Natasha Jillott

Preliminary Matters

Service

1. The Panel first considered the issue of service as the Registrant was not in attendance.

2. The Panel had been provided with the Registrant’s e-mail within the Certificate signed by the Registrar dated 17 November 2022. This confirmed the postal address and email for the Registrant.

3. The Panel had sight of the actual email of 17 November 2022 to the Registrant. This confirmed the dates and times of the hearing as well as informing her that this would be a virtual hearing. It also offered the Registrant an opportunity to make submissions at the hearing.

4. There had been no response from the Registrant.

5. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor that good service was effected by notifying the Registrant of the time and date of the hearing at her registered email address. There is a duty on the Registrant to update the register as soon as her address changes.

6. The Panel was satisfied that fair, proper and reasonable notice of the hearing today had been served on the Registrant, having been sent to the Registrant at her registered email addresses on 17 November 2022.The Panel determined that notice had been properly served in accordance with the Health and Care Professions Council (Conduct and Competence Committee) (Procedure) Rules 2003 (“the Rules”).

Proceeding in the absence of the Registrant

7. The Panel noted there had been no response from the Registrant.

8. In support of the application to proceed in the Registrant’s absence, the Panel has been provided with oral submissions by the HCPC. Ms Sheridan, for the HCPC, submitted there had been no engagement by the Registrant since the solicitors for the HCPC, Kingsley Napley, had first attempted contact with the Registrant on 2 August 2021 and this remained the case to 12 October 2022. She stated there had been attempts by email and the final bundle had been sent by post. She reminded the Panel that a preliminary hearing on 16 December 2022 also went ahead in the absence of the Registrant.

9. Ms Sheridan further submitted there was a general public interest in proceeding with particulars of dishonesty raised. She submitted that the Registrant had voluntarily absented herself by not engaging and there was nothing to indicate the Registrant would attend at any later date. Finally, she submitted any disadvantage to the Registrant was outweighed by the need for an efficient disposal of the particulars.

10. The Panel considered the HCPTS Practice Note on “Proceeding in the absence of the Registrant” and accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor. The Panel had in mind the need to exercise its discretion to proceed with the utmost care and caution. The Panel was satisfied that the Registrant had received reasonable notice of this hearing and had waived her right to appear. The Panel noted there had been multiple attempts by different means to engage the Registrant. Any adjournment would serve no useful purpose as any future attendance and engagement by the Registrant was unlikely. The Panel concluded the Registrant had voluntarily absented herself.

11. The Panel determined that it was fair and reasonable and in the interest of justice to proceed in the Registrant’s absence as it had found that good service has been effected, the Panel would be able to question the three witnesses waiting to give evidence and concluded and that there is a general public interest for a hearing to take place within a reasonable time.

12. The Panel concluded that the Registrant has voluntarily absented herself, no adjournment had been sought and adjourning would serve no useful purpose. Any disadvantage to the Registrant is significantly outweighed by the public interest in considering these particulars expeditiously.

Application to amend particulars

13. The Panel heard an application made by Ms Sheridan, to amend the wording of particulars 1 and 5.

14. The proposed amendments were as follows:

1.You assigned yourself and were paid for bank shifts on 01 March 2020,and/or 06 March 2020 and/or 21 March 2020 that you did not work.

5.Your conduct in relation to particulars 1 – 41 and/or 2, and/or 3, and/or 4 was dishonest.

15. The proposed amendments were submitted to be minor and typographical. In relation to particular 1, Ms Sheridan submitted that allowing the amendment would allow the Panel to assess the three dates separately. In relation to particular 5, she submitted it would allow dishonesty to be found on any one of the particulars and thus not require it being proved on all the particulars.

16. Ms Sheridan submitted the rules were silent on amendments in such circumstances, the key question was of fairness, these were stylistic changes, and the Registrant was not prejudiced despite not being on notice.

17. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor.

18. The Panel was of the view that the proposed amendments were in the interest of justice and would also assist in making the particulars more focussed. The Panel was satisfied that there would be no prejudice to the Registrant and no injustice would be caused to either party by the proposed amendments being allowed. It was therefore appropriate to allow the amendments to amend the particulars so that they reflect the proper reading of the Allegations.

19. The Panel acceded to the application and allowed the amendments. The amended particulars were recorded.

Amended Allegation

As a registered Clinical Scientist (CS19897) your fitness to practise is impaired by reason of misconduct. In that:

1.You assigned yourself and were paid for bank shifts on 01 March 2020, and/or 06 March 2020 and/or 21 March 2020 that you did not work.

2. Between June 2019 and March 2020, you inappropriately accessed the MAPS log ins of your colleagues to approve your own bank shifts.

3. You fraudulently claimed to have worked concurrent shifts for both bank and Cambridge Heart Clinic on:
a. 06 August 2019.
b. 24 September 2019
c. 08 October 2019
d. 29 October 2019
e. 4 November 2019
f. 19 January 2020
g. 20 January 2020
h. 31 January 2020
i. 26 February 2020

4. You did not inform the HCPC of your dismissal from your post in a timely manner.

5. Your conduct in relation to particulars 1 and/or 2, and/or 3, and/or 4 was dishonest.

6. The matters set out in particulars 1 – 5 constitute misconduct.

7. By reason of your misconduct your fitness to practise is impaired.

Application to adduce Hearsay evidence

20. Ms Sheridan next made an application to rely on the evidence of the following six individuals: DG, AM, IJ, TC, VC and EM. None of these witnesses had provided formal statements, but their evidence was featured within the HCPC bundle. This included within emails and also within the investigation report by KS, where the interviews of relevant individuals is summarised.

