Lee Turner

Preliminary Matters:

The history of this hearing

1. The hearing was originally listed for seven days, the first of them being 9 May 2023. The hearing was subsequently reconvened for one day in August 2023 and for three days in November 2024 before the present listing for seven days that commenced on 10 November 2025. In addition to these days scheduled for the hearing of the Allegation, the Panel has been occupied on a further 3 days in dealing with Preliminary Hearings concerning this case.

2. This determination is concerned only with the Panel’s decision on the Allegation. Other issues, and the Panel’s decision on those other issues, have been dealt with elsewhere. In the view of the Panel, it is not necessary to describe those other issues for the decision on the Allegation to be explained, and to include them in this determination would only serve to confuse matters.

3. As will be described when the Panel explains, in paragraph 13 below, the evidence it has received, before the present hearing dates commencing on Monday, 10 November 2025, evidence specifically dealing with the incidents included in the Allegation was only given on the first two days of the hearing in May 2023.

The Registrant’s response to the allegation

4. When the hearing commenced on Tuesday, 9 May 2023, the Registrant was given the opportunity to respond to the Allegation. On his behalf, Ms Stevens stated that each element of the Allegation was denied with the exception of particular 2(b), which was admitted.
Conducting the hearing partly in private

5. At the commencement of the case Ms Stevens applied for a direction that there should be an opportunity to deal with matters of submission and evidence in private in order to protect the Registrant’s private life. On behalf of the HCPC, the Presenting Officer did not object to this application. Having taken advice, the Panel acceded to the application on the ground advanced. At various points during the case matters have been dealt with in private.

Background:

6. The Registrant is registered with the HCPC as an Operating Department Practitioner. The events relevant to this case occurred when the Registrant was working in that capacity for North Bristol NHS Trust at Southmead Hospital (“the Hospital”). He was working on an agency basis, but had been working at the Hospital for some years.

7. Colleague A is a Registered Nurse. She was also working in operating theatres at the hospital, and she too was working on an agency basis.

8. On 21 December 2020, Colleague A was working a shift from 8:00am to 8:30pm. She contended that when she and the Registrant were setting up Theatre 4 for the arrival of an emergency case, she was sexually assaulted by the Registrant in the manner alleged by particular 3 of the Allegation.

9. Colleague A reported to a Team Leader on 21 December 2020, that an incident had occurred. The following day, she described the incident she alleged had occurred to the Clinical Coordinators for Anaesthetics, at which stage it was decided that an internal fact-finding investigation would be carried out. Person G was tasked with undertaking that investigation. The investigation began on 11 January 2021.

10. Both the Registrant and Colleague A were interviewed for the purposes of the Trust’s investigation. When interviewed, Colleague A stated that a similar incident had occurred with the Registrant on an earlier occasion and that the earlier incident had been witnessed by Colleague B. This earlier incident appears in the Allegation being decided by the Panel as particular 1(b). As a consequence, Colleague B was interviewed. In her interview, Colleague B confirmed details of the earlier particular 1(b) incident alleged by Colleague A and also referred to the two incidents which appear in the Allegation in particular 2.

11. The alleged incident on 21 December 2020, was reported to the Police but no criminal charges were brought against the Registrant.

12. Referrals to the HCPC were made by both the Registrant and on behalf of the Trust.

Decision on Facts:

13. The following witnesses were called by the HCPC to give evidence before the Panel:

• Colleague A. As already stated, Colleague A is a Registered Nurse. Colleague A’s evidence in chief was given on Tuesday, 9 May 2023. Cross examination commenced during the afternoon of that same day but was not completed. Although Colleague A was available to give evidence on other days scheduled for the hearing, no further questions relating to the specific incidents alleged by the Allegation were asked of her until Monday, 10 November 2025, on which day her evidence concluded.

• Colleague B. Colleague B is an Operating Department Practitioner, who was also working at the Hospital on an agency basis. Colleague B had been scheduled to give evidence on occasions before Tuesday, 11 November 2025, but it was not until that day that she did give her evidence.

• Person E was employed as a Clinical Advisor by the Recruitment Agency through which the Registrant worked at the Hospital. Person E gave evidence before the Panel on Thursday, 11 May 2023. The evidence given by Person E was unchallenged and there was no cross examination.

• Person G was a Clinical Matron working at the Hospital and undertook the Trust’s investigation. The evidence given by Person G was also given on Thursday, 11 May 2023, and was also not challenged.

14. The Registrant gave evidence before the Panel on Wednesday, 12 November 2025, and on the same day he called Ms LB, who gave character evidence on his behalf.

15. In addition to the oral evidence described above, the Panel was provided with extensive documentation. Included in it were hearsay statements of other people who were employed at the Hospital in December 2020, and statements made by the Registrant both to the Trust and to the HCPC’s Investigating Committee at the ‘case to answer stage’. Additionally, the Registrant provided written testimonial evidence and a statement made by his father on 7 November 2025.

16. The delay that has occurred in this case is both extreme and lamentable. It has not been in the interests of the Registrant or the two complainants all of whom have been exposed to unnecessary stress and inconvenience. Furthermore, it is not in the public interest for the resolution of Allegations to be long delayed, whatever the eventual outcome. In reaching its decisions the Panel has been mindful of the difficulties, particularly with regard to memory, that are likely to result from excessive delay.

