Mr Peter Waters

Preliminary Matters

Service

1. As the Registrant did not attend the hearing, the Panel first decided whether he had been sent a notice of hearing that satisfied the rules with regard to that issue. The Panel was satisfied that the email sent to the Registrant on 6 December 2023 constituted a valid notice of hearing, and, accordingly, the Panel had the jurisdiction to conduct the hearing.

Proceeding in the absence of the Registrant

2. After the Panel stated that it was satisfied that the Registrant had been sent a valid notice of hearing, the Presenting Officer applied for a direction that the hearing should proceed in the absence of the Registrant. In the context of this application, the Presenting Officer informed the Panel that the final hearing had been listed on a previous occasion in late 2022, and, in relation to that hearing, in advance of it the Registrant had stated that he would not attend, and did not in fact attend.

3. The Panel gave careful consideration to the issue of whether the hearing should proceed in the absence of the Registrant. It accepted the guidance contained in the relevant HCPTS Practice note and the advice of the Legal Assessor. It was necessary for the Panel to be satisfied that it would be fair for the hearing to proceed; fair not only from the point of view of the Registrant, but also having regard to the HCPC and the public interest.

4. The conclusion of the Panel was that the hearing should proceed in the absence of the Registrant. The reasons for this decision were as follows:

• It had been repeatedly stated by the person whom the Registrant had informed the HCPC had his authority to communicate with the HCPC on his behalf, that the Registrant would not be attending the hearing. This was stated on 7 December 2023 (in response to the notice of hearing) and 10 January 2024.

• The Panel was satisfied that the Registrant had knowledge that the hearing was scheduled to take place and the communications just referred to constituted an intention to voluntarily absent himself from the hearing.

• The issues in the case dated back to the mid-1990s, and further delay in resolving them would be highly undesirable.

• The HCPC’s witnesses were ready to give evidence to the Panel. They had been available when the final hearing was adjourned in late 2022, and it would be unfair to them to postpone the occasion for them to actually give evidence again.

• There was no indication communicated by or on behalf of the Registrant that he would wish to engage in the process were the hearing to be adjourned. Accordingly, the Panel concluded that nothing would be gained by adjourning the hearing as the allegation would have to be decided at some stage.

• The Registrant had referred to the stress he was experiencing as a consequence of the on-going fitness to practise process. The Panel therefore concluded that it would be in the Registrant’s own interests for the allegation to be decided.

• All of these factors combined to result in it being in the clear public interest that the hearing should proceed despite the absence of the Registrant from the hearing.

Directing that part of the hearing should be conducted in private

5. It was apparent from the documents made available to the Panel in advance of the hearing that there were two distinct factors in respect of which directing privacy might be required. They were, (i) the need to protect the complainant in respect of particular 1, “Person A”, from the risk that she might be identified, notwithstanding the reference to her in that anonymised manner; and (ii) to ensure that there should be no publication of information relating to the Registrant’s health.

6. These two factors resulted in the Panel directing that the hearing should be conducted partly in private in order to protect, respectively, the private lives of Person A and the Registrant. The need to protect these issues required the entire hearing was conducted in private, save for the evidence of Mr AM, an HCPC Manager who gave evidence in relation to particulars 2 and 3. It should be noted that this is the private version of the Panel’s determination. A separate, public, version of the determination will be issued which will be consistent with the reasons why the hearing was largely conducted in private.

Deciding the different elements of the allegation

7. The HCPC’s allegation against the Registrant is that his fitness to practise as an Operating Department Practitioner (“ODP”) is impaired by reason of misconduct. It follows that there are different elements of that allegation to be decided by the Panel, namely (i) whether the HCPC has proven the facts that are said to amount to misconduct (in this case, particulars 1 to 4 in the allegation); (ii) an assessment as to whether the proven facts amount to misconduct; (iii) if misconduct is established, whether that misconduct is currently impairing the Registrant’s fitness to practise. Before the Presenting Officer opened the case, the Panel decided that those three elements would be decided in one segment of the hearing, the Panel deciding them separately and sequentially.