21. It was clarified by Ms Sheridan that she did not seek to apply to rely on the evidence of DB, as that application had already been made and was granted at the preliminary hearing of 16 December 2022. Whilst the evidence for the six individuals subject to the present application was not included in the last application due to an oversight, Ms Sheridan submitted their Hearsay evidence should be admitted to avoid any inconsistency and unfairness.

22. Ms Sheridan referred to Rule 10 (1) (b) and (c) (of the Health and Care Professions Council (Conduct and Competence Committee) (Procedure) Rules 2003) and Section 1 of the Civil Evidence Act 1995 as support for hearsay evidence being admitted. She invited the Panel to consider the case of Thorneycroft v NMC [2014].

23. Ms Sheridan sought to rely on the interview evidence as well as the documents in relation to the relevant shifts. She relied on the additional bundle for the HCPC in support of this application. Ms Sheridan submitted the correspondence and attendance notes reflected the HCPC’s unsuccessful efforts to secure the attendance of both Mr DG and Mr AM. Both witnesses indicted that they had already engaged in the internal investigation, but neither wished to participate any further in the HCPC process. The HCPC considered it disproportional to summons them.

24. In relation to the individuals, Ms Sheridan submitted:

a) DG –who provided evidence of various issues including the lack of clinical entries (for the shifts the Registrant claimed to have worked and was paid for), the Registrant not being seen on the wards on the relevant days, DB’s logins being used by the Registrant to approve shifts and finally shifts being claimed with Cambridge Heart Clinic (‘CHC’) at the same time as bank shifts. Ms Sheridan submitted that the Registrant did not dispute these factual assertions in her replies, the records reflecting a lack of clinical work was also not disputed, shifts being claimed for both organisations were admitted, and the Registrant also accepted using DB’s logins to approve shifts.

b) AM– his login details were used by the Registrant, and he was spoken to by the investigators.

c) IJ – Ms Sheridan submitted IJ gives evidence on the process of bank shifts being approved and also on DB’s logins being used, which is accepted by the Registrant.

d) TC – it was conceded by Ms Sheridan that his evidence adds little as TC did not work bank shifts, but his evidence is relevant in repeating what he was told by DG at that time.

e) VC – her evidence was submitted to be relevant as she had been contacted to approve shifts. Ms Sheridan submitted this evidence is not disputed by the Registrant and is verified by email correspondence.

f) EM – she was part of the WhatsApp group where login details access was sought and the messages are contained within the bundle.

25. Ms Sheridan submitted the above evidence is not the sole and decisive evidence in respect of any or all of the particulars and is supported by other evidence before the Panel, which includes the Investigation Report and the Registrant’s own account. She submitted the evidence is largely consistent with what the Registrant accepts took place. She further submitted there was no evidence of any animosity between these individuals and the Registrant. Ms Sheridan submitted that KS, who authored the Investigation Report would attend the hearing and be asked if she simply adopted the findings by DG or went further in her enquiries.

26. As to the Registrant not being put on notice of this application, Ms Sheridan submitted the case summary and bundle makes it clear these individuals were not being called as witnesses, but it was clear their evidence was being relied upon. She stated there had been no objections on the admissibility of this evidence due to the lack of engagement by the Registrant.

27. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor.

28. The Panel considered the evidence being applied for was relevant as it dealt directly with the particulars to be considered.

29. The Panel had regard to the Thorneycroft principles and concluded that this evidence is not sole and decisive in respect of any of the particulars. It bore in mind the evidence which the individuals refer to is corroborated by other evidence, including emails, documents and witnesses. This included the author of the Investigation Report who would attend the hearing and be tested by way of questioning by Ms Sheridan and the Panel. The Panel noted that there was no evidence to suggest the Registrant was challenging any of the Hearsay evidence. It also noted the application was not challenged. The Panel had carefully considered the efforts by the HCPC to secure the witnesses as being reasonable and proportional to their relevance in the case, with efforts focussed on the main individuals, namely DG and AM.

30. In these circumstances, the Panel was satisfied that it would be fair and relevant to accept the evidence in relation to the above six individuals but would give what it deemed appropriate weight once the Panel had heard and evaluated all the evidence before it.

Background

31. The Registrant is a registered Clinical Scientist who was employed by Cambridge University NHS Foundation Trust (‘the Trust’). She worked for the Trust from 14 September 2009 to 17 July 2020. Since September 2016, the Registrant had been working at the Trust as a Band 8a Lead Cardiac Physiologist. In this role, she had management responsibilities for Band 3 -7 employees.

32. Concerns had been raised by colleagues that the Registrant had been approving her own shifts and then had not been working the hours she had claimed and received payment for these.

33. On the 11 March 2020, it was reported to the Trust that the Registrant had been falsely entering bank shifts onto the Health Roster System (MAPS). She had not been seen in the department and there was no evidence of her undertaking clinical work on those shifts. She had also been concurrently working for another organisation, CHC, at the same time as being paid for several bank shifts.

