Jonathon Wilson-Wilcox

Profession: Paramedic
Registration Number: PA35484
Hearing Type: Final Hearing
Date and Time of hearing: 10:00 08/09/2025 End: 17:00 11/09/2025
Location: Virtually via Video Conference
Panel: Conduct and Competence Committee
Outcome: Struck off

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Allegation Finding Order Notes Hearing History

Allegation

As a registered Paramedic (PA35484):

1. Between around September 2020 and May 2021 you:

a. Caused and/or allowed your employer to believe that you were undertaking a nonmedical prescribing course at Sheffield Hallam University when this was not the case.

b. Caused and/or allowed your employer to believe that you were absent from work on Thursdays due to university attendance when this was not the case.

c. Accepted payment from your employer in relation to university attendance days despite not attending university on those days.

2. Between around 11 May 2021 and 3 June 2021 you caused and/or allowed your employer to believe that you were undertaking a non-medical prescribing course at the Open University when this was not the case.

3. Your conduct at any or all of particulars 1a, 1b and/or 2 above was dishonest in that you sought to represent to your employer that you were undertaking a non- medical prescribing course when you knew that you were not.

4. Your conduct at particular 1c above was dishonest in that you knew that you were not entitled to receive these payments.

5. On one or more occasions on or after 7 October 2021, you failed to adhere to one or more County Court judgements and/or Warrants requiring you to reimburse your employer in respect of the payments referred to at particular 1c above.

6. Your conduct at 5 above was dishonest in that you knew that you were required to reimburse your employer.

7. Your conduct at any or all of particulars 1- 6 above constitutes misconduct.

8. By reason of the above matters, your fitness to practise is impaired.

Finding

Preliminary Matters
 
Adjournment application
 
1. The Panel was provided with the Registrant’s email dated 03 September 2025, in which he stated that he had been “off grid” for 10 months and had only become aware of the Notice for the substantive hearing late in the prior week. He said that he had not had time to read the bundle in full or seek advice and representation.
 
2. The Panel was further provided with the Registrant’s email dated 08 September 2025 on the morning of the hearing. [redacted]. He asked the Panel for an adjournment on this basis and on that of his earlier email.
 
3. Ms Evans, on behalf of the HCPC, opposed the adjournment. She submitted that an evidence bundle had been provided to the Registrant as long ago as August 2024. The current bundle had changed very little. She submitted that the HCPC had not received any correspondence from the Registrant until the email of 03 September 2025. There was no supporting evidence in respect of either the Registrant living ‘off grid’ or of his medical issues.
 
4. The Legal Assessor advised the Panel that it had the power to grant an adjournment if this was appropriate. He referred the Panel to the HCPTS Practice Note Postponement and Adjournment of Proceedings and the factors taken from CPS v Picton (2006) EWHC 1108, which the Practice Note sets out. He also referred the Panel to the case of GMC v Hayat [2018] EWCA 2796 and the court’s guidance that requests for adjournment on the grounds of ill health require careful scrutiny.
 
5. The Panel noted that the Registrant had not attended to make his application to adjourn the hearing. He had stated that he was unwell and there were medical issues which prevented attendance at the virtual hearing. However, the Registrant had provided no detail as to what his illness was, how it had affected him, or why it prevented him from attending. He had provided no documentation from any medical professional to support his inability to attend. The Registrant had stated that he was seeking further medical assistance on the morning of the hearing but again provided no detail of it. The Panel was mindful of the guidance of the court in Hayat regarding the need to scrutinise the reason for adjournment requests on medical grounds.
 
6. The Panel took into account that the Registrant had been provided substantially with the evidence on which the HCPC relied some time ago and before the Registrant had gone “off grid”. The Registrant had known that the case was being investigated but had not taken steps to maintain effective communications with his Regulator. He had had an awareness of the nature of the allegations for some time and been sent the hearing bundle in June 2025. The Registrant had not explained what, if any, attempts he had made to seek or obtain advice or representation.
 
7. The Panel took into account that the hearing had been arranged for some time with the attendance of witnesses, although virtual. The case concerned matters alleged to have occurred some time ago, and the Panel was aware of the risk of lapse of time on the memories of witnesses. The case had been allotted time in the hearings list and there is a public interest in dealing with regulatory cases expeditiously. The Panel considered that the Registrant had provided insufficient support for his application for an adjournment and it concluded that the need to deal with the hearing expeditiously in the public interest should be given preference.
 
8. The Panel decided to refuse the Registrant’s application for an adjournment of the hearing. 
 
Service of Notice
 
9. The Panel next considered whether notice of the hearing had been properly served on the Registrant. The Panel was provided with a Service Bundle of documents, which included a Notice of Hearing dated 05 June 2025 (“the Notice”). The Notice set out the date, time, and place (virtual) for the hearing. The HCPC also provided a Certificate of Registration demonstrating the Registrant’s registered status and his registered email address.
 
10. The Legal Assessor advised the Panel that the Health and Care Professions Council (Conduct and Competence Committee) (Procedure) Rules 2003 (as amended) (“the Rules”) provide that notice of the hearing must be served on the Registrant’s registered address. The Notice must be sent not less than 28 days before the start of the hearing. He referred the Panel to the HCPTS Practice Note Service of Documents, which sets out that the requirement is to send notice. Notice by email is deemed served on the day of sending and the Panel may accept a copy of the email header as demonstrating sending.
 
11. The Panel was satisfied that proper notice of the hearing had been served on the Registrant in accordance with the Rules. 
 
Proceeding in Absence
 
12. Ms Evans applied to the Panel to proceed in the Registrant’s absence at the hearing. She referred the Panel to the HCPC’s supporting bundle on proceeding. She submitted that there had been previous correspondence sent to the Registrant informing him of the date of the hearing. The email from the Registrant dated 03 September 2025 indicated that he was aware of the hearing taking place. Ms Evans submitted that the same email address was corresponded from as sent. The Registrant had been informed on 04 September 2025 by email of his right to attend the hearing to make his adjournment application or to provide written reasons for his request. Ms Evans submitted that it was appropriate to proceed in the Registrant’s absence for similar reasons to rejecting his adjournment application.
 
13. The Legal Assessor advised the Panel that, pursuant to Rule 11, it had a discretion to proceed if it was satisfied that all reasonable steps had been taken to serve Notice on the Registrant. He referred the Panel to the factors taken from R v Jones, Hayward [2002] UKHL 5 and GMC v Adeogba [2016] EWCA Civ 162 and also the HCPTS Practice Note Proceeding in the Absence of the Registrant. 
 
