Natalie Twomey

Preliminary Matters:

Service

1. The Panel was provided with a signed certificate as proof that the Notice of Hearing had been sent by email on 28 July 2025, to the email address shown for the Registrant on the HCPC register. The Panel was also provided with an email “delivery receipt” dated 28 July 2025.

2. Additionally, the Panel noted the contents of a number of emails from the Registrant to Blake Morgan, solicitors acting on behalf of the HCPC, including an email dated 7 December 2025 in which the Registrant confirmed that she was unable to attend the hearing.

3. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor and was satisfied that the Notice had been properly served in accordance with the Conduct and Competence Committee Procedure Rules (as amended) (‘the Rules’).
Proceeding in the absence of the Registrant

4. Mr Anderson, appearing on behalf of the HCPC, made an application under Rule 11 of the Rules for the hearing to proceed in the Registrant’s absence. He drew the attention of the Panel to the Registrant’s emails relating to her attendance. On 19 November 2025 the Registrant indicated that she would be unable to attend certain days of the hearing, but when asked to confirm which days she would be able to attend the Registrant stated on 3 December 2025 that she would “be unable to attend the hearing dates due to work”. She confirmed this position in an email dated 7 December 2025.

5. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor and took into account the guidance as set out in the HCPTS Practice Note “Proceeding in the Absence of the Registrant”.

6. The Panel considered the circumstances of the Registrant’s absence. It noted that the Registrant had been given ample notice of the hearing which had been scheduled for dates which took into account her availability. The Panel was of the view that the Registrant’s absence was voluntary, and it considered that an adjournment would be unlikely to secure her attendance. The Panel recognised that there may be some disadvantage to the Registrant in not being able to give evidence or make oral submissions. However, the Panel was satisfied that the Registrant had been afforded with an opportunity to attend the hearing, and she had chosen not to do so. Further, the Panel also noted that the Registrant had provided documents and a brief statement for the Panel’s consideration.

7. The Panel considered that there was a strong public interest in ensuring that the hearing was considered expeditiously. There is a public interest in the efficient disposal of the matter, the allegations cover a period of time from 2022 to 2024, and the HCPC had six witnesses warned to give evidence to the Panel.

8. In all the circumstances, the Panel decided that it was fair and appropriate for the hearing to proceed in the absence of the Registrant.

Privacy application

9. In her email dated 7 December 2025 the Registrant requested that the HCPC “maintain my privacy with releasing details”. She did not provide any additional reasons supporting her request. The Panel considered that this was an application that the entire hearing was heard in private.

10. Mr Anderson opposed the application for the entire hearing to be heard in public. He referred the Panel to the guidance in the HCPTS Practice Note “Conducting Hearings in Private”. He submitted that there is a public interest in openness and transparency in regulatory hearings and that the hearing should be heard in public. He submitted that the Panel may decide that it would be appropriate for details relating to the Registrant’s health to be heard in private to protect her private life.

11. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor. She advised that the Panel should carefully balance the public interest in open justice and the Registrant’s interests in protecting her private life. In accordance with the principle of open justice, the hearing should be heard in public, as far as this is compatible with the protection of the Registrant’s private life.

12. The Panel did not identify any reason why the entire hearing should be heard in private. As explained within the Practice Note a hearing should not be heard in private to save the Registrant from embarrassment or to conceal facts which, on general grounds, it might be desirable to keep secret. The Panel was of the view that any details of the Registrant’s health or family life that are not directly linked to the allegations should be heard in private, in order to protect the Registrant’s private life. The remainder of the case should be heard in public in accordance with the principle of open justice.

Background:

13. The Registrant is a registered Paramedic. She was initially employed by the London Ambulance Service (“LAS”) until her dismissal on 20 November 2023.

14. The Registrant referred herself to the HCPC on 7 November 2023, advising that LAS had placed restrictions on her practice without indicating the nature of the concerns which resulted in restrictions being imposed on her practice.

15. The concerns relating to the Registrant’s practice relating to her employment by LAS included:

• Attending work whilst smelling of alcohol on 21 June 2023;

• Between 10 July and 5 August 2023 dishonestly claiming payment for more hours than she worked;

• Dishonestly stating that her sister was unwell in order to justify absence from work on 28 November 2022.