Background

8. The Registrant is a registered ODP. In 2017 he was working for South Tyneside and Sunderland NHS Foundation Trust (“the Trust”), working at South Tyneside District Hospital in South Shields. He had commenced working for the Trust in May 1994.

9. In March 2017, the Trust was informed by a Safeguarding Team that allegations of historical child sex abuse had been made, as a result of which he was suspended from his employment on 17 March 2017.

10. In March 2018, the Registrant was charged with criminal offences arising from the allegations of historical child sex abuse. He stood trial in the Crown Court in December 2018 and was acquitted in respect of all the charges.

11. On 30 October 2019, a conversation took place between the Registrant and the Trust, and in the course of that conversation he was asked whether he had disclosed to the HCPC various matters, including the fact that he had been suspended and charged with the offences. He informed the Trust that he had not, and in due course, on 12 February 2020, the Trust made a referral to the HCPC.

12. As particulars of the misconduct the HCPC allege, reliance is placed upon the allegations of historical child sex abuse, a failure to inform the HCPC that the criminal charges had been made, and that upon renewal of registration on 20 September 2018, and 19 November 2020, the suspension and health issues were not disclosed. The various matters of alleged non-disclosure are also alleged to have been dishonest.

Decision on Facts

13. The HCPC called three witnesses to give evidence before the Panel. They were:

• Person A, the complainant in respect of the allegations of sexual assault in particular 1.

• “Person F”, whose involvement will be further described below, and who gave evidence relevant to particular 1.

• Mr AM, a Registrations Manager employed by the HCPC, whose evidence was relevant to particulars 2 and 3.

14. The HCPC also relied upon the evidence of two witnesses who made witness statements but were not called to give evidence before the Panel. The evidence of both of these witnesses was confined to the production of documents that had come into the possession of the HCPC and which were presented to the Panel in the hearing bundle.

15. The documentary exhibits presented by the HCPC extended to approximately 290 pages. It is not necessary for the Panel either to describe all of them or for the description of those which will be mentioned to be detailed. However, included in the documentary exhibits were:

• a transcript of what will be described below as “the covertly recorded discussion”;

• a transcript of the Police ABE (“Achieving Best Evidence”) video recorded interview of Person A;

• letters written by the Registrant’s employer, including those relating to his suspension from work;

• documents prepared by the Police describing its investigation into Person A’s allegations;

• witness statements obtained by the Police for use in the criminal prosecution of the Registrant;

• transcripts of evidence given at the Registrant’s trial in the Crown Court;

• documents exhibited by Mr AM that were relevant to the disclosure and renewal of registration issues that arose in relation to particulars 2 and 3;

• records obtained from the Registrant’s General Practitioner.

16. In addition to the documents just described which were included in the HCPC’s hearing bundle, during the hearing the Presenting Officer collated a clip of documents which were included in those that had been prepared on his behalf at the time of the original listing of the hearing in late 2022. The Presenting Officer undertook this task to ensure that, notwithstanding the absence of the Registrant, any relevant contention that had been made by him in relation to the allegations should be considered by the Panel.

17. In relation to the decision on the facts, the Panel accepted that it was for the HCPC to prove the facts. At no stage was the Registrant to be expected to disprove matters, and that was notwithstanding the decision made by the Registrant not to engage in these proceedings. The Panel also took note of three further matters, namely:

• The standard of proof in these proceedings is the balance of probabilities. That does not mean, however, that a matter can be proved on flimsy evidence. The Panel accepted the submission advanced by the Presenting Officer and echoed by the advice of the Legal Assessor, that, especially when grave issues are being decided, the Panel should act upon solid, cogent evidence. Furthermore, it was appropriate to consider that the more serious the contention is, the less likely the Panel should consider it to have occurred.

