
Mark Fraser Edgar
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Allegation
Allegation (as amended at the hearing)
As a registered Hearing Aid Dispenser (HAD00451) your fitness to practise is impaired by reason of your misconduct, in that:
1. Between 2008 and 2021 during the course of your employment with Edgware Road Specsavers Hearcare Limited (ERSHL):
a. Between 2016 and 2021, you submitted one or more duplicated claims;
b. Between 2008 and 2021, you claimed reimbursement for expenses in relation to vouchers purchased for personal use;
c. Between 2014 and 2021, you claimed reimbursement for expenses in relation to mobile phone accounts for persons not employed with ERSHL, specifically:
i. Person F;
ii. Person G;
iii. Person H;
iv. Person I.
d. Between 2014 and 2021 you claimed reimbursement for your personal expenses from ERSHL, including:
i. Taxi fares;
ii. Tyres;
iii. Parking;
iv. Hotels;
v. Meals.
2. Your claims were incorrect in respect of your categorisation and/or description of one or more of your expenses in Particular 1b:
a. Categorised them as PAYE Settlement Agreements rather than P11D claims;
b. described one or more of your expenses as staff incentives or similar variations.
3. On or around 24 December 2019, you incorrectly named an expense, “Employee secret Santa present” or words to that effect.
4. Your actions at any or all of Particulars 1 – 3 were dishonest in that you knew that the information that you provided was inappropriate and/ or misleading.
5. The matters in Particulars 1 – 4 amount to misconduct.
6. By means of your misconduct your fitness to practise is impaired.
Finding
Preliminary Matters
Amendment to the Allegation
1. At the outset of the hearing Mr Slack on behalf of the HCPC applied to amend the stem of Particular 2 which made reference to expenses in Particular 1(b)(i) and 1(b)(ii) when in fact there were no sub particulars in Particular 1(b). It was submitted that this was a typographical error which was minor in nature and an amendment could be made without injustice.
2. Mr Hussain-Dupre on behalf of the Registrant did not oppose the application.
3. The Panel had regard to the submissions of the parties and took into account the advice of the Legal Assessor. In the circumstances it was satisfied that removing the reference to 1b(i) and (ii) and replacing it with 1b would correctly reflect the Allegation and provide clarity. The Panel considered that this was a minor amendment that could be made without injustice.
Background
4. The Registrant was a Partner, Director and Hearing Aid Dispenser at the Edgware Road branch of Specsavers Hearcare Limited ("ERSHL”). He began his employment in 2006 and resigned on 31 March 2021 after an internal investigation by Specsavers Hearcare Limited was conducted into expense claims which he had submitted over a period from 2008 to 2021.
5. The concerns related to expense claims made for personal rather than business related expenditure, including for non-Specsavers employees. There were concerns regarding the Registrant’s use of vouchers and how the Registrant had categorised or described the vouchers and other expenses which he had claimed. In February 2021 it was identified by HS in February 2021 that the expenses claims sent for processing in January 2021 by the Registrant appeared “significantly high” against the expense type PAYE Settlement Agreements (“PSA’s”).
6. Some further analysis of the Registrant’s expenses claims was undertaken by LG who produced a preliminary remote analysis report dated 4 March 2021 which identified £17,946.08 submitted as claims for staff incentives under the PSA category, duplicated claims and invalid or inappropriate claims in breach of the Specsavers Expenses policy. This report was forwarded to ERSHL and it was recommended to the Board of Directors (which included the Registrant) that a full investigation should be undertaken. The Directors of ERSHL signed a resolution to authorise the investigation on 10 March 2021.
7. On 24 March 2021, whilst the investigation was ongoing, the Registrant self-referred the matter to HCPC and explained that he had stepped away from the business to allow the investigation to conclude.
8. On 31 March 2021 a final investigation report was produced by BW which concluded that there was a potential liability of £77,215.72 owed by the Registrant to ERSHL for incorrect gift voucher claims which were used for the Registrant’s personal shopping and described as staff incentives, mobile telephone claims, duplicate claims and inappropriate claims for taxis, hotels, tyres, parking, meals and a gift which were all for the personal benefit of the Registrant.
9. On 16 August 2021 the Registrant signed a resolution releasing him from his position as Director and an agreement for his shares in ERSHL to be purchased for £78,000 by Specsavers. The money for the shares was returned to the business of ERSHL. The Registrant confirmed that his business partners were happy with this resolution.
10. On 7 April 2022, a panel of the Investigating Committee decided that the Registrant had a case to answer and referred an Allegation to a panel of the Conduct and Competence Committee for final hearing. The Registrant was notified of the Allegation on 12 April 2022. This Allegation was amended (including the discontinuance of some Particulars) by a panel at a preliminary hearing on 17 March 2025.
11. It is alleged that, over a number of years, the Registrant submitted duplicated expense claims and made expense claims for vouchers that he had purchased for personal use. The Registrant is alleged to have claimed expenses for mobile phone accounts for people not employed by ERSHL, and claimed reimbursement for his personal expenses. These expenses include journeys to and from work, parking at his home address, tyres for his personal car, meals with his partner and hotel stays. It is further alleged that one or more of these expenses were miscategorised as PAYE Settlement Agreements, staff incentives, and/or secret Santa presents, and this was done to conceal the actual purpose of the reimbursements and to disguise them in order to financially benefit the Registrant.
Decision on Facts
12. At the outset of the hearing Mr Hussain-Dupre on behalf of the Registrant stated that the Registrant admitted Particulars 1(a), 1(b), 1(c), 1(d)(i), 2(a), 2(b), 3 of the Allegation. Mr Hussain-Dupre confirmed that the dishonesty alleged in Particular 4 was also admitted insofar as it related to Particular 3.
13. On behalf of the HCPC the Panel heard live evidence from BW who was the investigating officer for the Specsavers investigation. The Panel also heard from HS who was the analyst who first raised the issue with the level of the Registrant’s expense claims.
14. On behalf of the Registrant the Panel heard directly from the Registrant and from BE [Redacted] who is a former Director of Hearing Centre Operations of Specsavers. The Panel was provided with a bundle of documents comprising of statements of the witnesses together with investigation reports and documents that were gathered as part of the investigation. The Panel also had the notes of an interview with the Registrant that formed part of the investigation. The Panel was also provided with a reflective piece written by the Registrant.
15. The Panel heard and accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor. In respect of the facts, the Panel understood that the burden of proving the disputed facts is on the HCPC. The Legal Assessor reminded the Panel to have regard to the HCPTS Practice Note relating to admissions and that it could find the Allegations proved without receiving further evidence if it was fair and proper to do so.
16. The Panel considered that the admissions made on behalf of the Registrant were made with the benefit of professional advice, were not equivocal and were not contrary to the evidence. In these circumstances the Panel accepted the admissions in relation to Particulars 1(a), 1(b), 1(c), 1(d)(i), 2(a), 2(b), 3 and it finds those facts proved.
17. With regard to the disputed facts the HCPC will only be able to prove a particular fact if it satisfies the required standard of proof: namely the civil standard, whereby it is more likely than not that the alleged incident occurred. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor in relation to the test for dishonesty as outlined in the case of Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd [2017] UKSC67 and took into account the Practice Note ‘Making decisions on a registrant’s state of mind’.