17. The Panel accepted the advice it received from the Legal Assessor relating to the burden and standard of proof, advice that accorded with the submissions of the parties. It follows that in relation to each of the disputed factual elements of the Allegation, the Panel has asked itself the question whether the HCPC has presented to it evidence on the basis of which it could properly conclude that the matter was more likely than not to have occurred. In conducting this exercise, the Panel reviewed all of the written and documentary evidence, the transcript including the evidence of Colleague A given on Tuesday, 9 May 2023, its own notes of the evidence given in 2023 and since Monday, 10 November 2025, as well as to its notes of the submissions of the Presenting Officer and Ms Stevens. The Panel also had reviewed the guidance contained in the HCPTS Practice Note entitled, ‘Professional Boundaries’ (and, particularly the section of that document headed ‘Factors to be aware of when assessing evidence about boundary breaches’), as well as the Practice Note entitled, ‘Making Decisions on a Registrant’s State of Mind’ when it reached its decisions on the contention that the Registrant’s actions were sexually motivated.

18. In relation to the incident that is said to have occurred on 21 December 2020, Colleague A stated that she was in Theatre 4 where she and the Registrant were preparing it for the arrival of the emergency patient. She said she was dealing with a warming coil to ensure that fluid would be at the patient’s body temperature when the Registrant grabbed her by her neck and pushed her head down so that her cheek came into contact with the operating table. She claimed that having done this the Registrant thrust his hips and groin into her backside three times, she being overpowered while he did so. She stated that she exclaimed words such as ‘Oh my God’, at which point the Registrant released his grip and she stood up and faced him. At which point she claimed that the Registrant said in a jokey manner, ‘Sorry, I’m just really f****** horny’ and grabbed the area of his crotch while saying those words. In her witness statement, Colleague A stated “He clearly thought it was funny and that it was a bit of banter, but I think he could tell from my reaction that I was shocked and surprised”.

19. Before indicating some of the arguments that were advanced by Ms Stevens as to why the evidence of Colleague A should not be accepted as accurate and truthful, it is necessary for the Panel to make a general point about not only the 21 December 2020 incident but also about all of the disputed factual contentions. It is that there is a stark conflict of evidence. There are cases in which there is a realistic possibility that an incident that is alleged to be deliberate behaviour might have occurred as a result of a mistake. There are other cases in which an incident that was in fact innocuous is viewed by someone as sinister. The disputed incidents in this case are not of that type. It follows that in relation to them, there is evidence being given on one side that is not only incorrect, but deliberately so.

20. The three incidents alleged by Colleague A that are reflected in the three sub-paragraphs of particular 1 are alleged to have occurred before 21 December 2020. Not one of them was reported or recorded in any way at the time they occurred. As has already been described, the incident allegedly witnessed by Colleague B was referred to by Colleague A at an early stage following 21 December 2020 in the context of the Trust process. The others emerged later. Furthermore, the submission was made on behalf of the Registrant that Colleague A’s description of the 21 December 2020 incident did not originally include the contention that he grabbed his crotch when speaking the words he is alleged to have spoken immediately after the incident occurred.

21. The Panel accepted the submission made by Ms Stevens that the issue could not properly be decided by the Panel by it posing to itself the question, ‘Why would Colleague A tell deliberate untruths about the Registrant’s behaviour?’. In the view of the Panel, were there to be even a remote possibility that Colleague A’s evidence was untruthful, the disputed factual particulars would not be proven.

22. The Panel intends no discourtesy to Ms Stevens in not reproducing in this determination all of the points made in her submissions (indicated at the commencement of those submissions to be twenty in number). In reaching its decision the Panel reviewed the notes made during those submissions. The issues included (but were not limited to):

• Prohibited communications made and attempted by Colleague A after she took the affirmation on 9 May 2023.

• The contention that Colleague A was defensive and flippant, as well as demonstrating hostility towards the defence.

• The adding of allegations by Colleague B as time went on.

• Contamination of accounts, an issue that was submitted to be particularly relevant to particular 1(b) because of the circumstances in which Colleague B gave her account of that incident in the Trust investigation.

• The fact that there was an absence of particularity regarding the occasions on which the particular 1 matters were said to have occurred.

• The fact that complaints about the Registrant’s behaviour were not made by Colleague A before 21 December 2020.

• The inherent improbability of the Registrant acting as he did, and, particularly with regard to the incident that is alleged to have occurred on 21 December 2020, the inherent improbability that the event could have occurred without being noted by others in the area.

23. For reasons that will be explained, the Panel decided to make its decisions about the reliability of Colleague A’s accounts before turning to consider Colleague B and the accounts she gave. In relation to Colleague A, the view taken by the Panel was that if there was a realistic possibility that Colleague A’s account was not both truthful and accurate, the contentions advanced by the HCPC in particulars 1 and 3 would be not proven.

24. The Panel reviewed the evidence of Colleague A in the light of the submissions advanced by Ms Stevens as to why it should not be accepted. In the Panel’s judgement the following findings are relevant to the question whether her evidence should be accepted.