34. A disciplinary hearing was held on 17 July 2020, which resulted in the Registrant’s dismissal. Following this, a referral was made by the Trust to the HCPC on 13 August 2020 with supporting documentation provided.

35. On the 28 April 2021, a Panel of the HCPC’s Investigating Committee determined that there was a case to answer in relation to an allegation of misconduct of the Registrant’s fitness to practice.

The Hearing

36. There had been no admissions.
37. The Panel heard live evidence from the following witnesses called on behalf of the HCPC:
a) Witness 1: Divisional Head of Workforce at the Trust (EM);
b) Witness 2: Investigating Officer and Operations Manager at the Trust (KS);
c) Witness 3: Deputy Operations Manager (CS)

38. The witness evidence of the following, on behalf of the HCPC, was read in without the witness attending the hearing:
a) Witness 4: Cardiac Physiologist (DB);
b) Witness 5: HCPC Case Manager (JW)

HCPC Submissions

Facts
39. Ms Sheridan invited the Panel to find all of the factual particulars proved.

40. She submitted that Particular 1 is proven as the Registrant assigned herself shifts as per her own admissions. She reminded the Panel that Witness 1 had confirmed the correct procedure was to seek approval from senior managers. She submitted all three dates should be proved and in support of this she relied upon the lack of clinical work within the records, and the Registrant not being seen to be present on the Trust premises. She relied upon the emails and the extracts from the MAPS system and Echopack as corroborative of this position. Additionally, she relied upon Witness 2’s enquiries in obtaining copies of the EPIC digital patient record as not showing any clinical work done by the Registrant on these dates. She further relied on Witness 3’s oral evidence confirming the Registrant could not be found on the 6 March 2020.

41. Ms Sheridan invited the Panel to dismiss the Registrants’ account of working from home, being in the emergency department or doing administrative work as lacking credibility as the purpose of bank shifts was to see patients in order to clear the backlog. She submitted the Registrant had been unable to name anyone who could vouch for her presence. She also invited the Panel to draw an inference on the Registrant not asking to see the evidence against her at the disciplinary hearing, and instead offering to refund the payments.

42. In regards to Particular 2, Ms Sheridan submitted this can be proved on the basis of the Registrant’s admissions in relation to asking for the log-in details of Witness 4 to approve her own shifts. Although Witness 4 did not attend the hearing, Ms Sheridan submitted her evidence is not contradicted by the Registrant. In addition, Ms Sheridan sought to rely on the evidence of a more junior colleague, AM, whose log-in details were also used by the Registrant to approve her own shifts. She submitted this evidence could be accepted as the Registrant had not challenged this.

43. As to Particular 3 on fraudulently working for both NHS and CHC concurrently, Ms Sheridan sought to rely on the evidence of Witness 2 who investigated the matter and obtained time sheet/records for both organisations. Ms Sheridan submitted these were compared between August 2019 and February 2020, they showed overlaps of time claimed. The Registrant was a senior manager who should know the procedures. This had occurred on nine separate occasions, and no explanation was offered by the Registrant other than saying she was on “auto-pilot”, and she did not seek to look at the evidence against her when she offered to refund the sums of money.

44. In relation to Particular 4, Ms Sheridan submitted the Registrant had been dismissed by the Trust on 17 July 2020 and relied on the evidence of JW. His evidence was he checked the HCPC database on 17 November 2021 and the Registrant had not reported the dismissal. She submitted his evidence should be accepted as it remained unchallenged, and the Registrant had failed to provide any explanation.

45. With respect to dishonesty (Particular 5), Ms Sheridan submitted this was evidenced by the Registrant’s admissions on using junior colleagues’ log-in details to approve her own shifts. She further submitted this was done without the colleagues’ consent and the Registrant had given a false account of the reasons for requiring the log-in.

46. She further submitted there was an absence of evidence of clinical work on the relevant shifts, the overlap between time claimed at two organisations was on nine separate occasions and the evidence was unchallenged. She also submitted the Registrant would have known she is claiming for work not done and ordinary decent people would find this to be dishonest. Additionally, she submitted the Registrant would know she had to inform the HCPC as that is reflected within the HCPC Standards, and it would also be a matter of common sense to inform the regulator of the dismissal. Ms Sheridan invited the Panel to accept the evidence of Witness 1 who confirmed she specifically asked the Registrant if she was registered with any regulator and the Registrant had denied this.

Misconduct

47. Finally, Ms Sheridan submitted that there had been breaches of the HCPC Standards of Conduct Performance and Ethics of standards 9.1 and 9.5. She invited the Panel to find there is Misconduct if dishonesty was found proved as this would be at the top end of the misconduct spectrum. Even if dishonesty is not found on Particulars 1-3, she submitted it was still very serious misconduct as the Trust were deprived financially and waiting lists were not progressed. Ms Sheridan also argued there had been a breach of trust in using log-ins of junior colleagues without their consent and misrepresenting the reason for the details being required. She stated the Registrant had brought the profession into disrepute. Finally, in failing to disclose the dismissal to the HCPC, Ms Sheridan submitted the Registrant had undermined the regulatory function.

Impairment

48. The Panel heard submissions from Ms Sheridan for the HCPC. She invited the Panel to approach the question of impairment sequentially, looking both at the personal and public components of impairment in line with the HCPTS Practice Note Fitness to Practise Impairment.