Particular 1(d)(ii) - Found Proved
1(d) Between 2014 and 2021 you claimed reimbursement for your personal expenses from ERSHL, including:
ii. Tyres;
18. The Panel considered the evidence. It considered the evidence contained within the statement of BW who said, “Mark Edgar should not have made expense claims for tyre repairs and replacements for his vehicle as this contradicts the Expense Policy… The Expense Policy confirms that the relevant Specsavers business (i.e. ERSHL) will reimburse authorised mileage rates but that it is the individual’s responsibility as the car driver to ensure the car is well maintained, roadworthy and fit for purpose. In my opinion, replacing or repairing tyres would be considered as car maintenance and therefore should be paid for by Mark Edgar personally”.
19. The Panel noted the expenses policy made no mention of the provision to claim for tyres and confirmed BW’s statement that it was the individual’s responsibility to ensure the car was well maintained. The Panel noted that it was explained to the Registrant in his local interview with BW that as he was claiming the higher mileage rate for his personal car at 45 pence per mile (ppm) he was not entitled to claim any additional costs for the repair or maintenance of that car. The Registrant responded, “In all honesty, I saw it as an option on Concur and I thought I could claim for tyres”.
20. In the Registrant’s witness statement, he stated that he was using his personal car for work related home visits and he saw an option on the expenses system (Concur) for “car maintenance/repairs – Director” and he therefore assumed that this type of claim could be submitted. The Registrant stated “…there was no harm in trying” and that if the claim wasn’t allowed then it would be rejected. He told the Panel that he made no attempt to hide the nature of his claim and his fellow director was happy to sign off the claim.
21. The Panel considered that notwithstanding the fact that the Registrant used his personal car for business it was still a personal expense claim for the tyres. The Panel was persuaded by the evidence of BW that the higher mileage rate of 45ppm reflected an amount for maintenance/wear and tear for a personal vehicle being used on business. The Panel considered that the tyre expenses were personal expenses and were not legitimate business expenses.
Particular 1(d)(iii) - Found Proved
1(d) Between 2014 and 2021 you claimed reimbursement for your personal expenses from ERSHL, including:
(iii) Parking.
22. For similar reasons the Panel was satisfied that the parking claim made for residential permits outside the Registrant’s home address was also a personal expense and not a legitimate business expense. The Panel accepted the evidence of BW in his statement which set out that, “As the permit was for his residential address, this would not be a business expense, whether or not he was also using it for business purposes such as visiting patients”.
23. The Panel considered that this was the common-sense conclusion in relation to this expense. The fact that the permit allowed the Registrant to park near certain patient’s houses was, in the Panel’s view, a side benefit of this expense. The main purpose was a personal benefit to the Registrant to park outside his own house. The Panel considered that this was a personal expense and not a business expense as the Registrant would have been able to claim for any parking outside patients’ homes on an ad-hoc basis without this permit.
Particular 1(d)(iv) - Found Proved
1(d) Between 2014 and 2021 you claimed reimbursement for your personal expenses from ERSHL, including:
(iv) Hotels
24. BW in his witness statement set out that the Registrant had agreed during his local interview that the hotel stays were for personal reasons and because he had decided not to go home after working late. BW in his statement confirmed that this was not an allowable expense, however, if there was a legitimate business need then these expenses would have been appropriate. The Panel noted that the expenses policy mentions hotel costs under “claiming expenses when working away from home”.
25. The Panel noted that the Registrant explained that he stayed in hotels after work during the Covid period to prevent difficulties with his partner and their newborn baby. In the local interview with BW the Registrant agreed that he had decided to stay in a hotel for personal reasons and not because he needed to for business purposes and he agreed that it was not a legitimate business expense.
26. In his oral evidence before the Panel the Registrant confirmed that the reason he stayed in a hotel for a number of nights was because of tensions at home because of his work during the Covid 19 Pandemic. He explained that as a key worker he was able to take advantage of special rates and he now considered that this was a legitimate business expense.
27. The Panel considered that the evidence established that the Registrant chose to stay in a hotel for personal reasons related to his domestic arrangements and not because of a business-related reason. The Panel accepted that the Registrant had been working and his partner was concerned about infection but this did not mean that the expense was business related or a legitimate business expense. The Registrant chose to stay in a local hotel rather than return home for domestic reasons.
Particular 1(d)(v) - Found Not Proved
1(d) Between 2014 and 2021 you claimed reimbursement for your personal expenses from ERSHL, including:
(v) Meals
28. The Panel noted that this related to meals that the Registrant had paid for and claimed as business expenses with his romantic partner who was an employee of another Specsavers branch. The Registrant explained during his local interview that these would be work related meals and would mean that work was not discussed at home. The Registrant’s oral evidence to the Panel was that during every meal he would have been surprised “if Specsavers didn’t come up” in their conversation.
29. BW’s statement set out that there was no evidence, such as minutes, for these meetings and therefore the Registrant had no way of demonstrating that these were legitimate business meetings. In these circumstances BW was unable to say whether these were legitimate business meetings or not.
30. The Panel noted that the Specsavers expenses policy did allow for entertaining colleagues from other companies within Specsavers as business entertaining provided the expense did not exceed £100 per person for an event and the relevant information was recorded on the claim. There is no requirement in the expenses policy to record minutes to demonstrate the business nature of the event.
31. The Panel noted that it was for the HCPC to demonstrate that these meals were personal expenses. The Panel had no evidence that these were purely personal meals and although the Registrant had claimed for meals with his romantic partner she was also a Specsavers employee and colleague. The Panel considered that the HCPC had not discharged its burden to demonstrate that these meals were personal expenses.
Particular 4 - Found Proved in relation to all Particulars
4. Your actions at any or all of Particulars 1 – 3 were dishonest in that you knew that the information that you provided was inappropriate and/ or misleading.
32. Having established the factual Particulars the Panel went on to consider the Allegation of dishonesty that related to those Particulars. The Panel noted that the Registrant admitted that the conduct was dishonest in relation to Particular 3 and it accepted that admission for the reasons set out above.
33. In his oral evidence the Registrant explained that some of the things he said in his initial local interview with BW were said in an effort to protect others who were doing the same thing with regard to expenses claims. In his oral evidence the Registrant stated that his expenses claims were all approved by his business partners with full knowledge of his actions and that the interview was stressful and oppressive and he made concessions that things were dishonest to “get things to stop”.
34. The Panel noted that there were several inconsistencies in the Registrant’s accounts of his state of knowledge at the time. The Panel took into account the Registrant’s good character but also balanced this with the fact that these claims spanned a period of over a decade.
35. The Panel also noted the Registrant’s evidence that he did not have any training about the expenses policies or the Joint Venture Business agreements and he stated he was not aware of the expenses policy.
36. The Panel considered that the expenses policy was a short document available on the Specsavers intranet. The Panel accepted the evidence that there was a declaration box which the Registrant was required to tick which confirmed the expenses were legitimate business expenses in accordance with the expenses policy. The Panel noted that the Registrant had accepted in his local interview that in ticking this box he had completed a false declaration. The Panel noted that although the Registrant had stated he had no training or awareness of the expenses policy, he had similarly taken no steps to educate himself or escalate any queries to Specsavers. The Panel considered that the Registrant had deliberately closed his mind to any information about his expenses that might cast doubt on their legitimacy.
