Mrs Clare M Dillon

 

1. In 2010, the Regulator of Operating Department Practitioners was the Health Professions Council (HCP). 

 

2. In 2019 and 2020, the Regulator of Operating Department Practitioners was the Health and Care Professions Council (HCPC).

 

3. For the avoidance of doubt, the word ‘Regulator’ when used within this decision applies to both the HCP and HCPC. 

Service

 

4. The Panel was provided with a signed certificate as proof that the Notice of Hearing had been emailed to the Registrant on 7 December 2022.

 

5. The Panel was provided with a signed certificate dated 7 December 2022 confirming that the email address the Notice of Hearing had been sent to was the address that the Registrant had provided on the HCPC records. 

 

6. Accordingly, the Panel found that the Registrant had been served with the Notice of Hearing in accordance with Rule 3 of the HCPC Conduct and Competence Committee (Procedure) Rules 2003 (the Rules) and that she had been given more than 28 days’ notice in accordance with Rule 6 of the Rules. 

 

 

7. Mr Bridges applied for the hearing to proceed in the absence of the Registrant. He indicated that the Registrant had not engaged with the proceedings at any time.

 

8. Mr Bridges explained that the Registrant had failed to respond to multiple emails sent by Kingsley Napley LLP solicitors (Kingsley Napley) on behalf of the HCPC in October 2022, November 2022 and January 2023. A letter had also been sent to the Registrant’s home address on 11 November 2022 but this had been returned to Kingsley Napley. 

 

9. Mr Bridges submitted that as the Registrant had not engaged with the proceedings, there was no evidence that an adjournment would ensure her attendance at a future date. He submitted that in the circumstances of this case an adjournment would be futile. Mr Bridges further submitted that although the Panel had to conduct a balancing exercise, it was a proportionate decision to proceed in the absence of the Registrant. 

 

10. The Panel heard and accepted advice from the Legal Assessor. The Legal Assessor confirmed that it is a requirement of continued registration with the HCPC that contact details are kept up to date and accurate on the HCPC register (Rule 9(1) of the Health and Care Professions Council (Registrations and Fees) Rules (2003). 

 

11. The Legal Assessor referred the Panel to the cases of Jatta v NMC (2009) EWCA Civ 824, GMC v Visvardis (2004) EWCA Civ 162 R v Jones (Anthony Williams) HL 20 February 2002 and GMC v Adeogba (2016) EWCA Civ 162 and provided a summary of these cases. The case of Adeogba specifically states that, ‘there is a burden on all professional’s subject to a regulatory regime, to engage with the regulator, both in relation to the investigation and ultimate resolution of allegations against them. That is part of the responsibility to which they sign up when being admitted to the profession.’ At paragraph 20 in this case, the Judge stated, ‘the fair, economical, expeditious and efficient disposal of allegations against medical practitioners are of real importance.’ 

 

12. The Panel retired to consider its decision in respect of proceeding in the absence of the Registrant. It was satisfied that the Registrant had been properly served with the notice of hearing. The Registrant had also been sent follow up emails and correspondence by post from Kingsley Napley. The Panel noted that the Registrant had also been sent several follow up emails from the Health Care Professions Tribunal Service (HCPTS). 

 

13. The Panel was aware that the Registrant had been sent the Microsoft Teams link to enable her to join the hearing.

 

14. The Panel was conscious of the obligation on the Registrant to communicate with the Regulator and update it with her contact details. The Panel was mindful of the HCPTS Practice Note ‘Proceeding in the Absence of the Registrant’ dated June 2022, it was satisfied, as far as it could be, that the Registrant was aware of the proceedings.

 

15. The Panel found on the balance of probabilities that the Registrant had voluntarily absented herself. She had been given every opportunity to engage and had failed to do so. 

 

16. The Panel also noted that there was a live witness ready to give evidence. The Panel considered that if it was to adjourn the hearing, there was no further evidence before it that the Registrant would attend a future hearing. Further, the Registrant had not requested an adjournment or given any explanation for her failure to engage.

 

17. Whilst acknowledging the disadvantage to the Registrant in not being able to give live evidence, the Panel took the view that this disadvantage was outweighed by the public interest in the expeditious conclusion of the proceedings.