49. Ms Sheridan submitted the Registrant fitness to practice was currently impaired on both the personal and public component. In terms of the personal component, she submitted impairment on the grounds of bringing the profession into disrepute, breaching a fundamental tenet of the profession, and dishonesty with reference to CHRE v NMC and Grant. Ms Sheridan stated that whilst no adverse inference could be made in relation to not attending the hearing or providing any written documents for this fitness to practice process hearing it meant there was “very little” evidence to demonstrate her insight and remediation. There was therefore a risk of repetition. In terms of the public component Ms Sheridan reminded the Panel of the elements of maintaining public confidence in profession would be undermined if there was no finding of impairment.

Decision on Facts

50. Before making any findings on the facts, the Panel heard and accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor. In reaching its decisions on the disputed facts, the Panel took into account all the oral and documentary evidence in this case together with the submissions made by Ms Sheridan. The Panel has read the HCPC bundle and the exhibits.

51. In reaching its decision on the facts, the Panel has borne in mind that the burden of proof rests on the HCPC and it is for the HCPC to prove the Allegation irrespective of any admissions made by the Registrant. The standard of proof is that applicable to civil proceedings, namely the balance of probabilities.

52. It has approached the assessment of reliability and credibility carefully and has followed the guidance in R ( Dutta) v GMC [2020] and Khan v GMC [2021]. It notes that it is an error to place overreliance on the demeanour of a witness and that reliance on the confident demeanour of a witness is a discredited method of judicial decision making

53. The Panel has carefully considered the evidence in the round, giving appropriate weight to the documentary evidence. Throughout its’ deliberations the Panel has referred itself back to the contemporaneous investigation report, timesheets, system records (Echopack and EPIC data), and the emails when assessing the weight to attach to the oral evidence of witnesses and documentary evidence.

54. The Panel also acknowledged that the Registrant has no previous fitness to practice history and Witness 2 indicated that there were no issues concerning her clinical ability.

55. In relation to dishonesty, the Panel bore in mind the two-part test in Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd t/a Crockfords [2017], namely the subjective test of ascertaining the Registrant’s actual state of knowledge or belief, followed by an objective of assessment in whether the Registrant is dishonest.

Particular 1 - proved

1.You assigned yourself and were paid for bank shifts on 01 March 2020, and/or 06 March 2020 and/or 21 March 2020 that you did not work.

56. This Particular was proved by the Registrant’s admission of assigning herself the shifts, extracts from the Echopack and MPAS systems, and by the oral evidence of Witness 1, Witness 2 and Witness 3.

57. Witness 1 had confirmed in oral evidence that the correct procedure was to obtain approval of bank shifts from line managers, which for the Registrant would have been IJ, thus this process had not been followed. The Panel noted the Registrant, in her statement, had accepted she had assigned herself bank shifts; “I was the only one who booked bank shifts for echo”. The Registrant was consistent on this as reflected in her updated statement. She stated she had been approving her own shifts using log-in details of colleagues (see Particular 2).

58. The Panel accepted the admission and also accepted the Registrant would have been paid for these bank shifts; this was inferred by the Panel as the Registrant did not say otherwise in her statements and both Witness 1 and Witness 2 confirmed the Registrant had offered to refund the payment. This was also confirmed in the Investigation Report, which both witnesses confirmed had been written up within 6 days of interviewing the Registrant, thus the Panel found it to be contemporaneous evidence which could be relied upon.

59. As to the specific dates:
a) 1 March 2020 - the Panel noted DG stated in his email of 11 March 2020; “on, Sunday 1st of March…she had a bank shift booked from 14-22 hrs. She wasn’t seen nor any work was done by her. Please see enclosed echo worklist for the mentioned day.”
b) 6 March 2020 – in the same email of 11 March 2020, DG stated; “Another example of this is on Fri 6th March, she had annual leave in the afternoon with a bank shift from 17.21-20.00 that she was not present for. 5 members of staff were in the department until past 8pm due to a suspected coronavirus patient. No evidence of any clinical work done and no one had seen her in the department.” There was additional evidence from Witness 3 who confirmed in oral evidence that he was leaving to go home when he was called by TC to assist on a patients case as the Registrant was not present. None of the colleagues working that shift had seen the Registrant. The EPIC data showed entries of clinical intervention between 9:30 and 12:00 but nothing more for the rest of the day.
c) 21 March 2020 – DG email of 30 March 2020; “there were 10 bank shifts claimed by Natasha…and this includes all day Saturday bank shift (21st of March) when Natasha was supposedly booked to work privately Cambridge heart clinic in the afternoon – absolutely no evidence of any echo related clinical work carried out by her on the named day”. This is further corroborated by Echopac screenshots which were seen by the Panel and the Panel noted no clinical work had been undertaken by the Registrant on this date. There was no EPIC clinical intervention data for this date.

60. The Panel accepted the unchallenged evidence of DG as the Panel had sight of these contemporaneous emails. Witness 2 also provided evidence of her investigation and obtaining information from the Information Governance team within the Trust, which showed no clinical work had been recorded by the Registrant on these dates/times. This was verified by the EPIC digital patient record system, which would record any interaction with any patient related to cardiology or the emergency department, which is where the Registrant was based. There had been no suggestion of any animosity by DG as to give cause to undermine his evidence. The Registrant did not contest being paid for these shifts and it was noted the disciplinary record reflected the Registrant’s offer to refund the payment for the shifts.