• In making contact with the HCPC’s Solicitors and HCPTS employees, whilst still subject to the affirmation, the Panel did not consider that it demonstrated an intention to tailor her evidence about the relevant issues. It is clear that Colleague A was unhappy with the hearing process, including what she perceived to be a lack of support. The Panel has no hesitation in stating that it would have been preferable had she not taken the steps she did, but in the judgement of the Panel the fact that she did so does not go to discredit the evidence she gave.

• Again, the Panel was not able to conclude that the demeanour of Colleague A, which was said by Ms Stevens to be variously flippant, defensive and hostile were factors that detracted from the veracity of her evidence. The Panel noted that in December 2020, when describing the incident, Colleague A was said to have been flippant in manner. As to Colleague A’s demeanour in this hearing, different witnesses will respond in different ways. With regards to Colleague A’s manner in reporting the incident in December 2020, the Panel accepted Colleague A’s evidence that this was her style of communication. Ms Stevens criticised Colleague A for having complained that she (Ms Stevens) had accused her of lying. Having reviewed the transcript, the Panel is unable to identify an occasion on which Ms Stevens used the word ‘lie’, but the fact of the matter is that the cross examination of Colleague A was nothing if not thorough, and the account given by her challenged. The basis of that challenge was not that she was mistaken about things. In the view of the Panel it is not surprising that someone being cross examined in these circumstances may be both defensive and demonstrate a degree of resentment.

• It was very clear to the Panel that the focus of Colleague A’s complaint was what she said had occurred on 21 December 2020. Other incidents emerged, and it is unsurprising that the particular 1(b) incident was disclosed by Colleague A on 22 December 2020 in view of the fact that it was another alleged incident of “humping” of Colleague A by the Registrant, which Colleague A claimed could be corroborated. However, in circumstances where the Panel does not know how searching the investigation processes were, the Panel does not feel able to find that the fact that incidents were not referred to at an early stage demonstrates that they did not occur. The rigour of the Trust’s investigation is called into question by the circumstances in which Colleague B was spoken to about the particular 1(b) incident. It was Colleague A’s evidence that the Police conversation with her was conducted over the telephone. In these circumstances it is unsurprising that Colleague A’s full account did not emerge until she made the statement to the HCPC’s Solicitors nearly six months after the 21 December 2020 incident. It would, in the view of the Panel, be a very different matter if an earlier interview of Colleague A had recorded the question, ‘Have there been any other incidents?’ followed a negative response made by her.

• The issue of contamination or collusion will be dealt with when the Panel describes its view of Colleague B. It is sufficient for present purposes for the Panel to state that it did not believe that Colleague A and Colleague B had put their heads together to present a false account of the particular 1(b) incident.

• It is a fact that no date, or even approximate date, has been given for any of the incidents save for that on 21 December 2020. The Panel accepts the submission made by Ms Stevens that the absence of dates deprives the Registrant of a line of defence that would potentially be open to him were a specific date alleged and he could demonstrate that he was not working on that day. However, the Panel does not consider that it is a point that goes to detract from Colleague A’s account because before 21 December 2020 she had not intended to complain about the Registrant’s actions and for that reason had no reason to record the date on which they occurred or anything about them.

• The Panel considers that the absence of earlier complaints, is consistent with Colleague A thinking that with the 21 December 2020 incident a line had been crossed by the Registrant, and that she needed to put a stop to his behaviour. It was on any view a more serious incident than any of the others she alleged. The Panel accepts that after the comment relating to her arse looking jiggly, Colleague A sought to deal with the Registrant’s attention by increasing the size of the scrubs she wore. That action suggests an unwillingness to make an issue about untoward behaviour. There is a further aspect that is relevant, namely Colleague A’s wish not to jeopardise her ability to continue to work at the Hospital. She knew that the Registrant was a popular member of staff, and she perceived that her status as an agency worker created a further aspect of her perceived vulnerability, the record of her discussion with Person O and Person R on 22 December 2020 demonstrating that to be so.

• So far as the implausibility of the incident is concerned, the Panel accepts that nobody would expect a person of good character in the position of the Registrant to behave in the manner in which it is alleged he did. The very positive testimonial and character evidence provided to, and accepted by, the Panel only serves to underline that fact. However, neither implausibility nor positive testimonial evidence can prevent a finding that the behaviour did in fact occur if the evidence that it did is convincing.

• The Panel gave careful consideration to argument concerning the implausibility of the 21 December 2020 incident occurring without another person seeing what had taken place. There were undoubtedly other people coming and going in Theatre 4, and common sense dictates that there must have been, at the very least, a risk that someone would have seen such an incident. However, there are two factors that have led the Panel to conclude that this issue is not one on the basis of which it is possible to decide that Colleague A’s account should be discounted. One is that the incident as described by Colleague A took place very quickly. The other is that all of the other people who might have chanced to see what occurred were busy about their own activities. It is not suggested that anyone was standing about idly with no task of their own, or that anyone was focused on Colleague A and the Registrant, or even the area where they were. This is demonstrated by the fact that two of the people who might well have seen the incident, Person J and Person N, did not notice Colleague A at all. That she was in fact present is accepted by the Registrant.