 

18. Having considered all the issues and weighed the competing factors, the Panel determined to hear the case in the Registrant’s absence.

 

 

19. The Registrant is registered as an Operating Department Practitioner who was previously employed as a Band 5 Operating Department Practitioner within the Theatres, General and Maternity departments within Royal Cornwall Hospitals Trust (‘the Trust’) between 2007 and 2019.

 

20. On 16 June 2020 a referral form was sent to the HCPC by PR, an Assistant Employee Relations Officer at the Trust as a result of concerns surrounding the Registrant’s fitness to practise following a concluded unrelated Trust investigation. 

 

21. It was alleged that concerns were initially raised in 2010 and that the Registrant was subsequently suspended from practising as an Operating Department Practitioner in 2010. At the conclusion of that 2010 investigation, the Registrant was reinstated into her position as a Band 5 Operating Department Practitioner within the Trust. It is alleged that the Registrant did not disclose this suspension to the Regulator and made declarations which were false on registration renewal documents. 

 

22. In October 2019 restrictions were placed on the Registrant’s practice in that she was removed from patient-facing duties pending the outcome of a separate investigation. It is alleged by the HCPC that the Registrant did not declare her restricted practice to the HCPC and completed renewal applications which contained false declarations. 

 

23. In January 2020, the Trust suspended the Registrant and it is alleged that this suspension was similarly not disclosed to the HCPC by the Registrant.

 

 

24. Mr Bridges summarised the case on behalf of the HCPC. He set out the background as outlined above. He also provided the Panel with a ‘Timeline’ setting out the various dates that the Registrant had been suspended from practice, had restrictions placed on her practice and had provided her HCPC registration renewal documents.

 

25. Mr Bridges also set out clearly the ‘Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics’ that were relevant at the time of the Registrant’s alleged suspension from practice in both 2010 and 2019. The Panel was provided with copies of these standards. 

Witness Evidence

 

26. Witness TF gave evidence under affirmation on behalf of the HCPC. She confirmed her written statement. The evidence provided confirmed that TF worked as an Independent Safeguarding Investigator for the Trust. In 2020 she worked as an Investigation Officer and in this role conducted an investigation into allegations made against the Registrant. TF confirmed that the Registrant had worked for the Trust for eighteen years. The witness confirmed that she could give evidence of the fact that the Registrant had been suspended in 2010. In response to Panel questions, the witness confirmed that she did not know the exact date of the suspension and had no documentation about this to hand. 

 

27. Witness TF produced and exhibited the documents outlined below. All information relating to the allegations that led to the two Trust investigations in 2010 and 2019, although details of those allegations were redacted. Therefore, the Panel was not aware of the nature or content of those allegations. 

 

· The Trust’s investigation report dated 29 January 2020.

· A copy of the LADO Investigation Strategy Meeting notes dated 31 October 2019.

· A letter to the Registrant dated 6 November 2019 confirming she had been removed from clinical duties. 

· Copies of Trust Risk Assessments dated 5 November 2019 and 28 January 2020. 

· A letter to the Registrant dated 29 January 2020 confirming she had been suspended. 

· A copy of the Trusts Disciplinary Policy and Procedure from April 2018. 

 

28. At the request of the Panel, the witness was released from the affirmation to seek further information about the date of the Registrant’s 2010 suspension. The Panel determined that there was no unfairness to the Registrant in seeking this information, as the information could potentially demonstrate that the Registrant was not in fact suspended from practice on 1 October 2010, (when she completed her renewal application) and so could be to the Registrant’s advantage. The Registrant had been sent copies of the allegations and the Panel was entitled to explore those allegations in full. 

 

29. The witness returned and explained that the Trust did not have the records available from 2010. The only place that the records may be held was in the Registrant’s personnel file. This file had been placed in storage and would take over a week to obtain. She told the Panel that there was no guarantee that the information requested would be available in the personnel file. 

 

30. The Panel noted that there was no request for an adjournment and took the view that it had gone as far as it could to ascertain the relevant information. The Panel was mindful that it was required to proceed expeditiously and that an adjournment may well not produce the information sought. It therefore determined to continue to hear the remainder of the case.