61. The Panel was of the view that evidence was strongest on 6 March 2020 as it was corroborated by Witness 3. The Panel considered there was a pattern of behaviour and the evidence for 6 March 2020 to add weight to the two other dates. When considering in the round, the Panel concluded that the evidence against the Registrant had been made out.

62. The Registrant’s explanation was she had been working from home, was in the emergency department or doing administrative work. The Panel did not accept this explanation, as both Witness 1 and Witness 2 had confirmed the purpose of bank shifts was for patient to be seen in order to clear the patient backlog. They stated these bank shifts were never completed at home as they related to patient facing work. No evidence of any work done in the emergency department or home had been provided by the Registrant.

63. The Panel drew an adverse inference on the Registrant not mentioning the names of any colleagues who may be able to verify she had been present at the Trust, not seeking to look at the evidence against her in the disciplinary (as confirmed by Witness 2) and instead offering to refund the pay. It was considered that none of these actions were of a reasonable person facing such particulars. It would be reasonable for a person of the Registrant’s seniority to be aware of the procedures, yet no clinical interventions were recorded despite this being mandatory.

64. This particular was found proved.

Particular 2 - proved

2.Between June 2019 and March 2020, you inappropriately accessed the MAPS log ins of your colleagues to approve your own bank shifts.

65. The Panel noted the admission as the Registrant went into some detail on this in her statement:

“I also wish to acknowledge that I used my own healthroster manager log in to lock my own shifts. I also knew the login of another member of the team and used that login too. I would very much like to stress that this other member of the team did not know I was doing this and I do not wish for them to be pulled in to this investigation because of my actions. They did not share their log in details with me – this was something that I saw them type as they worked next to me on a computer. This is in no way their fault and I alone should face the consequences of my actions.
I know that this was wrong and I am very sorry that I did this”

66. The Panel took account of the evidence of Witness 4 in her witness statement, who stated her login details were accessed by the Registrant without her knowledge. She had stated she rarely used the MAPS system and she had never approved bank shifts. Whilst she did not attend the hearing, this evidence was accepted as this aligns with the admission by the Registrant. The Panel also had sight of the WhatsApp messages where the Registrant had requested Witness 4 to provide her log in details under false pretences.

67. The Panel also took account of the evidence from AM, who was a lower band than the Registrant. He stated his log-in details were also used by the Registrant to approve her own shifts. This was corroborated by a screenshot of the MAPS system showing approval using his logins of the Registrant’s shift on 15 March 2020. His evidence was taken at the end of March 2020 so was contemporaneous.

68. Witness 2 confirmed AM was a new member of staff and his evidence was that logins were sought by the Registrant to approve the shift of another individual, despite that individual’s shifts already being approved (as evidenced by the MAPS system). Hence, the Panel did not accept the reason given by the Registrant to AM as being credible.

69. This particular was found proved.

Particular 3 - proved

3.You fraudulently claimed to have worked concurrent shifts for both bank and Cambridge Heart Clinic on:
a. 06 August 2019.
b. 24 September 2019
c. 08 October 2019
d. 29 October 2019
e. 4 November 2019
f. 19 January 2020
g. 20 January 2020
h. 31 January 2020
i. 26 February 2020

70. Witness 2 gave evidence at the hearing that she had investigated the matter and obtained time sheet/records for both organisations (the Trust as well as CHC). Witness 2 had stated the following in her investigation Report: “The information received from CHC and Staff Bank were compared and a total of 20.5 hours had been claimed and paid to Natasha by Staff Bank when she was working for CHC between August 2019 and February 2020”. She stated the same in oral evidence.

71. The Panel did undertake a comparison exercise of the time sheets provided and concluded there was an overlap in shifts claimed on the dates alleged.

72. Next the Panel considered if this was deliberate and done fraudulently. The Registrant was a senior practitioner with management and budget responsibility for her team. The Registrant’s explanation at the investigatory meeting with Witness 2 was summarised as:

“She advised when she approves shifts she does this on autopilot”. It was not credible to accept this was an error as it was repeated on nine occasions over many months. The Panel was unable to reconcile why the Registrant would offer to return the payment and not ask to see the evidence, thus drew an adverse inference on this as mentioned earlier. The Registrant had accepted she was wrongly approving her own shifts, using logins of other colleagues without their knowledge.

73. The Registrant was a senior manager who should know the procedures. This had occurred on nine separate occasions and no explanation was offered by the Registrant other than saying she was on “auto-pilot”. She did not seek to look at the evidence against her but instead offered to refund the sums paid.

74. This allegation was found proved.

Particular 4 - proved

4.You did not inform the HCPC of your dismissal from your post in a timely manner.

75. The Registrant had been dismissed by the Trust on 17 July 2020, as reflected in the letter to the Registrant by the Trust following the disciplinary hearing.

76. The Panel had sight of the statement from Witness 5, who is a Case Manager at the HCPC. He stated as follows:

“I confirm that at the time Natasha Jillott was dismissed she was registered with the HCPC.
….
I reviewed the HCPC database on 17 November 2021 and I confirm that Natasha Jillott did not inform the HCPC that she had been dismissed from her post.”