14. The Panel noted that, in addition to the Notice of Hearing, several pieces of correspondence from the HCPC sent to the Registrant had also set out the date for the hearing. Before the Registrant had gone “off grid” he had been aware of the ongoing investigation. He had apparently not kept in touch with the Regulator over the progress of the case or informed them of his intention to be “off grid”.
 
15. Although there would be some disadvantage to the Registrant in proceeding in his absence and not hearing from the Registrant, the Panel would bear this in mind in the hearing. It would be able to ask the witnesses questions. The Panel took into account that the Registrant had been sent what was substantially the bundle in August 2024. The Panel reminded itself of its reasons for refusing the adjournment application.
 
16. The Panel decided that it was fair and appropriate to proceed in the absence of the Registrant and/or any representative. 
 
Amendment to the Allegation
 
17. Ms Evans applied to the Panel to amend the Allegation. She submitted that details of the proposed amendment had been provided to the Registrant on 22 August 2024. She submitted that the application had two aspects. Firstly, the HCPC applied to amend the “or” in Particulars 1(a) and 1(b) to read “caused and/or allowed”. She submitted that this correction did not increase the seriousness of the charge and did not prejudice the Registrant.
 
18. Secondly, Ms Evans applied to add the words “and/or Warrants” to the reference to County Court Judgement in Particular 5. She submitted that this accorded more closely with the evidence. Ms Evans submitted that the addition did not increase the seriousness of the charge. The Registrant had been notified that the amendment would be sought and it resulted in no prejudice to the Registrant in meeting the case. 
 
19. The Legal Assessor advised the Panel that, although there is no express rule dealing with amendments to allegations, it had been recognised by the courts in PSA v HPC & Doree [2017] EWCA Civ 319 that the Panel can amend an allegation, even late on in the case. He advised the Panel that it should consider whether it is fair to amend the Allegation and whether amendment resulted in any prejudice to the Registrant. 
 
20. The Panel decided that the amendments to Particulars 1(a) and 1(b) were not major changes and did not increase the gravamen of the charges. In relation to the proposed amendment to Particular 5, there was a material change. However, the proposed application had been made known to the Registrant in advance. The proposed amendment fairly set out the evidence, which had been served previously on the Registrant. The amendment did not result in any greater prejudice to the Registrant in meeting the case. 
 
21. The Panel decided to allow the application and grant the proposed amendment to the Allegation. 
 
Partial discontinuance
 
22. Ms Evans made a further application to discontinue particulars which concerned alleged false statements made by the Registrant. She submitted that the evidence supporting these had required raising enquiries with the Registrant’s GP. After due investigation, however, the evidence needed had not been possible to obtain. As a result, the HCPC took the view that there was no longer a realistic prospect of proving the particulars.
 
23. The Legal Assessor referred the Panel to the HCPTS Practice Note Discontinuance of Proceedings. He advised the Panel that it had to bear in mind the role it had in protection of the public. It had been recognised in CHRE v and Ruscillo GMC [2004] EWCA Civ 1356 and PSA v NMC & X [2018] EWHC 70 that panels have a duty to ensure cases are properly investigated. 
 
24. The Panel considered the application with care, mindful of its duties. It accepted that the HCPC had reached a limit with regard to its investigation of the Particular and there were no further enquiries which could reasonably be pursued. It took into account that, even with the partial discontinuance, if granted, a viable fitness to practise case remained. The Registrant suffered no prejudice by the Panel allowing discontinuance. 
 
25. The Panel took into account that the hearing was otherwise ready to proceed and identified a need for expedition in the public interest which would be prejudiced by further adjournment. The Panel decided to grant the partial discontinuance application and continue with the hearing.
 
Background
 
26. The Registrant is a Paramedic registered with the HCPC. At the times relevant to the Allegation, the Registrant was employed by the Nettleham Medical Practice (“the Practice”) as an Advanced Clinical Practitioner from 01 September 2020 to 04 June 2021. 
 
27. The Registrant wished to undertake a prescribing qualification, and it was agreed that he would be funded by the Practice and would be allowed one day release from his duties to attend a course of study. It was alleged that the Registrant had not undertaken the course but had still taken the paid time off from work. The Practice conducted an investigation and held a disciplinary meeting on 03 June 2021.
 
28. The Practice later sought recovery from the Registrant of monies paid, including taking the matter to the County Court. It was alleged that the Registrant had, on one or more occasions, failed to make the payments required by order of the court.
 
29. On 04 June 2021, the Practice submitted to the HCPC a referral form concerning the Registrant.
 
30. The HCPC called the following to give evidence to the Panel:
 
• HL, Practice Manager at the Practice;
 
• BJ, Deputy Practice Manager at the time of the events;
 
• MB, Assistant Head of Student Systems and Reporting, Sheffield Hallam University;
 
• Dr AH, Director of Student Support Services, Open University.
 
Decision on Facts
 
31. Ms Evans, on behalf of the HCPC, provided a written Case Summary with submissions. Ms Evans provided further submissions in the hearing. She highlighted to the Panel the evidence which she submitted supported the HCPC’s case. Ms Evans submitted that the HCPC’s witnesses were credible.
 
32. The Legal Assessor advised the Panel that the burden was on the HCPC to prove the facts in the Allegation on the ‘balance of probabilities’. The Registrant bore no burden of proof. 
33. The Legal Assessor advised the Panel on the guidance of the court to assessing evidence, based on the authorities Dutta v GMC [2020] EWHC 1974 (Admin) and Byrne v GMC [2021] EWHC 2237 (Admin). He advised the Panel to apply the test of dishonesty to the relevant particulars, as given by the Supreme Court in Ivey v Genting Casinos [2017] UKSC 62. 
 
34. The Legal Assessor referred the Panel to the HCPTS Practice Notes Fitness to Practise Impairment and Making decisions on a registrant’s state of mind. He advised the Panel to consider each of the factual particulars and decide whether the HCPC had discharged the burden of proof, providing reasons for its decisions.
 
Decision on the Facts
 
35. The Panel bore in mind that, in respect of each of the alleged facts, the burden of proving them was on the HCPC and that the Registrant was not subject to any burden of proof. The Panel was mindful that the standard of proof the HCPC had to reach was the ‘balance of probabilities’, which meant it may take a fact as proved if it decided, having considered the evidence, that it was more likely than not to have occurred.
 