Particular 1(a) – Found Proved
1. Between 2008 and 2021 during the course of your employment with Edgware Road Specsavers Hearcare Limited (ERSHL):
a. Between 2016 and 2021, you submitted one or more duplicated claims;
37. The Panel noted that the Registrant accepted that he had made duplicated claims but he stated that he had no idea how this came about and it was not intentional. The Registrant explained that he was not methodical in his approach and he kept receipts in a drawer. He stated that he may have claimed using his company credit card and then claimed again using the corresponding receipt. In answer to questions put to him in cross-examination the Registrant stated that he was not alerted to the duplication of the claim by the expenses system and he was not able to identify extra money coming into his account because of any duplicated claim.
38. The Panel considered that the amount and frequency of the duplicated claims made it less likely that these were inadvertent or a mistake. For example, the Panel noted that the Registrant made two claims for £64.48 for the same fan heater on the 23 and 30 November 2020. The Panel considered that it was unlikely that the Registrant would have forgotten he had claimed for this already during such a short time frame. In addition, the claims were not given the same description or claimed under the same expense heading which suggested to the Panel that the Registrant was attempting to make them appear different.
39. The Panel considered that it was part of the Registrant’s approach as set out in his statement to, “…try to maximise the amount of legitimate expenses that [he] could claim through the business as this was not then withdraw as salary or dividends”. The Panel considered that it was likely that the Registrant was aware that he was submitting duplicated claims given the amounts and nature of the expenses claimed. He was aware that there was a permissive nature within the business to the approval of claims and that there were no robust checking procedures in place.
40. The Panel did not accept the Registrant’s assertion that he thought that the expenses system would flag duplicate claims to him as this was inconsistent with his statement to the Panel that he had never had any of his expenses claims rejected for any reason. The Panel considered that the duplicated claims were made by the Registrant in an effort to maximise his income.
41. The Panel considered that the Registrant did appreciate that filing duplicate claims for the same expense was both inappropriate and misleading and amounted to dishonesty. The Panel also considered that this would be regarded as dishonest by the standards of ordinary decent people.
Particulars 1(b), 2(a), 2(b) – Found Proved
1(b) Between 2008 and 2021, you claimed reimbursement for expenses in relation to vouchers purchased for personal use;
2 Your claims were incorrect in respect of your categorisation and/or description of one or more of your expenses in Particular 1b, in that you:
a. Categorised them as PAYE Settlement Agreements rather than P11D claims;
b. described one or more of your expenses as staff incentives or similar variations.
42. The Panel determined to deal with these Particulars together as they were all related to the same issue of the voucher claims.
43. The Panel noted that in his local interview with BW the Registrant accepted that his actions in relation to the vouchers was a deviation from the Specsavers expenses policy. The Registrant was apologetic and stated he had “abused the system” through complacency. The Registrant accepted in that interview that he had misrepresented the description of the expense claims as staff incentives and had misled his business partners about the level of money he was removing from the business.
44. The Registrant during his oral evidence to the Panel stated that he was trying to shield his business partners from a similar investigation and was trying not to implicate anyone else in the investigation. The Registrant stated his business partners were well aware of his actions in relation to vouchers and were happy to sign off his expenses. He stated that those partners would also use vouchers for personal use on occasions and it was seen as a way to maximise the amount to claim through expenses instead of salary or dividends.
45. The Registrant stated in his witness statement that with the benefit of hindsight he accepted that he should have highlighted the vouchers which were strictly for personal use to be transferred directly on to his P11D or as a dividend payment. The Panel noted the evidence that the Registrant had categorised expenses on his P11D and it considered that this was evidence he was aware at the time he could have done so.
46. The Panel considered these statements were difficult to reconcile with the conclusion that the Registrant was not aware that his actions in claiming expenses for vouchers used for his own personal expenses was both inappropriate and misleading. The Panel considered that this was knowledge that the Registrant had at the time and he used the vouchers as a way to quickly and easily take money from the business without using the process for a dividend payment.
47. The Panel noted that this scheme had initially begun when the Registrant was making payment to his ex-wife by way of the vouchers in order to support his children. The Registrant recognised in his local interview that he had begun using the vouchers at a time of financial difficulty and he accepted that during Covid when his business bank account was frozen he had claimed for over £1000 of vouchers to “lighten his financial burden”.
48. The Panel considered that the Registrant’s initial reluctance to implicate others suggested that he was well aware that these claims were not appropriate and he knew that they should not have been made. The Panel considered that the Registrant had described the vouchers as staff incentives to hide the real nature of the claims and to mislead his business partners, the corporate arm of Specsavers and HMRC about the real nature and extent of these expenses and the benefit he was receiving from them.
49. Describing the claims as incentives and listing them on the PAYE settlement agreements description meant that he paid no personal tax on this income which has been estimated by the Registrant and the investigators at around £500 extra per month. The Panel considered that the Registrant would have been aware that he was receiving this money as expenses rather than income and not paying any tax on it.
50. The Panel noted the evidence of HS who stated that he would expect these expenses to be minor and that he had never seen them claimed at this level outside the Christmas period which was why he was alerted to the issue on the monthly reporting.
51. The Panel did not consider the process for claiming the vouchers was inadvertent or a mistake. The Panel considered that the Registrant deliberately exploited this process for his own financial gain and in doing so he misled others about the true nature of his claims from the business.
52. The Panel had no direct evidence from the Registrant’s former business partners. The Panel noted that in his local interview the Registrant accepted that his business partners “wouldn’t be happy” if they if they were aware that this money was being used for personal expenses. The Panel noted that in a meeting between BW’s and SA (the Registrant’s business partner and approver of his expense claims), SA told BW’s that he trusted the Registrant to make claims in accordance with the expenses policy. The Panel had no evidence, other than the Registrant’s assertions that his business partners were aware of the issue.
53. The Panel considered that it was more likely, given that the Registrant took steps to conceal the true nature of the claims, that his partners were not aware of the extent of the amount of the voucher claims. The Panel considered that the actions as found proved in Particulars 1(b) and 2 were both inappropriate and misleading and the Registrant was aware that his actions were dishonest and would be considered to be dishonest by ordinary decent people.
Particular 1(c) – Found Proved
1(c) Between 2014 and 2021, you claimed reimbursement for expenses in relation to mobile phone accounts for persons not employed with ERSHL, specifically:
i. Person F;
ii. Person G;
iii. Person H;
iv. Person I.
54. The Panel noted that the Registrant accepted he had claimed for mobile phone contracts for members of his family who were not employed by his business. In his local interview the Registrant accepted that the claims for mobile phone lines for his family were not legitimate claims. The Registrant stated in interview that the claim [Redacted] was potentially a business expense as he provided business advice to the Registrant as a former Specsavers employee.
55. The Panel heard evidence from [Redacted] who stated that there was no discussion about the mobile phone and it was just something that the Registrant did. In his evidence he stated that he would hardly, if ever, talk about work related matters with the Registrant.