• Some of the evidence relied upon by the HCPC was hearsay in nature. An example of such evidence was a document prepared by the Police in which the Registrant’s interview by the Police on 6 April 2017 is described; the Panel did not receive oral evidence from any Police officer. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor that such evidence was to be considered admissible, but that when it came to assessing what weight could properly be attached to that evidence it was important to remember that the evidence could be neither challenged nor explored, and that fact might cause the Panel to accord it less weight than evidence that could be tested. As the Registrant did not attend the hearing, the statements that were included in documents that recorded what he had said were necessarily hearsay in nature, and, accordingly, they could not be challenged on behalf of the HCPC by the Presenting Officer. However, to the extent that this was relevant, it had to be remembered that the Registrant had no obligation to prove anything.

• The Presenting Officer informed the Panel that there were no previous findings against the Registrant. The Legal Assessor advised the Panel that it should consider that the Registrant would be entitled to expect that the Panel should take that into account, and that it could be relevant in two distinct respects. First, a registrant of good character could rely upon that fact with regard to propensity (on the basis that a person of good character would be less likely to behave in a seriously inappropriate manner) and that it would also be relevant to credibility (being of good character, the Panel should be more prepared to accept their version of the relevant events).

Particular 1 - On multiple occasions between 1996 and 2000 you indecently assaulted a Child Under 16.

18. Before describing the evidence received by the Panel with regard to this particular, it is necessary to make clear the approach the Panel took to the fact that the Registrant was acquitted by the decision of the jury when he was tried in the Crown Court in December 2018. That acquittal necessarily meant that the jury in that trial was not persuaded on the different burden of proof that applied in that Court that the Registrant was guilty of the offences described. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor and proceeded on the basis that the decision of the jury in the Crown Court was a wholly neutral factor for the purposes of the present case. The reasons for this were as follows:

• The fact that the Registrant had been acquitted by the jury did not preclude the HCPC from advancing the facts underpinning the criminal prosecution in the present allegation, that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is impaired by reason of his misconduct.

• The present allegation having been advanced, the Panel has the clear obligation to decide it on the basis of the admissible evidence presented to it.

• It would not be legitimate for the Panel to factor into its decision on the facts of the present allegation, the decision of the jury, and that would be so even if the reasons for the jury’s decision were known, which, of course, they are not. For the Panel to stray into considering that the jury’s decision had any evidential value in these proceedings would necessarily involve the Panel in indulging in inappropriate speculation as to why the outcome in the criminal trial was an acquittal.

19. The factors that resulted in the Panel directing that substantial parts of the hearing should be conducted in private, and also a direction that was made in the criminal trial of the Registrant, have the consequence that no detail of the HCPC’s case, or of the Panel’s findings in relation to particular 1 can be made publicly available. All that the Panel can say is that it found the evidence of Person A to be consistent and compelling, and particular 1 was found proven on that basis.

Particular 2 – You did not inform the HCPC in a timely manner that you had been charged with 9 Counts of Indecent Assault of a Child Under 16.

20. This particular is advanced against the Registrant on the basis that he breached the requirement established by the HCPC’s Standards of conduct, performance and ethics to inform the HCPC of a criminal charge being brought.

21. Standard 9.5 of the Standards of conduct, performance and ethics that came into force in January 2016, under the heading, “Important information about your conduct and competence”, was in these terms:

“You must tell us as soon as possible if:
– you accept a caution from the police or you have been charged with, or found guilty of, a criminal offence;
…………”

22. The documentary evidence produced to the Panel disclosed that the Registrant was charged with the offences on which he subsequently stood trial on 7 March 2018. He did not inform the HCPC of that fact either then or at any time before his employer made a referral concerning him on 12 February 2020, very nearly two years later.

23. In the judgement of the Panel the Registrant had an obligation to disclose to the HCPC the fact that he had been charged. Furthermore, in failing to make that disclosure at any time before the referral from his employer, he did not make that disclosure in a timely manner. Accordingly, particular 2 is proven.

Particular 3 - On 20 September 2018 and 19 November 2020, you renewed your Registration with the HCPC and did not disclose that:

a. You had been suspended from work by your employer; and/or

b. You had a health condition as set out in Schedule A.

