Mr Jarred L Rose
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In your role as a Paramedic and Clinical Director at UK Specialist Ambulance Service (“UKSAS”):
1. In or around July 2016, you purported to employ Person A on behalf of UKSAS in the role of ‘Associate Director of Business Development’, when you did not have the authority to do so.
2. In or around May 2016, you falsified a contract of employment and job description, which Mr Person A signed on 18 May 2016.
3. Between July and December 2016, you told Person A that you had arranged multiple meetings to resolve the issue of non-payment of wages, when in fact you had not done so.
4. In or around September to October 2016, you informed Person A that you had instructed Law Firm A and Barrister A to pursue a claim against UKSAS for non-payment of wages when you had not done so.
5. You created Email Account 1 from which you sent emails that purported to be from Barrister A, when they were not.
6. You created Email Account 2 and informed Person A that this was Person B’s personal email address, when it was not.
7. Between September and December 2016, you created text messages that purported to be from Barrister A (which you then showed to Person A), that gave the impression that Barrister A was working on the matter and pursuing the unpaid wages, when he was not doing so.
8. Between September and December 2016, you created text messages that purported to be from Person C (which you then showed to Person A), that gave the impression that a resolution in relation to the unpaid wages was being worked on, when it was not.
9. Between September and December 2016, you sent a text message that purported to be to Person D (which you then showed to Person A), that gave the impression that payment of the unpaid wages was due to be made, when it was not.
10. Between September and December 2016, you created text messages and/or emails that purported to be from Person B (which you then showed to Person A), that gave the impression that a resolution in relation to the unpaid wages was being worked on, when it was not.
11. Your conduct as set out in Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and/or 10 was misleading; and/or dishonest.
12. The matters set out in Paragraphs 1 - 11 constitute misconduct.
13. Your fitness to practise as a Paramedic is impaired by reason of your misconduct.
1. The allegation as set out at the head of this determination incorporates minor amendments made by another panel of this Committee in mid-March 2020 when this case was originally listed for hearing but was adjourned.
2. When invited to respond to the allegation, Mr Walker on behalf of the Registrant stated that the entirety of the factual particulars, including particular 11 by which dishonesty is alleged, was admitted.
3. Before the Presenting Officer opened the case, the Panel was asked to make a ruling in principle as to whether parts of the hearing might be conducted in private. From documents presented to the Panel on the morning of the hearing it was apparent that mention would be made of matters relating to the Registrant’s personal life. Accordingly, the Panel directed that whenever it was intended to deal with such an issue, the hearing would be conducted in private, the record of the proceedings being so marked and the individuals remotely observing the hearing being requested to leave for the duration of the evidence relating to private matters.
4. At the time relevant to these allegations, the Registrant was employed as the Clinical Director of UK Specialist Ambulance Services Limited (hereafter “the company”). Despite his job title, his role did not involve management responsibilities, and, in particular, he was neither responsible for employees, nor did he have authority to engage employees of the company.
5. When the events relevant to this case commenced, Person A was employed by an NHS ambulance service as an Emergency Operations Centre Manager for 999. He commenced that employment in 2010 and continued in it until the summer of 2016 when he resigned because of events connected to the particulars being considered by the Panel.
6. The respective roles of Person A and the Registrant meant that by the autumn of 2015 there had been long-standing professional contact between them. In mid-October 2015 they met at a service station in connection with a purchase made by the Registrant of products sold by Person A’s wife in a business she ran. In conversation at that meeting, Person A stated that he thought he had progressed as far as he could in his then employment and had started to look for something new. The Registrant stated that Person A’s skills would be something that the company would be interested in, and he said that he would explore whether there would be any opportunities for Person A within the company. The Registrant asked Person A to send to him a CV and a personal statement within a matter of days, and that he (the Registrant) would get back to Person A after he had spoken to a director of the company, Mr MB. Person A duly sent the documents to the Registrant.
7. In mid-November 2015, Person A visited the offices of the company and met both Mr MB and another officer of the company, Person B. Following that meeting the Registrant asked Person A to prepare a job description for his expected role with the company. There was then a subsequent meeting between Person A, Mr MB and the Registrant on 31 December 2015 where Person A believed he had been offered employment by Mr MB, the details of which were to be dealt with by the Registrant.