56. The Panel considered that the evidence demonstrated that the Registrant was aware that he should not have been making the mobile phone claims for his family members as a business expense. The Panel considered that it was clear from the Registrant’s local interview that he knew that the contract was a business contract and he also added his family members on to that contract and claimed it as a business expense. The Panel noted that the Registrant volunteered this information during the interview when he was asked if there were any other expenses that were not brought up with him as a concern in the preliminary report. The Panel considered that this was evidence that the Registrant was aware these claims were inappropriate and should not have been made. The Panel considered that the Registrant was aware his actions as found proved in Particular 1(c) were dishonest and would be considered to be dishonest by the standards of ordinary decent people.
Particular 1(d) – Found Proved
1d Between 2014 and 2021 you claimed reimbursement for your personal expenses from ERSHL, including:
i. Taxi fares;
ii. Tyres;
iii. Parking;
iv. Hotels;
57. The Panel noted that the expenses policy was clear in relation to taxi fares that travel costs between home and normal place of work were not included. The Panel noted that in his initial interview the Registrant agreed that these should not have been claimed. In his oral evidence when it was put to him by Mr Slack that he was dishonest in making these claims the Registrant agreed. The Panel considered that the Registrant was aware that he could not claim for travel between his home and place of work and in making a claim in these circumstances he was dishonest. The Panel also considered that making such a claim would be considered dishonest by the standards of ordinary decent people.
58. With regard to the claim for tyres the Panel noted that the Registrant’s explanation was that “…there was no harm in trying” as this appeared to be a new category of expense on the system for Directors. The Panel considered that the Registrant took no steps to clarify or find out if this was a legitimate expense with Specsavers before making the claim other than a conversation with a fellow director to ensure that it would be approved. The Panel considered this was another example of the Registrant’s “complacency” with regard to the expenses policy. The Panel considered that the Registrant had deliberately closed his mind to the legitimacy of this claim for his own gain and had taken no steps to find out if this was a legitimate claim or not. The Panel considered that this would be considered dishonest by the standards of ordinary decent people.
59. The Panel reached a similar conclusion with regard to the claims in relation to parking and hotels. The Panel considered that the evidence suggested that the Registrant, in his own mind, had considered that there was some business benefit to the claims he was making for these items. This was clear from what he said in the local interview and in his evidence before this Panel. The Registrant was also aware that there was a personal benefit to him in relation to these items as the parking enabled him to park outside his own home and the hotel stays eased tensions at home. However, the Registrant took no steps to ascertain whether these were appropriately categorised as allowable business expenses. On his own evidence the Registrant did not look at the expenses policy and was “complacent” with regard to whether expenses complied with the policy. The Registrant admitted that the declaration that these were allowable expenses was ticked by him on the expenses system without any thought about whether these claims were in accordance with the criteria. The Panel considered that this was dishonest by the standards of ordinary decent people.
Statutory Grounds and Impairment
60. The Panel having found facts proved, by virtue of the Registrant’s admissions and its own findings, went on to consider whether the facts proved amounted to misconduct and whether, if there had been misconduct, the Registrant’s fitness to practise is currently impaired.
61. At this stage of the hearing, the Registrant gave evidence to the Panel, by way of his written reflective statement and oral evidence. The Registrant explained he had joined Specsavers at age 25 and there had been no detailed induction procedure. Although he held a nominal title, there had been no involvement in many of the usual decisions for a company director, but he believed his role was focused on clinical responsibilities. The Registrant told the Panel about his new business and the process undertaken for the management of his expenses claims. He gave the Panel details of available support, in particular the services of an accountant, that the Registrant accesses on matters of business going forward.
62. The Registrant accepted that he had taken steps to conceal some of the expenses claimed at Specsavers. He accepted that some of his actions, not merely ignorance, had involved intentional taking advantage of the system.
63. The Registrant also provided two testimonials, one from his accountant and one from a former colleague and now business colleague. The Registrant told the Panel that the latter colleague had been aware of all the details of the Allegations at the time he had been questioned by Specsavers. He had not provided full details of the formal Allegation to either character witness.
64. Mr Barnfield submitted that, for misconduct to be found, the misconduct must be serious. Not every falling short would satisfy the statutory ground. He submitted that standard 9.1 of the HCPC’s Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics (2016 version) was engaged. He submitted that the Registrant had to ensure his conduct justified the trust of the public. Mr Barnfield submitted that matters of dishonest misconduct are a serious departure from standards, damaging the reputation of the profession. He submitted that members of the public would be shocked and appalled by the Registrant’s conduct.
65. On the matter of impairment, the HCPC’s written submission in its Case Summary was that, if misconduct was found, the Panel should also find impairment. Mr Barnfield asked the Panel to evaluate the extent of the Registrant’s reflections. He submitted that it should consider the extent of remorse, insight and apology of the Registrant. Mr Barnfield referred the Panel to the HCPTS’ Practice Note, ‘Fitness to Practise Impairment’. He submitted that three of four aspects of the considerations of impairment, referred to in CHRE v NMC & Grant [2011] EWHC 927 (Admin), taken from the fifth ‘Shipman’ report by Dame Janet Smith, were engaged. He submitted that the Registrant, in giving evidence had still demonstrated unwillingness to attribute dishonesty to himself.
66. Mr Hussain-Dupre submitted that the Panel had heard the Registrant’s evidence and received the testimonials which it should take into account at this stage. He submitted that, per the judgement in Sawati v General Medical Council [2022] EWHC 283, the Registrant should not be penalised for having defended the charges.
67. Mr Hussain-Dupre submitted that the Registrant had, since the events under consideration, gone on to run a successful new business. He submitted that the Registrant’s business partner had been aware of the matters but still had chosen to start a business with the Registrant. The Registrant had reached an amicable settlement with the co-directors of the previous Specsavers business. Mr Hussain-Dupre submitted that the Registrant’s financial dependence on the new business would be the ultimate deterrent against any recurrence.
68. Mr Hussain-Dupre submitted that there was no need for a finding of impairment in the wider public interest. Further, in view of the Registrant’s remediation and the low risk of repetition, there was no need for a finding of impairment.
69. The Legal Assessor advised the Panel that it had to decide whether the facts found proved amounted to the statutory ground of misconduct, that was serious professional misconduct and must then consider whether this demonstrated that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is currently impaired. Both were matters for the Panel’s own judgement.
70. The Legal Assessor advised the Panel concerning the judgement in Sawati and confirmed that the courts had made clear that a registrant is entitled to defend an allegation. He referred the Panel to the HCPTS’ Practice Note, ‘Fitness to Practise Impairment’ and advised the Panel to consider the question as to impairment as per that guidance. He also reminded the Panel of the questions posed in CHRE v NMC & Grant [2011] EWHC 927 (Admin) as to the question of impairment.
Decision on Misconduct
71. The Panel bore in mind that not every finding of fact amounts to misconduct. In order to find misconduct as a statutory ground, the Panel must be satisfied that the facts amounted to serious professional misconduct. The Panel was aware that the decision was for its judgement, not involving a burden of proof.
72. The Panel carefully considered the evidence and its findings of fact.
Particulars 1(a) and 4 in respect of 1(a)
73. In respect of paragraph 1(a), the Registrant had admitted having submitted one or more duplicated expenses claims between 2016 and 2021. The Panel had gone on to find that these submissions had been committed dishonestly, on the basis that it found it was likely that the Registrant was aware that duplicates had been submitted. It found that the Registrant had intended to maximise his income by submission of the duplicate claims and had rejected his suggestion that his actions had been unintentional.
