Ms Lucy Peo Powell-Nateghy

Preliminary Matters

Hearing in Private

1. R2 has made a written submission that this hearing should be held entirely in private. She explained that for [redacted] health reasons, she is unable to read documents provided to her, she is “unable to provide any form of reasoned discussion or explanation” and has no “clear memory of the majority of her employment at KCC [redacted]. The HCPC submits that this information is not supported by medical evidence.

2. The Procedure Rules 2003 state: ‘…the proceeding shall be held in public unless the Committee is satisfied that, in the interests of justice or for the protection of the private life of the health professional, the complainant, any person giving evidence, or of any patient or client, the public should be excluded from all or part of the hearing.’

3. The HCPC submits that the concerns raised in this hearing are not so inextricably linked to health or private matters that the hearing should be wholly in private. In order to protect the Registrant's private life, it would be practicable to separate out those elements of the hearing that should be held in private from any which should not. There is no necessity for the entire hearing to be held in private, to protect the Registrant's private life.

4. R1 submitted that the hearing should be held entirely in public.

5. The Panel considered advice from the Legal Assessor and the HCPTS Practice Note on Proceeding in Private, before deciding to proceed partly in private, in relation to any health matters of R2.

Service and proceeding in absence

6. The Panel found that there has been good service of the Notice of Hearing dated 30 August 2023 sent to R2.

7. The Panel next considered whether to proceed with the hearing in the absence of R2. The Panel was advised by the Legal Assessor to consider the guidance in the HCPTS Practice Note entitled Proceeding in the Absence of the Registrant, and followed that advice. The Panel carefully considered the HCPC bundle of documents. The Presenting Officer stated that R2 has not attended the hearing today and the Panel should consider the guidance in: GMC v Adeogba and GMC v Visvardis [2016] EWCA Civ 162.

8. The Panel must exercise care and caution and consider all the circumstances of the case, when considering a decision to proceed in a Registrant’s absence, balancing fairness to the Registrant with fairness to the HCPC, and the interests of the public. The HCPC submits the hearing should proceed in R2’s absence, because there is nothing to indicate that she would be likely to attend if the matter were to be adjourned and it is in the public interest to proceed with this hearing.

9. The Panel received and accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor to consider the guidance in the relevant HCPTS Practice Note.

10. The Panel is satisfied that it is appropriate to proceed in the absence of R2. An adjournment would simply prolong a stressful process for R2 for no useful purpose. It is in the public interest and in both Registrants’ interests for the hearing to proceed in R2’s absence. The Panel finds that she is aware of the hearing and has waived her right to attend. Accordingly, the Panel decided that a fair hearing can take place in the absence of R2.

Amendment of the Allegation

11. At the commencement of the hearing Ms Beckett on behalf of the HCPC made an application to amend the Allegation against R2, on the grounds that the Panel has an inherent power to amend an allegation and there would be no injustice in doing so. Ms Beckett applied to make various minor amendments. R2 was sent notice of the application on 3 November 2023 and no objections have been raised in response. Ms Beckett submitted that the key factor in the exercise of the discretion to permit an amendment, is whether any unfairness or prejudice to R2 will arise, if the applications are granted. The amendments are minor and do not change the nature of the case, or make the case more serious. They will assist the Panel and there is no prejudice to either of the Registrants.

12. The Panel accepted the Legal Assessor's advice that there is no specific HCPTS Practice Note in relation to amendments, but the Panel may grant an application for an amendment at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including when making the decision. The Panel must balance any request for an amendment with fairness to the Registrants, and scrutinise the purpose of the amendment, to ensure it does not go beyond the evidence which was before the Investigating Committee. There is no need for referral back to that Committee in this case, on the basis that the proposed amendments are minor. Also notice of the proposed amendment was given to R2 and no objection has been raised by either Registrant.

13. The Panel finds the proposed minor amendments serve to clarify the case against R2. In the circumstances there is no prejudice to the Registrants and the amendment application is granted.

Background

14. R2 was employed by KCC as a Senior Practitioner Occupational Therapist (SPOT) at the material time. It is alleged that on or around 12 March 2019, R2 inappropriately shared an SCCF portfolio with R1, who was also employed by KCC in a more junior role and was seeking to progress from grade KR9 to KR10. Further, it is alleged that R2 was dishonest during KCC’s investigation into the matter. On 4 April 2020, KCC made a referral to the HCPC in respect of R2 and an Investigating Committee decided that there is a case to answer in relation to an allegation of impairment of R2’s fitness to practise.

15. R2 has not made any admissions to the allegations or provided formal written evidence. She did send an email to be shared with the Panel. She explained that for [redacted] health reasons, she is unable to read documents provided to her, she is “unable to provide any form of reasoned discussion or explanation” and has no “clear memory of the majority of her employment at KCC [redacted]”. The HCPC submits that this information is not supported by medical evidence.

16. A questionnaire was sent to R2 by DW a Counter Fraud Specialist employed by KCC, on 24 August 2020, under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. This was sent in lieu of a formal interview and included the formal caution. R2 did not respond to this questionnaire. The HCPC submit the Panel may draw an adverse inference from R2’s failure to provide an explanation.

17. The HCPC submit R2 breached the trust of her employer and acted in a way which fell far short of what would be proper in the circumstances and what the public would expect of an HCPC registered OT. R2 breached standards 5.2, 9 and 9.1 of the HCPC Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics and standards 2, 3.1, 7 and 9.1 of the HCPC Standards of Proficiency for OTs (March 2013).

18. The Procedure rules provide that, where it would be just to do so, a Panel may consider and determine together: two or more allegations against the same Registrant; or allegations against two or more Registrants. For this hearing the cases against R1 and R2 have been joined but some of the evidence presented is only relevant to one of the Registrants. Each Registrant is entitled to have their case decided solely on the evidence against them. Therefore, the Panel has only considered the evidence relevant and admissible with regard to the allegation against R2 when deciding her case.

Evidence

19. The Panel read the joint hearing bundle of 1,284 pages and written submissions from the HCPC and R1.

20. The Panel heard oral evidence from SE (KCC Counter Fraud Specialist), CH (KCC Investigating Officer and SPOT), DW (retired KCC Counter Fraud Specialist), MM (KCC Operational Manager), FC (KCC SPOT), SL (KCC SPOT) and R1.

21. FC stated that she prepared an SCCF using a new set of documentation. This was submitted to a panel in December 2016 and she was later promoted by KCC. On 14 November 2018 R2 requested a copy of FC’s SCCF. FC replied sending her draft SCCF to R2. R2 stated she would only share the SCCF with SL.