16. Following an investigation into the concern, the Registrant was dismissed by LAS due to her capability and failure to attend work regularly, as set out in a dismissal letter, dated 28 December 2023.

17. In an email dated 31 January 2024 sent to the HCPC, the Registrant stated that she had resigned from her role at LAS.

18. On 16 February 2024, the Registrant participated in an interview for a role as a Paramedic working for Care and Custody Health Mitie (“MITIE”). It is alleged that the Registrant falsely reported that she had not been subject to investigations or complaints, that she had never been made subject to any disciplinary hearings.

19. On 10 March 2024, the Registrant sent an email to the HCPC providing information that she had been offered a job by MITIE. Subsequently on 20 March 2024 she emailed stating that she had disclosed to them the HCPC referral. MITIE informed the HCPC on 27 March 2024 that the Registrant had not informed them about the HCPC investigation.

20. On 16 April 2024, MITIE referred the Registrant to the HCPC stating that the Registrant did not disclose the HCPC investigation to them. MITIE subsequently dismissed the Registrant.

21. The HCPC was provided with a certificate of conviction stating that on 19 April 2024 the Registrant was convicted of an offence contrary to Section 5(1) of the Road Traffic Act and Schedule 2 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 at Ipswich Magistrates’ Court. The Registrant was disqualified from holding or obtaining a driving licence for 18 months (until November 2025 unless a course was completed) and the payment of a fine of £120. The Registrant had pleaded guilty to the offence.

Admissions:

22. In correspondence between the Registrant and representatives of Blake Morgan, the Registrant had been asked whether she admitted any of the allegations. In an email dated 19 November 2025 the Registrant had stated that she admitted:

• “Not telling about the hearings when applying for a new job with Mitie as I did not know they meant hearings were included”; and

• The disqualification from driving and therefore being arrested.

23. The Registrant also confirmed that these statements related to allegations 14 and 22.

24. The Panel heard submissions from Mr Anderson. He did not invite the Panel to make findings of fact on the basis of the Registrant’s correspondence. He noted that the Registrant was not legally represented and that she was not present to enable the Panel to clarify and confirm her position.

25. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor and had regard to the guidance in the HCPTS Practice Note. Having considered all the circumstances the Panel did not consider that it was fair or appropriate to make findings of fact based on the Registrant’s correspondence.
Evidence:

26. The Panel read the HCPC bundle of 449 pages. This bundle incorporated documents provided by the Registrant, including a reflective statement and testimonials. The Panel also requested and was provided with two additional documents, an email from an HCPC employee to the Registrant dated 11 December 2023 (redacted), and an email from an HCPC employee to the Registrant dated 20 March 2024.

27. The HCPC called the following witnesses to give oral evidence:

• PC, Group Manager at Whipps Cross Ambulance Station, part of LAS;

• SG, Clinical Lead at MITIE;

• MR, Registration Manager at the HCPC;

• DS, Clinical Team Manager, Whipps Cross Ambulance Station;

• ER, Clinical Team Manager, Whipps Cross Ambulance Station;

• DH, Paralegal employed by Blake Morgan (at the relevant time).

28. The HCPC bundle also included the Registrant’s response documents including reflective statements and an employment reference.

29. During the hearing the Panel considered that in order to ensure that the case was properly presented, further evidence should be provided by the HCPC. In particular the Panel made a request for:

• Evidence that the Registrant was informed of an HCPC investigation prior to 16 February 2024; and

• Evidence of the HCPC question or request that resulted in the Registrant’s email sent to the HCPC on 20 March 2024.
30. In response to this request the Panel was provided with two additional documents (redacted); an email from the HCPC to the Registrant dated 11 December 2023 and an email from the HCPC to the Registrant dated 20 March 2024.

Decision on Facts:

31. The Panel took into account the submissions on behalf of the HCPC made by Mr Anderson.

32. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor. She advised on the burden and standard of proof, the Panel’s approach to the assessment of witness evidence and factual findings, and the two stage test for dishonesty. Her advice also included reference to the HCPTS Practice Note “Making decisions on a registrant’s state of mind”.