25. In addition to the factors identified above, the Panel reminded itself that it received evidence about an earlier disagreement that had occurred between the Registrant and Colleague A. That disagreement appeared to have arisen in the context of a criticism made by Colleague A about the state of the Registrant’s Operating Theatre and it may well be that it was founded on a misunderstanding. The Panel considered whether the knowledge of this disagreement should lead it to treat the evidence of Colleague A with caution on the basis that she may have harboured resentment towards the Registrant because of this earlier disagreement. Having heard Colleague A’s evidence and having the opportunity to observe her, the Panel was satisfied that this was not a relevant factor, and it is also noteworthy that when the Registrant was spoken to on the day after the incident, the Registrant is recorded as having told the Clinical Coordinators for Anaesthetics that he viewed Colleague A as “a mate”.

26. The Registrant gave evidence before the Panel in a clear manner and without contradiction. He said he had a normal friendly working relationship with both Colleague A and Colleague B. In relation to the earlier disagreement there had been between him and Colleague A concerning the condition of his Operating Theatre, he confirmed that there had been a ‘falling out’ but that he had apologised to Colleague A to the way that he had reacted to her criticism. He described in detail the work he was undertaking on 21 December 2020. He explained the layout of the Operating Theatre and who was present in stating why he contended that the incident could not have occurred as alleged by Colleague A. He described being shocked and distraught when he learned of Colleague A’s allegation, which he said had not happened. He also robustly denied the other disputed factual elements of the Allegation. He made clear that he was an experienced and conscientious practitioner who loved his role as an Operating Department Practitioner.

27. The conclusion of the Panel was that the evidence of Colleague A was honestly given and reliable. It accepted that the events had occurred as described by Colleague A. It follows from this that the Panel rejected the evidence of the Registrant where it conflicted with it.

28. The specific elements of the Allegation advanced by the HCPC that relate specifically to Colleague B are more limited, being two in number. One of them (the placing of an arm around Colleague B’s shoulder) is admitted. The other (relating to asking why Colleague B was not wearing a bra) was denied. The evidence of Colleague B is also relevant to a ‘humping’ incident alleged by Colleague A (particular 1(b)).

29. The Panel thought it sensible to start with Colleague B’s evidence relating to particular 1(b) on the basis that if the Panel concluded that that evidence was contaminated that is a factor that should be considered in relation to the question about her bra.

30. Particular 1(b) alleges that on an unparticularised date, the Registrant thrust his hips into Colleague A while she was leaning over a bed. The evidence of both Colleague A and Colleague B about this matter is that they were working in different operating theatres that were located on opposite sides of a corridor. They were chatting, Colleague B leaning against a bed outside the theatre in which she was working and Colleague B facing away from her making up the bed which was outside the theatre in which she was working. It is alleged that the Registrant walked past, and without saying anything, thrust his hips into Colleague A’s backside and walked on. Colleague B recalled that she probably said words to the effect, ‘What the fuck’, and that Colleague A said something to the effect of not liking it when the Registrant did that.

31. The Panel has no hesitation in stating that it considers that the manner in which Colleague B was interviewed by the Trust about this matter, was, at the very least, less than ideal. Colleague A, having previously said that Colleague B had witnessed the particular 1(b) incident, was present when Colleague B was asked about it. It would have been preferable had Colleague B been asked about the incident in an open and neutral manner with Colleague A absent. The relevant question for the Panel at the present stage is to decide if there is a realistic possibility that Colleague B’s account about the incident is tainted.

32. Mention was made by Ms Stevens to Colleague B’s reference to ‘a patriarchy’ and to the ‘MeToo movement’. In the judgement of the Panel these comments amounted to no more than a resigned belief on the part of Colleague B that inappropriate comments and actions were part and parcel of everyday life, including what could be expected to occur at work. They did not, in the view of the Panel, represent an attitude from which it could properly be believed that Colleague B had an agenda to malign the Registrant. The Panel found Colleague B to be a confident and strong character and accepted her explanation for not having reported the incident at an earlier stage. The Panel has no hesitation in finding that had Colleague B been asked in the Trust process to agree with a version of events that she did not agree with, she would have refused to do so. Furthermore, the Panel did not consider that there were any grounds on which it could conclude that Colleague B was motivated by a desire to disadvantage the Registrant. Indeed, she expressed surprise at the fact that the issues relating to her personally featured as elements of the Allegation.

33. The conclusion of the Panel was that Colleague B gave evidence that was both truthful and reliable. It follows that the Panel rejected the evidence of the Registrant that he did not ask her why she was not wearing a bra.

34. The result of the acceptance of the evidence of both Colleague A and Colleague B, as well as the acceptance by the Panel of the Registrant’s admission of particular 2(b), is that each element of particulars 1 to 3 inclusive is proven.

35. For the avoidance of doubt the Panel should state that it reached its findings on the issues alleged by particulars 1 to 3 without resorting to deciding whether the circumstances would be appropriate to consider whether “cross admissibility” would apply. This was a decision made by the Panel out of considerations of fairness to the Registrant.

36. The Panel then went on to consider particular 4 which alleges that the Registrant’s actions were sexually motivated. In reaching its decision on this matter, the Panel had regard to the Practice Note that has already been referred to. It applied the test that for it to be found that the Registrant had been sexually motivated, it would be necessary for the Panel to find on a balance of probabilities that in acting as the Panel has found he did, he acted either in pursuit of sexual gratification or in pursuit of a future sexual relationship.

37. The Panel does not find that any of the Registrant’s actions were done in pursuit of a future sexual relationship, whether with Colleague A or Colleague B.