74. The Panel considered that the Registrant’s conduct had fallen far below the requirements of standard 9.1 of the HCPC’s Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics (2016 version), which states:
“Personal and professional behaviour
9.1 You must make sure that your conduct justifies the public’s trust and confidence in you and your profession”.
75. The Panel considered that the public expected registered hearing aid dispensers to act with integrity and honesty. It took into account that the Registrant had a senior role as a director of the Specsavers branch. Over-claiming expenses inflated the costs of the business and was an unethical practice. The duplicated claims had extended over a considerable period of time and had been repeated. The Panel was satisfied that this was serious professional misconduct.
Particulars 1b, 2(a), 2(b) and 4 in respect of 1b, 2(a), 2(b)
76. The Panel next considered the Registrant’s actions in relation to Particulars 1(b), 2(a) and 2(b), which concerned the ‘voucher’ claims. The Registrant had admitted these factual particulars and the Panel had also found that his actions had been dishonest, in Particular 4.
77. The Panel had taken into account that the Registrant had claimed in the region of £45,000 in vouchers between 2008 and 2021. It had found that the Registrant had attempted to hide the real nature of the claims from business partners, the corporate arm of Specsavers and HMRC. It considered that he had been aware of that he was not paying tax by receiving the money as expenses. In evidence to the Panel at this stage and in his reflections, the Registrant admitted that he had intentionally concealed his actions and exploited the expenses system.
78. The Panel again considered that this conduct fell far below the standards expected and was conduct which fellow professionals would regard as deplorable. This misconduct was serious professional misconduct.
Particulars 1(c) (i) to (iv) and 4 in respect of 1(c) (i) to (iv)
79. The Panel had found Particular 1(c)(i) to (iv) inclusive proved by virtue of the Registrant’s admissions to the facts. It had also found that this conduct had been committed dishonestly by the Registrant.
80. The evidence was that the Registrant had made early admissions to his employer that most of the mobile phone claims for his family members were not legitimate claims. The Panel had found that the Registrant had been aware that he should not have been claiming for any of his family’s mobile phones as a business expense. The Panel had found that this would be considered dishonest by ordinary decent people.
81. The Panel took into account the number of claims and the period of claiming, together with the dishonesty. It considered that the Registrant’s conduct had fallen far below standards of probity which the public expected and breached standard 9.1. The Panel concluded that this was serious professional misconduct.
Particulars 1(d) (i) to (iv) and 4 in respect of1(d) (i) to (iv)
82. The Registrant had admitted Particular 1(d)(i) and the Panel had found Particulars 1(d)(ii) to (iv) inclusive proved, together with dishonest conduct in relation to each of those Particulars of the Allegation.
83. The Panel had found that the Registrant had been aware that his travel costs between home and his normal place of work should not have been claimed. It had found that the Registrant had deliberately closed his mind as to whether claims for car tyres were allowable. He had been aware that there was a personal benefit to his illegitimate claims for car parking and hotels in the relation to the relevant claims. He had taken no adequate steps to check the expenses policy.
84. Taking into account the Registrant’s responsible position within the branch and the repeated claims and period involved, the Panel considered that this had been a serious falling short of the standard and was serious professional misconduct.
Particulars 3 and 4 in respect of 3
85. The Registrant had admitted Particular 3 of the Allegation and that his conduct had been dishonest in respect of incorrectly naming the expense, and the Panel had therefore found the matters proved. As with the claims in respect of other expenses, the Panel was of the view that the misuse of the expenses system and concealment of the claims fell far below the required standards and was serious professional misconduct.
86. The Panel had found that each of the particulars which had been found proved as fact and dishonestly committed by the Registrant amounted to misconduct. It also considered that, regarded as a whole, the Registrant had engaged in serious professional misconduct by repeatedly taking numerous opportunities to boost his legitimate income by claiming illegitimate monies as his business expenses.
87. Although not directly connected to the Registrant’s clinical practice, in the sense of his treatment of patients, the misconduct found did undermine fundamental tenets of the profession in terms of the requirement to act with honesty and probity.
Decision on Impairment
88. The Panel having found misconduct went on to consider whether the Registrant’s fitness to practise is currently impaired as a result. The Panel was mindful that not every finding of misconduct will result in a finding of impairment.
89. The Panel carefully considered its findings of fact and misconduct. It again took into account the Registrant’s evidence at this stage, including his reflective account, his oral evidence and the two testimonial letters provided. The Panel also took into account the submissions received and accepted the legal advice of the Legal Assessor. It was mindful that the issue of impairment is a matter for the Panel’s judgement and does not involve a burden of proof.
90. The Panel paid careful regard to the HCPTS’ Practice Note, ‘Fitness to Practise Impairment’. It took into account the guidance given in relation to the case of Sawati v General Medical Council [2022] EWHC 283 and noted that the Registrant had a right to defend himself against allegations without unfair inferences being drawn in relation to insight or aggravating factors.
91. The Panel followed the guidance given in the Practice Note and the approach as to the two broad ‘components’ of impairment: the ‘personal’ component and the ‘public’ component, bearing in mind their interrelation.
92. Considering first the ‘personal’ component, which relates to the risk of the Registrant repeating his past misconduct, the Panel bore in mind the questions posed in the case of Cohen v GMC [2008] EWHC 581 (Admin), which are to consider whether the Registrant’s misconduct is remediable, has been remedied and is highly unlikely to be repeated.
93. The Panel took into account that the misconduct involved dishonesty, which is acknowledged to be hard to remediate. Nevertheless, the Panel considered that, if there was good evidence of insight and acceptance of misconduct, the dishonesty was in principle capable of remediation.
94. The Panel noted the guidance from the Practice Note that an important question is the development of the Registrant’s insight. The Panel therefore looked closely at the evidence which the Registrant had provided.
95. The Panel noted the Registrant’s efforts to put himself in a position in which the system of expenses was much simpler than before and therefore reduced any temptation to abuse it. It also heard from the Registrant that he is keen to access the assistance of professionals in determining appropriate handling of expenses and other financial matters. It took into account that the misconduct in question occurred some years ago, and the Panel had no information concerning any subsequent concerns.
96. The Panel noted that in his reflective statement the Registrant had stated: “During this panel hearing I’ve reviewed again regarding the questions around honesty. Being ignorant and choosing not to seek further advice was in fact a decision to be dishonest”. The Panel took into account that, during his oral evidence, the Registrant accepted during cross-examination that his dishonesty had been broader than his written statement had suggested. He agreed that his actions had involved intentional concealment of some expenses and an intention to abuse a system that he knew well. The Panel was concerned that he continued to refer to “poor decision making”, which, in its view appeared to downplay the seriousness of the misconduct. The Panel further noted that there was an absence of any apology or any indication of remorse in the Registrant’s reflection.
97. The Panel considered the two testimonial references which the Registrant had provided, noting that one was provided by his accountant and the other by the Registrant’s business partner and former colleague. The Panel took into account that, on questioning, it became apparent that, although the business partner and former colleague had awareness of the overall nature of the concerns, the Registrant had not made either aware of the full detail of the Allegation.