33. As set out in the Practice Note a person’s state of mind can only be proved by inference or deduction from the surrounding evidence. When considering the allegations of dishonesty the Panel asked the following two questions:

a) What did the Registrant know or believe as to the facts and circumstances in which the alleged dishonesty arose?

b) Given the Registrant’s knowledge and belief of the circumstances they were in, was the Registrant’s conduct dishonest by the standards of “an ordinary decent person”?

34. The Panel noted the evidence of the Registrant’s good character, as set out within the testimonials she provided for the Panel’s consideration. When considering the allegations of dishonesty which involve making findings about the Registrant’s state of mind, the Panel took the Registrant’s good character into account. However, the Panel considered that the Registrant’s good character bore little weight when it was considered in the context of the other evidence before the Panel.

Particular 1 – found proved

On 28 November 2022, you sent an email to your employer, London Ambulance Service (“LAS”), stating “I've had to phone in sick my sister has deteriorated again and had to drive back to Norfolk to be with her”.

35. The Panel found particular 1 proved by the documentary evidence. The hearing bundle included a copy of the email sent by the Registrant to the LAS group management team on 28 November 2022.

Particular 2 – found proved

Your conduct in relation to Particular 1 was dishonest in that you knew that your sister was not sick.

36. The Panel accepted the evidence of PC and his interpretation of the Facebook posts included in the bundle. The Panel found PC’s evidence to be credible and reliable. PC was a professional witness, his evidence was consistent with the documents, and there was nothing to indicate that he was fabricating or exaggerating any of the matters he described.

37. PC identified the Registrant’s sister as the source of Facebook posts containing pictures of a house decorated for Christmas. The relevant Facebook page was scanned or printed on 29 November and displays a post made one day ago (i.e. 28 November). PC also referred to the Registrant’s Facebook post, again scanned or printed on 29 November, made two days ago (27 November). The Registrant shared a memory of a holiday in Mexico the previous year and added “8 days till this paradise again”. PC explained in his evidence that he became aware of these Facebook posts because they were being discussed by other managers.

38. When the Registrant was asked about the Facebook posts in a capability meeting on 5 April 2023, she stated that her sister was in ITU and that her sister’s husband was responsible for the Facebook post made on the sister’s Facebook account.

39. The Panel considered this explanation, but it was satisfied that the content of the Facebook posts was incompatible with the Registrant’s email, regardless of whether the Registrant’s sister or her husband were responsible for the content of the Facebook posts. The message conveyed by the photographs of Christmas decorations was inconsistent with the Registrant’s sister being sick to the extent that the Registrant had to drive to Norfolk to be with her, rather than attend to her responsibilities at work.

40. The Panel was therefore satisfied, on the basis of the surrounding evidence, that the Registrant knew that her sister was not sick on 28 November 2022.

41. The Registrant deliberately provided misleading information to her employer to excuse her absence from work on 28 November 2025. This conduct would be regarded as dishonest by the standards of an ordinary decent person.

42. The Panel therefore found Particular 2 proved.

Particular 3 – found proved

On 5 April 2023, during a capability hearing you put across the mitigation that you missed work in late November/Early December 2022 due to your sister being in ICU in hospital.

43. The Panel found particular 3 proved by the evidence of PC and the documentary evidence. The Panel was not provided with a record of the capability hearing, but it was provided with a copy of a letter dated 14 April 2023 from LAS Assistant Director of Operations which was sent to the Registrant. This letter set out the Registrant’s mitigation in relation to her absence in late November/early December 2022. It noted the Registrant’s explanation for her absence on 27 November 2022 that her “sister admitted to ITU and put on a ventilator. You explained that the Dr in the hospital had told you they were considering a DNAR for your sister but this later turned out to be a mistake of the hospital”.

Particular 4 – found proved

Your conduct in relation to Particular 3 was dishonest in that you knew that your sister was not in ICU in hospital.

44. The Panel was satisfied that the Registrant knew that her sister was not in ICU in hospital because of the inconsistent Facebook posts as described above. The Registrant knew that she had not told the truth but tried to cover this up within the capability meeting on 5 April 2022 by suggesting that she had got the dates wrong.

45. The Registrant deliberately sought to excuse her absence from work in late November/early December to her employer, by providing information that she knew to be untrue. This conduct would be regarded as dishonest by the standards of an ordinary decent person.