22. SL stated she was the supervisor of R1. R2 sent her a copy of FC’s SCCF on 15 November 2018. SL did not open the SCCF email until October 2019 when she was asked to do so by MM and had not shared it with anyone else.

23. SE stated that on 19 November 2019, she was assigned as the investigator in charge of the fraud investigation regarding the submission of an SCCF by R1 on 15 October 2019 to MM. On 21 November 2019, a Senior ICT Compliance Officer at KCC provided access to R1’s virtual desktop. The investigation examined if the document sent to by R1 was plagiarised and if he had submitted any other plagiarised versions of the SCCF belonging to FC. SE provided a table of the different versions of the SCCF discovered on R1’s virtual desktop. On 5 February 2020 SE and DW conducted a PACE interview with R1. On 7 April 2020 SE created an excel spreadsheet and analysed the metadata for the word documents saved in R1’s desktop and Outlook mailbox relating to the SCCF. On 8 April 2020 SE accessed the virtual desktop for R1 and used the Microsoft Word comparison tool to compare the different versions of the SCCF. SE identified that R1 sent a version of the plagiarised SCCF to colleagues on six occasions, between 7 April 2019 and 17 October 2019.

24. CH conducted the disciplinary investigation of this matter on behalf of KCC, interviewed R1 on 11 February 2020 and prepared a report dated 5 March 2020. R1 accepted that 76% of the SCCF he emailed to MM on 15 October 2019 had been copied and explained that he was using FC’s SCCF as a template but that this was not the final version. He sent the SCCF to MM in error and would have wanted MM to have contacted him to inform him he had sent the wrong version to her. R1 stated R2 informed him that MM was not keen on him completing the SCCF and was not happy for him to develop. SL did not provide written feedback on his three practice observations which he needed to complete his SCCF.

25. On 29 November 2019 CH sent a questionnaire to R2 asking her about FC’s SCCF and whether she provided R1 with a copy of it. R2 replied that she had shared FC’s SCCF with another SPOT (SL) and had shared a hard copy during a supervision session with another SCCF applicant (AI) she supervised. R2 did not state that she had shared a copy with R1 and answered ‘no’ to the question ‘were you aware that R1 had access to FC’s portfolio?’ SL confirmed on 6 December 2019 that she had not shared the SCCF sent to her with R1.

26. SE contacted R2 on 19 December 2019 as a witness regarding the SCCF submitted by R1. SE received R2’s signed witness statement on 30 January 2020. DW stated that R2 was suspended from her employment with KCC on 13 February 2020. DW sent a formal letter to R2 on 24 August 2020 with a list of questions arising from the KCC investigation into R2. She did not reply and resigned from KCC on 8 September 2020. It was therefore decided not to continue with the KCC investigation into R2.

HCPC submissions

27. R1 was employed as an OT by KCC from August 2015 but left in January 2018. He was re-employed around the end of July 2018 on a KR9 grade as an OT. KCC uses a SCCF to support career progression for registered practitioners, including OTs.

28. Progression through the SCCF is based on the successful submission of a portfolio of evidence which demonstrates the individual’s competency for the requirement at each stage of the framework. The portfolio contains a central document completed by the applicant as well as other supporting documentation such as critical reflections and feedback from direct observations. The portfolio is supported by an assessment report from a supervisor or assessor. It is submitted to an assessment panel who consider if the evidence presented meets the criteria and therefore the applicant will be eligible for career progression. In all cases, individuals who submit a portfolio that meets the criteria will automatically progress to an experienced OT post. The individual will progress one pay grade from KR9 (starting at £28,925) to KR10 (starting at £33,082)”.

29. A “template” document is available on the KCC intranet webpage. R2 was a SPOT. This is a KR11 grade at KCC, with supervisory duties. She was employed in this role from March 2017. From around May 2017 onwards, R2 and R1 were in a personal relationship with each other.

30. On 24 July 2018, whilst he was waiting for his DBS clearance, before starting his re-employment with KCC in the summer of 2018, R1 sent a “first draft” of an SCCF to R2 “for your considered opinion”. On his re-employment until 12 July 2019, R1’s supervisor was Colleague 3 (SL).

31. R1 emailed SL a copy of an SCCF document. During supervision on 22 August 2018 SL and R1 discussed the areas of his development which he needed to meet the SCCF criteria.

32. In due course thereafter, R1 registered for the SCCF framework process to progress through the framework to the level of “Experienced Practitioner” and received confirmation by letter of his registration on 12 September 2018, setting out the key dates for the process. The letter reads: “…Thank you for submitting your Social Care Capability Framework (SCCF) Registration and informing us of your intention to submit a portfolio for career progression to Experienced Practitioner through this framework… You may find the Kent page (website address) a useful tool to download all the necessary documentation for your portfolio…”

33. R1’s portfolio was due to be submitted by 23 October 2019, with the panel assessment date being 20 November 2019.

34. In November 2018 R2 had obtained a copy of an SCCF portfolio from FC, another SPOT in the organisation, who had previously successfully completed the SCCF process and had achieved career progression through having done so. R2 then asked and gained FC’s permission to share this SCCF with SL. R2 specifically stated that she would not share it with any prospective SCCF applicants. Notwithstanding this, on 12 March 2019, R2 emailed FC’s SCCF to R1.

35. Subsequent versions of R1’s SCCF thereafter contained varying but substantial amounts of FC’s work. This first came to light when MM, having taken over R1’s supervision (when SL moved to another part of the organisation), was in the process of reviewing R1’s SCCF sent to her on 15 October 2019, shortly prior to the submission deadline.

36. MM noticed substantial similarities between the SCCFs of R1 and FC. She asked R2 to review the SCCF from R1 with her. Having done so, MM raised concerns with her own manager.

37. The fraud investigation was carried out by SE who examined the metadata and text content of versions of R1’s SCCF emailed during 2019. SE found that plagiarised versions of FC’s SCCF had been sent to colleagues by R1 on 6 occasions.

38. The KCC investigation also found a different version of his SCCF (named ‘Version 6’ by SE in her evidence) saved on R1’s computer. This ‘Version 6’ did not contain substantial amounts of FC’s work. The HCPC submits that this version had apparently only been created on 30 October 2019, after R1 had been alerted that there were concerns that he had plagiarised FC’s work.