8. The events just described were followed by other numerous communications between Person A and the Registrant (and, on some occasions, other individuals connected with the company). By late March 2016 the Registrant emailed to Person A a draft contract of employment, and a further draft was emailed at the end of April 2016. The final version of the email was produced in early May 2016, and shortly afterwards Person A visited the company’s offices where both he and the Registrant signed the contract document. The contract provided for the Registrant to commence work with the company on 4 July 2016. Contemporaneously with his signing of the contract of employment with the company, Person A wrote to the NHS ambulance service by which he had been employed for six years resigning from his employment.
9. Believing his employment with the company to have commenced, in early July 2016, Person A went to an ambulance station operated by the company. Unsurprisingly, he thereafter acted in a manner consistent with his belief that he was an employee of the company. For example, in mid-August 2016 he was taken by the Registrant and introduced to the company’s pharmacist. On 18 August 2016, he attended a meeting with the Registrant and the ambulance service by which he had very recently been employed, and at that meeting he was represented as an employee of the company.
10. Equally unsurprisingly, Person A expected to be remunerated by the company. The contract of employment provided for Person A to be paid a salary of £5,000.00 gross per calendar month. However, no payment was received by him on 29 July 2016, the day he expected his salary to be credited to his account. He contacted the Registrant who stated that the payment would be received the following day. When the salary was not received he again contacted the Registrant who stated that he was with the company’s accountant trying to resolve the issue.
11. Not only did the July salary payment never materialise, but also no salary was paid at the end of August 2015, September 2015, October 2015 and November 2015. There were many discussions between Person A and the Registrant about this issue as time went on, and, as alleged by particular 3, the Registrant told Person A that he had had many communications with others.
12. The various deceptions alleged by particulars 4 to 10 inclusive were all made in the context of the Registrant’s purported efforts to resolve the issue of Person A not having been paid anything by the company since 4 July 2016.
13. The law firm described as “Law Firm A” in particular 4 is a real firm of solicitors. The Registrant made an appointment to attend upon that firm, but he did not in fact attend. The purported communications by Law Firm A were fabricated by the Registrant for the purpose of showing them to Person A.
14. The barrister described as “Barrister A” in particulars 4, 5 and 7 is a real barrister practising from real chambers. However, Barrister A was never instructed by the Registrant and had no knowledge of the Registrant or Person A. The Registrant created an email address that included the name of the real Barrister A at a domain that appeared to be connected with legal work. He thereafter fabricated purported emails from Barrister A.
15. The individual described as “Person B” in particulars 6 and 10 is a real person (in fact one of the individuals whom Person A had met in mid-November 2015 when he visited the company’s offices) but the purported email account was created by the Registrant and the emails were fabricated by him. Similarly, Person C and Person D (referred to in particulars 8 and 9) are real people, but the text messages disclosed to Person A were not made by them. The Registrant used a second mobile telephone to which he had access to send messages to his usual mobile telephone, changing the recorded user of the secondary telephone to represent text messages as having been sent by Person B, Person C and Person D.
16. Eventually, Person A was so concerned he contacted the chambers of Barrister A and was told that neither the chambers nor Barrister A had any knowledge of dealings with the Registrant. On 5 December 2016, Person A confronted the Registrant who confessed that the contract was a fabrication and that he had not had the company’s authority to employ him. Person A said that he wished to discuss matters with Person B, and when he did so, Person B appeared to be under the impression that the meeting (which the Registrant did not attend, saying that he was unwell) was about the failure to progress the discussions of a possible position with the company of which he had been aware from his involvement a year earlier.
Decision on Facts
17. It has already been stated that at the commencement of the hearing all of the factual particulars were admitted. The approach of the Panel has been not to take the admissions as a reason not to examine the evidence. Rather, in reaching its decisions, the Panel has carefully examined the detail of the case to decide if the Registrant’s admissions should be accepted. In this regard the Panel has, of course, been mindful that the burden rests on the HCPC to prove factual matters on the balance of probabilities.
18. The HCPC called three witnesses to give evidence before the Panel. They were Person A, Mr MB, a director of the company, and Mr GD, an accountant who was not a full-time employee of the company but who was a director of it. The Panel’s general assessment of these witnesses was as follows:
- Person A gave a clear and detailed account of the relevant events. He was demonstrably careful not to speculate and he demonstrated no animosity against the Registrant. The Panel found him to be an impressive and compelling witness upon whose evidence it could safely rely.
