s dishonesty was misconduct. 

87.    Particulars 5-9 related to the Registrant crossing professional boundaries and in a sexually motivated manner towards Colleague D. This was a serious breach of standards 6.1, 6.2, and 9.1. The Registrant had not only acted in a highly unprofessional manner in his uncalled-for touching of Colleague D, but had persisted when she clearly told him to stop. Colleague D gave evidence that she felt very uncomfortable, intimidated, and violated. She said that thereafter she was worried about her safety at work. The Panel found that she had been caused emotional harm and this had been for the Registrant’s sexual gratification. This was extremely serious and fell far short of the conduct expected of professionals. It was misconduct. 

88.    The Panel had found conduct that amounted to sexual harassment in its finding that particulars 10a and 10c were proved. This was unwanted conduct related to sex. This was a clear breach of standard 9.1 because these colleagues, fellow staff members, and members of the public more broadly, aware of such conduct, would lose trust in the Registrant. This conduct is unacceptable in the work environment and hence was misconduct. 

Decision on Impairment

89.    Ms Bernard-Stevenson reminded the Panel of the purpose of fitness to practise proceedings with reference to the case of Meadow v GMC [2007] 1 QB 462 and the formulation by Dame Janet Smith as referenced in CHRE v NMC and Grant 2011 CHRE v NMC and Grant [2011] EWHC 927.

90.    She submitted that as the Registrant had disengaged, the Panel had no statement or reflection from him and did not know what steps, if any, he had taken to remediate. In her submission, the Registrant’s conduct may be underpinned by attitudinal issues, which are often more difficult to remediate. With regard to patient safety, whilst there had been no direct risk to service users, it was submitted that the Registrant’s treatment of fellow staff members and making them feel uncomfortable negatively impacted on the team dynamic and may in turn affect service users. 

91.    With regard to the public interest, Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted that the Registrant’s conduct represented a significant departure from the standards expected and had brought the profession into disrepute. A finding of impairment was required in her submission to maintain professional standards and confidence in the profession and the HCPC as Regulator. 

92.    The Panel was aware, in view of the legal advice it received, that:

•    impairment is a matter for the Panel’s independent judgement;

•    misconduct and impairment are separate stages in the decision-making process, and it may be that misconduct having been found, a panel may decide that fitness to practise is not impaired: Cheatle v GMC [2009] EWHC 645 (Admin);

•    the question for the panel was whether the Registrant’s fitness to practise is currently impaired by reason of misconduct. Accordingly, in assessing impairment, the Panel was looking at the past to assess the present; Meadow v GMC [2007] 1 QB 462;

•    the Panel may be assisted by the HCPTS Practice Note on ‘Professional Boundaries’, which explains why these are important;

•    when assessing the personal component of impairment, the Panel may be assisted by the three-fold test set out in the case of Cohen v General Medical Council [2008] EWHC 581 (Admin): Is the conduct remediable? Has it been remedied? Is it highly unlikely to recur?

•    the Panel was likely to be assisted by the guidance provided in CHRE v Nursing and Midwifery Council and Grant [2011] EWHC 927 (Admin), as formulated by Dame Janet Smith in the report into the Fifth Shipman Inquiry. The Panel must consider not only whether a finding of impairment is required to protect the public, but also whether the public interest requires such a finding to be made.

93.    The Panel began by looking at the Registrant’s past conduct, and structured its decision-making around the formulation set out in the case of Grant. 

94.    As to whether the Registrant had put patients at unwarranted risk of harm, whilst there had been no direct risk, the Panel accepted the submission of Ms Bernard-Stevenson and considered that the impact on culture and team dynamics is likely to be negatively impacted where colleagues are made to feel uncomfortable or concerned for their safety around a staff member. Colleague A’s evidence was that she was discussing a patient with the Registrant. Being kissed out of the blue is likely to result in a loss of focus and concentration and, in turn, risk mistakes being made. Similarly for Colleague D, she was unlikely to want to work in close proximity to the Registrant for fear of his unwanted touching. She would be concerned for her own safety risking a lack of focus on her patient. Colleague D’s evidence was that she had not previously worked with the Registrant, and her evidence as to not feeling safe in the department and being guarded around colleagues she did not know would, in the Panel’s view, detrimentally impact on team relationships and in turn patient care. Further, the Registrant’s own account given during the internal interview was that he was actively treating the patient whilst unfastening Colleague D’s gown. This posed an obvious risk to that patient.