24. It is apparent from the wording of this particular that it is concerned with what was not disclosed by the Registrant when he renewed his registration under the two-yearly cycle of re-registration that is required of all HCPC registrants. As is apparent from this particular, two such renewals are in issue, those of 20 September 2018, and 19 November 2020. As two alleged non-disclosures are alleged in respect of each, it follows that there are potentially four issues to be considered. It is important that the Panel should underscore the fact that this particular is concerned with the identified renewals. Other requirements are imposed by the HCPC on all registrants with regard to disclosing suspensions from work. Standard 9.5 of the Standards of conduct, performance and ethics referred to by the Panel in relation to particular 2 provides as follows: “You must tell us as soon as possible if: ……you have had any restriction placed on your practice, or been suspended …… by an employer, because of concerns about your conduct …..”. However, the HCPC has not made an allegation founded on this provision. Its case is that he was required to make the disclosure of the fact that he had been suspended in the renewal application.

25. The Panel received evidence from Mr AM, a Registrations Manager employed by the HCPC. Mr AM has been employed by the HCPC since before the dates relevant to this particular, and the Panel was grateful to him for the matters he was able to explain. On both occasions, the renewal was undertaken by the Registrant online. It was not possible for the HCPC to produce the actual forms completed by the Registrant, but Mr AM was able to explain the process to the Panel. He produced as exhibits an example of the online form the Registrant would have completed on 20 September 2018. The Panel did not see an example of the form completed on 19 November 2020, but it was shown the record of the completion of the renewal held by the HCPC.

26. On the basis of the evidence of Mr AM, the Panel is satisfied that the Registrant did not disclose in completing either renewal application that he had been suspended from work by his employer or that he had the health condition particularised in the allegation. The issue the Panel has been required to consider is whether there was an obligation on him to make those disclosures in the context of those renewals.

27. The question on 20 September 2018 which required the Registrant to tick for his registration renewal to proceed without further enquiry was this: “Since my last registration there has been no change relating to my good character (this includes any conviction or caution, if any that you are required to disclose), or any change to my health that may affect my ability to practise safely and effectively.” This declaration, which the Panel is satisfied that the Registrant made, has two elements, namely that there has been no change (i) to his good character, and (ii) no change to his health that might affect his ability to practise safely and effectively.

28. As already stated, the Panel did not see a copy of the online form completed in November 2020. Nevertheless, from the recorded result on his online declarations produced by Mr AM, the Panel is satisfied that on 19 November 2020, the Registrant made similar declarations to those he had made on 20 September 2018.

29. So far as character is concerned, on 20 September 2018, the Registrant had some six months previously been charged with very grave criminal offences, and the Panel has already stated that he had not made to the HCPC the declaration of that charging, which he should have done. However, accepting that he had defaulted in his obligation to disclose the charging to the HCPC, if the question is asked whether, on 20 September 2018, the question is asked whether he should have acknowledged that his good character had “changed”, then the Panel cannot say that he should have done. He was intending, as was his right, to dispute the criminal allegations raised against him, and the suspension from work was based on the complaint that had resulted in the criminal prosecution. On 19 November 2020, the answer is still clearer; by that date he had been acquitted by the jury.

30. To decide if the HCPC had proven that the Registrant should have disclosed the particularised health condition in the context of the renewal processes, the Panel reviewed the available evidence. In the view of the Panel it had scant evidence. Upon analysis it amounted to the following (and in setting out this short chronology, it is relevant to record the fact that the Registrant was charged with the criminal offences on 7 March 2018):

[Redacted]

31. It should be noted that the obligation was to disclose health matters that might have affected his ability to practise safely and effectively, not the disclosure of health matters per se. Having carefully considered the evidence, the Panel concluded that the HCPC had not proved that, as at 20 September 2018, there is clear evidence that the Registrant’s health was so affected. Further, the Panel concluded that the HCPC had similarly failed to prove that as at 19 November 2020, that the Registrant’s health was such that his ability to practise safely and effectively was affected.