39. R2 answered written questions as part of an internal KCC disciplinary investigation into R1 conducted by the Investigating Officer, CH. R2 failed to disclose that she had shared FC’s SCCF with R1, and specifically denied knowing R1 had access to a copy of FC’s SCCF.

40. In a signed witness statement dated 28 January 2020, prepared as part of SE’s fraud investigation into R1; R2 stated that she could not recall having sent FC’s SCCF to R1. R2 was suspended from her employment with KCC on 13 February 2020.

Legal Assessor's advice

41. The Legal Assessor advised the Panel to consider the HCPTS Practice Notes entitled "Drafting Fitness to Practise Decisions" and "Making decisions on a Registrant’s state of mind". The burden of proof is upon the HCPC in respect of the factual particulars. When the Panel is considering whether an alleged fact is proved, the standard of proof required is on the balance of probabilities. In other words, the Panel must be satisfied that the act or omission alleged is more likely than not to have occurred before it can find it proved.

42. The Procedure rules provide that, where it would be just to do so, a Panel may consider and determine together: two or more allegations against the same Registrant; or allegations against two or more Registrants. If allegations against more than one Registrant are joined, it will not necessarily be the case that all of the evidence presented is relevant to the allegations faced by both Registrants. Each Registrant is entitled to have their case decided solely on the evidence against them and the Panel must take care to consider evidence only in relation to the allegation and Registrant to which it relates.

43. The Panel should set out the undisputed facts, the facts alleged, the facts in dispute, and in relation to the latter, the findings of fact which it made and why. Where the credibility and/or reliability of witnesses is in issue, or two witnesses give contradictory evidence, the Panel should set out any factors that it considered in giving appropriate weight to a witness's evidence, or which led to the evidence of one witness being preferred over another. This will help readers understand why the Panel has reached a particular decision on a particular issue. Good character evidence is relevant to this exercise.

44. The Panel should make findings about what happened, before determining the Registrant’s state of mind or motivation at the time of the behaviour in question. The findings about what happened, will form an important part of the evidence to be examined when determining the Registrant’s state of mind or motivation. The question of what a person's state of mind was, is a question of fact.

45. In Kuzmin v General Medical Council (GMC) [2019] EWHC 2129 (Admin) it was decided that, unless it would be unfair to do so, Tribunals are entitled to draw an adverse inference when a practitioner does not give evidence at their MPT hearing. The Court concluded that a Tribunal has the power to draw inferences from silence and it is in the public interest that Tribunals have that power. Whether to exercise the power to draw an adverse inference from silence in disciplinary proceedings will be highly fact dependent and an inference should not be drawn unless the following relevant criteria are met:

• A prima facie case to answer has been established;
• The practitioner has been given appropriate notice and warning that, if they do not give evidence, then such an inference may be drawn. The practitioner must be given an opportunity to explain why it would not be reasonable for them to give evidence and, if it is found that there is no reasonable explanation, be given an opportunity to give evidence;
• There was no reasonable explanation for the practitioner not giving evidence; and
• There were no other circumstances which would make it unfair to draw an adverse inference.

46. Lord Justice Hickinbottom noted it is likely to be unfair to draw an adverse inference if, for example, a practitioner is not given prior notice that an adverse inference may be drawn should they not give evidence, or fail to answer a particular question. It may be useful for regulators to provide guidance confirming the existence of the power to draw adverse inferences and how it may be used.

47. The Panel must decide questions about the Registrant's state of mind on the usual civil standard of proof (the balance of probabilities). The case law in Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd [2017] UKSC 67, and Raychaudhuri v GMC [2018] EWCA Civ 2027, states: When making decisions involving alleged dishonesty, the Panel will need to determine whether the Registrant acted as an honest person would have acted in the circumstances. This means asking two questions:

(1) What did the Registrant know or believe as to the facts and circumstances in which the alleged dishonesty arose?
(2) Given the Registrant’s knowledge and belief of the circumstances they were in, was the Registrant’s conduct dishonest by the standards of an “ordinary decent person”?

48. In respect of the first question, although this list is not exhaustive, in determining what the Registrant knew or believed as to the facts and circumstances in which the alleged dishonesty arose, the Panel should consider the following factors:

• Any surrounding evidence speaking to what the Registrant knew or believed about what they were doing, for instance, what they said about it, what they have been told about it, what information was available to them, and what they recorded about it;
• Any evidence relating to what was expected of the Registrant in the particular circumstances;
• Any evidence relating to the Registrant’s understanding of the wider context, for example: any rules or practices in the workplace, any individual requirements of the service user and so on;
• Any subsequent account given by the Registrant as to what they knew or believed, and the credibility of that account.

49. In respect of the second question, the Panel should consider whether, taking account of the Registrants’ understanding of the circumstances, an ordinary decent person would find the conduct to be dishonest. This is purely an objective test. The Registrants’ own standards of honesty are irrelevant here; they are held to the standards of society in general.

50. In Wingate v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2018] EWCA Civ 366 it was decided that integrity is a broader concept than honesty. In professional codes of conduct, "integrity" expresses the higher standards that society and professions expect from professionals. Integrity connotes adherence to the ethical standards of one's profession and involves more than mere honesty.

51. In relation to the ground of misconduct there is no statutory definition of misconduct but Lord Clyde in the case of Roylance v General Medical Council (No.2) [2000] 1 A.C. 311 stated that: Misconduct is a word of general effect, involving some act or omission which falls short of what would be proper in the circumstances. The standards of propriety may often be found by reference to the rules and standards ordinarily required to be followed in the particular circumstances. The Panel should therefore consider if the Registrants breached any of the HCPC’s Standards.

52. The fact that a panel has found some facts proved, does not mean that a finding of the statutory ground will follow. Similarly, if the Panel finds the statutory ground applies, a finding of impairment is not automatic. Each stage must be considered separately, and reasons given for the Panel's decisions. Whether any of the proved facts amount to serious misconduct and if so, whether the Registrant is currently impaired, are matters for the Panel's judgement.

53. The Panel should consider the HCPTS Practice Note "Fitness to Practise Impairment". The test of impairment is expressed in the present tense; that fitness to practise “is impaired.” A Registrant may have been impaired at the time of the failing identified in the allegation. However, the Panel’s task is to form a view about the Registrant’s current fitness to practise, by taking account of the way in which the Registrant has acted or failed to act in the past and, looking forwards, whether the Registrant’s ability to practise safely is compromised; and/or whether public confidence in the profession would be undermined, in the absence of a finding of impairment. Thus, in determining fitness to practise the Panel must take account of two broad components: the ‘personal’ component: the current competence, behaviour etc. of the Registrant; and the ‘public’ component: including the critically important public policy issues.