Particular 1(a)
 
36. In respect of Particular 1 of the Allegation, the Panel took into account the Training Agreement dated 13 September 2020 (“the TA”) which HL had exhibited to her witness statement. The TA appeared to have been signed by the Registrant and for the Practice. It set out expressly an expectation that the Registrant would attend training to qualify as a non-medical prescriber, with attendance for six months at Sheffield Hallam University (“SHU”), and the Practice would meet the Registrant’s salary during his attendance. The TA was consistent with HL’s evidence that the Registrant had expressed a desire to be allowed to do this training. 
 
37. The Panel also took account of the evidence of MB, who gave efforts of detailed enquiries made on the SHU systems. MB informed the Panel that SHU staff are accustomed to make checks. She stated that only occasionally were there false negatives. She was confident that the Registrant had never been registered as a student of SHU. The Panel considered that MB was a credible witness who gave evidence in a straightforward manner.
 
38. The Panel also considered the minutes of the Investigation Meeting dated 11 May 2021, signed by the Registrant. These recorded “an earlier meeting in the day in which Jon said that he hadn’t been going to Sheffield University…”. The Panel took into account that this was hearsay evidence. However, the record had been signed by the Registrant and dated around the time of the events. The Panel found that the recorded minutes were likely to be accurate.
 
39. The Panel found HL to be a credible and measured witness and it accepted her evidence. The Panel considered that the documentary evidence was consistent with HL’s account that she had interviewed the Registrant and it had been agreed that the Practice would fund the Registrant’s course. 
 
40. The Panel accepted the evidence that the Registrant stated to HL in March 2021 that he was making good progress on the prescribing course at his review. It noted that this was recorded in the exhibited probationary review form (signatures obscured). The Panel also accepted HL’s evidence that the Registrant had asked for an extension to put off taking his exams and that in April 2021 he had stated that he was chasing his student ID number with SHU following her request. The Panel noted the exhibited instant messages to that effect. 
 
41. The Panel also took into account the minutes of the Disciplinary Meeting exhibited by BJ, dated 03 June 2021. The Panel noted that the latter minutes were unsigned by the Registrant. However, the implication in them of the Registrant’s non-attendance at the university course was consistent with BJ’s evidence in her witness statement that the Registrant had confirmed to her that he had never started the course. The Panel considered that the minutes, having been prepared at the time of the meeting, were likely to be accurate.
 
42. The Panel found that, on the balance of probabilities, the Registrant had caused his employer to believe that he had agreed to undertake a nonmedical prescribing course at SHU and that such a course had been in progress. The Registrant’s terms and conditions of employment exhibited had commenced on 01 September 2020 and the employer had discovered the truth about the lack of the SHU course in May 2021. The Panel was satisfied that the misrepresentation had lasted over this period. 
 
43. The Panel also found proved that the Registrant had never been enrolled on the relevant course but he had, by his replies to HL, allowed the employer to continue to labour under its misapprehension by his conduct. He had therefore caused and allowed the employer to believe he was undertaking the university course.
 
44. The Panel found Particular 1(a) proved. 
 
Particular 1(b)
 
45. The Panel took into account HL’s evidence that the rota she exhibited showed the Registrant had not been scheduled for work on Thursdays. It also noted that his exhibited terms and conditions of employment required the Registrant to work Tuesday to Friday inclusive. This was consistent with HL’s evidence in her witness statement and that the Registrant had a day off on Monday. It also noted the Registrant’s email dated 20 July 2021 in which he sought credit for having worked on some Mondays.
 
46. The Panel again referred to the signed minutes of the Investigation Meeting on 11 May 2021. The minute note stated that HL had “stated that the practice had been paying Jon for a full day on Thursday to complete the course with Sheffield University” and “as Jon didn’t tell anyone at the practice that he wasn’t attending Sheffield University, then he was claiming for something that the practice hadn’t agreed to”.
 
47. The Panel again took into account the evidence that the Registrant had provided misleading information in March 2021 at his probation review and in April 2021 in response to being chased for his student ID by HL.
 
48. The Panel found that the minute note, the probationary record, and the instant messages were consistent with HL’s evidence that the Registrant had also told her informally at various times that the course was going “OK”. The evidence, minuted by HL, was that the Registrant told her he had not been attending SHU at the May meeting.
 
49. Taking all the evidence into account, the Panel was satisfied that the Registrant had caused his employer to be under a mistaken understanding. It found that the Registrant had been absent from work on Thursdays between September 2020 and May 2021 and had caused the employer to believe that this was due to his university attendance. Further, the Panel was satisfied that the Registrant’s conduct over this period had allowed the employer to continue in this mistaken belief. He had at no stage before May 2021 informed the employer of the true position. 
 
50. The Panel found Particular 1(b) proved. 
 
Particular 1(c)
 
51. The Panel took into account HL’s evidence that the Registrant had been employed to work 156 hours per month. This was consistent with the hours set out in the Registrant’s terms and conditions of employment, as exhibited, and the calculations HL set out in her evidence. The Panel also took into account the payslips for the Registrant, exhibited for September 2020 to May 2021, which indicated payment for 156 hours. The Panel had already found that the Registrant had not attended SHU over this period.
 
52. The Panel noted that, in his email dated July 2021 to HL, the Registrant had not disputed that in principle there had been an overpayment, although he had asked about getting some credit for having worked on some Mondays. He had not challenged the assertion by HL in the Investigation Meeting of being paid for Thursdays by the Practice. 
 
53. The Panel accepted HL’s evidence. It was satisfied that the Practice had paid the Registrant in respect of his university attendance but the Registrant had not attended university despite accepting payment.
 
54. The Panel found Particular 1(c) proved.
 
Particular 2
 
55. The Panel took into account the Investigation Meeting minutes, in which it was recorded that the Registrant had said that he had enrolled with the Open University (“OU”) on a course because SHU had not accepted his application. The Panel noted that this meeting had taken place on 11 May 2021. It also took into account that, in the Disciplinary Interview on 03 June 2021, the Registrant was recorded as having said that he had not signed up to the OU course, stating, “I looked into it but the course had already started”. The Panel accepted that these minutes were likely to be accurate.
 
56. The Panel also heard evidence from Dr AH. Dr AH gave knowledgeable and credible evidence about the OU student records. The Panel accepted Dr AH’s evidence that, although there was a record of the Registrant having contacted the OU in November 2019, there was no record of him enrolled as a student with the OU.
 
57. The Panel considered that it could place considerable weight on the evidence of HL and BJ, as supported by their exhibits, and also the evidence of Dr AH. The Panel found that, based on his assertions to HL, the Registrant had caused the employer to believe, from 11 May 2021 to 03 June 2021, that he was undertaking a course at the OU, but in fact this had not been true, according to the evidence of Dr AH.
 