31. There were two further witnesses who had not been warned to attend. Their statements were read into the evidence. 

 

32. Witness SY’s written statement confirmed that he was employed by the HCPC in the role of Registration Manager. He confirmed that the Registrant was first registered with the Regulator on 3 March 2005. She then renewed her registration in 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018 and 2020. SY confirmed in his written statement that the Registrant had not contacted the Regulator at any time to inform it of either her suspensions or the restrictions that had been placed on her practice. He exhibited the following documents:

 

· HCPC Standards of Ethics and Guidance from 2016.

· The paper renewal form completed when the Registrant renewed her registration on 1 October 2010.

· The paper renewal form completed when the Registrant renewed her registration on 16 November 2012. 

· Communications logs dealing with the Registrant’s online renewals of her registration on the HCPC online portal from 6 October 2014, 12 September 2018 and 26 November 2020. 

 

33. Witness HR, Senior Paralegal of Kingsley Napley, provided a statement exhibiting the following documents:

 

· Email correspondence between the HCPC, regarding the Registrant’s no –contact identifying restrictions on her practice dated 13 July 2020. 

· The HCPC referral form completed by PR, an assistant employee relations advisor at the Trust dated 10 June 2020.

· A letter from the Trust to the Registrant regarding her suspension dated 29 January 2020. 

 

 

34. Mr Bridges set out the case on behalf of the HCPC. He stated that the conduct alleged amounted to misconduct. Furthermore, with regard to the dishonesty alleged, he reminded the Panel that the test for dishonesty was the one described in the case of Ivey and Genting. 

 

35. In relation to misconduct, Mr Bridges submitted that the Panel must find whether the facts as alleged amount to misconduct. Further, he drew the attention of the Panel to the cases of Roylance and Grant (citations for these cases are set out below).

 

36. In relation to impairment of fitness to practice, Mr Bridges drew the attention of the Panel to the ‘Fitness to Practice Impairment Guidance Note’ from February 2022. He submitted that the Registrant had not engaged or offered any explanation of the conduct alleged. She had not demonstrated any insight and therefore there was a real risk of repetition. Mr Bridges therefore submitted that in relation to the personal component, the Registrant’s fitness to practice is impaired.

 

37. In relation to the public component of impairment of fitness to practice, Mr Bridges submitted that there was a need to uphold proper professional standards and public confidence in the profession. This would be undermined if there was no finding that the Registrant’s fitness to practice was impaired. 

 

38. It was submitted on behalf of the HCPC that the Registrant’s fitness to practice was currently impaired in both the public and private components. 

 

 

39. The Panel heard advice from the Legal Assessor. The Panel was advised that: 

 

· It will need to consider the evidence in relation to each particular allegation separately.

· The burden of proving each charge in dispute is on the HCPC. The Registrant does not have to prove anything, or disprove anything.

· Where there is doubt, it should be resolved in the Registrant’s favour. The Registrant does not have to incriminate herself.

· The standard of proof required is the civil standard of proof. This means ‘on the balance of probabilities.’ Essentially, a fact will be established if it is more likely than not to have happened.

· The Panel must decide the case only on the evidence heard or that is properly before it in written statement form.

· Hearsay is admissible in civil proceedings. The test for the admission of hearsay evidence is fairness – in the circumstances in which it is admitted is it fair to the parties.

· Failure to notify - failure to do something means did not do something that there was an accepted duty to do. In considering whether there is an obligation to do something, the circumstances need to be examined.

 

40. The Legal Assessor reminded the Panel of the two limbed test in Ivey v Genting Casino v Genting Casinos (2018) 2 All ER 406. Firstly, the Panel must determine the defendant’s subjective belief and any other relevant circumstances and secondly, in the light of that knowledge or belief and any other relevant circumstances, determine whether the defendant’s behaviour is dishonest by the standards of ordinary, honest people. 

 

41. The Legal Assessor also summarised the following cases for the benefit of the Panel: Susan Lim Met Lee v GMC (2016) (unreported), R v Barton and Booth (2020) EWCA Crim 575, Ali V SRA LTD (2021) EWHC 2709 (Admin), Ahmedsowidau v GMC (2021) EWHC 3466 (Admin),Maxfield –Martin v SRA (2022) EWHC 307 (Admin) , Sawati v GMC (2022) EWHC (283) Admin and finally Professional Standards Authority for Health and Social Care v GDD, Mohammed Amir (2021) ECHC 3230 (Admin).