46. The Panel therefore found Particular 4 proved.

Particular 5 – found proved

On 21 June 2023, you attended work whilst smelling of alcohol and as a consequence of that you were removed from front line duties.

47. The Panel found Particular 5 proved by the evidence of PC, DS, ER, and the documentary evidence.

48. The Panel was satisfied that the Registrant attended work whilst smelling of alcohol. The Panel heard oral evidence from DS and ER, both of whom described a scent of stale alcohol emanating from the Registrant when they were standing alongside her. DS was standing at a work desk and the Registrant was standing alongside him on his right side. He was trying to assist her with a KitPrep app on her work iPad, which is used for various work-related tasks relating to drugs. DS and ER did not detect any signs that the Registrant was intoxicated.

49. The Panel also took into account the documentary evidence in the LAS investigation report. This included contemporaneous statements from two other managers who described a scent of alcohol when they were in proximity to the Registrant on 21 June 2023.

50. The LAS investigation report dated 7 November 2023 included the Registrant’s response to this concern. In a meeting on 21 June 2023 she stated that the smell of alcohol might be due to her interaction with a patient who had vomited with the vomit soiling her uniform. Further, in an email dated 25 July 2023 she stated that she recalled the same patient and referred to that patient’s methadone leaking onto her uniform. The investigation followed up this suggestion and another member of staff who had attended the patient had no recollection of the patient being covered in vomit or alcohol.

51. In their questions to DS and ER the Panel explored whether there were any signs of such an incident. DS and ER recalled that there was nothing unusual about the Registrant’s uniform. DS explained that the Registrant would also be expected to have a spare uniform at the station to enable her to change her uniform if required.

52. On the balance of probabilities, the Panel was satisfied that the smell of alcohol emanating from the Registrant was attributable to her earlier consumption of alcohol rather than any interaction with a patient.

53. The Panel was also satisfied that the Registrant was removed from duties as a result of the incident on 21 June 2023. It accepted the evidence of PC that restrictions were placed on the Registrant’s employment because he could not allow the Registrant back on the road or use of blue lights with any suspicions surrounding alcohol consumption. This evidence was consistent with the Registrant self-referral to the HCPC in which she stated that she was placed on restricted duties on 21 June 2023 whilst an investigation was carried out.

Particular 6 – found proved

On renewing your registration with the HCPC on 26 June 2023, you did not inform the HCPC that restrictions had been placed upon your practice.

54. The Panel found particular 6 proved by the evidence of MR and the documentary evidence. MR provided a clear explanation of the HCPC system for registrants to renew their registration. Registrants must renew their registration every two years and the Registrant renewed her registration on 26 June 2023.

55. MR explained that registration process enables registrants to declare any change relating their character. The Registrant completed her renewal on 26 June 2023 and made a declaration that there had been no changes relating to her character.

56. The record for the Registrant’s renewal of her registration confirmed that she had completed her renewal using the on-line portal. The record of her professional declaration in relation to any “change relating to good character” was “no”.

57. MR explained the HCPC records of contact from the Registrant to the HCPC registration department. Within the list of various communications, there were no records held by the HCPC registrations department of any declaration made by the Registrant that restrictions had been placed on her practice.

Particular 7 – found proved

Your conduct in relation to Particular 6 was dishonest in that you knew that restrictions had been placed upon your practice by LAS on 21 June 2023.

58. The Panel was satisfied that the Registrant knew that restrictions had been placed on her practice by the LAS on 21 June 2023. The LAS investigation report included a statement of the Incident Response Officer who described his conversation with the Registrant on 21 June 2023. The Registrant was informed that she would be stood down from her duties for the remainder of the shift, and the following day, and that PC would follow up with her and discuss the plan of action. The Registrant did not return to patient facing duties, and she was therefore aware when she completed the renewal of her HCPC registration on 26 June 2023 that she had been placed on restricted duties due to the incident on 21 June 2023. The events on 21 June 2023 would have been fresh in the Registrant’s mind when she completed her on-line renewal form.