98. The Panel concluded that the weight that could be afforded to their opinions of the Registrant’s character and honesty was impacted by this matter. Therefore, notwithstanding that the testimonials were positive as to the Registrant’s general professionalism, good character and honesty, they were not sufficient to turn the Panel’s decision from its other concerns.
99. The Panel took into account the serious nature of the misconduct which had occurred. The expenses claims ranged over a period of some years. It had involved the potential loss to the business of a large sum (although the Panel was told that repayment terms had been agreed and met). The findings of the Panel had been that the claims had been deliberate and an intentional misuse of the expenses system.
100. Referring to the judgment in Grant, the Panel considered that, by his misconduct, the Registrant had brought the profession into disrepute and had breached fundamental tenets of honesty for the profession. He had also acted dishonestly.
101. Taking all of this into account, the Panel considered that considerable, persuasive evidence of remediation was required, acknowledging that dishonesty is said to be hard to be remedied, and is attitudinal in nature. The Panel was of the view that the Registrant has commenced on a journey towards remediation but has not demonstrated complete remediation. He did not appear, for example, to be able to explain how dishonesty such as in this case undermines public confidence in the profession as whole, instead concentrating on concerns with clinical abilities. In the view of the Panel, describing the misconduct as “poor decision making” did not meet its view of the misconduct and minimised the scale and nature of his dishonesty.
102. In conclusion, the Panel found that the demonstration of insight by the Registrant was lacking in completeness. Further, there was a lack of recognition of the impact on his profession of his dishonesty and the absence of a demonstration of remorse. In light of that the Panel was unable to exclude the risk of repetition to the necessary degree. Accordingly, the Panel found that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is currently impaired, in relation to the ‘personal’ component.
103. Taking this into account, the Panel next considered the three ‘elements’ of the ‘public’ component of impairment. The Panel, having found that it could not exclude a risk of repetition, concluded that there was a need to protect service users. In addition, taking into account the amount of money involved in the claimed expenses, the period over which the misconduct had occurred and the repeated nature of the misconduct, the Panel decided that a finding of impairment was also necessary on the ‘public component’. The Panel was of the view that public confidence in the profession and declaration of proper professional standards would be undermined unless there was a finding of current impairment.
104. The Panel found the Registrant’s fitness to practise as a registered Hearing Aid Dispenser is currently impaired.
Sanction
Submissions
105. The Panel had found that the Allegation was well-founded and the Registrant’s fitness to practise as a registered Hearing Aid Dispenser is currently impaired by reason of his misconduct.
106. The Panel therefore went on, in accordance with Article 29(3) of the Health Professions Order 2001 (as amended) (“the Order”) to consider what further steps were necessary, pursuant to the remainder of Article 29.
107. Mr Barnfield, on behalf of the HCPC submitted that the Panel should consider the guidance of the HCPC’s Sanctions Policy March 2019 (‘SP’) on the matter of whether to impose a sanction. He submitted that the Panel must be proportionate in its approach. It had to work up the ‘ladder’ of sanctions.
108. Mr Barnfield submitted that the Panel should consider the seriousness of the case, taking into account its aggravating and mitigating features as determined by the Panel. On the question of potential aggravating factors, he submitted that a case may be aggravated by limited or lack of remediation, remorse and/or apology.
109. Mr Barnfield reminded the Panel of parts of the determinations made at previous stages, including that there was an incomplete journey of remediation and the reference to a lack of remorse and apology. He submitted that these were relevant matters to the Panel’s decision, together with the noted lack of insight as to the impact of the misconduct on the profession. Mr Barnfield drew the Panel’s attention to paragraphs 56-58 of the SP, and the matter of dishonesty being attitudinal in nature and difficult to remediate.
110. As to mitigation, Mr Barnfield submitted that reflection, even where limited, is of some value. He noted that the Registrant had offered his reflections to the Panel. The Registrant had engaged with the process throughout. He submitted that, per Bolton v Law Society [1994] WLR 512, matters of personal mitigation have less impact in deciding sanction.
111. Mr Hussain-Dupre, on the Registrant’s behalf, submitted that the Panel should approach the sanctions in ascending order of seriousness, imposing that most appropriate in the circumstances. He submitted that the Panel’s finding of incomplete development of insight suggested that there was emerging insight on the part of the Registrant.
112. Mr Hussain-Dupre focused his submissions on the appropriateness of a suspension order. He said that the Registrant had spent his entire career in audiology. He had made a significant contribution to it and, through his new business the Registrant had a further significant contribution to make. The Registrant currently had about 1000 patients, who relied on his business.
113. [Redacted]. He submitted that a suspension of six months would be proportionate in the circumstances. The Registrant would not be able to practise during this time and needed time to develop his insight. Such a suspension would not be fatal to the business and would allow the opportunity to take on two locums. In that way, he could continue to support his patients. He submitted that this would not then be career-ending or force the Registrant to step away from the profession.
114. Mr Hussain-Dupre submitted that the Registrant appreciated the Panel’s decisions and was willing to make the necessary financial sacrifices. The financial repercussions of a suspension would be serious. He submitted that the Panel needed to conduct a balancing exercise between the need to protect the public but also considering the needs of the Registrant.
115. Mr Hussain-Dupre submitted that a six-month suspension is sufficient to acknowledge the public interest factors in the case.
Legal Advice
116. The Legal Assessor advised the Panel that, having found the Allegation well-founded and the Registrant’s fitness to practise is impaired, it must consider its powers pursuant to Article 29. He advised the Panel to consider the guidance in the SP. He set out the options to the Panel and advised it to consider them in ascending order. He advised the Panel that it must consider imposing a sanction, if any, that is proportionate and achieved protection of the public. It must balance the Registrant’s interests with the public interest.
117. The Legal Assessor referred the Panel to paragraphs 56-58 of the SP in particular and also the judgment in Simawi v GMC [2020] EWHC 2168 in which the Knowles J reviewed caselaw principles in relation to cases involving dishonesty. He also referred to Lusinga v Nursing and Midwifery Council [2017] EWHC 1458 (Admin), Abbas v GMC [2017] EWHC 51 and R (ota Hassan) v GOC [2013] EWHC 1887 (Admin), on the point that dishonesty is a serious professional failing, but there are ranges of circumstances and of disposals. The Legal Assessor reminded the Panel of the earlier advice relating to Sawati v GMC (above).
Decision
118. The Panel took into account the submissions of the parties and accepted the legal advice of the Legal Assessor. It carefully considered the guidance from the SP and its findings of fact, misconduct and impairment.
119. The Panel had well in mind that, in taking any step under Article 29 and in considering any sanction, it had to act proportionately. Therefore, the Panel started with the least restrictive step and considered each in ascending order of increased restriction, stopping at the minimum which met the level of impairment and achieved public protection. The Panel balanced the interests of the Registrant with the public interest.
120. The Panel had in well in mind the Overarching Objective of the HCPC to protect the public, which had the following elements:
(a) to protect, promote and maintain the health, safety and well-being of the public;
(b) to promote and maintain public confidence in the professions regulated under this Order; and
(c) to promote and maintain proper professional standards and conduct for members of those professions.