32. The result of all these findings is that no element of particular 3 is established, with the consequence that it is not proven.

Particular 4 - Your conduct in relation to allegations 2 and 3 above was dishonest.

33. In view of the Panel’s conclusion that no element of particular 3 is proven, it follows that the sole issue to be decided in relation to particular 4 is whether the Registrant’s failure to inform the HCPC in a timely manner that he had been charged with the criminal offences was dishonest.

34. In deciding whether dishonesty in relation to this failure has been proven by the HCPC, the Panel applied the advice it received in relation to reaching such a finding, namely that the first stage is to decide the (subjective) state of mind of the Registrant in not reporting the matter. Having reached a decision as to the Registrant’s state of mind, it is then necessary to ask whether that would be considered to be dishonest by the standards of ordinary decent people.

35. The criminal charges were of an extremely serious nature. In the view of the Panel, it is inconceivable that a health professional would not have appreciated that the regulator would have expected to be told of those criminal charges. Even allowing for the likelihood that the Registrant would have been distressed upon finding that he had been charged, it is instructive to consider what his state of mind must have been on 20 September 2018 (some six months after he was charged) when he renewed his registration. As the Registrant felt able not to declare that at that time there had not been any change to his health that might affect his ability to practise safely and effectively, the Panel is entitled to assume that on 20 September 2018, he was able to assess the situation calmly and rationally. Furthermore, on that same date, 20 September 2018, the Registrant positively ticked a box on the online renewal form that required him to declare “Since my last registration there has been no change relating to my good character (this includes any conviction or caution, if any, that you are required to disclose)”. In its finding in relation to particular 3, the Panel has already stated that it has not been proven that the Registrant should consider that his good character had been diminished as a consequence of the outstanding criminal allegation, but the significance of it for present purposes is that the completion of this form must necessarily have brought to the Registrant’s mind the fact that he had not reported the charges to the HCPC. If the completion of the renewal form on 20 September 2018 had resulted in the Registrant belatedly informing the HCPC of the charges, it might still have been complained that the disclosure was not “as soon as possible”, but the fact is he did not report them then, or at all until after the HCPC received a referral from his employer more than 16 months later. In the judgement of the Panel the failure to rectify the matter on 20 September 2018 merely serves to underline that the failure to disclose before then, in a timely manner, was deliberate and calculated.

36. The Panel asked itself the question whether ordinary decent people would consider it to be dishonest deliberately to withhold from a professional regulator the fact of criminal charges of this seriousness in circumstances where there was a clear requirement to do so in the generic standards of conduct issued by that regulator. The clear answer to that question is that it would be considered to be dishonest.

37. It follows from this finding that particular 4 is proven with regard to particular 2.

Summary of factual findings

38. The Panel has found proven that on multiple occasions between 1996 and 2000, the Registrant indecently assaulted a child under the age of 16 years (particular 1), that he did not inform the HCPC in a timely manner that he had been charged with nine counts of indecent assault of a child under the age of 16 years (particular 2) and that he acted dishonestly in failing to inform the HCPC that he had been so charged (particular 4). Having made these findings, the Panel then moved on to consider whether they amounted to misconduct.

Decision on misconduct

39. In reaching its decision on misconduct, the Panel acknowledged that the indecent assaults upon a child occurred in the context of the Registrant’s private life, and did not arise from his professional activities. Nevertheless, the manner in which a professional person acts in their private life at least potentially has an impact on their professional reputation. The Panel is satisfied that behaviour of the sort the Panel has found proven in relation to particular 1 falls into this category.

40. The dishonest failure to disclose the fact that he had been charged, was, however, inextricably linked to his profession; if a regulator that is charged with the obligation to protect the public is kept in ignorance of important matters, such as the fact that a registrant has been charged with extremely grave offences, its ability to function is compromised.