- Mr MB. The Panel found that Mr MB tried to assist the Panel in its task of reaching the correct conclusion on the issues it had to decide. However, his recall of events with regard to Person A was not as clear as the recollection of Person A himself. Accordingly, where such differences arose the Panel preferred the account of Person A. Nevertheless, the Panel found the evidence Mr MB gave about the Registrant to be reliable and untainted by hostility.
- Mr GD was called to give evidence but neither party wished to ask him any questions in addition to, or to challenge, his written witness statement. The Panel did not consider it necessary to seek any clarification of his written evidence. Accordingly, the Panel accepted the evidence of Mr GD as contained in his witness statement.
19. In addition to the witnesses called to give evidence before the Panel at the hearing, the HCPC relied upon the witness statement of an employee of a firm of solicitors retained by it to produce documents relating to Law Firm A. Furthermore, the HCPC produced a bundle of documentary exhibits extending to some 1,377 pages, included in which were copies of the various fabricated documents and communications referred to in the factual particulars being considered by the Panel.
20. The Registrant gave evidence before the Panel and called to give evidence on his behalf, Dr GB, a medical Consultant who had been treating him. Additionally, the Registrant produced a bundle of documents extending to 25 pages. This bundle contained three letters written by Dr GB, a number of testimonials and a document expressing an apology to Person A.
21. When the Panel assessed the evidence of the Registrant it decided that it had a number of reservations about his evidence. The Registrant was at pains to make it clear that he did not wish to challenge any element of Person A’s recollection of events. That was clearly something he was entitled to do. However, when the Registrant was asked questions by the Presenting Officer as to what he had done and why he had done it, the Registrant repeatedly stated that he did not know or could not remember. The Panel would have found that these replies lacked credibility even if his actions directed towards Person A had been taken on the spur of the moment as the Registrant maintained they were, and not the wide-ranging, multi-faceted and complex steps that were actually taken. Furthermore, while the Registrant replied that he did not know or could not remember, and steadfastly refused to accept that he had planned any of his actions or the labels of “deception” or “deceit”, he also repeatedly made the positive assertion that he did not act with the intention of doing harm. Added to this, the Registrant’s evidence was on occasions contradictory and required correction, particularly with regards to dates of extraneous events such as the year of birth of his daughter and the date when his father died in particularly distressing circumstances in his presence, dates that the Panel found were significant for the assessment of the evidence of Dr GB. The overall conclusion of the Panel was that it was necessary to treat the Registrant’s evidence with a significant degree of caution.
22. It is necessary for the Panel to explain its views about Dr GB at some length. The fact that the Registrant wished to rely on the evidence of Dr GB was unknown to the Panel until the morning of the first day of the hearing when it was provided with the Registrant’s bundle of documents that contained three short letters prepared by Dr GB dated 17 December 2018, 1 October 2019 and (marked “DRAFT LETTER”) 14 July 2021. At an early stage of the proceedings the Panel raised two issues in relation to Dr GB, namely, the intended status of Dr GB as a witness and the stage of the proceedings at which it was proposed to call him to give evidence. It seemed to the Panel that some of Dr GB’s evidence was factual (since 16 May 2017 he has been treating the Registrant) but other elements contained statements of opinion (specifically, the reason why the Registrant had acted as he had and whether he would act in a similar manner in the future). However, no application had been made on behalf of the Registrant to adduce expert evidence and the letters did not satisfy the standard requirements of expert evidence, in particular the declaration of independence. It was suggested that in the circumstances Dr GB’s opinion evidence could be inadmissible. However, it was agreed by the parties that if admitted the Panel would decide what weight it could place on it. On that basis the Panel admitted Dr GB’s evidence. The Panel was requested to receive the evidence of Dr GB before that of the Registrant. As to that order, the Panel asked whether it would not be more appropriate to call a witness whose evidence required factual assumptions to support their opinion after the person who could provide that factual evidence, namely the Registrant. Mr Walker’s response to this latter point was to state that Dr GB was only available for one hour during the afternoon of the second day of the hearing and the Registrant was entitled to call his evidence in the order in which he wished to do so, and that any interference with that right might be considered a serious procedural irregularity.
23. In the event the issue with regard to the order in which the Registrant and Dr GB gave their evidence had a real impact on the Panel’s assessment of the evidence of the latter. It would have assisted the Panel’s task in assessing the evidence if Dr GB had been asked whether the Registrant’s evidence at the hearing was consistent with his own discussions with the Registrant.