 

42. In relation to misconduct, the Legal Assessor summarised the case law from the following cases: Roylance v GMC (no 2) 2001 1 AC 311, Beckwith v SRA (2020) EWHC 3231 (Admin), R (Remedy UK Ltd v GMC (2010 EWHC 1245, Bolton v Law Society (1994) WLR 512.

 

43. With regards to considering whether a Registrant’s fitness to practice is impaired, the Legal Assessor summarised the following cases: Cheatle v GMC (2009) EWHC 645 (Admin), GMC v Armstrong (2021) EWHC 1658 (Admin),CHRE V NMC (and Grant) (2011) EWHC 927 (Admin), Cohen v GMC (2008) EWHC 158 (Admin) and also referred the panel to the questions formulated by Dame Janet Smith in the Fifth Shipman report, as set out in the case of Grant. 

 

 

44. In reaching its decision on facts, the Panel considered all the evidence before it, both oral and documentary, together with the submissions of Mr Bridges. The Panel was aware that the burden of proof of each of the matters alleged is on the HCPC and must be proved on the balance of probabilities. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor.

 

45. Particular 1.a – found proved. The Panel did not find as a fact that the Registrant made a false declaration to the Regulator. The reason for this was that the HCPC had not established the date that the Registrant was suspended from practice in either the documentary evidence produced or the oral evidence from witness TF. However, on the basis of the evidence before it, the Panel found as a fact that the Registrant had been suspended from practice prior to 23 October 2010 until that date. 

 

46. The Panel had regard to the Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics for the Regulator (then the HPC) that applied at this time. Paragraph 4 of those standards states ‘You must provide (to us and any other relevant regulations) any important information about your conduct and competence. In particular, you must let us know straight away if you are suspended or placed under a practice restriction by an employer or similar organisation because of concerns about your conduct and competence.’

 

47. The Panel had sufficient evidence before it that the Registrant had not notified the regulator of her suspension on or around October 2010. The Panel took the view that it could not make a finding that the Registrant had made a false declaration or that she had been obliged to notify the Regulator of a suspension on 1 October 2010. The allegation was phrased in the alternative. This meant that the Panel was entitled to find as a fact that the Registrant had failed to disclose information to the Regulator that she had been suspended from her role as an Operating Department Practitioner in or around October 2010. In coming to this conclusion, the Panel took into account the uncontested evidence of SY and the oral evidence of TF, and therefore found this allegation proved on that basis.

 

48. Particular 1.b – found proved. The Panel had regard to all the evidence before it and found that the HCPC had established this allegation on the balance of probabilities. The Panel was content that the witness evidence and the exhibits produced by the witnesses constituted sufficient evidence to find this proved. 

 

49. The Panel found that the Registrant had failed to disclose information that she had been removed from patient facing duties and that she had made a false declaration in her renewal form on 26 November 2020.  The Registrant was asked a specific question ‘Change relating to good character’ and answered ‘No.’ The Registrant at that time was aware that she was under investigation from the Trust and that her duties had been restricted. She had been removed by the Trust from patient facing duties. The Panel found on the balance of probabilities that the Registrant must have been aware that this change related to her good character in terms of her fitness to practice, and therefore the declaration was false. The Panel also found as a fact that at no time had the Registrant notified the HCPC that she had been removed from patient facing duties. 

 

50. Particular 1.c – found proved. Again, the Panel found that the witness evidence and exhibits produced by the HCPC constituted sufficient evidence for this allegation to be proved on the balance of probabilities. The Panel also found as a fact that at no time had the Registrant notified the HCPC that she had been suspended from her role. 

 

51. The Registrant had completed the renewal form on 26 November 2020 by answering ‘no’ in response to the question ‘Change relating to good character.’ The Registrant at that time was aware that she had been suspended from her role as an Operating Department Practitioner. The Panel found on the balance of probabilities that the Registrant must have been aware that this change related to her good character in terms of her fitness to practice, and therefore the declaration was false.