95.    The Panel was satisfied that unwanted sexualised conduct towards colleagues posed a risk to patient safety due to lack of focus and concentration, either for one’s own protection or, in the Registrant’s case, focus being on sexualised conduct rather than patient care. The Panel noted the Registrant’s lack of insight, remediation, or remorse. As such, the Panel found that he was liable in the future to put patients at unwarranted risk of harm and also liable to put colleagues at further risk of emotional harm. 

96.    As to whether the Registrant had, in the past, brought the profession into disrepute, the Panel found that this was clearly the case due to its findings of breaches of professional boundaries and sexual misconduct. The Registrant had crossed boundaries with two female colleagues and, in respect of Colleague D, had persisted with sexualised touching for his own gratification when expressly told that his conduct was unwanted. 

97.    With regard to whether the Registrant was likely to repeat this conduct, the Panel asked itself, in accordance with Cohen, whether the conduct is remediable, whether it has been remedied, and whether it is likely or unlikely to be repeated. 

98.    It considered that the conduct was attitudinal and hence difficult to remediate, but not impossible, as the Registrant could develop an understanding of professional boundaries and proper attitudes towards females. In one of his internal interviews he described himself as ‘old-school’, considering that this was a positive, saying he would, for example, hold doors open for women.

99.    The Registrant having provided no evidence of Continuing Professional Development or reflection to the Panel, the Panel had no evidence on which it could find any remediation having taken place. Indeed, the Panel was very concerned at the attitude expressed by the Registrant as to how the allegations of Colleague D made him feel during an interview. He said:

“I am fuming and I’m so angry. It’s like putting the knife in and twisting it. I’m not sure what their problem is. I’m old school and will always help women. Making allegations such as these is bang out of order.”

100.    The Panel was concerned that the Registrant took no responsibility for his actions or how they may have been perceived, and indeed sought to blame the women who had complained about his conduct. It followed that there was a high risk of repetition. The Registrant was likely in the future to repeat his sexual misconduct, placing colleagues at risk of harm, and brining the profession into disrepute. He is currently impaired. 

101.    The Panel moved to the next limb of the Grant test, whether the Registrant has in the past breached a fundamental tenet of the profession. It did not consider his dishonesty at this stage, as this is dealt with separately in the final limb. 

102.    The Panel considered that maintaining professional boundaries is fundamental to trust in the profession. The Registrant’s breach of these had been serious, particularly with regard to Colleague D, where his conduct had been sexually motivated. The Panel found that the Registrant had in the past breached this fundamental tenet, and adopting its reasoning above in relation to bringing the profession into disrepute, found that the Registrant was highly likely to breach this fundamental tenet in the future. The Registrant had not engaged with the regulatory process and, in the absence of any evidence of insight or remediation, the Panel could reach no other conclusion. There was a significant risk of repetition and the Registrant remains currently impaired. 

103.    Finally, the Registrant had in the past acted dishonestly in his entry for 31 August in the controlled drugs book. 

104.    As to whether this conduct was remediable, it was a single incident and, by the Registrant’s own admission, misjudged. When interviewed by the Trust, he acknowledged that he had made a stupid mistake. This was in principle capable of remediation because it was not for personal gain, but in a misguided attempt to try to protect a colleague. 

105.    However, the Panel was unable to find that the conduct had been remedied, because the Registrant had demonstrated only very limited insight, through his admission at the time, that it had been the wrong thing to do. He did not at the time, and has not subsequently, provided anything to demonstrate any understanding as to the seriousness of his action, or the potential risks in terms of regulatory compliance or risks to patients if controlled drugs are not accounted for. There was a risk that the Registrant would repeat his dishonest conduct in the future if he considered it was the easiest way to overcome an issue.

106.    It followed that there was a risk of repetition and that the Registrant is currently impaired. 

107.    Having found that the Registrant is personally impaired in respect of each limb of Grant, the Panel considered whether the wider public interest also required a finding of impairment to mark the unacceptability of the past conduct, maintain standards, and to maintain public trust and confidence in the profession. 

108.    Sexually motivated misconduct will always have a significant negative impact on the public’s trust and confidence in professionals, not least because people will be concerned that they or their loved ones may be subject to such unwanted conduct. Members of the public, aware of the Panel’s findings in this matter, would not want to receive treatment from the Registrant due to fear that they may experience similar touching or unwanted conduct. Employers would not want to employ him due to concerns for the safety of their patients and staff. Other professionals, particularly females, aware of this case would not want to work with him due to concern that they too may be sexually harassed. 

109.    Dishonest conduct which carries a risk of repetition likewise engages the public interest, because it is fundamental both to relationships between registrants and patients and also the relationship between employers and staff. Employers would not want to employ a registrant who cannot be trusted to account for controlled drugs. Fellow practitioners would have concerns about the Registrant’s ability to carry out an important aspect of his role. 