77. Although he did not attend the hearing, the Panel were able to give his evidence weight as his evidence had been unchallenged and no explanation had been provided by the Registrant.

78. The Panel heard evidence at the hearing from Witness 1 who confirmed that she had asked the Registrant if she is was registered with any regulator and the Registrant had denied she was subject to any professional regulator.

79. There is a duty to inform the regulator of disciplinary matters as soon as possible, as reflected in the HCPC Standards of Conduct Performance and Ethics. Whilst some time allowance may be reasonable to inform the regulator, the Panel did not consider it reasonable that 16 months had passed and the HCPC had still not been told by the Registrant about the dismissal.

80. This particular was found proved.

Decision on Grounds
Dishonesty - proved

5. Your conduct in relation to particulars 1 and/or 2, and/or 3, and/or 4 was dishonest.

81. The Panel noted the above particulars had been found proved. It was aware dishonesty only needed to be found on one of the particulars but did consider each particular individually.

82. Particulars 1 and 3 were considered together as both related to her falsely claiming for shifts not worked. The Panel had concern over the correct procedure not being followed and the Registrant using the log-in details of junior colleagues to approve her shifts, as opposed to seeking approval from senior managers. Log-in details were used of colleagues to approve her shifts, without their consent. It was concerning that the Registrant had provided misleading explanations of why the log-ins were required, which was indicative of concealment. It was not an isolated incident and this was repeated on multiple occasions to suggest this was a pattern of behaviour. No explanation had been forthcoming from the Registrant to deal with the concerns. The Panel considered ordinary decent people would consider this dishonest. Accordingly, dishonesty was found proved on these particulars.

83. Particular 2 had been admitted by the Registrant and she confirmed her colleague did not know she was using her log-ins;

“I would very much like to stress that this other member of the team did not know I was doing this …. They did not share their log in details with me – this was something that I saw them type as they worked next to me on a computer. … I know that this was wrong and I am very sorry that I did this”

84. The Panel also noted the Registrant had misrepresented her reasons to another colleague in that she required it to approve another individual’s shift, despite having been approved by her minutes earlier. The Panel considered dishonesty was proved on this allegation.

85. Finally, in respect of Particular 4, the lengthy delay was inexcusable. There had been no notification by the Registrant to the HCPC. The Registrant was a band 8a manager and would be expected to know the rules of her own regulator. The Panel reviewed the Trust’s disciplinary procedure policy document, and this confirmed the Trust would notify regulators of dismissal, and specifically mentioned the HCPC. The Panel had accepted the evidence of Witness 1 was credible in respect of asking the Registrant if she was registered with any regulator and the Registrant denying this. The Panel deemed this to be an attempt by the Registrant to conceal her registration and found dishonesty on this allegation too.

Misconduct

86. The Panel has approached its decision on misconduct by considering each of the particulars in the Allegation separately. The Panel has concluded that the facts found proved in relation to each of the particulars were so serious as to amount to misconduct.

87. The Registrant knew the Trust policy, used log-in details of others to approve her own shifts and has been untruthful to them on the reason for their log-in details being required. The Registrant was wrong to do this as a senior manager and should have been reminding other junior colleagues not to share log-in details. The Panel considered booking shifts with two organisations at the same time was fraudulent activity, was repeated on nine occasions, and thus was serious misconduct. In not reporting the dismissal to her regulator, the Registrant had undermined the regulatory function and brought the profession into disrepute. Taken together, the Panel found her conduct to be serious and deplorable. The dishonesty involved put this at the top end of the misconduct scale.

88. In the Panel’s judgement, the Registrant’s behaviour fell seriously below the standards expected of a Clinical Scientist. It has found that the Registrant failed to uphold her professional standards in fundamental areas and that she has breached fundamental tenets of her profession.

89. The conduct involved breaches of the following:

HCPC Standards of Conduct Performance and Ethics:-

9.1 You must make sure that your conduct justifies the public’s trust and confidence in you and your profession.
9.5 You must tell us as soon as possible if: …. you have had any restriction placed on your practice, or been suspended or dismissed by an employer, because of concerns about your conduct or competence.

Decision on Impairment

90. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor.

91. The Panel has approached its’ decision on impairment looking at the situation as it is today. It has had regard to the HCPTS Practice Note Fitness to Practise Impairment.

92. The Panel’s primary objective is the protection of the public, the maintenance of public confidence in the profession, and the declaring and upholding of proper standards of conduct and behaviour.

93. In reaching a decision on impairment, the Panel has considered all of the evidence and the submissions, and has exercised its’ own judgment on impairment.

94. Clinical Scientists are expected to act in a professional manner at all times. They must make sure that their conduct justifies both service users’ and the public’s trust in the profession. In Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence v (1) Nursing and Midwifery Council (2) Grant [2011], Cox J summed up the Panel’s task in the following way:

“In determining whether a practitioner’s fitness to practise is impaired by reason of misconduct, the relevant panel should generally consider not only whether the practitioner continues to present a risk to members of the public in his or her current role, but also whether the need to uphold proper professional standards and public confidence in the profession would be undermined if a finding of impairment were not made in the particular circumstances.”