 

52. Particular 2 in relation to 1 a – found proved. At this point in time, ‘The Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics’ (which applied from 1 July 2008) clearly stated that a Registrant must tell the Regulator ‘straight away’ if there was a suspension from practice. The Panel was confident that in withholding that information from the Regulator, the Registrant was acting dishonestly. The Panel found there was sufficient evidence to say that this was dishonest without evidence of the exact date that the Registrant had been suspended from duty. This is because there was evidence that the Registrant had been suspended around October 2010 and evidence of her duty to inform the Regulator of that fact.

 

53. Particular 2 in relation to 1b – found proved. At this point in time, ‘The Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics’ (which applied from 1 August 2012) stated at Paragraph 9.5, ‘You must tell us as soon as possible if - you have any restriction placed on your practice, or been suspended or dismissed by an employer, because of concerns about your conduct and competence.’

 

54. The Panel noted that the Registrant had restrictions placed on her practice on 29 October 2019. She therefore had a duty to report the change in her circumstances to the HCPC from 29 October 2019.  

 

55. The Panel heard no evidence from the Registrant as to why she had failed to provide information to the HCPC that she was obliged to provide in accordance with ‘The Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics’. In the absence of any alternative explanation, the Panel found that the Registrant would have been aware of her obligations to the Regulator to inform it that she had been removed from patient facing duties. The Panel found on the balance of probabilities that her failure to do so was dishonest. 

 

56. Further, the Registrant had completed a registration renewal form on 26 November 2020 and failed to declare on this form the change in her character in relation to her fitness to practice. The Panel found that this was also dishonest. 

 

57. Particular 2 in relation to 1 c – found proved. The Registrant was suspended from practice from her role as an Operating Department Practitioner on 29 January 2020.  She therefore had a duty to report this change in her circumstances to the HCPC as soon as possible from that date. There was clear evidence that the Registrant had not done so. 

 

58. In the absence of any alternative explanation from the Registrant, the Panel found on the balance of probabilities that the Registrant’s failure to notify the HCPC of her suspension was dishonest. 

 

59. The Panel noted that the HCPC referral form was completed by the Trust on 10 June 2020. Between 29 October 2019 and that date, the HCPC received no communication from the Registrant about either the restrictions placed on her practice or her suspension. It could not therefore be said that the Registrant had insufficient time to notify the HCPC of these facts. The Panel took this timescale into account when coming to its decision. 

 

60. In addition to this, the Panel found that the Registrant was an experienced practitioner. She was first registered as an Operating Department Practitioner on 3 March 2005 and had worked for the Trust for eighteen years. The Panel found on the balance of probabilities that an experienced practitioner would have been well aware of her responsibilities to the Regulator and took this into account when coming to its decision. 

 

 

61. The Panel took the approach that misconduct must be serious and fall short of what is proper in the circumstances. It recognised that not all wrongdoing will be sufficient to meet the statutory ground. The Panel was conscious that membership of a profession has both its rewards and responsibilities. 

 

62. The Panel found that the failure to disclose information relating to her character and fitness to practice to the Regulator occurred on more than one occasion. It was not an isolated incident but repeated acts of dishonesty. 

 

63. The Panel determined that not being honest with the Regulator was serious and undermines the purpose of the Register and prevents the Regulator from performing its function of public protection. The Registrant had been the subject of a number of disciplinary actions and had not notified the Regulator of any of these. 

 

64. The Panel found that this behaviour constituted misconduct. 

 

 

65. The Panel firstly considered the personal component as to whether the Registrant’s fitness to practice was impaired. The Panel was mindful that it was considering the Registrant’s current fitness to practice as of the date of the hearing, rather than historical fitness to practice at the time of the allegations.

 

66. There had been no engagement from the Registrant with the regulatory process. The Panel found that there was no evidence of any insight or remediation from the Registrant that indicated a change from the time of the allegations. 

 

67. The Panel took the view that dishonesty is an attitudinal issue which can be difficult to remediate. The Panel considered that the Registrant’s fitness to practice was impaired at the time that she failed to disclose to the Regulator her suspensions and restrictions on practice.  Therefore, the Panel considered that the risk of repetition must remain due to the lack of any evidence that the Registrant had made efforts to remediate. The Panel determined that in relation to the personal component, the Registrant’s current fitness to practice is currently impaired.