110.    It followed that in the Panel’s view, a finding of impairment was required in the public interest, to protect the public, maintain standards, and uphold public trust and confidence in the profession. If no such finding were made this would indicate that the Registrant’s conduct was excusable or on some level acceptable, when that was clearly not the case. Public trust and confidence in both the profession and the regulatory process required a finding of impairment to mark the inherent unacceptability of the Registrant’s misconduct. 

Decision on Sanction

111.    Ms Bernard-Stevenson did not make a submission that any particular sanction would be appropriate in this case, but having made submissions in respect of relevant aggravating and mitigating features, identified parts of the HCPC’s Sanctions Policy which she submitted were relevant to the Panel’s decision.

112.    With regard to aggravating features, Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted, as identified by the Panel at the impairment stage, that the conduct carried a potential for harm to service users in addition to the emotional harm caused to colleagues. There had been repetition of the breaching of boundaries. The Registrant lacked insight. With regard to his conduct towards female colleagues, he had taken no responsibility and indeed sought to blame the women who made allegations against him. There was no evidence of remediation as the Registrant had not engaged. 

113.    As to mitigation, the Registrant had demonstrated some limited remorse during the internal investigation. 

114.    Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted that the Panel may be assisted by the sections of the Sanctions Policy relating to sexual misconduct and dishonesty. 

115.    The Panel accepted the Legal Assessor’s advice, namely that it should:

•    have regard to the Sanctions Policy and begin by identifying any particular aggravating or mitigating factors, then work through the sanctions starting with the least restrictive; 

•    impose the minimum sanction necessary to meet the Regulator’s overarching objective, bearing in mind that the purpose of sanction is not to punish; Sir Anthony Clarke MR in Meadow v GMC [2007] 1 QB 462: “In short, the purpose of fitness to practise proceedings is not to punish the practitioner for past misdoings but to protect the public against the acts and omissions of those who are not fit to practise”;

•    ensure that any sanction is proportionate, whilst bearing in mind that the interests of the profession take precedence; Bolton v Law Society (1994) 1 WLR 512, endorsed in the context of health regulation in The Council for the Regulation of Health Care Professionals v General Dental Council (Fleischmann) [2005] EWHC 87 (Admin);

•    in cases of dishonesty, there is generally considered to be a ‘scale of dishonesty’ and there is not an automatic presumption of strike off; Hassan v General Optical Council [2013] EWHC 1887 (Admin);

•    in cases of sexually motivated conduct, again strike off is not a foregone conclusion and has been overturned by the Court, for example in Arunachalam v GMC [2018] WEHC 758 (Admin). Erasure was, however, upheld in Yasin v GMC [2018] EWHC 677 (Admin).

116.    The Panel considered that the following were aggravating features:

•    repetition of breaches of professional boundaries;

•    persistence of sexually motivated touching when told to stop;

•    lack of insight into sexual misconduct and placing blame on the women who reported it;

•    lack of remorse and remediation into sexual misconduct;

•    potential for harm to service users.

117.    The Panel could only identify the single mitigating feature referenced by Ms Bernard-Stevenson, the early admission made by the Registrant in relation to the retrospective entry in the controlled drugs book, and some remorse for that conduct. 

118.    The Panel therefore determined that the aggravating features outweighed the limited mitigation and a sanction to reflect the increased seriousness of the misconduct was required. 

119.    The Panel then worked through the available sanctions in ascending order. In view of its previous findings as to seriousness and the potential for harm to service users and colleagues, the Panel considered that taking no further action or imposing a caution order would be wholly insufficient. Restrictive action was required both to protect the public and to properly reflect the seriousness of the misconduct. 

120.    With regard to conditions of practice, the Panel, having regard to the Sanctions Policy, considered that these were not appropriate in view of the attitudinal nature of dishonesty and sexual misconduct. Further, as the Registrant had not engaged with the regulatory process, the Panel could have no confidence that the Registrant would comply with any conditions imposed. In any event, conditions of practice were, in the Panel’s view, insufficient to meet the public interest where dishonesty and sexual motivation had been found proved, for the reasons set out in the impairment section above. 