38. With regard to sexual gratification, the Panel views the placing of his arm around Colleague B to be insensitive and (as Colleague B viewed it) an invasion of her personal space. But there were no elements of that action from which it could properly be inferred that the Registrant was or wished to gain sexual gratification from that action.

39. However, different considerations apply to the remaining particulars. Three of the incidents – 1(b), 1(c) and 3 – involved mimicking a sexual act. In relation to the last of those incidents (that which occurred on 21 December 2020) the Registrant himself provided the answer as to whether he was sexually motivated by saying, as the Panel finds he did, “Sorry, I’m so f****** horny.” However, the Panel finds that although there may have been other factors driving him to act as he did (for example, what he thought to be humour or a demonstration of physical superiority), nevertheless, sexual gratification was a factor.

40. Similarly, the Panel finds that the particular 1(a) jiggly arse comment to have a sexual element that is sufficient for that particular to be included in a finding of sexual motivation, as well as the question addressed to Colleague B about her not wearing a bra, as that question was part and parcel of the Registrant looking at Colleague B’s breasts.

41. Accordingly, all of the proven facts with the exception of particular 2(b) occurred as a result of sexual motivation, that motivation being the pursuit of some sexual gratification.

Conduct of the hearing following the handing down of the decision on the facts.

42. The Decision above was handed down at the end of the hearing day on Friday, 14 November 2025. The Panel indicated that it wished to commence at 10:00am on Monday, 17 November 2025, to be addressed on the issues of the statutory grounds and impairment of fitness to practise. At the request of Ms Stevens, the Panel agreed to commence at 11:30am.

43. When the hearing recommenced at 11:30am on Monday, 17 November 2025, the Registrant was not present and Ms Stevens stated that she wished the Panel to receive a letter that had been written by the Registrant and also that she wished to address the Panel in private. In public, Ms Stevens informed the Panel that she and Mr Dubb, who instructed her, would be taking no further part in the hearing.

44. Before leaving the hearing, Ms Stevens explicitly stated that there was no application for an adjournment. She also stated that she could see no issue concerning the Panel proceeding with the remaining stages of the case.

45. Following Ms Stevens and Mr Dubb leaving the hearing, the Presenting Officer made an application that the hearing should proceed in the absence of the Registrant. The notice of hearing sent to the Registrant on 16 June 2025, included the information that the hearing would proceed on Monday, 17 November 2025 and the following day. The Presenting Officer submitted that there was no application to adjourn and that the Registrant had demonstrated that he had no wish to attend the hearing either directly by person attendance or indirectly by being legally represented. In these circumstances, he submitted, the Registrant had voluntarily absented himself from the hearing with the consequence that the hearing should proceed in his absence.

46. The Panel was provided the Registrant’s letter dated 16 November 2025. The first paragraph of that letter reads, ‘I am writing to inform you that I intend to surrender my registration as an Operating Department Practitioner with immediate effect.’ The Panel was troubled with this wording as it suggested that the Registrant could request his name be removed from the HCPC Register or that the Panel would have the power to direct such a removal upon his request. In fact, neither could be done. The Panel thought it necessary to voice these concerns while Ms Stevens and Mr Dubb were still present in the hearing, which it did.

47. When the Panel enquired of the Presenting Officer what the HCPC’s position would be upon the departure of Ms Stevens and Mr Dubb, and in particular whether an application to proceed in the Registrant’s absence would be made, Mr Dubb and Ms Stevens left the hearing. At that point, the Presenting Officer made an application to proceed in the Registrant’s absence.

48. When it retired to reach a decision on the HCPC’s application that the hearing should proceed in the Registrant’s absence, the Panel considered that in view of what had been said in private that morning, if it had been requested that the matter should be adjourned to enable the Registrant to attend the hearing and that application had been supported by medical evidence, then it would not be proper to proceed in his absence. However, there was no request that the case should be adjourned, and no suggestion that there would be a time when the factor disabling the Registrant’s attendance at the present time would not apply. In these circumstances, the Panel concluded that it was fair in all the circumstances to proceed with the already long-delayed hearing.

Decision on Grounds:

49. The Presenting Officer addressed the Panel on the proper approach to the making of a decision on the statutory ground of misconduct. Those submissions will not be repeated as they accorded with the advice the Panel received which will be summarised below. He submitted that there were clear and significant breaches of elements of the HCPC’s Standards of conduct, performance and ethics in force at the time of the relevant events. He referred to Standards 6.1, 6.2 and 9.1. He submitted that the Registrant’s actions should be regarded as deplorable, and such that they should be labelled misconduct.

50. The Panel accepted the advice it received in relation to the decision to be made. Accordingly, no burden of standard of proof should be applied. The question to be answered was whether the proven facts are sufficiently serious properly to be categorised as misconduct.

51. When the Panel reviewed the proven facts it decided that there was a substantial difference between the issue alleged by particular 2(b) (the admitted issue of the Registrant placing his arm around Colleague B’s shoulder) and the other proven matters. In putting his arm around Colleague B’s shoulder, the Registrant was not sexually motivated. While being of the view that all health professionals should be mindful of the personal space of others, and be respectful of the fact that many people find being touched in this manner unwelcome and uncomfortable, the Panel concluded that particular 2(b) was not sufficiently serious to be categorised as misconduct, either in isolation or in combination with the other proven matters.