58. The Panel found Particular 2 proved.
 
Particular 3
 
59. The Panel took into account its findings in relation to Particulars 1(a), 1(b), and 2. It applied the test of dishonesty as set out by the Supreme Court in Ivey v Genting Casinos. First, the Panel considered what had been the Registrant’s state of knowledge or belief as to the facts.
 
60. The Panel accepted the evidence of HL that there had been discussion with him about the Registrant attending a nonmedical prescribing course at his interview. It also took into account the TA, signed by the Registrant, which set out an agreement for the Registrant to attend SHU for a six-month course. The Registrant had also made further representations to the employer tending to lead the employer to believe he was undertaking the course, as set out above.
 
61. The Panel accepted the evidence that the Registrant had told HL in a meeting that he had enrolled with the OU. The Panel had accepted the evidence that the Registrant had not enrolled on either the SHU or OU courses, as set out above.
 
62. The Panel was satisfied that the Registrant had been fully aware that he had caused and allowed his employer to believe that he was undertaking a nonmedical prescribing course. He had been fully aware that he had caused and allowed his employer to believe his absence from work on Thursdays was due to the supposed attendance on the university course. He was fully aware that he had told HL about his enrolment on the OU course.
 
63. The Panel was satisfied that, since the Registrant had been aware that he had not enrolled on either course, he had knowingly misled his employer of the true position in respect of either. He had knowingly sought to represent to the employer a position which was materially untrue. 
 
64. The Panel was satisfied that ordinary decent people would regard the Registrant’s conduct as dishonest by their objective standards in respect of each of Particulars 1(a), 1(b) and 2.
 
65. The Panel found Particular 3 proved in respect of Particulars 1(a), 1(b), and 2.
 
Particular 4
 
66. The Panel took into account that the hours for which the Registrant was being paid each month were set out in his payslips. The Panel accepted HL’s evidence that the Registrant had been paid during this period. The Panel considered that it was likely that the Registrant would have been aware of the payments of salary to him. 
 
67. The Panel took into account that the signed TA set out that the Registrant’s salary payment during his attendance at SHU was payable by the employer in return for his attendance. The TA stated those monies were recoverable in the event of failure to complete the training. The Panel found it was likely that the Registrant would have been fully aware of these matters. 
 
68. The Panel had found that the Registrant, between September 2020 and May 2021, had not attended SHU and was obliged to make repayment. This was supported by his acceptance in the July 2021 email of the need for recovery in principle. 
 
69. The Panel found that the knowing receipt of salary by the Registrant, when he knew that he had not attended the university course, would be regarded as dishonest by the objective standards of ordinary decent people. 
 
70. The Panel found Particular 4 proved. 
 
Particular 5
 
71. The Panel considered the exhibits provided by HL, which included the County Court Judgement of 07 October 2021 for the sum of £2,111.22. This recorded that the Registrant had made an offer to pay the Practice and gave judgement to the Practice for that sum. 
 
72. The Panel took into account the Request for Warrant of Control for the sum of £1,411.22. This was consistent with HL’s evidence that the Registrant had failed to discharge the full amount of the judgement. The Panel was also provided with a further Order of the Court, dated 27 October 2022, suspending the warrant, on terms of payment of £300 per month. HL provided a schedule of recorded payments which showed payments received of less than £300 per month by the Practice.
 
73. The Panel had in addition a copy of a Request for Reissue of Warrant, dated 13 January 2023, based on a balance of Judgement or order of £1,194.22. It also had copies of payments recorded by the court dated 21 April 2023 (£100.00), 16 June 2023 (£5.00), and 21 July 2023 (£363.22), which did not accord with the required £300 per month.
 
74. The Panel found HL to be a credible witness. It accepted her evidence that the last payment received from the Registrant had been in July 2023 and were irregular amounts prior. The Panel also accepted her evidence that there remained an outstanding balance of £726. The Panel therefore concluded that there had been a failure to settle the initial Judgement after 07 October 2021. There had then been a later failure to meet the order to pay regular monthly instalments of £300 since 27 October 2022.
 
75. The Panel found Particular 5 proved.
 
Particular 6
 
76. The Panel noted the obligation to repay training costs as set out in the TA. After the Registrant had left the Practice, in email correspondence the Registrant had accepted an obligation to repay money, although raising a request for re-calculation to account for Mondays on which he claimed to have worked. When the Practice issued a claim in the County Court, the Registrant had responded with an offer of payment. On 27 October 2022, a further Order of the County Court had suspended the Warrant, based on payment by specified instalments. 
 
77. The Panel was satisfied that, in these circumstances, the Registrant was fully aware that he had an obligation to reimburse his employer and the amounts required. The evidence showed that he had made some payments. The Panel accepted HL’s evidence to the effect that, although there had been an initial payment of £300 in November 2022, thereafter the payments had not been made in accordance with the Order of the court. 
 
78. The Panel concluded that the Registrant had been aware of his obligation to reimburse the employer as a result of the County Court Judgement and the Order dated 27 October 2022. However, he had not met the payments required in the latter order and would have been aware of this. He had, however, not taken any steps to bring the matter back to the court or to meet that obligation. 
 
79. The Panel was of the view that, by their objective standards, ordinary decent people would regard the Registrant’s conduct as dishonest by his actions in knowingly failing to meet the obligation to pay.
 
80. The Panel found Particular 6 proved.
 
Decision on Grounds
 
81. The Panel had found each of the factual particulars of the Allegation proved. The Panel went on to decide whether the facts amounted to misconduct, a statutory ground of impairment in the Health Professions Order 2001 (as amended) (“the Order”).
 
82. The Panel received no further evidence at this stage of the hearing. It received written submissions on behalf of the HCPC from Ms Evans and also her oral submissions. The Panel had no submissions before it from the Registrant. The Panel heard and accepted the legal advice of the Legal Assessor.
 
83. Ms Evans referred to the Judgement in Roylance v GMC [1999] UK PC 16. She submitted that the relevant standards were reflected in the 2016 HCPC Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics (“SoC”) paragraph 9.1 and also the pre-2023 HCPC Standards of Proficiency for Paramedics (“SoP”) paragraph 3.1.
 
84. Ms Evans submitted that Paramedics occupy a position of trust; patients and their families must be able to trust paramedics, who must act with honesty and integrity. Ms Evans submitted that dishonesty risks damaging the reputation of the profession and may cause a loss of trust. Ms Evans submitted that the Registrant’s departures from expected standards were sufficiently serious to amount to misconduct.
 