54. Mr Justice Silber set out guidance in Cohen v General Medical Council [2008] EWHC 581 (Admin) that: “It must be highly relevant in determining if a doctor’s fitness to practise is impaired that first his or her conduct that led to the charge is: (a) easily remediable? (b) has been remedied? (c) is highly unlikely to be repeated?”

55. An additional relevant High Court case is: Cheatle v General Medical Council [2009] EWHC 645 (Admin) in which Mr Justice Cranston stated: “There is clear authority that in determining impairment of fitness to practise at the time of the hearing regard must be had to the way the person has acted or failed to act in the past... In my judgment this means that the context of the doctor’s behaviour must be examined. In circumstances where there is misconduct at a particular time, the issue becomes whether that misconduct in the context of the doctor’s behaviour both before the misconduct and to the present time, is such as to mean that his or her fitness to practise is impaired. The doctor’s misconduct at a particular time may be so egregious that, looking forward, a Panel is persuaded that the doctor is simply not fit to practise medicine without restrictions, or maybe at all. On the other hand, the doctor’s misconduct may be such that, seen within the context of an otherwise unblemished record, a Panel could conclude that, looking forward, his or her fitness to practise is not impaired, despite the misconduct.”

56. Mr Justice Mitting in Zygmunt v General Medical Council [2008] EWHC 2643 (Admin) stated: “Smith LJ helpfully identified recurrent features of cases in which impairment of fitness to practice has been found to exist at paragraph 25.50 of her report: I think it would be helpful, in the resolution of the problems that I am about to outline, if I analyse the reasons why a decision maker might conclude that the doctor is unfit to practise or that his/her fitness to practise is impaired. In the examples I discussed above, four reasons for unfitness recurred. These were (a) that the doctor presented a risk to patients; (b) that the doctor had brought the profession into disrepute; (c) that the doctor had breached one of the fundamental tenets of the profession; and (d) that the doctor’s integrity could not be relied upon. Lack of integrity might or might not involve a risk to patients. It might or might not bring the profession into disrepute. It might be regarded as a fundamental tenet of the profession. I think it right to include it as a separate reason why a doctor might be regarded as unfit to practise, because it is relevant even when it arises in a way that is quite unrelated to the doctor’s work as a doctor.”

57. The High Court revisited the issue of impairment in the case of Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence v (1) Nursing and Midwifery Council (2) Grant [2011] EWHC 927 (Admin) where Mrs Justice Cox noted: “In determining whether a practitioner’s fitness to practise is impaired by reason of misconduct, the relevant Panel should generally consider not only whether the practitioner continues to present a risk to members of the public in his or her current role, but also whether the need to uphold professional standards and public confidence in the profession would be undermined if a finding of impairment were not made in the particular circumstances.” In reaching a decision as to whether a Registrant’s misconduct impairs current fitness to practise, the Panel should take into account the need to maintain public confidence in the profession as well the requirement to maintain proper standards of conduct and performance.

58. When assessing insight, the Panel will need to consider what effect, if any, the fact that the Registrant has denied the allegation has on this assessment. It is wrong to conclude that a Registrant who has denied the facts alleged cannot then demonstrate insight at the impairment stage. Each case must be considered on its own facts, but a nuanced approach should be taken in assessing insight in these circumstances. In assessing harm and future risk, the Panel should take account of the fact that harm can be caused in different ways. It may be that some harm has an adverse effect on physical or mental health. In other cases, harm may include a breakdown in trust within a wider team that may affect the safe and effective delivery of care.

59. In Yeong v General Medical Council [2009] EWHC 1923 (Admin) Mr Justice Sales said at paragraph 21: “It is a corollary of the test to be applied and of the principle that a Panel is required to look forward rather than backward that a finding of misconduct in the past does not necessarily mean that there is impairment of fitness to practise - a point emphasised in Cohen and Zygmunt...In looking forward, the Panel is required to take account of such matters as the insight of the practitioner into the source of his misconduct, and any remedial steps which have been taken and the risk of recurrence of such misconduct. It is required to have regard to evidence about these matters which has arisen since the alleged misconduct occurred.”

Decision on facts

1. On or around 12 March 2019, you shared the Social Care Capability Framework Portfolio (‘the SCCF portfolio’) belonging to Colleague 2 with Colleague 1 by email.

60. SE gave evidence of her qualifications to carry out an investigation into the matter for KCC. She conducted a forensic examination of R1’s KCC intranet “desktop” and KCC Outlook mail folder, particularly examining the metadata of documents, and emails. SE’s investigation of R1’s (Colleague 1 / GWN) KCC desktop identified an email chain that included an email from R2 to R1 dated 12 March 2019, with an attachment which was identified during the investigation as being the version of FC’s SCCF, originally sent to R2 by FC at her request on 14 November 2018.

61. R2 did not include anything in the body of her email to R1, although the email was forwarded with the chain including FC’s comment “…I wouldn’t expect anyone to copy it either”. R1 responded to R2 on the same day “Thank you”.

62. Having considered this documentary evidence, the Panel found particular 1 proved to the requisite standard.

2. In respect of particular 1 above, you:
a) shared the portfolio with Colleague 1 on or around 12 March 2019 in the knowledge that he was registered for career progression through the Social Care Capability Framework (SCCF) system;

63. R2 was not R1’s supervisor, but was one of two SPOTs in the team both of whom had responsibility for supporting OTs and would therefore have been aware of his career progression and his registration for the SCCF process. R1 gave evidence that he was in a personal relationship with R2, although according to MM, R2 had denied this.

64. R1 referred, in his interview with SE on 11 February 2020, to R2 and SL calling a meeting to apologise to him and the other OTs undertaking the SCCF process for having expected more than was necessary from them. The Panel finds R2 would have known that R1 was registered for career progression, and therefore particular 2a is proved.

b) had previously indicated to Colleague 2 words to the effect of that you would “only share the SCCF portfolio with Colleague 3” and not “other prospective SCCF applicants”;

65. The documentary evidence of email correspondence between FC and R2 is produced for the Panel. In addition, the evidence of FC establishes that on 14 November 2018, R2 asked her if she would be prepared to share her SCCF, “so we can have an idea what is needed”. This had been previously discussed at a “SPOT” meeting. FC provided a draft version of her own SCCF, the final version of which had been successfully accepted by an SCCF panel to enable her to progress from KR9 to KR10 grade. FC was the first person to have successfully completed the SCCF process with the new documentation. FC stated in the return email: “Don’t read it too closely. I don’t want any feedback and I’m sure nobody would want to copy it either”.