24. The Panel makes no criticism of Dr GB. He is a highly qualified and very experienced Consultant medical practitioner. The Panel does not doubt what he has said about the treatment he has provided to the Registrant. However, it is important to record the fact that Dr GB had no knowledge of the Registrant at the time of the relevant events; the Registrant’s first appointment was approximately five months after the last date alleged in the factual particulars being considered by the Panel. The account given by a patient to a doctor will be of fundamental importance in any case. In this case the importance is underlined by the fact that Dr GB did not have contemporaneous knowledge of the Registrant. Dr GB’s evidence about the causal connection between the Registrant’s previously untreated medical condition and the dishonesty being considered by the Panel is important for two distinct reasons. One is to apply the correct finding about the subjective element of the Registrant’s state of mind in respect of dishonesty. The other is to assess the risk of repetition that is crucial to the decision on current impairment of fitness to practise. The importance of the latter consideration is underlined by Dr GB’s evidence that he believes that at the present time the Registrant presents less of a risk of being dishonest than exists in the general population. In circumstances where there is such a significant mismatch between what the Registrant appears to have told Dr GB and what he said in evidence to the Panel (particularly with regard to the distinct issues of not being aware of why he did what he did and disclosing the recent matrimonial deception when he first attended Dr GB), the Panel has concluded that it does not accept the opinion element of Dr GB’s evidence.
25. Particular 1. The Panel finds it proved that the Registrant purported to employ Person A. It also finds not only that the Registrant did not have authority to do so, but the Registrant knew that he did not have authority to do so. The Panel is satisfied that it can exclude the possibility that the Registrant took the steps he did in the belief that he was continuing with a desire on the part of Mr MB to employ Person A because the Registrant stated in oral evidence that he did not really believe that Mr MB intended to employ Person A. Particular 1 is proven.
26. Particular 2. Having reviewed the evidence of Person A and the documentary exhibits (including the contract of employment) the Panel is satisfied that the Registrant did falsify the contract of employment and the job description, and also that Person A signed it. Particular 2 is proven.
27. Particular 3. The Registrant told Person A that he had been communicating with others about the issue of non-payment of Person A’s salary, when in fact he had not spoken to anyone about the issue. Particular 3 is proven.
28. Particular 4. The Panel is satisfied that the information given by the Registrant to Person A about the instruction of Law Firm A and Barrister A was false as neither had been instructed. Particular 4 is proven.
29. Particular 5. Emails purportedly sent by Barrister A were created, but they were fabricated by the Registrant as they were not sent by Barrister A but created by the Registrant on an email account he had set up. Particular 5 is proven.
30. Particular 6. Emails purportedly sent by Person B were created and Person A was informed of them. However, they were not in fact sent by Person B but fabricated by the Registrant on an account created by the Registrant. Particular 6 is proven.
31. Particular 7. Text messages purportedly sent by Barrister A stating that he was working on pursuing unpaid wages were received on the Registrant’s telephone and shown to Person A. However, they were not in fact written by Barrister A. The text messages were in fact written by the Registrant on a telephone to which he had access, saving the number of that telephone under the name of Barrister A on his receiving telephone. Particular 7 is proven.
32. Particular 8. Text messages purportedly sent by Person C giving the impression that a resolution in relation to the unpaid wages was being worked on were received on the Registrant’s telephone and shown to Person A. However, they were not in fact written by Person C. The text messages were in fact written by the Registrant on a telephone to which he had access, saving the number of that telephone under the name of Person C on his receiving telephone. Particular 8 is proven.
33. Particular 9. The Registrant purportedly sent a text message about unpaid wages to Person D and was shown to Person A, but it was not a genuine message. Particular 9 is proven.
34. Particular 10. The Registrant created messages that gave the impression that a resolution in relation to unpaid wages was being worked on and which were purportedly sent by Person B. They were shown to Person A, but they were not genuine messages from Person B. Particular 10 is proven.