85. The Legal Assessor advised the Panel that misconduct is a statutory ground of impairment, pursuant to Article 22(1)(a)(i) of the Order. Although that ground was stated to be “misconduct”, it was accepted that the statutory ground was only met by “serious professional misconduct”. Whether the misconduct was such was a matter for the judgement of the Panel: R (Biswas) v GMC [2007] EWHC 1644 (Admin) and Mallon v GMC [2007] CSIH17. 
 
86. The Legal Assessor advised the Panel that misconduct may involve conduct in professional practice going to fitness to practise but it may also involve conduct of a morally reprehensible or disgraceful kind which may bring the profession into disrepute: R (Remedy UK Ltd) v GMC [2010] EWHC 1245 (Admin). The decision whether the conduct is sufficiently serious is for the Panel. The Panel should consider each of its factual findings on the particulars of the Allegation.
 
Panel’s decision
 
87. The Panel considered the relevant professional standards which had applied to the Registrant at the time. It decided that the following standards were engaged in the case:
From the HCPC’s Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics (2016 edition):
 
“9 Be honest and trustworthy Personal and professional behaviour 
 
9.1 You must make sure that your conduct justifies the public’s trust and confidence in you and your profession.”
 
From the HCPC’s Standards of Proficiency for Paramedics (pre-2023 edition):
 
“Paramedics must: 
 
3 be able to maintain fitness to practise 
 
3.1 understand the need to maintain high standards of personal and professional conduct.
 
9 be able to work appropriately with others
 
9.2 understand the need to build and sustain professional relationships as both an independent practitioner and collaboratively as a member of a team”
 
Particular 1(a)
 
88. The Panel had found that early on in his employment by the Practice, the Registrant had signed a written agreement that he would attend SHU to undertake a nonmedical prescribing course. He had expressed an interest in doing such a course at his interview. The Panel had found that, over an extended period, the Registrant had caused and allowed his employer to believe that he was undertaking the course, making misleading statements which maintained the employer’s misapprehension.
 
89. The Panel considered that the Registrant’s conduct, maintained over a significant period and leading to a material deception as to his professional development, had fallen far short of the expected standards of honesty and high standards, SoC 9.1. The Registrant had also undermined the relationship with HL by misleading her. The Registrant had failed to demonstrate an understanding of the need for high standards of conduct, breaching SoP 9.2 and 3.1.
 
90. The Panel decided that this was serious professional misconduct. 
 
Particular 1(b)
 
91. The Panel took into account that, although the Registrant had been contracted to work from Tuesday to Friday inclusive, the Practice had taken him out of the work rota on Thursdays to allow his attendance at SHU. By his conduct, the Registrant had caused and allowed the employer to believe his absence was due to this university attendance.
 
92. The Panel considered that the loss of the Registrant’s services on the Thursday to allow for attendance would have had administrative consequences for the Practice. The Practice had been prepared to do this but on the mistaken understanding, created by the Registrant, that he was taking the prescribing course.
 
93. The Panel also considered that this conduct, maintained over a significant period, fell far short of the expected standards of honesty and high standards, contrary to SoC 9.1. The Registrant had again failed to work collaboratively as a team with his colleagues, contrary to SoP 9.2. 
 
94. The Panel decided that this was serious professional misconduct. 
 
Particular 1(c)
 
95. The Panel considered that the Registrant had been aware of the terms of the TA and aware that he was being paid his salary to attend the SHU course. He had accepted payments over the relevant period, which had amounted to a considerable sum of money. Due to his non-attendance the Registrant had not been entitled to the considerable sum involved. The amount in the claim in the County Court Judgement had been significantly reduced only because it had been set off against other entitlements. 
 
96. The Panel decided that, in accepting these payments, the Registrant had fallen far below the expected standards and fellow professionals would regard this as deplorable conduct. The funds of the Practice had been depleted as a result. The Panel found the acceptance of payments to which the Registrant had not been entitled amounted to serious breaches of SoC 9.1 and SoP 3.1.
 
97. The Panel decided that this was serious professional misconduct. 
 
Particular 2
 
98. The Panel likewise considered that the Registrant’s conduct in relation to Particular 2 fell far below the requirements of honesty and trustworthiness. At the point where the Registrant had opened up to HL in the meeting of 11 May 2021 that he had not been attending SHU, he had compounded his misconduct by suggesting he had instead enrolled with the OU. This situation then persisted until further investigation by the Practice. The Registrant had failed in his duty of candour.
 
99. The Panel considered that this conduct, maintained over the period 11 May 2021 until 03 June 2021, had fallen far short of the expected standards of honesty and high standards, SoC 9.1. The Registrant had also abused the relationship with HL by misleading her and had not understood the need for high standards of conduct, breaching SoP 9.2 and 3.1.
 
100. The Panel decided that this was serious professional misconduct. 
 
Particular 3
 
101. The Panel had found, in relation to each of Particulars 1(a), 1(b), and 1(c), that the Registrant had acted dishonestly. It considered that dishonesty in the circumstances of the particular misconduct in the case of each of these particulars was also serious. The dishonesty had, in each case, been the foundation of maintaining the Registrant’s deceptive conduct and fell seriously below the standards SoC 9.1 and SoP 3.1. It also seriously breached the requirement to work as a team in SoP 9.2.
 
102. The Panel decided that the Registrant’s conduct in Particular 3 was serious professional misconduct. 
 
Particular 4
 
103. Likewise, in relation to Particular 4, the Registrant’s dishonesty had misled HL and the Practice into believing the Registrant was still meeting the requirements of the TA. It was the foundation of the deception. This was a serious breach of SoC 9.1 and SoP 3.1. It also seriously breached the requirement to work as a team in SoP 9.2.
 
104. The Panel decided that the Registrant’s conduct in Particular 4 was serious professional misconduct. 
 
Particular 5
 
105. The Panel was mindful, from considering the evidence, that the Registrant’s failure to pay the County Court Judgement initially and then the Warrant and Order for payment by instalments had occurred after the Registrant had left the Practice. 
 
106. Although not directly related to his professional practice as a Paramedic treating patients, the Panel took into account that these failures were a breach of the general requirement to adhere to the law. In addition, there was a link to the Registrant’s practice because the dishonesty which gave rise to the debt had occurred when the Registrant should have been undertaking professional development via the university course.
 
107. The Panel was satisfied that this conduct had brought disgrace on the Registrant himself. Further, the conduct brought the profession into disrepute with members of the public. The Registrant’s failure to engage with the court orders and warrants had occurred over a period of time and had been repeated failures. Members of the public would be very concerned at this behaviour in a professional. The Panel was satisfied that this conduct was a serious departure from SoC 9.1 and SoP 3.1.
 