 

68. The Panel determined that the Registrant’s conduct, which undermined the integrity of the Register, would undermine public confidence in the profession. Further, the Panel concluded that the standards of professional practice would also be undermined and considered that other professionals would find it deplorable that a Registrant, who had been the subject of a number of disciplinary actions, had not notified the Regulator. This could have the effect of preventing the Regulator from its primary role of protecting the public. 

 

69. The Panel have no evidence that there has been no harm to service users. However, a fully informed member of the public aware of the findings of dishonesty, (particularly as this related to the Regulator), would expect there to be a finding of impairment of fitness to practice. This is in order to declare and uphold proper standards of conduct and to maintain public confidence in both the profession and the Regulator.

 

 

70. On behalf of the HCPC, Mr Bridges confirmed that the HCPC was not requesting a specific sanction as this is a matter of judgement for the Panel. He directed the Panel to the ‘HCPC Sanctions Policy’ (the Sanctions Policy), which was last updated in 2019. Mr Bridges specifically referred the Panel to Paragraph 10 (’the primary function of any sanction is to protect the public’) and Paragraphs 25-41 (‘Mitigating factors.’) 

 

71. Mr Bridges submitted that the Registrant had not demonstrated insight or remorse for the misconduct now found proved. He referred the Panel to the cases of Parkinson v NMC EWHC 1898 (Admin) (2010) and Burrows v Pharmaceutical Company EWHC (Admin) (2016). Mr Bridges submitted that in the case of Burrows, the court noted that in cases of obvious dishonesty, the registrant will always run the risk of removal, given the serious nature of the wrongdoing. In these circumstances the court had held that failure to attend a hearing essentially amounts to ‘courting removal’ from the register.

 

72. The Legal Assessor also directed the Panel to the Sanctions Policy. There is clear guidance within the Sanctions Policy as to the steps the Panel need to take when determining sanction. The Legal Assessor also elaborated on ‘proportionality’ and referred the Panel to the judicial guidance given in the cases of Bank Mellat (Appellant) v Her Majesty’s Treasury (Respondent) (No 2) (2013) UKSC 39 and R v Oakes (1986) 1SR 103, in relation to the meaning of proportionality.    

 

73. The Panel was guided by the Sanctions Policy and was mindful that the purpose of a sanction is not to punish the Registrant but to protect the public and the wider public interest in upholding proper standards and maintaining the reputation of the profession.

 

74. The Registrant had not engaged with this process at any stage and the Panel had no information from her in relation to any insight or attempts at remediation. The Panel therefore could not find any mitigating factors to take into consideration.

 

75. The Panel identified the following aggravating factors:

 

· Overarching dishonesty on several occasions relating to failure to provide information to the Regulator. This amounted to a repetition of concerns and a pattern of unacceptable behaviour. 

· Lack of insight, remorse or apology. The Registrant had provided no information and had not engaged throughout the regulatory process. 

· Lack of remediation. The Registrant had provided no information or evidence of efforts made to remediate. This would significantly increase the risk of repetition and is therefore a risk to the public. 

 

76. The Panel was mindful that it had made findings of dishonesty. Cases of dishonesty are defined as ‘Serious cases’ within the Sanctions Policy, paragraphs 56 – 58. The Panel considered that dishonesty in relation to the Regulator was a serious matter and noted that this conduct had occurred on multiple occasions.

 

77. In accordance with the Sanctions Policy, the Panel worked through the Sanctions available to it in ascending order.

 

78. The Panel considered that its findings are too serious for the Panel to consider taking no further action.

 

79. The Panel considered that mediation is not appropriate or relevant in the circumstances of the case.

 

80. The Panel considered that a Caution Order would not adequately reflect the seriousness of the Registrant’s misconduct or reflect her current impairment of fitness to practice in both the personal and public components.