59. The Panel was also satisfied that the Registrant was aware of the requirements under the HCPC Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics Standard 9.5 to inform the HCPC if “you have had any restriction placed on your practice, or been suspended or dismissed by an employer, because of concerns about your conduct or competence”. The Registrant would be expected to make a declaration relating to her character, given the incident that had occurred on 21 June 2023.

60. If the Registrant had any uncertainty about her obligation to make a declaration, guidance was available to her. MR explained that information is available to Registrants completing an on-line application to renew their registration, and that the guidance relating to character reflects Standard 9.5 of the HCPC Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics.

61. The Panel was therefore satisfied that the Registrant knew that restrictions had been placed on her practice and that she knew that she should declare this as a change relevant to her character when she renewed her registration.

62. The Registrant deliberately chose not to provide information to the HCPC that she was required to provide under the HCPC Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics. This conduct would be regarded as dishonest by the standards of an ordinary decent person.

Particular 8 – found proved

On 3 July 2023, you sent an email to LAS’ recruitment department stating “I’ve been passed on this email address to possibly discuss a secondment. I'm currently on non patient facing duties due to a back and knee injury and looking for somewhere to do non patient facing duties”.

63. The Panel found particular 8 proved by the documentary evidence. The Panel was provided with a copy of the Registrant’s email dated 3 July 2023.

Particular 9 – found proved

Your conduct in relation to Particular 8 was dishonest in that you knew that the reason for being placed on non-patient facing duties was not due to a back and knee injury.

64. The Panel was satisfied that the Registrant knew that she had been removed from non-patient facing duties due to the incident on 21 June 2023 and not due to a back and knee injury. The Panel referred to its findings in particular 7 and to the Registrant’s acceptance that she had lied in her email. PC carried out an interview with the Registrant on 24 July 2023 and the Panel was provided with a transcript of this interview. The Registrant was asked why she had felt it was appropriate to lie, when asking for a secondment. She replied “I am not happy at logistics. Emailed hoping to move elsewhere. Said about injuries as I am embarrassed about the circumstances”.

65. The Registrant lied about the reason she had been placed on non-patient facing duties due to her embarrassment. This conduct would be regarded as dishonest by the standards of an ordinary decent person.

Particular 10 – found proved

On 2 August 2023, you sent an email to LAS stating: “The 24th and 25th July would have been 0700-1600. The 31st and 1st are accurate. Today was 0700-1530. The 29th would have been an 0700-1600” when asked what shifts you had worked for your employer.

66. The Panel found particular 10 proved by the documentary evidence. The Panel was provided with a copy of the Registrant’s e-mail dated 2 August 2023.

Particular 11 – found proved

Your conduct in relation to Particular 10 is was dishonest in that you knew that you had not worked on 24 July 2023 and 29 July 2023 for the times stated in your email.

67. The Panel was satisfied that on 2 August 2023 the Registrant would have recollected the times she had worked on 24 July 2023 and 29 July 2023. The Panel also accepted the evidence of PC, who reviewed the CCTV evidence for the dates of 24 July 2023 and 29 July 2023. He described the Registrant’s car as being a distinctive bright blue colour. The logistics centre was on an industrial estate and therefore access was by car rather than on foot. PC also confirmed that the CCTV footage was checked to see if the Registrant had returned to the logistics centre after her departure, but her car was not seen.

68. The outcome of the review of the CCTV footage for the relevant dates was:

• 24 July 2023 08.35-09.25
• 29 July 2023 10.00-11.53

69. In its deliberations the Panel noted that the Registrant had attended an interview with MC on 24 July 2023. The transcript of the interview did not record its start time or how long it lasted. Nevertheless, it was not a lengthy transcript, and the Panel did not consider that it could account for the very substantial discrepancy between the Registrant’s email and the CCTV footage. The interview would not have explained the two gaps in time between 07.00 and 08.35 and after 09.25.

70. Having reviewed the evidence, the Panel concluded that the Registrant knew that she had not worked the hours stated in her email of 07.00 to 16.00 on 24 July 2023 and 07.00 to 16.00 on 29 July 2023.

71. The Registrant provided information to her employer about her working hours on 24 July and 29 July 2023, knowing that the information was not true. This conduct would be regarded as dishonest by the standards of an ordinary decent person.