35. Particular 11. This particular alleges that the conduct included in each and every preceding particular was “misleading and/or dishonest”. The Panel addressed this contention in relation to each particular separately. Having done so, the Panel found that each was misleading; the relevant conduct represented a state of affairs that was not the true state of affairs. With regard to dishonesty, the Panel accepted the advice that it was first necessary to decide the subjective issue of the Registrant’s intention or belief as to the relevant matter, and then apply that finding to the objective question of whether honest and reasonable people would find it to be dishonest. As already stated, this was an exercise the Panel conducted separately in relation to each of the particulars 1 to 10. Having done so, with regard to each, the Panel concluded that it had been proved against the Registrant that he knew what he was doing, he knew that the representations he made to Person A were false and that he made those representations with the intention that Person A should accept them as genuine. Having applied this finding to the objective consideration of what honest and reasonable people would make of the matter, the Panel came to the clear conclusion that each particular would be said to be dishonest. It follows that both limbs of particular 11 are proven with regard to every preceding particular.
Decision on Grounds
36. The Registrant’s behaviour was of the utmost gravity. Notwithstanding the absence of the motive of pecuniary gain, it was very serious dishonesty perpetrated knowingly, persistently, in various different respects over a period that exceeded six months. It breached standard 9.1 of the HCPC’s Standards of conduct, performance and ethics which relates to both personal and professional behaviour and which requires all registrants to make sure that their conduct justifies the public’s trust and confidence in themselves and their profession. The Panel is satisfied that all fellow professionals would regard the Registrant’s behaviour to have been deplorable. In short it crosses the threshold properly to be described as misconduct.
Decision on Impairment
37. The Panel accepted the advice it received that it is necessary to address both the personal and public components of the consideration of current impairment of fitness to practise.
38. Wide ranging and serious dishonesty of the sort involved in this case is conceptually difficult, but arguably not impossible, to remediate. However, for it to be remediated, it would at the very least be necessary for the registrant concerned to have a clear understanding of why the dishonesty had occurred, because without that understanding there can be no confidence that it will not be repeated. As already stated, the Registrant was very clear in his evidence stating time and time again that he did not recall what he had done or understand why he had done it. It follows that any insight it could be said the Registrant has developed is necessarily very limited.
39. Furthermore, for reasons the Panel has already explained, it is unable to accept the opinion of Dr GB that the treatment the Registrant has received for his health condition has resulted in the risk of repetition being reduced to one that is very low. In short, the unwillingness or inability of the Registrant to acknowledge or understand his motivation for acting as he did towards Person A has led the Panel to be unable to draw the causal link Dr GB felt able to draw between the wholesale dishonesty demonstrated by the Registrant towards Person A and his untreated health condition. Furthermore, the Registrant’s evidence before the Panel that his inability to recall what he did to Person A was because of his health issues at the time, but this lack of recall resulting from his health issues was never referred to by Dr GB either in his written or oral evidence. That being so, while accepting that there is no suggestion that the Registrant has behaved in a dishonest manner in the period since he consulted Dr GB, the Panel nevertheless finds that there is a risk of a repetition of dishonest behaviour.
40. For these reasons the Panel has concluded that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is impaired with regard to the personal component.
41. When the Panel considered the public component relevant to current impairment of fitness to practise, it concluded that a finding of impairment is also required in that regard. That is so for the following reasons:
- A lack of honesty and integrity on the part of a Paramedic, as with all health professionals, has clear implications for patient safety, and that is so in this case despite there being no suggestion that the Registrant’s actions towards Person A impacted adversely on service users.
- A finding of impairment of fitness to practise is required to declare and uphold proper professional standards. Were such a finding not made the wrong signal would be sent to other registrants.
- Fair-minded members of the public understanding the detail of this case would be dismayed were no finding made and confidence in the Paramedic profession and the regulation of it would be diminished.
42. The finding of misconduct currently impairing the Registrant’s fitness to practise means that the Panel must go on to consider the issue of sanction.
Decision on Sanction
43. After the Panel handed down the private version of its determination explaining why the allegation is well founded, it allowed the parties time to consider the document before it received submissions on sanction.
44. On behalf of the HCPC, the Presenting Officer made it clear that the HCPC did not urge the Panel to apply any particular sanction, saying that the decision is one for the Panel’s discretion. However, he outlined for the Panel the proper approach to the sanction consideration and outlined various sections of the HCPC’s Sanctions Policy which it was submitted are relevant. He also suggested various aggravating and mitigating factors that he suggested the Panel might consider helpful when making its decision.