95. Whilst there is no statutory definition of impairment, the Panel was assisted by the guidance provided by Dame Janet Smith in the Fifth Shipman Report, as adopted by the High Court in CHRE v NMC & Grant [2011]. In particular, the Panel considered whether its findings of fact showed that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is impaired in that he:

a. Has in the past acted and/or is liable in the future to act so as to put a patient or patients at unwarranted risk of harm; and/or
b. Has in the past brought and/or is liable in the future to bring the medical profession into disrepute; and/or
c. Has in the past breached and/or is liable in the future to breach one of the fundamental tenets of the medical profession; and/or
d. Has in the past acted dishonestly and/or is liable to act dishonestly in the future.

96. In approaching the question of impairment, the Panel has considered the personal and public components.

97. On the personal component the Panel found that the Registrant’s fitness to practice was currently impaired. The Panel considered the key questions: are the acts or omission which led to the allegations remediable; has the Registrant taken remediable action and are those acts or omissions likely to be repeated. The Panel was also mindful that in some cases including those involving serious attitudinal or behavioural issues may be more difficult to remediate, or where public confidence in the profession require a finding of impairment to be made. The Panel considered that in this case the Registrant’s behaviour including the seriousness of her dishonesty would be difficult to remediate.

98. Whilst the Panel made no adverse inference concerning the Registrant’s absence from the hearing or submission of any documentary evidence this meant the Panel did not have the benefit of questioning the Registrant or assessing any written material. There was little evidence of insight to indicate how the Registrant accepted how her behaviour fell below professional standards, how and why it occurred and the consequences to those affected e.g. patients, colleagues her organisation, the profession and the wider public. There was no evidence available to indicate she had taken action to address the failures in a way which remedied past harms and avoid any future repetition. The Registrant’s statement included some admissions, but provided limited insight as the Registrant’s focus was on her friendships and loss of employment. There was no evidence of reflections, compensating her organisation, letters of apology courses taken to address her behaviour, information on her current roles, testimonials. There had been a pattern of dishonesty over a period of time and so a very real risk of repetition remains.

99. In terms of the public component the Panel has taken into account its overarching responsibility to protect service users, promote and maintain professional standards, and to uphold and protect the wider public interest, which includes promoting and maintaining public confidence in the profession. The Panel considered patients were potentially impacted by the Registrant claiming for work she did not undertake and which could have been done by others to reduce waiting lists for patients who would be awaiting vital scans. There had been a breakdown in trust with her colleagues who felt the need to report her. The Registrant’s behaviour fell seriously short of the behaviour which the public would expect and affects the public’s confidence in the profession. The public is entitled to expect registrants to act with honesty and integrity. The Panel further finds that the Registrant’s behaviour has brought damage to the profession. The Panel are satisfied that given the nature of the allegations and the facts found proved public confidence in the profession would be undermined if there were to be no finding of impairment.

100. Having regard to all of the above, the Panel has found that, by reason of her misconduct, the Registrant’s fitness to practise is currently impaired on the both the private and public component of impairment.

Decision on Sanction

101. The Panel heard submissions from Ms Sheridan and in reaching a decision on the sanction it has taken these submissions into account. She confirmed she had no instructions for a particular sanction, but she did assist in highlighting the aggravating and mitigating factors. These are considered further below. Ms Sheridan reminded the Panel that all sanctions remain open including a striking off order, but left it for the Panel to make its own determination.

102. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor and has reached its decision on sanction by following the guidance in the HCPC Sanctions Policy.

103. The Panel has had regard to all the evidence presented. It reminded itself that a sanction is not intended to be punitive although it may have a punitive effect. The Panel bore in mind the principles of fairness and proportionality and that a sanction must be reasonable and the least restrictive possible.

104. The primary function of any sanction is to address public safety from the perspective of the risk which the Registrant may pose to patients and to the wider public interest; namely the deterrent effect on other Registrants, the reputation of the profession and public confidence in the regulatory process.

105. The Panel began its deliberations on sanction by considering the mitigating factors:-

(i) The Registrant had no previous regulatory findings made against her and had an unblemished career up until this determination.
(ii) The Registrant did make an admission on Particular 2, but the Panel noted there had been no admissions to the dishonesty.

106. The Panel then considered the aggravating factors and found the following: -

(i) Breach of trust and abuse of professional position, which was in relation to the employer and her colleagues.
(ii) Repeated pattern of dishonesty and unacceptable behaviour, which was in relation to the findings made above on multiple dates. There remained a risk of repetition.
(iii) Lack of insight, as the Panel were unable to consider why she acted in the way she did, given the Registrant had not provided any evidence of insight. There was therefore a real risk of the repetition of her behaviour. The Panel also noted the Registrant had failed to provide evidence when she was given an opportunity to explain the reasons at the investigatory hearing by the Trust.
(iv) Lack of remediation and reflection.

107. The Panel also considered the dishonesty resulted in this case being serious, as public confidence in the profession is undermined. The Panel noted there are varying degrees of dishonesty, and it needs to be considered in a nuanced way. This was not a single act as there had been repeated misconduct, this had taken place over an extended period between August 2019 and March 2020. The Registrant had taken an active role in this, there was a failure to notify the HCPC of the dismissal, and there was an absence of early admissions with a lack of admissions in relation to the dishonesty.

108. The Panel next considered the sanctions in ascending order of gravity.

109. It has found that it is not appropriate to make No Order because of the serious nature of the incident.

110. A Caution Order is not appropriate because the conduct found proved was too serious for a Caution Order to be appropriate. The misconduct was of a serious nature, it was not isolated, the Registrant demonstrated a lack of insight, risk of repetition and no remediation.