Particular 12– found proved

On 31 January 2024, you sent an email to the HCPC stating: “I resigned from the ambulance service on the 25th January”.

72. The Panel found particular 12 proved by the documentary evidence. The Panel was provided with a copy of the Registrant’s email dated 31 January 2024.

Particular 13 – found proved

Your conduct in relation to Particular 12 was dishonest in that you knew that you had not resigned from LAS as your contract of employment had been terminated on 3 November 2023 with 12 weeks’ notice on the grounds of capability due to failure to attend work regularly.

73. A copy of the Registrant’s dismissal letter dated 28 December 2023 was included in the HCPC bundle. The letter stated that the Registrant was dismissed on the ground of “capability due to failure to attend work regularly”. The Registrant was informed that she was entitled to receive 12 weeks notice and that her last day of service was 25 January 2024.

74. The Panel was satisfied that this letter was sent to the Registrant and that she therefore knew that she had been dismissed and that she had not resigned.

75. The Registrant provided information about the termination of her employment to her regulator, knowing that it was untrue. This conduct would be regarded as dishonest by the standards of an ordinary decent person.

Particular 14 – found proved

On 16 February 2024, during a job interview with Care and Custody Health Mitie (“Mitie”) you responded “No” to the question: “Have you ever been subject to any disciplinary hearings?”.

76. The Panel found particular 14 proved by the evidence of SG and the documentary evidence. The Panel found that SG was a credible and reliable witness. Her evidence was consistent with the documentary evidence and she clearly explained the extent of her involvement in the recruitment of the Registrant.

77. The Panel noted that the Registrant indicated that this particular was admitted, although her admission was equivocal. She stated that “I will admit to not telling about the hearings when applying for a new job with Mitie as I did not know they meant hearings were included.”

78. In her oral evidence SG confirmed that she was one of the managers who interviewed the Registrant on 16 February 2024 and that the notes of the Registrant’s responses to interview questions were her own notes. One of the interview questions was “Have you ever been subject to any disciplinary hearings”, to which the Registrant’s answer was “no”. In her oral evidence SG confirmed that she read the question in exactly the same words as the question appears in the interview notes. She told the Panel that if the Registrant had replied “yes” to the question, she would have remembered this.

Particular 15 – found proved

Your conduct in relation to Particular 14 was dishonest in that you knew that you had been subject to a disciplinary hearing whilst working for LAS.

79. The Panel was satisfied that the Registrant had understood the interview question, and that she did know that she should disclose that she had been subject to a disciplinary hearing by her employer. The interview question was clear and unambiguous and the Registrant could not have misunderstood its requirements.

80. The Panel was also satisfied that the Registrant knew she had been subject to disciplinary hearings. She had attended a hearing on 5 April 2023 which had resulted in the issue of a final reminder to change her conduct and she had attended a hearing on 3 November 2023 which included issues relating to unauthorised absence and had resulted in the termination of her employment.

81. These matters would have been fresh in the Registrant’s mind when she was interviewed on 16 February 2024, and the Panel was satisfied that the Registrant knew that she should have been open and honest about those matters.

82. The Registrant’s conduct would be regarded as dishonest by the standards of an ordinary decent person.

Particular 16 – found proved

On 16 February 2024, during a job interview with Mitie you responded “No” to the question: “Have you ever been dismissed from any employment?”.

83. The Panel found particular 14 proved by the evidence of SG and the documentary evidence.

84. SG confirmed in her oral evidence that each of the questions set out in her record of interview was asked in exactly the same words as the question appears in her notes. One of the interview questions was “Have you ever been dismissed from any employment”, to which the Registrant’s answer was “no”.

Particular 17 – found proved

Your conduct in relation to Particular 16 was dishonest in that you knew your contract of employment with LAS had been terminated on 3 November 2023 with 12 weeks’ notice on the grounds of capability due to failure to attend work regularly.

85. The Panel was satisfied that the Registrant understood the question she had been asked. It was a clear and unambiguous question. The Registrant also knew that she had been dismissed because she had received the dismissal letter dated 28 December 2023. Her dismissal would have been fresh in her mind when she participated in the interview on 16 February 2024.

86. The Panel inferred that the Registrant deliberately concealed her dismissal from MITIE and decided that this conduct would be regarded as dishonest by the standards of an ordinary decent person.