66. R2 replied on the same day by email to FC saying: “You’re a star. Will only share with SL (if that’s OK) and no prospective SCCF applicants”. FC responded on the following day: “Yes of course, that’s fine”. R2 emailed the SCCF to SL, although SL did not open it at that time. In her oral evidence FC confirmed that she would not have felt it acceptable for her SCCF to be shared with prospective SCCF applicants. In her view the SCCF process required personal input.

67. Notwithstanding this assurance, there is evidence of R2 sharing the SCCF with applicants on at least two occasions. In the course of the disciplinary investigation into R1, CH sent R2 a questionnaire. R2 replied that she had shared a hard copy of the SCCF on 29 November 2018, in supervision with an OT who had nearly completed her SCCF. R2 stated that she had taken the copy away at the end of the supervision, disposing of it in the confidential waste. As previously determined by the Panel, R2 also sent FC’s SCCF portfolio by email to R1 on 12 March 2019. The Panel finds particular 2b is proved.

c) Subsequent to sending the SCCF portfolio, instructed Colleague 1 to delete the email attaching the document.

68. R1 stated during his PACE interview on 11 February 2020 that, on or around 23 October 2019, R2 telephoned R1 to tell him that he had sent the “wrong” SCCF to MM on 15 October 2019, and that R2 instructed him to delete emails and phone messages between them. R1 stated he had refused to do so. R1 confirmed this account in his evidence to the Panel. The relevant email chain from 12 March 2019 was discovered on R1’s KCC computer desktop. The Panel noted that the 12 March 2019 email was not found in R2's sent items, nor was that email found in R1's inbox, however a subsequent email in which R1 thanked R2 was found in his Outlook account, and that enabled SE to recover the full email chain. That email chain included the 12 March 2019 email from R2 to R1 with the SCCF as an attachment. The absence of the surrounding emails is suspicious, but the Panel does not find that the HCPC have proved, on the balance of probabilities that R2 'instructed' R1 to delete the emails. The evidence for this instruction comes from R1, who also said that he had not followed that instruction. The Panel finds that the evidence of R1 cannot safely be relied upon in relation to the alleged instruction from R2 in respect of this alleged particular against her. Accordingly, it has not been proved by the HCPC that R2 did instruct R1 to delete the 12 March 2019 email attaching FC’s SCCF. However, the Panel is satisfied that R2 deleted it from her laptop to conceal the fact that she had sent it to him. The Panel finds that particular 2c is not proved.

3. On 29 April 2019, you emailed Colleague 1 providing comments on the draft SCCF portfolio he sent you, commenting:

a) “it needs to be more personal to you than the list you had earlier”
b) “make sure the how you’ve achieved it is a definitely thing you have done and link it to how it improves outcomes for service users.”

69. The HCPC evidence from SE of her investigation of R1s KCC computer desktop, Outlook email and documents, is that she discovered an email including the wording as alleged in the particular. Particulars 3a and 3b are proved.

4. Your actions at:
a) 1 and/or 2 (a) were motivated to secure an unfair advantage for Colleague 1;
b) 2 (c) were motivated to conceal that you had improperly shared Colleague 2’s work with Colleague 1;
c) 3 were motivated to conceal that Colleague 1 had copied Colleague 2’s work.

70. R1 disclosed during the investigations into him, that he and R2 were in a personal relationship and confirmed this in oral evidence before the Panel.

71. R2 was not R1’s supervisor, nor was she officially supporting him with his SCCF. SL was his supervisor until 12 July 2019, after which MM took over the supervision of his SCCF. The purpose for which R2 obtained FC’s SCCF was purportedly so that she and SL could support their OTs who were undertaking the SCCF process. R2 had specifically told FC that she would not share it with prospective SCCF applicants. She had already shown it to another applicant, in hard copy and had destroyed the copy after the supervision. The Panel finds that R2’s motivation for providing R1 with an electronic copy of the SCCF documentation prepared by FC (who had successfully gone through the process) was for him to be able to unfairly improve his prospects of achieving successful career progression. The Panel finds that the conduct at 1 and 2a was motivated to secure an unfair advantage for R1. The Panel finds particular 4a is proved.

72. In respect of particular 4b, the Panel, having not found the conduct at particular 2c was proved, accordingly finds that particular 4b is not proved.

73. In respect of particular 4c, R2 gave feedback to R1 in response to the SCCF that he sent to her on 7 April 2019. However, it is not clear that R2 knew that a substantial amount of this document had been copied from FCs SCCF at the time that she sent her email reply on 29 April 2019. Reading her full email, which puts the comments into context, the tone and content of R2’s email appears to be giving general feedback on the quality of the document. It is not proved to the requisite standard that R2 was motivated to conceal that R1 had copied FC’s SCCF. Particular 4c is not proved.

5. On 29 November 2019, within your response to an interview questionnaire:
a) When asked: ‘Did you share this portfolio with anyone’, you did not indicate that you had shared a copy of Colleague 2’s portfolio with Colleague 1;
b) When asked ‘Were you aware that Colleague 1 had access to a copy of Colleague 2’s portfolio’, you responded with ‘No’.

74. R2’s responses to the interview questionnaire sent by CH during the disciplinary investigation into R1 are exhibited in the evidence bundle and confirm the facts alleged above. The Panel finds particulars 5a and 5b proved.

6. You did not inform the HCPC that you had been suspended on 13 February 2020.

75. The letter of RM, Service Manager for KCC, to R2 dated 17 February 2020 confirms that she was suspended by KCC on 13 February 2020. The witness statement of SY, HCPC Registration Manager, dated 22 June 2022 shows that R2 did not inform the HCPC of her suspension at the time of her suspension or during the renewals process on 3 August 2021. The Panel finds particular 6 proved.

8. Your actions at 1 and/or 2(a) and/or 2(c) and/or 3(a) and/or 3 (b) and/or 4 (a) and/or 4(b) and/or 4 (c) and/or 5(a) and/or 5 (b) and/or 6 were dishonest and/or lacked integrity.

76. Given that the Panel did not find particulars 2c, 4b and 4c proved, the Panel finds it has not been proved that R2’s actions were dishonest and/or lacked integrity. In respect of particulars 3a and 3b, the Panel found R2 gave feedback to R1 in response to the SCCF that he sent to her on 7 April 2019. However, it is not clear that R2 knew that a substantial amount of this document had been copied from FCs SCCF at the time that she sent her email reply on 29 April 2019. Reading her full email, which puts the comments into context, the tone and content of R2’s email appears to be giving general feedback on the quality of the document. It is not proved to the requisite standard that R2 was dishonest or lacking in integrity when sending this email.