121.    The Panel therefore considered whether a suspension order would be an appropriate sanction, bearing in mind its duty to act proportionately. The Panel had found that the conduct was in principle capable of remediation. This was because the dishonesty was isolated, not for personal gain, and hence at the low end of the spectrum of seriousness. The sexual misconduct, whilst inherently serious, again was not the most serious. The touching had not been of sexual organs and there had not been targeting or any particular vulnerability of the women. However, the Panel noted, in accordance with the Sanctions Policy, that such conduct is not to be considered less serious where it involves colleagues rather than patients. The Panel was also cognisant that sexually motivated misconduct is inherently serious due to the impact on public trust and confidence.

122.    The Panel noted that, in accordance with the Sanctions Policy, a suspension order is likely to be appropriate where the registrant has insight, the conduct is unlikely to be repeated, and there is evidence to suggest that the registrant is likely to be able to remedy their failings. None of these were applicable in this matter. The Registrant’s lack of engagement, even by way of a written reflection, meant that the Panel had no evidence of insight and as such had found, as it was bound to do, that there was a risk of repetition of both the dishonesty and the sexual misconduct. 

123.    The Panel saw no basis to depart from the Sanctions Policy in these circumstances. There was simply nothing before the Panel to indicate a willingness on the Registrant’s part to resolve the concerns. In addition, the Panel had regard to the types of conduct which may justify a striking off order, and these include dishonesty and conduct which is of a sexual nature or sexually motivated. 

124.    The Panel determined that having found such misconduct proved, with aggravating features listed above, combined with a lack of evidence to indicate that the Registrant understands why his misconduct was serious, and in turn a likelihood of repetition, a striking off order was the only appropriate and proportionate order in this case. 

125.    The Panel was aware that this will have significant implications for the Registrant, both reputationally and in terms of his ability to earn a living. However, in view of the serious nature of the misconduct, and the ongoing associated risks to the public and the profession’s reputation, no other sanction would protect the public or be sufficient to maintain standards and uphold public confidence. 

126.    Accordingly, the Panel imposed a Striking Off Order. 

That the Registrar is directed to strike the name of Mr Stephen Spencer from the Register on the date this order comes into effect.

Interim Order

1.    The Panel next considered an application by Ms Bernard-Stevenson for an interim suspension order to cover the appeal period before the final order becomes effective. She renewed her application to proceed in the Registrant’s absence for this part of the hearing, which the Panel granted for the reasons previously given. 

2.    Ms Bernard-Stevenson submitted that an interim order should be made in light of the Panel’s decision that a striking off order is necessary to protect the public and to meet the public interest. She submitted that an interim order is necessary on both these grounds. She submitted that an interim order for 18 months would be appropriate to cover the time taken to deal with any appeal. No submissions were received from or on behalf of the Registrant. He had received notice that such an application may be made within the Notice of Hearing sent on 30 April 2026.

3.    The Legal Assessor advised the Panel that it could make an interim order if doing so was necessary for protection of the public, otherwise in the public interest, or in the interests of the Registrant. The Panel should bear in mind its previous findings and consider whether it is necessary to place any restriction on the Registrant’s practice with effect from today. If so, it should determine the appropriate form and duration of any interim order.

4.    The Panel considered whether to impose an interim order. It was mindful of its earlier findings that the Registrant posed risks to the public and that the public interest was not met by any less restrictive sanction than strike off due to the combination of the seriousness of the misconduct and the Registrant’s lack of demonstration of any willingness to remediate.  The Panel decided that it would be incompatible with those findings if there was no interim order in place. 

5.    Accordingly, the Panel concluded that an interim suspension order is necessary for the protection of the public and was otherwise in the public interest. 

6.    The Panel made an Interim Suspension Order for 18 months. This was to allow for any appeal to be dealt with. When the appeal period expires this Order will come to an end unless an appeal has been filed with the High Court. If there is no appeal, the Final Order shall take effect when the 28-day appeal period expires.

History of Hearings for Stephen Spencer

Date	Panel	Hearing type	Outcomes / Status
03/09/2026	Conduct and Competence Committee	Final Hearing	Struck off
22/05/2026	Conduct and Competence Committee	Interim Order Review	Interim Suspension
24/11/2025	Investigating Committee	Interim Order Review	Interim Suspension
01/07/2025	Investigating Committee	Interim Order Review	Interim Suspension
20/03/2025	Investigating Committee	Interim Order Review	Interim Suspension
16/10/2024	Investigating Committee	Interim Order Review	Adjourned
17/07/2024	Investigating Committee	Interim Order Review	Interim Suspension
10/06/2024	Investigating Committee	Interim Order Review	Adjourned
05/03/2024	Investigating Committee	Interim Order Review	Interim Suspension
05/12/2023	Investigating Committee	Interim Order Review	Interim Suspension
05/06/2023	Investigating Committee	Interim Order Application	Interim Suspension