 

81. The Panel determined that a Conditions of Practice Order was not appropriate as it considered that the misconduct was too serious, involving dishonesty, which is an attitudinal issue and not readily addressed by conditions of practice. Furthermore, there had been no engagement from the Registrant. Even if conditions could be formulated, without any engagement, the Panel concluded that it would be impossible to formulate any suitable conditions of practice. In coming to this conclusion, the Panel considered that the misconduct had been repeated and further, there was no evidence before the Panel that the Registrant would comply with any conditions imposed.

 

82. The Panel considered the Sanctions policy in relation to the imposition of a Suspension Order. The Panel noted that a Suspension Order can be made when the concerns represent a serious breach of ‘The Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics.’ 

 

83. The Panel had no evidence before it that the Registrant had insight, that the Registrant would be able to resolve or remediate her failings or that the issues were unlikely to be repeated.  The Panel was mindful of the case law and the fact that the Registrant had failed to engage with the regulatory process. For these reasons, the Panel determined that a Suspension Order was not in the public interest in this case.

 

84. Finally, the Panel considered a Striking Off Order. The Sanctions Policy states that a Striking Off Order is a sanction of last resort for serious, persistent and deliberate acts including dishonesty. A Striking Off Order ‘is likely to be appropriate where the nature and gravity of the concerns are such that any lesser sanction would be insufficient to protect the public, public confidence in the profession and public confidence in the regulatory process’.  

 

85. The Panel found that the Registrant had breached Standard 9 of ‘The Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics.’ This standard requires registrants to be honest and trustworthy.  Standard 9.1 states: ‘You must make sure that your conduct justifies the public’s trust and confidence in you and your profession.’  

 

86. The Panel concluded that the Registrant’s dishonest conduct had breached a fundamental requirement of continued registration. The Registrant had not demonstrated any insight, the misconduct had been repeated on several occasions and her lack of engagement indicated that the Registrant was unwilling to resolve matters. 

 

87. In the Panel’s judgement, the Registrant’s misconduct would be difficult to remediate due to the attitudinal nature of her dishonesty. Further, in circumstances in which the Registrant had completely failed to engage with the regulatory process, the Panel concluded that the misconduct was incompatible with her remaining on the Register. 

 

88. The Panel determined that the Registrant’s interests were outweighed by the need to uphold professional standards, the wider public interest and maintaining public confidence in both the profession and the Regulator.

 

89. The Panel therefore concluded that the appropriate sanction is a Striking Off Order. 

 

1. On behalf of the HCPC, Mr Bridges applied for both an Interim Suspension Order and for the Panel to proceed in the absence of the Registrant. He requested an Interim Suspension Order for eighteen months, to cover the 28 days before the substantive order comes into effect and the time taken for an appeal to be heard should the Registrant appeal.

 

2. In relation to proceeding in the absence of the Registrant, Mr Bridges submitted that the Registrant had waived her right to attend and be heard in relation to the Interim Order for the same reasons as previously. He submitted that the Registrant should not be permitted to frustrate the next stage by failing to attend the hearing.

 

3. The Panel accepted advice from the Legal Assessor who reminded them of the case of Gupta v GMC (2001) EWHC (Admin) 631. The Panel recognised that the Registrant was on notice that an application for an Interim Order may be made in the event of a sanction being imposed.

 

4. The Panel determined to proceed in the absence of the Registrant, taking into account Mr Bridges’ submissions into account and for the same reasons as set out in its previous decision in relation to proceeding in absence at the beginning of the hearing.  

 

5. The Panel determined that it was necessary on both the grounds of public protection and public interest for an Interim Suspension Order to be made. The public protection aspect of this case relates to the importance of maintaining the integrity of the Register. The misconduct found by the Panel runs the risk of undermining the ability of the Register to protect the public. 

 

6. The Panel considered that an Interim Suspension Order was also necessary in the public interest.  The misconduct is serious and not to make an Interim Suspension Order would be incompatible with the Panel’s findings that the Registrant should be struck off from the Register.

 

7. The Panel therefore determined that an Interim Suspension Order was necessary to protect the public and that such an order was also in the public interest. It accepted Mr Bridges’ submissions and determined that the Interim Suspension Order would be of eighteen months’ duration, in order to cover the 28-day period before the substantive order comes into effect and to allow for the conclusion of the appeal process if an appeal was made.