52. With regard to the other proven matters, all of which were found to have been sexually motivated, the Panel was of the clear view that they should be categorised as misconduct. In the view of the Panel, it is so obvious that a registered health professional should not make comments to colleagues that have been driven by sexual motivation or make physical contact with them when similarly motivated, that published standards documents are hardly required to demonstrate that point. Nevertheless, the Panel finds that the Registrant’s conduct breached Standard 6.2, ‘You must not do anything ….. which could put the health or safety of a ….. colleague at unacceptable risk’, and Standard 9.1, ‘You must make sure that your conduct justifies the public’s trust and confidence in you and your profession’. In the Panel’s view the Registrant’s behaviour was extremely serious and such that fellow professionals would regard it to have been deplorable.

Decision on Impairment:

53. The Presenting Officer made submissions as to the proper approach to a decision on current impairment of fitness to practise. He referred the Panel to the HCPTS Practice Note on the topic and took the Panel to passages in that document.

54. With regard to the personal component, the Presenting Officer submitted that the findings raise fundamental questions about the Registrant’s judgement and attitudes towards colleagues. He recognised that there has been no suggestion of a repetition of untoward behaviour since the last incident concerning Colleague A, that the Registrant has provided very positive testimonial evidence and that he has engaged in a course about harassment and bullying. He submitted that remediation is harder to achieve when the conduct in issue is of the type presented in this case. The Presenting Officer submitted, the scale of remediation task was such that there will be a concern that the behaviour will be repeated.

55. So far as the public component of impairment of fitness to practise is concerned, the Presenting Officer reminded the Panel that when serious issues of misconduct (as opposed to say, clinical deficiencies) are being considered, questions of whether or not remediation has been achieved can be of secondary importance to the public interest. The Presenting Officer submitted that the following matters were relevant to the decision to be made. Colleague A had been sexually assaulted whilst at work, and that assault involved her being pinned down by the neck. It was not an isolated incident, as two Colleagues had been the recipient of sexually motivated behaviour. There had been previous instances concerning Colleague A before 21 December 2020. In the light of these factors he submitted that the Registrant’s conduct constituted very serious departures from expected standards of behaviour and, as such, required a finding of current impairment of fitness to practise.

56. The Panel again accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor and paid close attention to the HCPTS Practice Note. Consistent with that advice and guidance it considered the personal and public components separately.

57. An important issue for a decision on the personal component is for a panel reaching the decision to form a view about the risk of recurrence. An element of that decision is the extent to which the registrant in question has insight into the occurrence of the matters in issue. It is the case that the Registrant denied all of the matters that the Panel has found to be misconduct. He was, of course, entitled to deny these matters and to maintain his denial of them. He is not to be punished for his denials. But it is not to say that denial is without consequence. If acknowledgement of the incident is relevant to a decision about whether there is a risk of repetition, then the absence of acknowledgement must be considered as a factor in reaching that decision. The misconduct in this case was deliberate repeated behaviour that was obviously inappropriate. It can properly be described as demonstrating a behavioural or attitudinal deficit. In circumstances where the person who committed that behaviour does not accept that he did, the Panel can have no confidence that he understands why he did it. If the Registrant does not understand why he did it (as, on the information available to it, the Panel can only assume he does not) there can be little confidence that it will not be repeated. For that reason the Panel is of the view that a risk of repetition remains, and that must result in a finding of personal component current impairment of fitness to practise.

58. So far as the public component of impairment of fitness to practise is concerned, the Panel is of the clear view that a decision on current impairment is required. The Registrant’s behaviour was extremely serious. It was repeated with regard to Colleague A, and although the comment about not wearing a bra made to Colleague B might be thought less serious than the Colleague A incidents that involved physical contact, it was nevertheless part of a pattern of unacceptable behaviour. People must feel able to attend work and go about their duties without thinking that they might be subject to behaviour of the type proven. There is no suggestion in the present case that the Registrant’s actions resulted in there being any adverse consequences for patients. However, it is foreseeable that if colleagues are thinking that they may be subjected to unacceptable behaviour they might not be fully focusing on their tasks, with a consequential risk to patients. The Panel is satisfied that fair-minded members of the public would be seriously troubled by having contact with any health professional with whom they might have contact. In the case of behaviour by an Operating Department Practitioner that concern is likely to be heightened given the acutely vulnerable situation of an anaesthetised patient during the time the professional contact takes place. Were the Panel not to make a finding of current impairment of fitness to practise it would not be sending the appropriate message to the public or to fellow professionals.

Decision on Sanction:

59. The Panel’s written decision on misconduct and current impairment of fitness to practise was handed down at the end of the hearing day on Monday, 17 November 2025. The Panel received the Presenting Officer’s submissions on sanction at the commencement of the hearing the following morning.