108. The Panel decided that the Registrant’s conduct in Particular 5 was serious professional misconduct. 
 
Particular 6
 
109. The Panel had found that the Registrant’s failure to make the payments necessary by the County Court Judgement and the Order which suspended the Warrant had been dishonest conduct. The Panel determined that this also fell seriously below the standards, taking into account the sustained period and repeated nature of the failures. The Panel found that the conduct amounted to serious breaches of SoC 9.1 and SoP 3.1.
 
110. The Panel decided that the Registrant’s conduct in Particular 6 was serious professional misconduct. 
 
Decision on Impairment
 
111. Having found that the facts found proved were in each particular serious professional misconduct, the Panel next considered whether it determined that the misconduct meant that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is currently impaired. The Panel bore in mind that not every finding of misconduct will automatically result in a finding of impairment. The issue of impairment is a matter for the Panel’s judgement.
 
112. The Panel had received no further evidence from either party at this stage. It had written submissions on behalf of the HCPC, which Ms Evans supplemented in the hearing. The Panel had no submissions before it from the Registrant. The Panel heard and accepted the legal advice of the Legal Assessor.
 
113. Ms Evans submitted that the issue had to be evaluated as current impairment. She referred to the questions posed in CHRE v NMC & Grant [2011 EWHC 927 (Admin). She submitted that the Registrant may pose a future risk to service users. 
 
114. Ms Evans referred to the questions in the HCPTS Practice Note Fitness to Practise Impairment, taken from Cohen v GMC [2008] EWHC 581 (Admin), on the risk of repetition. She submitted that public confidence in the profession would be undermined if the conduct was not met by a finding of impairment.
 
115. The Legal Assessor advised the Panel that the matter of impairment was for the judgement of the Panel. It should consider its findings of fact and misconduct made so far. He referred the Panel to the HCPTS Practice Note Fitness to Practise Impairment and the guidance contained in it. He advised the Panel that the guidance advised considering impairment in terms of the ‘personal’ component, which concerned the risk of the Registrant repeating his misconduct. It also guided the Panel to consider the ‘public’ component, which concerned wider public issues in the overarching objective.
 
116. The Legal Assessor reminded the Panel of the questions relevant to impairment taken from Dame Janet Smith’s Fifth Shipman Report and cited with approval in CHRE v NMC & Grant [2011] EWHC 927 (Admin), viz.
 
“Do our findings of fact in respect of the doctor’s misconduct, […] show that his/her fitness to practise is impaired in the sense that s/he:
 
has in the past acted and/or is liable in the future to act so as to put a patient or patients at unwarranted risk of harm; and/or
 
has in the past brought and/or is liable in the future to bring the medical profession into disrepute; and/or
 
has in the past breached and/or is liable in the future to breach one of the fundamental tenets of the medical profession; and/or
 
has in the past acted dishonestly and/or is liable to act dishonestly in the future.” 
 
Panel’s decision
 
117. The Panel considered the HCPC’s submissions. It accepted the legal advice and carefully considered its findings of fact and as to the statutory ground of misconduct. It considered the guidance in the Practice Note. 
 
118. The Panel considered the factors set out in Grant from Dame Janet Smith’s Fifth Shipman Report. The Panel concluded that it had no real evidence presented to it that direct harm had been caused to patients. It accepted that proven dishonesty was an undesirable matter in a professional person, but did not find that the evidence supported finding a material risk to patients.
 
119. The Panel did find, however, that the Registrant had clearly broken a fundamental tenet of the profession by engaging in repeated and sustained dishonesty. The principles of honesty and trustworthiness were set out as a key standard in the SoC. Further, the Panel was of the view that the Registrant had brought the profession into disrepute. It considered that members of the public would be alarmed at a Paramedic who had dishonestly deceived his employer and received a large overpayment as a result. The Panel had also found that the dishonesty continued after the Registrant had left the practice in his failure to meet the County Court Judgement and Warrants/Orders.
 
120. The Panel also considered that it was of note that the Registrant’s dishonest conduct had been carried out and had continued over a period of months, between September 2020 and June 2021, with regard to his dishonesty at the Practice. He had also failed to repay the Practice, despite the court orders, over a period from October 2021, and a balance of the debt remained outstanding. 
 
121. The Panel took into account that, by his actions, the Registrant had caused a financial loss to the Practice, in that it had paid him for the Thursday sessions in which he had not attended university. He had been culpable for this loss, as the Panel had found he had acted knowingly and dishonestly. He had not fully complied with attempts to recover the overpayments through the court.
 
122. The Panel was guided by the Practice Note and the case of Cohen v GMC [2008] EWHC 581 (Admin). It considered whether the Registrant’s misconduct was remediable, whether it had been remedied, and whether it was likely to be repeated. 
 
123. The Panel determined that, although dishonesty is acknowledged to be difficult to remediate, the Registrant’s misconduct and his dishonesty might be possible to remedy. He could finish repaying the Practice. He could demonstrate remorse and undertake appropriate reflections, Continuing Professional Development (“CPD”), and training.
 
124. The Panel took nothing against the Registrant for not attending the hearing. However, it remained the case that, before contacting the HCPTS on 03 September 2025 about the hearing, the Registrant had not been in contact with the HCPC for a significant period of time. As a result, the Panel had no information about the development of any insight on the Registrant’s part. It had no reflections from him, nor details of any relevant training or CPD undertaken. It had no references from anyone concerning the Registrant’s current work or character. The Panel noted that the Registrant had not initially fully paid the County Court Judgement and had not adhered to the payment schedule ordered by the court. A significant sum of £726 remained unpaid.
 
125. The Panel did acknowledge that the Registrant had made some apology and expression of regret during the Practice investigations. However, after the lapse of time and with the failure to repay in full, the Panel could not give this much weight.
 
126. The Panel was mindful that it had to consider the Registrant’s current fitness to practise. However, there was no further information before the Panel concerning the Registrant’s further efforts, if any, to remediate matters, apart from the partial payment of the debt to the Practice. 
 
127. The Panel was therefore driven to the conclusion that there remained a risk that the Registrant may in the future breach a fundamental tenet of the profession, may bring the profession into disrepute, and may act dishonestly. 
 
128. Since the Panel had found that there is a risk of repetition, the Panel concluded that the Registrant is currently impaired on the ‘personal’ component of impairment.
 
129. The Panel also considered that members of the public and members of the profession would be shocked and alarmed at the Registrant’s misconduct. Therefore, the Panel determined that the need to maintain public confidence in the profession and the need to promote and maintain proper professional standards and conduct for members of the profession would be seriously undermined if the Panel did not make a finding of impairment. The Panel found that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is impaired on the ‘public’ component of impairment.
 