121. The Panel considered the factors which, in its view, aggravated or mitigated the seriousness of the case. In terms of aggravation, the Panel noted the high value of the amount of expenses which had been illegitimately claimed and the long period over which the misconduct had occurred. The Registrant’s misconduct had been with the purpose of intentionally obtaining personal benefit and had been repeated misconduct carried out in numerous ways.
122. The Panel considered that the misconduct was aggravated by a lack of demonstrated remorse or apology. It took due account of the Registrant’s right to defend the allegations. However, it noted that there was a limitation to the demonstration of insight developed by the Registrant in the time since the Panel’s determination on facts had been handed down. The Panel had found that the Registrant lacked complete insight, particularly in relation to the impact of his misconduct on public confidence in the profession as a whole, and the apparent minimisation of the nature and scale of the dishonesty.
123. In terms of mitigation, the Registrant had admitted some of his conduct in the internal investigation and had admitted several of the factual particulars at the start of the hearing. This had included an admission of dishonest conduct in relation to one of the particulars. The Registrant had referred himself to the HCPC and had fully co-operated with both the internal investigation and the HCPC’s processes.
124. The Panel acknowledged that there had been a period of years since the events in question, during which the Registrant had established his own new business and there was no suggestion to the Panel of any subsequent concerns.
125. The Panel noted that the Registrant had displayed some insight in his written reflections, referring to a recognition of the need for integrity in practice and a dedication to transparency and accountability for his actions. He had indicated, when cross-examined in the hearing, a broader acceptance of his dishonesty than had been indicated in his written reflections. The Panel had concluded that the Registrant’s insight was still developing and not complete.
126. There was no suggestion in the Allegation of any issues with the Registrant’s clinical practice, or of any direct harm occasioned to patients. The Panel noted the practical steps and intentions that the Registrant told the Panel he had applied to his new business, and the Registrant’s current positive conduct in practice was supported by the testimonials provided.
127. The Panel took into account that honesty is a fundamental tenet of the profession, in which Hearing Aid Dispensers are dealing directly with the public, dispensing expensive hearing aids and receiving payment.
128. The Panel noted paragraphs 56 to 58 of the SP, which state:
“56. The Standards of conduct, performance and ethics require registrants to be honest and trustworthy (Standard 9). Dishonesty undermines public confidence in the profession and can, in some cases, impact the public’s safety.
57. Dishonesty, both in and outside the workplace, can have a significant impact on the trust placed in those who have been dishonest, and potentially on public safety. It is likely to lead to more serious sanctions. The following are illustrations of such dishonesty:
• putting false information in a service user’s record (including in an attempt to cover up misconduct or a lack of competence);
• providing untruthful information in job applications (perhaps misleading the prospective employer about experience, training or skills gained);
• using medicines, devices or services meant for service users;
• fraud, theft or other financial crime.
58. Given the seriousness of dishonesty, cases are likely to result in more serious sanctions. However, panels should bear in mind that there are different forms, and different degrees, of dishonesty, that need to be considered in an appropriately nuanced way. Factors that panels should take into account in this regard include:
• whether the relevant behaviour took the form of a single act, or occurred on multiple occasions;
• the duration of any dishonesty;
• whether the registrant took a passive or active role in it;
• any early admission of dishonesty on the registrant’s behalf; and
• any other relevant mitigating factors”.
129. The Panel had found that the Registrant had acted dishonestly over a significant period of time, in which he had knowingly exploited the expenses system, on repeated occasions, resulting in a large amount of money being taken from the business. There was no suggestion of a direct financial loss to any patient, but the costs of the business were likely to have been impacted, and the interests of the Registrant’s business partners.
130. The Registrant had made some early admissions to incorrect claiming, in the internal investigation. He had made a singular admission to dishonesty at the start of the hearing. However, otherwise, the Registrant had only made significant steps to acknowledge his dishonesty after the Panel had made its factual determination. Before this he appeared to blame the inappropriateness of his actions on a lack of induction, or lack of robustness of the system and stated that his behaviour was common practice by directors at Specsavers franchises and therefore acceptable.
131. The Panel therefore concluded that the seriousness of the case was not at the lower, but rather at the higher end, of the scale.
132. The Panel turned its consideration to the appropriate disposal of the case. It first considered whether it could take no further action despite the finding of impairment. However, the Panel decided that taking no further action would not be sufficiently protect the public, in view of the risk of repetition which could not be excluded. Taking no further action would also fail to mark the wider public interest concerns and meet the seriousness of the findings. The Panel considered that neither was the case suitable for mediation, for similar reasons.
133. The next more serious disposal was to impose a caution order. The Panel noted paragraph 101 of the SP, which states:
“101. A caution order is likely to be an appropriate sanction for cases in which:
• the issue is isolated, limited, or relatively minor in nature;
• there is a low risk of repetition;
• the registrant has shown good insight; an
• the registrant has undertaken appropriate remediation”.
134. The Panel did not consider the issues to have been either isolated, limited or relatively minor. A risk of repetition remained. Moreover, a caution order would leave the Registrant free to resume unrestricted practice, when there was a need to protect the public from a potential risk of repetition. Further, a caution order was insufficient to mark the seriousness of the breach of the fundamental tenet of honesty for the profession.
135. The Panel next considered a conditions of practice order. It took into account paragraphs 107 and 108 of the SP, which states:
“When might a conditions of practice order not be appropriate?
107. Conditions will only be effective in cases where the registrant is genuinely committed to resolving the concerns raised and the panel is confident they will do so. Therefore, conditions of practice are unlikely to be suitable in cases in which the registrant has failed to engage with the fitness to practise process or where there are serious or persistent failings.
108. Conditions are also less likely to be appropriate in more serious cases, for example those involving:
dishonesty (see paragraphs 56–58)”.
136. The Panel considered that the misconduct had been serious and repeated over a considerable period. The dishonesty indicated attitudinal issues and further work would be required from the Registrant on developing his insight.
137. Further, the Panel was of the view that the dishonesty made the case too serious for a conditions of practice order to sufficiently meet the need to maintain public confidence in the profession. It reminded itself of paragraph 57 of the SP, which states:
“57. Dishonesty, both in and outside the workplace, can have a significant impact on the trust placed in those who have been dishonest, and potentially on public safety”.
138. The Panel therefore moved on to consider whether it should impose a suspension order on the Registrant’s registration. It observed paragraph 121 of the SP, which states:
“When is a suspension order appropriate?
121. A suspension order is likely to be appropriate where there are serious concerns which cannot be reasonably addressed by a conditions of practice order, but which do not require the registrant to be struck off the Register. These types of cases will typically exhibit the following factors:
• the concerns represent a serious breach of the Standards of conduct, performance and ethics;
• the registrant has insight;
• the issues are unlikely to be repeated; and
• there is evidence to suggest the registrant is likely to be able to resolve or remedy their failings.”
139. The Panel had found that a serious breach of the Standards had occurred. It was of the view that the Registrant has some insight, though not complete and which requires further development. The Panel could not exclude a risk of repetition, but it considered there is evidence that the Registrant has the capacity to remedy attitudinal failings, in light of the steps taken in his new business.