41. When viewed individually, and still more so when viewed collectively, these matters would be considered to be utterly deplorable by fellow professionals. In the judgement of the Panel, a finding of misconduct is appropriate.

Decision on impairment of fitness to practise.

42. Having decided that the proven matters amount to misconduct, the Panel then considered whether the misconduct is currently impairing the Registrant’s fitness to practise. In undertaking this exercise, the Panel considered, and accepted the guidance contained in, the HCPTS Practice Note entitled, “Fitness to Practise Impairment” published in November 2023. Accordingly, the Panel considered both the personal and public components of impairment of fitness to practise.

43. In the view of the Panel, it is difficult to say that repeated sexual assaults upon a child can be remediated. It is, however, possible to imagine circumstances in which the person who perpetrated those assaults could be said to present a reduced risk of repeating his behaviour. In the present case, there has been no acknowledgment that the incidents occurred, no recognition of how grossly inappropriate his behaviour was, and no acceptance of the harm that was caused to Person A. Those factors, coupled with the marked attitudinal deficit that must have been present to have resulted in the Registrant behaving as he did, has the consequence that, notwithstanding the fact that the incidents happened many years ago and there is no suggestion they have been repeated in the intervening years, the Panel cannot conclude that there is no risk of repetition.

44. With regard to the dishonest failure to disclose the fact that he had been charged with criminal offences, generally the Panel found the Registrant’s response worrying. There was no acceptance that he had had the personal obligation to disclose and that he had failed to discharge it and no acceptance of why that was a very serious omission. Instead, there was a combination of shifting responsibility (claiming that he had not been told to report the matter), [Redacted] (which may have been an explanation initially, but, for the reasons expressed in paragraph 35 above, cannot have been the case by 20 September 2018) and unconvincing excuses (in relation to the suspension issue, the claim that his employers instructed him to maintain confidentiality in relation to the matter could justify non-disclosure to the HCPC). When the Panel considered these factors, it concluded that there could be no confidence that the Registrant would observe his clear, personal obligations in the future.

45. For these reasons, the Panel concluded that in respect of the personal component, the Registrant’s fitness to practise remains impaired.

46. So far as the public component is concerned, even if there was not the continuing risk of repetition, with the attendant potential for harm, the Panel would feel compelled to find that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is impaired. This is because fair-minded members of the public would be appalled to discover that a practitioner against whom findings as serious as those made in this case had been permitted to return to unrestricted practice. Furthermore, were it not to make a finding of impairment of fitness to practise, the Panel would be failing to declare and uphold proper professional standards.

47. For all the reasons expressed in this section of the Panel’s determination, the Registrant’s fitness to practise is impaired.

48. It follows that the allegation is well founded, with the consequence that the Panel must go on to consider the issue of sanction.

Decision on sanction

49. After the Panel handed down its written determination explaining that the allegation was well founded, it allowed the Presenting Officer time to consider that document before he made submissions on sanction.

50. When the Presenting Officer made his submissions on sanction, he commended to the Panel the HCPC’s Sanctions Policy. He stated that the HCPC did not urge the Panel to apply any particular sanction, but he did draw the attention of the Panel to the fact that in the Sanctions Policy it is suggested that certain types of cases might be viewed as “serious cases”. He also submitted that there were aggravating factors in the present case, and that these included the repeated nature of the abuse found by particular 1, the actual harm suffered by Person A, the Registrant’s lack of insight and remediation and the risk of repetition. The Presenting Officer acknowledged that it would be his responsibility to bring to the attention of the Panel any mitigating factors that might be identified, but he submitted that the HCPC was not able to identify any.

51. The Panel accepted the advice it received from the Legal Assessor as to the decision it was required to make. A sanction should not be imposed with the intention of punishing the Registrant (although if imposed for proper reasons it might have a punitive effect). The factors that the Panel could properly take into account in deciding on sanction were the need to protect the public, the importance of maintaining a proper degree of public confidence in the ODP profession and the regulation of it, and the need to declare and uphold proper professional standards. To ensure that these principles are applied, it would be necessary for the Panel, first to consider whether the findings it has made require any sanction, and then, if they do, to consider the available sanctions in an ascending order of seriousness. The Panel confirms that it has applied this advice in reaching its decision.