130. The Panel found that the Allegation is well-founded and the Registrant’s fitness to practise as a Paramedic is currently impaired.
 
Decision on Sanction
 
131. The Panel, having determined that the Registrant’s fitness to practise as a Paramedic is currently impaired, next considered whether it had to take a step under Article 29 of the Order.
 
132. The Panel received no further evidence at this stage. It heard submissions on sanction from Ms Evans. The Panel had received no submissions from the Registrant. The Panel heard and accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor.
 
133. Ms Evans submitted that the Panel must bear in mind the need to impose a sanction which was appropriate and proportionate, although it may be punitive in effect. She referred the Panel to the HCPC Sanctions Policy (March 2019) (“SP”). Ms Evans reminded the Panel of its factual findings and submitted that there was no evidence of the Registrant’s recent practice. 
 
134. In terms of mitigation, Ms Evans submitted that no harm had occurred to patients. She submitted, on aggravating factors though, that the case involved a breach of trust, which the SP indicates might involve more serious sanctions. She submitted that there was also a lack of insight, remorse, or apology by the Registrant and a lack of demonstrated remediation. Ms Evans referred the Panel to the section of the SP on dishonesty.
 
135. The Legal Assessor advised the Panel that it must first consider the steps under Article 29(4) of the Order, moving on to consider Article 29(5) if the case did not fall within the former. He referred the Panel to the SP and the guidance contained therein. 
 
136. The Legal Assessor advised the Panel that, in considering any step, the Panel should act proportionately, imposing the least sanction which met the requirements of public protection. The Panel had to balance the Registrant’s interests with the public interest. Therefore, the Panel should consider the available sanctions starting with the least restrictive, moving up to the minimum which would provide for protection of the public. 
 
137. The Legal Assessor drew the attention of the Panel to cases which indicated that cases of dishonesty were regarded as serious, but it was also acknowledged that there was a spectrum of dishonesty, referring to Simawi v GMC [202] EWHC 2168, Lusinga v NMC [2017] 1458 (Admin), Abbas v GMC [2017] EWHC 51, and R (ota Hussan) v GOC [2013] EWHC 1887 (Admin). 
 
Panel’s decision
 
138. The Panel carefully considered its findings of fact, misconduct, and impairment. It took into account the HCPC’s submissions and accepted the legal advice of the Legal Assessor.
 
139. The Panel bore in mind the need to act proportionately. It therefore approached its powers of sanction starting with the least restrictive sanction and moving up if necessary. It balanced the interests of the Registrant with the public interest. 
 
140. The Panel first considered what it found to be any factors mitigating or aggravating the seriousness of the case. As to mitigation, the Panel acknowledged that there had been no direct harm caused to patients of the Practice. It took into account that, during the investigation, the Registrant had indicated some remorse for his conduct. He had repaid some of the money. 
 
141. In terms of aggravating factors, the Panel considered that there had been an abuse of the trust placed in the Registrant by the Practice. The Practice had allowed the Registrant to be absent from work for a significant number of days on trust that he was using the time effectively and it had paid him for that time. He had breached the signed Training Agreement.
 
142. When the original failure to enrol with SHU had become known to HL, the Registrant compounded his misconduct by saying he had enrolled with the OU. Despite agreeing in principle to repay the Practice for the salary paid for training, the Registrant had not fully repaid the money and the Practice had been obliged to go to court to attempt recovery.
 
143. Finally, the Panel considered that the sustained and repeated nature of the Registrant’s misconduct, and his failure to inform the Practice that he had not enrolled on any course, aggravated the case. 
 
144. In the circumstances of the case and in light of the limited action to repay the Practice fully and the limited demonstration of further insight and remediation, the Panel did not consider the mitigating factors to carry a great deal of weight. The Panel considered that the aggravating factors did carry weight in its assessment of seriousness.
 
145. The Panel was mindful that there is a spectrum of dishonest misconduct. The Panel had to make an assessment of the level of dishonesty based on the facts of the case.
 
146. The Panel took into account paragraph 58 of the SP:
 
“58. Given the seriousness of dishonesty, cases are likely to result in more serious sanctions. However, panels should bear in mind that there are different forms, and different degrees, of dishonesty, that need to be considered in an appropriately nuanced way. Factors that panels should take into account in this regard include:
 
• whether the relevant behaviour took the form of a single act, or occurred on multiple occasions;
 
• the duration of any dishonesty;
 
• whether the registrant took a passive or active role in it;
 
• any early admission of dishonesty on the registrant’s behalf; and
 
• any other relevant mitigating factors.”
 
147. The Panel had found that the dishonesty in this case had occurred on more than one occasion. It had been persistent and presented in more than one aspect. The dishonesty had continued over a significant period and resulted from the Registrant’s deliberate acts and omissions. The Panel did not accept that there had been any early admission of dishonesty. The Panel took into account that, when the initial confession to HL had been made about his non-attendance on the SHU course, the Registrant had compounded his dishonesty by misleading her about enrolling on the OU course. Despite agreeing that money in principle was due to the Practice, the Registrant had still not repaid the Practice in full. The Panel considered that the dishonesty in this case was at the serious end of the scale.
 
148. The Panel turned its consideration to the appropriate sanction. The Panel took into account that the SP stated that mediation was appropriate for minor cases and that there was no route to return the case if mediation failed. The Panel decided that the case was unsuitable for mediation on the basis of its seriousness and the need to protect the public. 
 
149. The Panel next considered taking no action. It decided that taking no action when it had found a risk of repetition of dishonesty would fail to protect the public, since the Registrant would be free to return to unrestricted practice. Further, there would be insufficient marking of the seriousness of the misconduct. 
 
150. The Panel considered imposing a caution order. It took into account that this would mark the Registrant’s misconduct, noting that it could be imposed for up to 5 years. 
 
151. The Panel noted, however, that the SP states:
 
“101. A caution order is likely to be an appropriate sanction for cases in which: 
 
• the issue is isolated, limited, or relatively minor in nature;
 
• there is a low risk of repetition; 
 
• the registrant has shown good insight; and 
 
• the registrant has undertaken appropriate remediation.”
 
152. The Panel considered that none of these factors were present. It concluded that it would not protect the public and would not mark the seriousness of the case to impose a caution order. 
 