77. Therefore, particular 8 is not proved with regard to particulars 2c, 3a, 3b, 4b and 4c.

78. The Panel noted that the concept of integrity is broader than honesty, applying the case of Wingate.

79. The Panel has applied the test in Ivey v Genting Casinos. In respect of R2’s state of mind at the relevant times, the Panel has considered particular 8 in respect of the proved factual particulars 1, 2a, 4a, 5a, 5b and 6. The Panel finds R2 knew that she had wrongly shared the SCCF of FC with R1 electronically so that he had full access to the SCCF of FC. R2 told FC that she would not share the SCCF with any prospective SCCF applicants, and then did so. FC gave evidence that she felt “let down” and also that her “trust” was affected by this. As a supervisor of more than one SCCF applicant, the Panel finds that R2 must have known that sharing this document, in this way, with only one applicant would give them an unfair advantage. As such the Panel finds that she knew her action was dishonest. The Panel considers that an ordinary decent member of the public would regard these actions as dishonest and therefore the Panel finds particular 8, as it concerns 1, 2a and 4a proved as being dishonest and lacking in integrity.

80. The Panel finds R2 knew that she had wrongly shared the SCCF of FC with R1 electronically. Failing to disclose this, when specifically asked in a questionnaire as part of the disciplinary investigation into R1’s conduct, but including that she had shared a hard copy with another OT three months earlier than the R1 sharing, gives rise to an inference that she deliberately withheld the information. In response to the same questionnaire, R2 denied knowing that R1 had access to the SCCF when R2 had actually sent it to him by email. The Panel finds that this was a deliberate lie, and that R2 chose to lie to seek to avoid the potential consequences of being found to have shared the SCCF with R1. Applying the “objective” limb of the Ivey test, the Panel finds that ordinary decent people would consider lying during an investigation to be dishonest, and R2 as a SPOT would have known that. Therefore, the Panel finds particular 8, as it concerns particular 5a and 5b proved as being dishonest and lacking in integrity.

81. The Panel finds R2’s failure to inform the HCPC that she had been suspended from her employment with KCC on 13 February 2020 was dishonest and lacking in integrity. As R2 was a senior and experienced OT she would be familiar with the HCPC Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics, which would require her to notify her regulator as soon as possible that she had been suspended. In addition, at renewal on 3 August 2021 when asked if there had been any change relating to good character she answered “no”, which she clearly knew was not true. Applying the “objective” limb of the Ivey test, the Panel finds that ordinary decent people would consider failing to inform her regulator of her suspension to be dishonest. Therefore, the Panel finds particular 8, as it concerns particular 6 proved as being dishonest and lacking in integrity.

82. The Panel finds that particular 8 has been proved with regard to particulars 1, 2a, 4a, 5a, 5b and 6.

9. Your actions at 5(a) and/or 5(b) were misleading.

83. The information provided to CH by R2 as part of an internal disciplinary investigation was misleading. Failing to mention having shared the document with R1 when other instances of sharing were specifically mentioned, was misleading by omission. In addition, R2 stated that she was not aware that R1 had access to the SCCF document of FC, when that was not the case. The Panel finds particular 9 is proved.

84. The HCPC submitted that the Panel may draw an adverse inference from R2’s failure to provide an explanation to DW. The Panel considered this submission and the legal advice and decided not to draw any adverse inference from R2’s silence. Furthermore, it was not necessary to do so in view of the Panel’s findings set out above.

Decision on grounds and impairment

85. The HCPC submits that a registrant is required to comply with the HCPC Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics.

86. The statutory ground in this case is based on R2’s conduct. Her competence as an OT has not been questioned. The Panel has found that R2 has acted dishonestly. The Panel considered whether R2’s behaviour in respect of the proved facts amounts to misconduct.

87. Misconduct is a matter for the Panel’s judgment and has been defined as a word of general effect, involving some act or omission which falls short of what would be proper in the circumstances. The standard of propriety may often be found by reference to the rules and standards ordinarily required to be followed by a practitioner in the particular circumstances and the conduct complained of must be serious.

88. The HCPC submits that the behaviour outlined in the factual particulars does amount to misconduct, in that it constitutes a serious falling short of what would be proper in the circumstances and what the public would expect of an HCPC registered OT. The HCPC submits that working in partnership with other professionals does not encompass plagiarising their work or enabling plagiarism of their work, or attempting to gain a career advantage for a friend by doing so.

89. The Panel finds that R2 is in breach of the following HCPC Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics:

5.2 You should only disclose confidential information if you have permission.
9.1 You must make sure your conduct justifies the public’s trust and confidence in you and your profession.
9.5 You must tell us as soon as possible if:
- you accept a caution from the police or you have been charged with, or found guilty of, a criminal offence;
- another organisation responsible for regulating a health or social-care profession has taken action or made a finding against you; or
- you have had any restriction placed on your practice, or been suspended or dismissed by an employer, because of concerns about your conduct or competence.
9.6 You must co-operate with any investigation into your conduct or competence, the conduct or competence of others, or the care, treatment or other services provided to service users.

90. R2 is also in breach of the following HCPC Standards of proficiency for Occupational Therapists (March 2013):

2.2 understand what is required of them by the Health and Care Professions Council;
3.1 understand the need to maintain high standards of personal and professional conduct;
7.1 be aware of the limits of the concept of confidentiality;
9.1 be able to work, where appropriate, in partnership with service users, other professionals.

91. The Panel finds the proved facts in respect of R2 do amount to serious misconduct, except with regard to particulars 3a and 3b which concern an email to R1 in which R2 was providing feedback, and the HCPC has not proved that she was motivated to conceal that R1 had copied FC’s work, nor that she acted without integrity or dishonestly. R2’s misconduct was likely to undermine the team dynamic and trust among her colleagues. Her dishonest conduct as found proved amounts to serious misconduct.

92. The Panel next considered whether R2’s fitness to practise is currently impaired. The HCPTS Practice Note on Finding that Fitness to practise is “Impaired” states there are two components: the personal component, which includes looking at the current competence, behaviour etc. of the individual registrant; the public component which includes the need to protect service users, declare and uphold proper standards of behaviour and maintain public confidence in the profession.