60. The Presenting Officer began his submissions by stating that the HCPC did not make a positive submission as to the appropriate sanction to be imposed. He did, however, urge the Panel to have regard to the HCPC’s Sanctions Policy, and advanced submissions as to the proper approach to the sanction decision, submissions that accorded with the terms of the Sanctions Policy and the advice of the Legal Assessor. The Presenting Officer invited the Panel to consider whether the findings made engaged two of the types of case identified by the Sanctions Policy as “Serious Cases”, namely, sexual misconduct and violence. In inviting the Panel to identify mitigating factors it would be appropriate to consider, he suggested that the Panel might consider the two written reflections provided by the Registrant, the Registrant’s understanding of the impact of bullying as well as the CPD course already described. The Presenting Officer submitted that as aggravating factors the Panel might consider that the misconduct represented a pattern of behaviour, that there are on-going concerns about the Registrant’s insight into his behaviour with the consequential risk of repetition. He also submitted that with regard to Colleague A, the Registrant’s actions occurred in the workplace, that actions of the sort under consideration give rise to a risk of service user harm, and that the incident on 21 December 2020 occurred in an operating theatre that was being prepared for an emergency patient.

61. The Panel accepted the advice it received from the Legal Assessor. Accordingly, a sanction should not be imposed to punish the Registrant. A sanction should only be imposed to the extent that it is required to protect the public, maintain a proper degree of public confidence and to declare proper professional standards. No more severe sanction should be imposed than these proper sanction aims require. The first decision to be made is whether any sanction is required. If it is, then the available sanctions must be considered, starting with the least restrictive until one that is sufficient is reached. The Panel also accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor that care was needed in any use of the statements made by the Registrant in his letter dated 16 November 2025.

62. The Panel first sought to identify aggravating factors. In the judgement of the Panel the matters that are being considered are extremely serious without there being further issues increasing the seriousness of them. As submitted by the Presenting Officer, sexual misconduct identified in the Sanctions Policy as a category of “Serious Case”. The Panel considers that it is appropriate to note that the issues involving physical contact with Colleague A were particularly serious. Furthermore, Colleague A was clearly distressed by the incident on 21 December 2020, and behaviour of the type being considered has the potential to have wider consequences for effective team working and patient care.

63. When the Panel turned to consider mitigating factors, it concluded that there were no factors that related specifically to the proven matters that could sensibly be described as mitigating. However, more generally, the Panel did feel that there were factors in the Registrant’s favour that it would be fair to keep in mind when reaching its decision. The Panel acknowledges that the Registrant has reflected on the impact of bullying and undertook the course described, though the relevance of those factors to the issue in hand is limited in view of the denial of the allegations. Testimonials have been presented to the Panel which speak highly of the Registrant both personally and professionally. It should also be recorded that until his disengagement from the final two days of the hearing, the Registrant has fully engaged in this fitness to practise process.

64. With these findings in mind, the Panel first asked itself whether a sanction is required. The clear answer to this question arrived at by the Panel was that it is. To pass from the case without a sanction being imposed would be to fail to recognise the seriousness of the findings made and, given the finding that there is a risk of repetition, would not provide public protection.

65. The Panel next considered a caution order. The Panel heeded the terms of paragraph 101 of the Sanctions Policy. Not one of the suggested factors there is present in this case. The issue is not isolated, limited or relatively minor in nature. The risk of repetition is not low. The Registrant has not shown good insight and appropriate remediation has not been undertaken. A caution order would not be appropriate.

66. The Panel then went on to decide if a conditions of practice order would be appropriate, and in that context reviewed paragraphs 105 to 117 of the Sanctions Policy. The fundamental problem in this case is behavioural and attitudinal, and it is the view of the Panel that it is extremely difficult to formulate appropriate conditions of practice to address such issues, as recognised by paragraph 108. Tailor-made conditions of practice are not required to ensure registered health professionals do not behave in a sexually inappropriate manner towards colleagues. In the present case the Registrant’s very limited insight and the fact that he has stated that he does not wish to work as an Operating Department Practitioner are further reasons why a conditions of practice order would not be appropriate.

67. The Panel therefore necessarily addressed the question of whether a suspension order should be imposed. Paragraph 121 of the Sanctions Policy is in these terms:

‘A suspension order is likely to be appropriate where there are serious concerns which cannot be reasonably addressed by a conditions of practice order, but which do not require the registrant to be struck off the Register. These types of cases will typically exhibit the following factors:

• the concerns represent a serious breach of the Standards of conduct, performance and ethics;
• the registrant has insight;
• the issues are unlikely to be repeated; and
• there is evidence to suggest the registrant is likely to be able to resolve or remedy their failings.’

It is certainly the case that the Panel’s findings represent a serious breach of the Standards of conduct, performance and ethics. But that apart, the factors suggested in paragraph 121 are not present in this case. The Registrant only has very limited insight, and it cannot be said that the issues are unlikely to be repeated. Importantly, is no evidence to suggest that the Registrant will be likely to resolve or remedy his failings. It would be difficult to resolve or remedy failings without acknowledging that they had occurred. There has been no acknowledgement over the five years since the issue arose. For these reasons the Panel considered it necessary to consider whether a striking off order should be made.

68. With regard to striking off orders there are two paragraphs of the Sanctions Policy that the Panel considered to be relevant, paragraphs 130 and 131. The former makes it clear that a striking off order is an order of the last resort for serious, persistent, deliberate or reckless acts that include sexual misconduct. Paragraph 131 states that a striking off order is likely to be appropriate where the nature and gravity of the concerns are such that any lesser sanction would be insufficient to protect the public, public confidence in the profession, and public confidence in the regulatory process. Particular mention is made in that paragraph of cases where a registrant lacks insight and is unwilling to resolve matters.