153. The Panel then moved on to consider whether it could conclude the case with conditions of practice. Paragraph 106 of the SP states:
 
“106. A conditions of practice order is likely to be appropriate in cases where:
 
• the registrant has insight;
 
• the failure or deficiency is capable of being remedied;
 
• there are no persistent or general failures which would prevent the registrant from remediating;
 
• appropriate, proportionate, realistic and verifiable conditions can be formulated;
 
• the panel is confident the registrant will comply with the conditions; 
 
• a reviewing panel will be able to determine whether or not those conditions have or are being met; and
 
• the registrant does not pose a risk of harm by being in restricted practice.”
 
154. The Panel had already recorded that the Registrant had demonstrated no real insight. The Panel gave no weight to the fact that the Registrant had not attended the hearing. He had shown some limited acknowledgement in his investigation interview of his responsibility. However, he had gone on to fail to fully pay back his debt to the Practice, despite the county court claim, judgement, and warrant/order.
 
155. The Panel had since then been provided with no evidence of further development of insight. Although possible to remediate, though difficult, the Panel had no evidence of further remediation beyond part-payment of the debt to the Practice. 
 
156. In the absence of the Registrant demonstrating insight to it, it had no confidence that the Registrant would comply with conditions. Further, the Panel considered that there is a risk of the Registrant repeating his dishonest misconduct. It acknowledged that dishonesty can indicate serious attitudinal issues. 
 
157. The Panel had no information about the Registrant’s current intentions to practise. It therefore was unable to devise workable and practicable conditions to protect the public. However, in light of the seriousness with which it regarded the dishonesty, the lack of demonstrated insight, and the risk of repetition, the Panel concluded that conditions of practice failed to protect the public or mark the seriousness of the misconduct. 
 
158. The Panel next considered a suspension order. It noted that suspension serves the purpose of removing a registrant from practice for a period. The Panel noted paragraph 121 of the SP, which states:
 
“121. A suspension order is likely to be appropriate where there are serious concerns which cannot be reasonably addressed by a conditions of practice order, but which do not require the registrant to be struck off the Register. These types of cases will typically exhibit the following factors:
 
• the concerns represent a serious breach of the Standards of conduct, performance and ethics;
 
• the registrant has insight;
 
• the issues are unlikely to be repeated; and
 
• there is evidence to suggest the registrant is likely to be able to resolve or remedy their failings.”
 
159. The Panel was satisfied that the Registrant had engaged in serious breaches of the fundamental tenet and the SoC regarding honesty and trustworthiness. The Panel had before it no demonstration of insight from the Registrant, save the limited insight referred to above. The Panel had found that there remained a risk of repetition. It had no evidence to suggest that the Registrant would be likely to remedy his failings, noting for example that the Registrant had still not fully met the requirements of the court’s order.
 
160. The Panel noted paragraph 130 of the SP states that striking off is “a sanction of last resort for serious, persistent, deliberate or reckless acts, involving … dishonesty…”. The SP referred the Panel to paragraphs 56-58. Paragraph 56 set out that dishonesty undermines public confidence in the profession and paragraph 57 states that dishonesty can have a significant impact on public trust and is likely to lead to more serious sanction. 
 
161. The Panel acknowledged that there is a spectrum to dishonesty, but it had found the case involved dishonesty at the serious end of the scale. The Panel concluded that, taking into account the seriousness of the dishonest misconduct and the risk of repetition, which necessitated a sanction to protect the public, together with the need to maintain public confidence in the profession, no lesser sanction than a strike-off order met the needs of public protection.
 
162. The Panel decided to impose a strike-off order.

Order

The Registrar is directed to strike the name of Jonathon Wilson-Wilcox from the Register on the date this order comes into effect

Notes

Interim Order

1. Ms Evans applied to the Panel to impose an Interim Suspension Order. She submitted that the Panel had found that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is impaired. She said that the Panel had made a striking off order and had identified an ongoing risk of harm to the public in its determination. Ms Evans asked the Panel to grant the Interim Suspension Order for 18 months.

2. Ms Evans applied for the Panel to proceed with the application for an Interim Order in the Registrant’s absence, pursuant to Rule 11. She submitted that the Registrant had been notified in the Notice of Hearing of the potential for an Interim Order application. She submitted that the Registrant had not attended the hearing. He had provided no evidence supporting his reasons for non-attendance.

3. The Panel first considered whether it was appropriate to proceed to hear the application for an Interim Order in his absence, pursuant to Rule 11, as is suggested in the relevant HCPTS Practice Note Interim Orders.

4. The Panel took into account that the Notice also stated in terms that the Panel might impose an Interim Order, if necessary. The Panel had previously decided in the hearing that the Notice had been duly served on the Registrant. The Panel considered that the Registrant had been provided with an opportunity to attend the application to make representations and that he was aware of the hearing. For similar reasons as to the decision to proceed with the hearing, the Panel decided to proceed to hear the application in the Registrant’s absence.

5. The Legal Assessor advised the Panel that, pursuant to Article 31(2) of the Health Professions Order 2001 (as amended) (“the Order”) the Panel may make an interim order on the grounds that either it is necessary for public protection, it is otherwise in the public interest, or it is in the person’s own interests. He referred the Panel to the HCPTS’ Practice Note Interim Orders to guide its decision-making.

6. The Legal Assessor advised the Panel it had to impose the least restrictive interim order sufficient to protect the public and first to consider whether interim conditions would suffice and only if not, to impose an interim suspension order. He advised that the interim order could be imposed for a maximum of 18 months, but this was not the default, and any period had to be justified.

7. The Panel was satisfied that, having found that a striking off order is necessary and that there is a continuing risk of repetition of dishonest misconduct, an interim order is necessary in order to protect the public. Further, the Panel was satisfied that an Interim Order is also needed as otherwise in the public interest, since taking into account the risk of repetition, the public would be alarmed if there was no interim order.

8. The Panel decided that Interim Conditions of Practice would not sufficiently protect the public, for similar reasons as in its determination on sanction. Therefore, the Panel made an Interim Suspension Order. The Interim Suspension Order was granted for 18 months on the basis that if any appeal is made it may take that period to deal with the appeal.

9. The Panel imposed an Interim Suspension Order for 18 months.

10. The Panel makes an Interim Suspension Order under Article 31(2) of the Health Professions Order 2001, the same being necessary to protect members of the public and being otherwise in the public interest.

11. This order will expire: (if no appeal is made against the Panel’s decision and Order) upon the expiry of the period during which such an appeal could be made; (if an appeal is made against the Panel’s decision and Order) the final determination of that appeal, subject to a maximum period of 18 months.

Hearing History

History of Hearings for Jonathon Wilson-Wilcox

Date Panel Hearing type Outcomes / Status
08/09/2025 Conduct and Competence Committee Final Hearing Struck off
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