93. The test of impairment is expressed in the present tense, that fitness to practise is impaired at the current date. The Panel has taken into account the lapse of time since these matters occurred but has also looked at the R2’s past actions in order to assess her likely future conduct. The Panel considered the need to uphold the HCPC Standards of Conduct, the Standards of Proficiency and public confidence in the profession, in deciding whether a finding of impairment should be made.

94. In relation to current impairment, it is submitted by the HCPC that dishonesty is a character trait and difficult to remediate.

95. Whether a Registrant’s fitness to practise is impaired is a matter for the Panel’s judgment. There is no burden of proof on the HCPC or the Registrant at this stage.

96. The Panel cannot be satisfied R2 has reflected sufficiently on the impact of her misconduct. There is a risk of repetition because there has to date been a failure to accept or address the misconduct. Further, R2’s lack of engagement has left the Panel without evidence of insight, regret, remorse or evidence of remediation in relation to her misconduct. For this reason, her fitness to practise is currently impaired under the personal component.

97. The Panel has no evidence before it regarding any insight or remorse on the part of R2 who has stated that she wishes to leave the OT profession and is unable to engage for health reasons. In the circumstances, there is a risk of repetition of her dishonest conduct. Potential harm was caused in undermining the trust within the team in not following fair procedures for career development. There is a risk to service users if procedures are not followed to determine appropriate career progression based on the individual’s skills and competence. This can impact the safe and effective delivery of care.

98. In considering the public component, as identified in the HCPTS Practice Note, there is a need to declare and uphold proper standards of conduct and behaviour, so as to maintain public confidence in the profession. R2’s behaviour fell far short of what is to be expected and it is necessary to maintain public confidence in the profession and the regulatory process, by finding that there is a current impairment of her fitness to practise.

99. A member of the public in possession of the facts of this case would expect there to be a finding of impairment. R2’s misconduct undermines the fundamental tenets of trust and integrity and brings the profession into disrepute. There is a risk to service users if procedures are not followed to determine appropriate career progression based on the individual’s skills and competence, and where trust among colleagues is undermined.

100. Further, the misconduct is so serious that finding that R2’s fitness to practise is not impaired would undermine both public confidence in the profession and in the regulatory process.

101. Accordingly, due to the need to uphold proper professional standards, the Panel finds that her fitness to practise is also currently impaired under the public component. The dishonesty is so serious that a finding of impairment is required. R2’s actions were deliberate and intentional. Furthermore, even if the Panel was satisfied that the likelihood of R2 repeating her dishonest behaviour was low, this dishonesty in a registered health care professional, is so serious that a finding of impairment is required so as to ensure that public confidence in the profession and in the regulatory process is not undermined.

Decision on sanction

102. The Panel considered the submissions made by Ms Beckett and accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor.

103. Ms Beckett drew the Panel’s attention to the case of Bolton v the Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 512, in which Lord Bingham stated: “The reputation of the profession is more important than the fortunes of any individual member. Membership of a profession brings many benefits, but that is a part of the price.” In addition, this principle was followed in the case of Nkomo v GMC [2019] EXHC 2625, which stated this principle is relevant to findings of dishonesty.

104. Ms Beckett submitted that lying to an investigation and the breadth of issues of dishonesty and lack of integrity found by the Panel makes the misconduct overall extremely serious. R2 has not engaged or provided any evidence of insight, regret, remorse, or any remediation. She is currently impaired and the Panel has been unable to conclude that there is not a risk of repetition. Furthermore, the effect of a registrant’s dishonesty on public confidence in the profession and its regulator is particularly relevant in this case, as the Panel has found that there is no evidence of insight into the effect on public confidence of a finding of dishonesty. In particular, the Panel has found that R2’s conduct undermines the fundamental tenets of trust and integrity and brings the profession into disrepute.

105. In accordance with the Legal Assessor’s advice the Panel has followed the HCPC Sanctions Policy, which states that Professionals registered with the HCPC must adhere to the Standards of conduct, performance and ethics, and the relevant Standards of proficiency. Sanctions should only be imposed in relation to the facts found proved, but should address all of those facts which have led to a finding of impairment. The sanctions available to the Panel and are set out in Article 29 of the Health Professions Order 2001. In writing any decision on sanction, the Panel must provide clear and detailed reasoning to support its decision, explaining the issues it has considered and the impact any aggravating or mitigating factors have had on the outcome.

106. Any sanction must be proportionate, is not intended to be punitive and should be no more than is necessary to meet the legitimate purposes of providing adequate protection to the public, to protect the reputation of the profession, maintain confidence in the regulatory system and declare and uphold proper professional standards. The Panel’s primary function at this stage is to protect the public, while deciding what, if any, sanction is proportionate, taking into account the wider public interest and the interests of R2. The Panel has started by considering the least restrictive sanction first, working upwards only where necessary. The final sanction should be a proportionate approach, and will therefore be the minimum action required to protect the public.

107. The Panel identified the following aggravating factors:

• There was an attempt by R2 to cover up that she had sent FC’s SCCF to R1 by dishonestly, during the disciplinary investigation into R1, omitting to say that she had sent the SCCF to R1 and denying that she knew that R1 had access to the SCCF.
• R2 misused her position as a SPOT, and her dishonesty cast suspicion onto others.
• R2 suggested R1 had misused her computer to send the SCCF to himself. This caused him to be interviewed in respect of a criminal offence under the Computer Misuse Act.
• R2’s misconduct had adverse effects on work colleagues: she intended to create an unfair advantage for R1; FC felt let down and that their trusting working relationship had been affected; MM was shocked when she found out about R2’s actions.
• There is a risk to Service Users if procedures are not properly followed to determine appropriate career progression based on the individual’s skills and competence. This can impact the safe and effective delivery of care.
• R2’s suspension by KCC impacted on team colleagues and Service Users, as there would have been one less team member to share the workload burden on an already very busy team. Her Senior Practitioner skills would also have been denied to the team.
• Her misconduct was likely to undermine the team dynamic as well as trust amongst her colleagues.
• R2’s failure to inform the HCPC that she had been suspended was dishonest/lacking in integrity and impacted upon the HCPC’s ability to consider this and assess risk.
• There was a lack of engagement in the regulatory process and no early admission of dishonesty.
• This is a case where R2 took an active role in multiple instances of serious dishonesty between March 2019 and August 2021.

108. The Panel identified the following mitigating factors:

• R2 is of previous good character with no other concerns raised regarding her fitness to practise.
• These matters occurred 3-4 years ago.
• There is no evidence of any direct harm having come to any Service Users.
• There has been some partial engagement with the HCPC process.
• R2 has stated that she does not intend to return to OT practice due to her health problems.