52. The Panel first considered the aggravating factors arising from the finding. The Panel agreed with those advanced by the Presenting Officer as outlined above. In relation to the actual harm suffered by Person A, the Panel received evidence from her that the impact the Registrant had on her life was so great that she developed a lot of self-hatred and very low self-esteem. That evidence was reflected in the covertly recorded conversation on 14 March 2017, an audio recording of which the Panel heard. As a party to that conversation, the Registrant is well aware of the harm he caused Person A.

53. The only factor that the Panel was able to identify that could be said to be in favour of the Registrant is that he had not been the subject of any previous regulatory findings, and it was apparent from the transcript of the evidence he gave in the Crown Court that he had no history of criminal offending. It should also be mentioned, as a factor that could potentially be relevant to the issue of sanction (but which is neither an aggravating nor mitigating factor) that the Registrant has ceased to practise, and has no desire to return to practise, as an ODP. As recently as yesterday, 1 February 2024, it was written on his behalf, “As previously mentioned in a previous email, [the Registrant] has now retired and has no desire to return to the health care profession in any capacity so any outcome from this hearing will have no impact on his future.” In considering the issue of sanction, the Panel is required to consider what the Registrant should be permitted to do, rather than reflect his current status and intentions.

54. It is necessary for the Panel to state that the findings made in this case are of the utmost seriousness. There were repeated indecent assaults upon a child, and the seriousness of that is in no way diminished by the fact that the abuse occurred many years ago. Sexual abuse of children is a specific category of “Serious case” identified in the Sanctions Policy at paragraphs 78 and 79. The latter paragraph is in these terms, “Sexual abuse of children, whether physical or online, is intolerable, seriously damages public safety and undermines public confidence in the profession. Any professional found to have participated in sexual abuse of children in any capacity should not be allowed to remain in unrestricted practice.” Cases of dishonesty are also recognised by the Sanctions Policy to fall into the category of serious cases.

55. When the Panel considered whether a sanction is required in this case, it concluded that it certainly is. Furthermore, a caution order would be wholly inappropriate as it would not provide the degree of protection from the risk of repetition and would fail to recognise the seriousness of the findings and, for that reason, fail to maintain public confidence.

56. The Panel also rejected the imposition of a conditions of practice order. The serious failings identified by this case were not of a clinical nature, the Registrant is not practising as an ODP, and, in any event, a conditions of practice order would not sufficiently reflect the seriousness of the matter.

57. The Panel therefore considered a suspension order. Paragraph 121 of the Sanctions Policy is in the following terms:

“A suspension order is likely to be appropriate where there are serious concerns which cannot be reasonably addressed by a conditions of practice order, but which do not require the registrant to be struck off the Register. These types of cases will typically exhibit the following factors:

• the concerns represent a serious breach of the Standards of conduct, performance and ethics;

• the registrant has insight;

• the issues are unlikely to be repeated; and

• there is evidence to suggest the registrant is likely to be able to resolve or remedy their failings.”

58. The concerns in this case do represent a serious breach of the Standards of conduct, performance and ethics, but the Registrant does not have insight, there is a risk of repetition and there is no evidence that he will be able (or willing) to resolve or remedy his failings. In all the circumstances, the Panel concluded that a suspension order was not appropriate.

59. Having rejected a suspension order as an appropriate outcome, the Panel necessarily found itself considering a striking off order. In that regard it noted that paragraph 130 of the Sanctions Policy states that it is a sanction of the last resort for serious, persistent, deliberate or reckless acts involving a number of cases, two of which, sexual abuse of children and dishonesty are specifically mentioned. Paragraph 131 advises that a striking off order is likely to be appropriate when the nature and gravity of the concerns are such that any lesser sanction would be insufficient to protect the public, public confidence in the profession, and public confidence in the regulatory process.