69. The provisional view of the Panel was that a striking off order is appropriate in this case. However, being mindful of the gravity of making such an order, the Panel revisited the appropriateness of a suspension order. Having done so, the Panel was satisfied that a suspension order would not be appropriate. Had the Registrant’s attitude to the allegations been different, so that the Panel had been able to conclude that there would be a realistic prospect that the position at the end of a period of suspension would be different with regard to his insight and the risk of repetition, then a suspension order might have been an appropriate disposal. But as it is, there is no basis upon which the Panel could find that the position after even the maximum period of suspension would be any different. For that reason, a suspension order is not appropriate. A suspension order being inappropriate, to adopt the words in paragraph 131 of the Sanctions Policy, any lesser sanction than striking off would be insufficient to protect the public, public confidence in the profession, and public confidence in the regulatory process. For that reason, the Panel is satisfied that a striking off order is required and is a proportionate response.

The Registrar is directed to strike the name of Lee Turner from the Register on the date this Order comes into effect.

Right of Appeal:

You may appeal to the High Court in England and Wales against the Panel’s decision and the order it has made against you.

Under Article 29(10) of the Health Professions Order 2001, any appeal must be made within 28 days of the date when this notice is served on you. The Panel’s order will not take effect until the appeal period has expired or, if you appeal, until that appeal is disposed of or withdrawn.

Interim Order:

Application

70. After the Panel announced its decision that the substantive sanction would be that of a striking off order, the Presenting Officer applied for an interim suspension order for a period of 18 months to cover the appeal period. He submitted that the Panel’s decision made in relation to the substantive issues resulted in an interim order being necessary for protection of members of the public and being otherwise in the public interest. In submitting that the order should be made for the maximum period of 18 months, the Presenting Officer argued that if the Registrant did appeal the Panel’s decision, an appeal could take at least that length of time to be finally disposed of.

71. The absence of the Registrant from the hearing resulted in there being no submissions by or on behalf of the Registrant on this issue.

Panel Decision

72. The Panel accepted the advice it received in relation to the application. It also had regard to the section entitled, “Interim orders” between paragraphs 133 and 135 of the Sanctions Policy and the HCPTS Practice Note entitled, “Interim Orders”. Accordingly, it was first required to decide whether it had jurisdiction to consider the application. If satisfied that it had jurisdiction, it must then decide whether the application should be decided in the absence of the Registrant. If the issue should be decided in the absence of the Registrant, the Panel must then consider whether there are risks that satisfied one or more of the three grounds that could justify the making of an interim order. Those grounds are, (i) that it is necessary for protection of members of the public, (ii) that it is otherwise in the public interest, and (iii) that it is in the interests of the registrant concerned. Furthermore, it is necessary to remember that the default position established by the legislation governing this process is that when a substantive sanction is imposed, there will be no restriction on a registrant’s ability to practise while their appeal rights remain extant. Accordingly, something more than the fact that a substantive sanction has been imposed is required to justify the making of an interim order. The Panel confirms that it has followed this approach.

73. Included in the notice of hearing email sent to the Registrant on 16 June 2025, was the following paragraph statement: “Please note that if the Panel finds that it is necessary to do so, it may also impose an interim order (under Article 31 of the Health Professions Order 2001) at any stage during the hearing. An interim order suspends or restricts a registrant’s right to practise with immediate effect.” The Panel concluded that this afforded the Registrant the opportunity of making representations on the issue of whether an interim order should be made, and for that reason provided jurisdiction for the application to be considered by the Panel.

74. The Panel was satisfied that it was appropriate to decide the application in the absence of the Registrant; when such an application is made there is necessarily a degree of urgency in deciding the matter, the Registrant was informed in the notice of hearing that such an application might be made and there is no reason to believe that the Registrant would wish to be heard on the matter if the Panel did not deal with it at the present time.

75. Whilst acknowledging the default position that there is no restriction on a registrant’s ability to practise while their appeal rights remain outstanding, the Panel concluded that in the present case, an interim order is required. It is necessary for protection of members of the public and it is otherwise in the public interest for the same reasons explained by the Panel in its substantive sanction decision.

76. The Panel considered whether interim conditions of practice would be a sufficient restriction during the appeal period, but concluded that, for the same reasons a substantive condition of practice order was not appropriate, interim conditions of practice would not provide sufficient protection.

77. The Panel therefore concluded that an interim suspension order should be made.

78. The Panel decided that the interim suspension order should be for the maximum period of 18 months. An order of that length is necessary because the final resolution of an appeal could well take 18 months if the Registrant appeals the Panel’s decision and Order. In the event that the Registrant does not appeal the decision and Order, the interim order will simply fall away when the time within which he could have commenced an appeal passes.

Interim Suspension Order:

The Panel makes an Interim Suspension Order under Article 31(2) of the Health Professions Order 2001, the same being necessary to protect members of the public and being otherwise in the public interest.

This order will expire: (if no appeal is made against the Panel’s decision and Order) upon the expiry of the period during which such an appeal could be made; (if an appeal is made against the Panel’s decision and Order) the final determination of that appeal, subject to a maximum period of 18 months.

History of Hearings for Lee Turner