45. On behalf of the Registrant, Mr Walker also identified mitigating factors, many of which the Panel accepted were appropriate to be considered and which will be identified below. When he addressed the available sanctions (not in the order in which his submissions are here summarised) he acknowledged that the Panel might well consider that a conditions of practice order is not appropriate, but made clear that the Registrant would comply with any conditions should such an order be thought appropriate. He also submitted that striking off is not required and would be wholly inappropriate. Although Mr Walker acknowledged that a caution order might at first sight be not thought to be a sanction fitting for a case involving dishonesty, nevertheless the unusual features present in this particular case would justify from the guidance contained in the Sanctions Policy the making of such an order. If the Panel did not agree that a caution order should be imposed he submitted that a suspension order for a short to medium period would represent a proportionate response.
46. The Panel approached the decision on sanction by accepting that a sanction must not be imposed to punish a registrant against whom findings have been made. Rather, a sanction is only to be imposed to the extent that it is required to protect the public, to maintain a proper degree of confidence in the registered profession and to declare and uphold proper professional standards. To ensure that these principles are applied the Panel must first consider whether any sanction at all is required. If a sanction is required, then the available sanctions must be considered in an ascending order of seriousness until one that sufficiently addresses the proper sanction goals just mentioned is reached. Further, in reaching its decision the Panel is required to heed the guidance contained in the HCPC’s Sanctions Policy, accepting it is guidance, albeit important guidance, from which it may depart if required by the circumstances.
47. The Panel began its deliberations by listing the aggravating factors it considered appropriate to take into account, and those factors in favour of the Registrant that should be considered.
48. The aggravating factors are the following:
- The findings are self-evidently very serious, involving wide-ranging dishonesty that extended over a considerable period of time.
- There is limited insight for the reason that will be further explained below.
49. In the Registrant’s favour the Panel considered that the following should be accepted:
- The matters arose at a time when the Registrant was suffering a degree of ill health and when he had suffered a bereavement a short time before.
- Although his behaviour may have taken place in order to boost his self-esteem, it is fair to record that he suffered no pecuniary gain from his actions.
- His actions did not impact adversely on service users.
- He has apologised for his actions.
- Although he has limited insight for the reasons stated below, he nevertheless has insight into what he did was wrong and the importance of a professional in his position demonstrating honesty.
- He has fully engaged in this process, put himself forward to be questioned, and, indeed, admitted his actions (including dishonesty) from an early stage.
- There have been no adverse regulatory findings against the Registrant, whether before the events that have been considered by the Panel or since.
- Not only has the Registrant worked without complaint for some four years since the events occurred, but he has produced two testimonials from a partner in the GP practice employing him. The testimonials are dated 6 December 2018 and 14 July 2021, and both comment positively on the Registrant’s clinical work and explicitly state that there has been no doubt concerning his honesty.
50. Before it considered the available sanctions in an ascending order of seriousness, the Panel further considered the respect in which it had already stated that the Registrant had demonstrated limited insight, and what that judgement meant for any future risk of repetition. What makes his insight limited is that as demonstrated by the repeated replies he gave in evidence before the Panel, the Registrant is unable to say why he acted as he did. Unless a person can identify why there have been shortcomings in the past it is not possible, or at the very least extremely difficult, to be confident that they will not act in a similar manner in the future. This is why the Panel finds his insight limited notwithstanding the apology he has tendered and his understanding of the importance of professional honesty. It is also why the Panel has found that there is a risk of repetition. It should be noted that this inability of the Registrant to identify the reasons for his action was very clearly and repeatedly stated to the Panel in evidence which was given some five years after the deceptions commenced during which he had significant time to examine and understand his motives.
51. With these general findings in mind, the Panel first considered whether any sanction is required. The clear answer reached by the Panel is that a sanction is required; this case is far too serious for no order to be made.
52. When the Panel addressed a caution order it considered paragraph 101 of the Sanctions Policy. The issue is only isolated or limited in the sense that the dishonesty was directed towards a single individual, Person A; in all other respects it was anything other than isolated or limited. The findings are definitely not minor in nature. There is a risk of repetition and for the reasons explained the Registrant’s insight cannot be described as good. Not being aware of the reasons for his actions it follows that there has not been appropriate remediation. The Panel concluded that a caution order would not be appropriate.
53. No conditions of practice could be formulated to prevent a practitioner from acting dishonestly. Therefore, a conditions of practice order was rejected.