111. The Panel next considered a Conditions of Practice Order. The Panel had found dishonesty with limited insight displayed. The Panel noted dishonesty is an attitudinal issue and can be harder to remedy. There was no evidence that the misconduct could be remedied. There were no workable conditions that could be formulated in this specific case, and the Panel had no confidence that in any event conditions formulated would be complied with by the Registrant. The Registrant’s misconduct was not minor and was likely to be repeated. In the circumstances it has determined that the Registrant’s misconduct was too serious for a Conditions of Practice Order to be appropriate.

112. The Panel next considered a Suspension Order. The Panel noted the serious breaches of standards and deemed suspension was not appropriate where there is a lack of insight and a risk of repetition. There was no evidence to indicate that the Registrant is likely to be able to resolve or remedy their failings.

113. Finally, the Panel considered a striking off order, which was an option that was open to the Panel. The Panel were fully aware that a striking off order is a sanction of last resort for serious persistent deliberate or reckless acts involving such misconduct as dishonesty, failure to work in partnership and abuse of professional position. The Panel were satisfied that given the circumstances of this case a striking off order was necessary and appropriate.

114. Repeated dishonesty has been found on Particulars 1 to 4 and the dishonesty was deemed serious as highlighted further above. There had been no insight shown into the dishonesty and the Panel remained concerned of the risk of repetition.

115. The Registrant had also failed to work in partnership with her colleagues and there had been an abuse of her professional position. An example of this was using log-in details of junior colleagues whilst misleading them on the reason for this and it was noted AM was particularly affected to learn what happened, as he had recently joined and felt pressured in providing his log in details.

116. The Panel were satisfied that due to the nature and gravity of the concerns that any lesser sanction than a striking off order would be insufficient to protect the public, public confidence in the profession and public confidence in the regulatory process. The Registrant demonstrated a lack of insight and repeated serious misconduct.

117. The Panel was satisfied that a striking off order was the most appropriate sanction, having considered lesser sanctions before arriving at this order.

The Registrar is directed to strike the name of Natasha Jillott from the Register on the date this order comes into effect.

Right of Appeal

You may appeal to the High Court in England and Wales against the Panel’s decision and the order it has made against you.
Under Article 29(10) of the Health Professions Order 2001, any appeal must be made within 28 days of the date when this notice is served on you. The Panel’s order will not take effect until the appeal period has expired or, if you appeal, until that appeal is disposed of or withdrawn.

Application for an Interim Order

1. Ms Sheridan made an application in relation to two preliminary matters. The first that the Registrant was clearly on notice by virtue of a letter dated 17 November 2022 that an application for an Interim Order may be made in the event of the Panel determining a sanction of Conditions of Practice , Suspension Order or Strike Off. Ms Sheridan also made an application to proceed in the absence of the Registrant for all the reasons previously raised.
2. The Panel heard an application from Ms Sheridan to cover the appeal period by imposing an 18-month Interim Suspension Order on the Registrant’s registration. She submitted such an order is necessary to protect the public as the Panel had found proved serious allegations of dishonesty, as well as a lack of insight and risk of repetition. She also sought the order on the ground of it being in the wider public interest given the allegations against the Registrant that have been proved and a reasonable well-informed member of the public would be concerned if no restriction was put on the Registrant’s practice. Ms Sheridan submitted an order for an interim suspension as her view was that there are no appropriate conditions that can guard against the risk of repetition. She sought an order for 18 months to cover the period of any appeal to the High Court.
3. The Panel heard and accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor. The Panel determined that the Registrant was on notice that such an application may be made. The Panel also determined that it should proceed in the absence of the Registrant. For the reasons set out earlier in its earlier decision to commence the hearing in the absence of the Registrant, the Panel determined it would be fair, proportionate and in the interest of justice to consider this application.
4. The Panel had careful regard to Paragraphs 133-135 of the Sanction Policy and to Paragraph 7 of the HCPTS Practice Note on Interim Orders, which offer guidance on interim orders imposed at final hearings after a sanction has been imposed.
5. The Panel recognised that its powers to impose an interim order is discretionary and that imposition of such an order is not an automatic outcome of fitness to practice proceedings in which a striking off has been imposed, and that the Panel did take into consideration the impact of such an order on the Registrant.
6. The Panel first considered whether an interim conditions of practice order should be imposed. The Panel determined that there were no workable conditions relevant to this case. There was no information as to what the Registrant is currently doing in terms of her work, and the Panel had no confidence that she would comply with any such conditions.
7. The Panel were satisfied it was necessary to impose an Interim Suspension Order under Article 31(2) of the Health Professions Order 2001. This was necessary for the protection of the public and is otherwise in the public interest. The Panel had regard to the reasons given in the earlier decision today in regards to the striking off. In the circumstances, it also considered that public confidence in the profession and the regulatory process would be seriously undermined were the Registrant allowed to remain in practice as a Clinical Scientist during the appeal period.
8. The period of the order is for 18 months to allow for the possibility of an appeal to be made and determined.
9. If no appeal is made, then the interim order will be replaced by the striking off order 28 days after the Registrant is sent the decision of this hearing in writing.

History of Hearings for Natasha Jillott