60. Acknowledging the seriousness of taking that step, the Panel considers that no lesser sanction than striking off would sufficiently reflect the extremely grave findings made in this case. For that reason, the Panel is satisfied that it represents a proportionate outcome.

61. Accordingly, the Panel makes a striking off order.

ORDER: The Registrar is directed to strike the name of Mr Peter Waters from the Register on the date this Order comes into effect.

Interim Order

Application

1. After the Panel announced its decision that a striking off order would be imposed, the Presenting Officer applied for an interim suspension order to cover the appeal period.

2. In relation to the Panel’s jurisdiction to consider the matter, the Presenting Officer produced for the Panel an email sent on 1 February 2024 by Ms LR of Kingsley Napley to the person whom the Registrant had informed the HCPC had his authority to communicate with the HCPC on his behalf. The email stated that in the event that a conditions of practice order, a suspension order or a striking off order was made, then the HCPC might apply for an interim order to cover the appeal period. This email was replied to some minutes later, and included in the reply the following was written: “I have no intentions to make any representations regarding the possible application.” The Presenting Officer submitted that this communication satisfied the requirement that the Registrant should be afforded an opportunity of making representations on the issue of an interim order. He also submitted that it would be appropriate to deal with the application in the absence of the Registrant.

3. In relation to the substance of the matter, the Presenting Officer submitted that, in the light of the Panel’s decisions on the substantive issues, an interim suspension order to cover the appeal period is both necessary for protection of members of the public and is otherwise in the public interest.

Decision

4. The Panel accepted the advice it received from the Legal Assessor as follows:

• That it should be satisfied that the Registrant had been afforded an opportunity of being heard on the issue of whether an interim order should be made.

• That the Panel was satisfied that it would be fair to the Registrant for the issue to be considered in his absence.

• In relation to the substance of the application, that the default position established by the legislation governing these proceedings is that when a substantive sanction is imposed there should be no restriction on the registrant’s ability to practise unless and until that registrant’s appeal rights are exhausted. It follows that positive reasons are required to justify departure from this default position. Those reasons are to be measured against the grounds that can justify the imposition of an interim order, namely that it is (i) necessary for the protection of members of the public, (ii) otherwise in the public interest, or (iii) in the interests of the registrant.

5. The Panel was satisfied that the Registrant had been given the opportunity of making representations, which had in fact been made. The Panel was also satisfied that it was fair to permit the HCPC to advance the application in the absence of the Registrant.

6. The Panel determined that an interim order is necessary for the protection of members of the public and is otherwise in the public interest. It is necessary for the protection of members of the public because of the likelihood of repetition with the attendant risk of harm. It is otherwise in the public interest for the reasons explained by the Panel why the public component of impairment of fitness to practice is established.

7. An interim order being necessary, the Panel next considered whether the factors requiring it could be satisfactorily addressed by the imposition of an interim conditions of practice order. The conclusion of the Panel was that they could not. The reason for this decision is the same reason why substantive conditions of practice are not appropriate.

8. For these reasons an Interim Suspension Order is required.

9. As to the duration of the Interim Suspension Order, the Panel determined that it should be for the maximum period of 18 months. If the Registrant does not appeal against the substantive decision and Order there will be no prejudice to him because the Interim Suspension Order will simply fall away when the striking off order takes effect. However, if the Registrant does appeal within the 28-day period within which he can take that step, the final determination of that appeal could well take 18 months, and for the reasons already expressed, his ability to practise should be restricted pending that final determination.

The Panel makes an Interim Suspension Order under Article 31(2) of the Health Professions Order 2001, the same being necessary to protect members of the public and being otherwise in the public interest.

This order will expire: (if no appeal is made against the Panel’s decision and Order) upon the expiry of the period during which such an appeal could be made; (if an appeal is made against the Panel’s decision and Order) the final determination of that appeal, subject to a maximum period of 18 months.

History of Hearings for Mr Peter Waters