54. When the Panel considered a suspension order it acknowledged that the public would be protected from the risk of repetition for the duration of the order. However, the Panel was required to consider what the position might be at the end of any period of suspension, a factor underlined by one of the suggested factors contained in paragraph 121 of the Sanctions Policy, “there is evidence to suggest the registrant is likely to be able to resolve or remedy their failings.” For reasons that have been explained in paragraph 50 above, the inability of the Registrant to identify why he acted as he did given the time he has had to reach an understanding of why he acted as he did means that there is no evidence that he will be likely to be able to resolve his failings; rather, the evidence suggests that he will not. Therefore, the Panel has concluded that the position at the end of any period of suspension would be as it is now. That being so, the Panel rejected the making of a suspension order as a suitable sanction.
55. It follows that the Panel next considered a striking off order. In circumstances in which the findings involve wide-ranging dishonesty and the likelihood is that matters will not be resolved, the Panel is satisfied that this is the required sanction. It is required not only for the degree of protection that members of the public are expected to receive from the regulation of a profession, but it also, given the particular circumstances of this case, the sanction that is required to maintain public confidence and to declare and uphold proper professional standards. For these reasons the Panel is satisfied that the only appropriate sanction is a striking off order.
Order: The Registrar is directed to strike the name of Jarred L Rose from the register on the date this order comes into effect.
Right of Appeal:
You may appeal to the High Court in England and Wales against the Panel’s decision and the order it has made against you.
Under Article 29(10) of the Health Work Professions Order 2001, any appeal must be made within 28 days of the date when this notice is served on you. The Panel’s order will not take effect until the appeal period has expired or, if you appeal, until that appeal is disposed of or withdrawn.
Reasons for making the Interim Suspension Order:
(1) After the Panel announced that it was making a striking off order, the Presenting Officer applied for an interim suspension order to cover the period during which the Registrant could appeal the Panel’s decision and Order, and, in the event that an appeal is made, the longer period pending the final resolution of that appeal.
(2) The Panel first considered whether it had jurisdiction to consider the matter. The Panel was satisfied that in the notice of hearing email sent to the Registrant on 24 February 2021, the Registrant was put on notice that in the event of a striking off order being made, the making of an interim order was a possibility. This notification afforded the Registrant an opportunity to make representations on the issue of whether an interim order should be made, and that opportunity meant that the Panel had jurisdiction to consider the application.
(3) On behalf of the Registrant Mr Walker opposed the making of an interim order. He submitted that there would be no risk of harm to service users. Furthermore, public confidence would not be damaged by allowing the Registrant to continue to practise given the Panel’s substantive decision. He submitted that were an interim order not made, the Registrant would have an opportunity to put his affairs in order.
(4) In relation to the decision whether an interim order should be made, the Panel accepted the advice it received from the Legal Assessor that the default position established by the legislation governing these proceedings is that when a substantive sanction is imposed there should be no restriction on the registrant’s ability to practise unless and until that registrant’s appeal rights are exhausted. It follows that positive reasons are required to justify departure from this default position. Those reasons are to be measured against the grounds that can justify the imposition of an interim order, namely that it is (i) necessary for protection of members of the public, (ii) otherwise in the public interest, or (iii) in the interests of the registrant himself or herself.
(5) The Panel considered the points raised by Mr Walker but determined that an interim order is required, the same being necessary for protection of members of the public and being otherwise in the public interest. The reasons for this decision were:
- For the reasons explained in the substantive decision, the Panel has found that there is a risk of repetition and that risk has implications for public safety. The public should be protected against the risk of repetition that would exist if the ability of the Registrant to practise during the appeal period is not restricted.
- Given the totality of the Panel’s findings including the risk of future harm, serious damage would be done to the reputation of the Paramedic profession and the regulation of it were there to be no restriction on the Registrant’s ability to practise while his appeal rights remain extant.
(6) An interim order being necessary, the Panel next considered whether the factors requiring it could be satisfactorily addressed by the imposition of interim conditions of practice. The conclusion of the Panel was that they could not. The reason for this decision is the same reason why appropriate substantive conditions of practice could not be formulated.
(7) For these reasons an Interim Suspension Order is required.
(8) As to the duration of the Interim Suspension Order, the Panel determined that it should be for the maximum period of 18 months. If the Registrant does not appeal against the substantive decision and Order there will be no prejudice to him because the Interim Suspension Order will simply fall away when the striking off order takes effect. However, if the Registrant does appeal within the 28 day period he has to take that step, the final determination of that appeal could well take 18 months, and for the reasons already expressed, his ability to practise should be restricted pending that final determination.