140. Before making its decision, the Panel looked at the next more serious sanction, which was to make a striking off order. It noted paragraph 131 of the SP, which states:
“131. A striking off order is likely to be appropriate where the nature and gravity of the concerns are such that any lesser sanction would be insufficient to protect the public, public confidence in the profession, and public confidence in the regulatory process. In particular where the registrant:
• lacks insight;
• continues to repeat the misconduct or, where a registrant has been suspended for two years continuously, fails to address a lack of competence; or
• is unwilling to resolve matters".
141. The Panel considered that, whilst there are limitations, the Registrant had demonstrated some insight. There had been no further concerns since the events up to 2021. The Registrant, by the steps taken in relation to his new business, had demonstrated a willingness to resolve the past concerns.
142. The Panel reminded itself of the mitigating factors. It noted that the Registrant had referred himself to the HCPC and had fully co-operated with the investigations and proceedings. He had now acknowledged the broader aspects of his dishonesty.
143. The Panel concluded that, taking all the factors into account, the Registrant’s impairment was not fundamentally incompatible with being on the register.
144. The Panel was satisfied that a period of suspension will allow time for the Registrant to further develop his insight and undertake remediation of his misconduct. For the period of the suspension, the public would be protected and the suspension order will be reviewed before its expiry by another panel. In that a lower sanction will achieve the objective of public protection, striking off would be disproportionate.
145. The Panel decided to impose a Suspension Order. It next considered the period for which the suspension order should be imposed. It noted paragraph 122 of the SP which stated:
“How long should a suspension order be imposed for?
122. A suspension order should be imposed for a specified period up to one year.
When determining how long a suspension order should be imposed for, panels must ensure that their primary consideration is what is necessary and proportionate in order to ensure that the public is protected (see paragraphs 20–22)”.
146. The Panel was of the view that the period of suspension had to take into account the seriousness of the case, in order to adequately protect the public. The selected period had to allow time for the Registrant to complete his development of insight. It had to mark the Panel’s view of the misconduct, to send a message to the public and to the profession of the expected standards. The Panel considered that seriousness was at the higher end of the scale and therefore a longer period of suspension was warranted.
147. The Panel acknowledged that a period of suspension will have an effect on the Registrant’s ability to pursue his profession and will impact his business. It understood from the evidence given that the Registrant was likely to suffer financial loss as a result. The Panel took into account that personal mitigation carries less weight in regulatory proceedings, per Bolton v Law Society. Although the Registrant’s patients may be impacted by the suspension, that particular public interest consideration had to be balanced with the broader public interest considerations of professional regulation. The Panel was of the view that the wider public interest outweighed the Registrant’s interests and was proportionate.
148. The Panel decided that the proportionate sanction is to impose a suspension order for 1 year.
149. Before its expiry, another panel appointed by the HCPC will review the suspension order. As part of that review, the next panel will consider whether the Registrant’s fitness to practise remains impaired, or whether he is safe to return to unrestricted practice.
150. The reviewing panel will be assisted by the Registrant’s attendance at the review hearing. It will be a matter for the Registrant what he decides to bring to the next panel, but it may assist the Registrant if he was able to provide the following:
a. The Registrant’s further written reflections and demonstration of insight – in particular discussion of the impact on colleagues, public and patients of his misconduct;
b. Evidence of CPD focussed on the issues in the findings of the Panel for example business ethics and financial controls courses;
c. Testimonials and references from relevant persons having knowledge of the Registrant’s character and professional performance and financial probity, such as from any appropriate professionals or others.
Order
ORDER: The Registrar is directed to suspend the registration of Mr Mark Fraser Edgar for a period of 12 months from the date this Order comes into effect.
Notes
Right of Appeal
You may appeal to the High Court in England and Wales against the Panel’s decision and the order it has made against you.
Under Article 29(10) of the Health Professions Order 2001, any appeal must be made within 28 days of the date when this notice is served on you. The Panel’s order will not take effect until the appeal period has expired or, if you appeal, until that appeal is disposed of or withdrawn.
Interim Order
Application
1. The Panel having decided to suspend the Registrant’s registration for 12 months, Mr Barnfield applied to the Panel pursuant to Article 31(1)(c) of the Order for it to impose an interim suspension order, to cover the period of any appeal.
2. Mr Barnfield submitted that an interim suspension order was required because it was necessary for protection of the public and it was otherwise in the public interest. He submitted
that the Panel had found misconduct at the higher end of the scale and a risk of repetition. He submitted that, in light of the seriousness of the misconduct it was in the wider public interest for an interim order to be in place, the high threshold for an interim order having been passed. He submitted that an 18-month order was a realistic period for the interim order to cover the time any appeal might take to be disposed.
3. Mr Hussain-Dupre submitted that the Panel should consider whether the test of necessity was satisfied, bearing in mind the period between the self-referral of the case and the hearing. He submitted that the Registrant had been working successfully in the intervening period.
4. Mr Hussain-Dupre submitted that the Registrant needed time to re-arrange his patient diary and website advertisements, matters which should be taken into consideration on a practical level.
5. The Legal Assessor advised the Panel that it could make an Interim Order, if satisfied that it is necessary for the protection of members of the public or is otherwise in the public interest, or is in the interests of the person concerned, for the Registrant’s registration to be suspended or to be made subject to conditions. The Panel must consider the reasons behind its determination thus far and whether the test is satisfied. He advised the Panel that, if an interim order is necessary, the Panel must consider the least restriction necessary, and set the period of the interim order, which may be made for up to 18 months.
Decision
6. The Panel considered the submissions made and accepted the legal advice of the Legal Assessor.
7. The Panel was mindful that it had found impairment by misconduct which included dishonesty at the higher end of the scale. Despite acknowledging that the Registrant had remained for a period in practice, there had now been serious findings made against the Registrant.
8. The Panel had found that a risk of repetition remained, which could not be excluded, because of the Registrant’s incomplete development of insight. In light of the risk of repetition, which presented a potential risk of harm to the public from any repetition of dishonesty, the Panel decided an interim order was necessary to protect the public.
9. Bearing in mind the need for public protection and in light of the findings of dishonesty, the Panel was of the view that maintenance of public confidence in the profession also necessitated an interim order, which was otherwise in the public interest.
10. Taking into account its reasoning in relation to its sanction decisions, the Panel was of the view that interim conditions of practice were not workable or practicable in order to meet what were attitudinal failings, in the Registrant’s dishonest misconduct. Accordingly, the Panel imposed an interim suspension order as the minimum which met the need for protection of the public and the public interest. In light of the period which might be required to deal with any appeal, the interim order would be for 18 months.
11. The Panel makes an Interim Suspension Order under Article 31(2) of the Health Professions Order 2001, the same being necessary to protect members of the public and being otherwise in the public interest.
This order will expire: (if no appeal is made against the Panel’s decision and Order) upon the expiry of the period during which such an appeal could be made; (if an appeal is made against the Panel’s decision and Order) the final determination of that appeal, subject to a maximum period of 18 months.
Hearing History
History of Hearings for Mark Fraser Edgar
Date | Panel | Hearing type | Outcomes / Status |
---|---|---|---|
27/08/2025 | Conduct and Competence Committee | Final Hearing | Suspended |
09/06/2025 | Conduct and Competence Committee | Final Hearing | Adjourned part heard |