109. The Sanctions Policy states:

• The Standards of conduct, performance and ethics require registrants to be honest and trustworthy (Standard 9).
• Dishonesty undermines public confidence in the profession and can, in some cases, impact the public’s safety. Dishonesty, both in and outside the workplace, can have a significant impact on the trust placed in those who have been dishonest, and potentially on public safety. It is likely to lead to more serious sanctions.
• Given the seriousness of dishonesty, cases are likely to result in more serious sanctions. However, panels should bear in mind that there are different forms, and different degrees, of dishonesty, that need to be considered in an appropriately nuanced way. Factors that panels should take into account in this regard include: whether the relevant behaviour took the form of a single act, or occurred on multiple occasions, the duration of any dishonesty, whether the registrant took a passive or active role in it, any early admission of dishonesty on the registrant’s behalf and any other relevant mitigating factors.

110. The Panel finds that R2 has not recognised her failings. There have been no admissions or evidence of genuine insight, remorse or apology from her.

111. Due to the serious nature of the misconduct in this case, taking no further action or mediation is not appropriate.

112. The Sanctions Policy states: ‘A caution order is likely to be an appropriate sanction for cases in which: the issue is isolated, limited, or relatively minor in nature; there is a low risk of repetition; the registrant has shown good insight; and the registrant has undertaken appropriate remediation. A caution order should be considered in cases where the nature of the allegations mean that meaningful practice restrictions cannot be imposed, but a suspension of practice order would be disproportionate.'

113. The following features suggestive of a Caution Order do not apply in R2’s case: the issue is isolated, limited, or relatively minor in nature; there is a low risk of repetition; the registrant has shown good insight; and the registrant has undertaken appropriate remediation… a suspension of practice order would be disproportionate.

114. A Caution Order would not be in accordance with the HCPC Sanctions Policy in this case and there are no exceptional circumstances to justify a departure from it. A caution would be insufficient to mark the significance of the Panel’s findings. It would fail to deter other practitioners from behaving in this way. A caution would not uphold the wider public interest. R2’s misconduct was too serious for a caution.

115. The Sanctions Policy states: Conditions will only be effective in cases where the registrant is genuinely committed to resolving the concerns raised and the panel is confident they will do so. Therefore, conditions of practice are unlikely to be suitable in cases in which the registrant has failed to engage with the fitness to practise process or where there are serious or persistent failings … There may be circumstances in which a panel considers it appropriate to impose a conditions of practice order in the above cases [including dishonesty]. However, it should only do so when it is satisfied that the registrant’s conduct was minor, out of character, capable of remediation and unlikely to be repeated. The panel should take care to provide robust reasoning in these cases.

116. R2’s misconduct was not minor and the Panel was unable to formulate appropriate, workable and practicable conditions of practice. The relevant misconduct arose from a lack of honesty and integrity over a significant period, including during the investigation. Additionally, the lack of engagement in the process with the HCPC means that conditions of practice could not be justified.

117. The Sanctions Policy states: A suspension order is likely to be appropriate where there are serious concerns which cannot be reasonably addressed by a conditions of practice order, but which do not require the registrant to be struck off the Register. These types of cases will typically exhibit the following factors:

• the concerns represent a serious breach of the Standards of conduct, performance and ethics;
• the registrant has insight;
• the issues are unlikely to be repeated; and
• there is evidence to suggest the registrant is likely to be able to resolve or remedy their failings.

118. In the judgement of the Panel a Suspension Order is not appropriate in view of the lack of engagement by R2 and the seriousness of her misconduct. The nature of her dishonesty was more serious than that of R1 as reflected in the different allegations against her. R2’s dishonesty occurred on multiple occasions in more than one context, and this is indicative of a character trait.

119. Accordingly, the Panel has decided that a Suspension Order is not consistent with the Panel’s findings at the facts, grounds and impairment stage in respect of R2.

120. Having determined that a Suspension Order was not an appropriate sanction in this case, the Panel then considered whether the case would more properly merit a Striking off Order under the Sanctions Policy which states:

A striking off order is a sanction of last resort for serious, persistent, deliberate or reckless acts involving (this list is not exhaustive):
a. dishonesty…
A striking off order is likely to be appropriate where the nature and gravity of the concerns are such that any lesser sanction would be insufficient to protect the public, public confidence in the profession, and public confidence in the regulatory process. In particular where the registrant:
b. lacks insight;

121. A Striking off would not be unduly punitive due to the nature of R2’s dishonesty and the lack of evidence of insight. The misconduct in her case is sufficiently serious for a Striking off Order and the requirements of public protection and the wider public interest cannot be adequately served by a Suspension Order.

122. A Striking off Order is proportionate and the only appropriate sanction in the present circumstances. Trust and honesty are essential elements of OT professional practice. There is a lack of acceptance by R2 of what she has done and the effect of her serious misconduct. There is a risk of repetition and her failings are not likely to be remediated because R2 states that she no longer wishes to practice as an OT.

ORDER: The Registrar is directed to strike the name of Ms Lucy Peo Powell-Nateghy from the HCPC Register from the date this order comes into effect. 

Interim Order

123. The Panel makes an Interim Suspension Order under Article 31(2) of the Health Professions Order 2001, the same being necessary to protect members of the public and being otherwise in the public interest. This order will expire: (if no appeal is made against the Panel’s decision and Order) upon the expiry of the period during which such an appeal could be made; (if an appeal is made against the Panel’s decision and Order) the final determination of that appeal, subject to a maximum period of 18 months.

Reasons for the making of an Interim Order:

124. Following the announcement of the sanction, the Presenting Officer applied for an Interim Suspension Order. The Panel was satisfied that it was appropriate to consider this application in the absence of the Registrant because she had been informed by the Notice of Hearing dated 30 August 2023 that such an application might be made. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor to consider whether an interim order was necessary under Article 31, to protect the public or in the public interest or in R2’s own interest, because of the nature of the findings made in this case. The HCPC submitted that an interim order is necessary. The Panel is satisfied that it is appropriate to direct that R2’s registration should be subject to Suspension on an interim basis. This order is necessary for the protection of the public and is in the public interest. The Panel concluded that the appropriate length of the Interim Order is 18 months, as an Interim Order would continue to be required pending the resolution of an appeal, in the event of R2 giving notice of an appeal within 28 days.

History of Hearings for Ms Lucy Peo Powell-Nateghy