Particular 18 – found proved

On 16 February 2024, during a job interview with Mitie you responded “No” to the question: “Are there any outstanding investigations or complaints against you?”.

87. The Panel found particular 18 proved by the evidence of SG and the documentary evidence.

88. SG confirmed in her oral evidence that each of the questions set out in her record of interview was asked in exactly the same words as the question appears in her notes. One of the interview questions was “Are there any outstanding investigations or complaints against you”, to which the Registrant’s answer was “no”.

Particular 19 – found proved

Your conduct in relation to Particular 18 was dishonest in that you knew that there was an HCPC ongoing investigation into your fitness to practice.

89. The Panel was satisfied that the Registrant knew that there was an ongoing investigation into her fitness to practice. She had referred herself to the HCPC on 7 November 2023 and on 11 December 2023 an email was sent to her by an HCPC employee advising her that the threshold for further investigation had been met and that the case had been transferred to the investigations team. Subsequent correspondence from the HCPC to the Registrant bore the FTP reference 91448.

90. The Panel was also satisfied that the Registrant understood the question she was asked in the interview about outstanding investigations. The HCPC investigation would have been fresh in her mind when she attended the interview on 16 February 2024.

91. The Panel inferred that the Registrant deliberately concealed the HCPC investigation from MITIE and decided that this conduct would be considered dishonest by an ordinary decent person.

Particular 20 – found proved

On 20 March 2024, you sent an email to the HCPC stating: “Yes they are aware. The manager I have been dealing with and told is Paul Trevor” in response to a question as to whether your employer (Mitie) was informed of the HCPC ongoing investigation into your fitness to practice.

92. The Panel found Particular 20 proved by the documentary evidence.

93. The Panel was provided with a copy of an email dated 20 March 2024 sent by the HCPC to the Registrant. The Registrant was asked whether she had informed MITIE of the fitness to practise case and whether she could share details of her line manager.

94. The Panel was also provided with a copy of the Registrant’s email in response, also dated 20 March 2024, in which she stated “Yes they are aware. The manager I have been dealing with and told is Paul Trevor”.

Particular 21 – found proved

Your conduct in relation to Particular 20 is dishonest in that you knew that you had not informed Mitie of the HCPC ongoing investigation into your fitness to practice.

95. The Panel accepted the evidence of SG. She told the Panel that Mr Trevor was the contract director. He was not the Registrant’s line manager, and his only involvement with the Registrant would have been to make the arrangements for the Registrant to be vetted by Warwickshire Police. SG considered that it was highly unlikely that the Registrant had direct contact with Mr Trevor. SG also told the Panel that when she was alerted to the HCPC investigation she phoned Mr Trevor and that he confirmed that he was not aware of the HCPC investigation and he said “you know as much as I do”.

96. The Panel considered that it was unlikely that a contract director with responsibility for vetting would not have taken action if the Registrant had informed him of the HCPC investigation.

97. In light of SG’s evidence, the Panel was satisfied that the Registrant knew that she had not informed MITIE of the ongoing HCPC investigation.
98. The Panel inferred that the Registrant deliberately concealed the HCPC investigation from MITIE and decided that this conduct would be considered dishonest by an ordinary decent person.

Particular 22

On 19 April 2024, you were convicted for driving a motor vehicle above the prescribed limit contrary to Section 5(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and Schedule 2 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 by Ipswich Magistrates Court.

99. The Panel noted that the Registrant has consistently accepted that she was disqualified from driving, although her admission has not referred directly to her conviction.

100. The Panel was provided with a copy of the memorandum of conviction. The certificate was not signed. This was explained in the witness statement of DH. She requested a signed copy and received an email from the Court stating the Court no longer provide wet signatures on documents.

101. The Panel was satisfied that the memorandum of conviction had been confirmed in correspondence with Ipswich Magistrates’ Court and had been obtained from a reliable source.

102. The Panel found Particular 22 proved by the documentary evidence and the evidence of DH.

Particular 23

From 26 July 2024 to 3 September 2024, you have refused to provide information pertaining to your current employment as requested by the HCPC.

103. The Panel was provided with correspondence between the Registrant and employees of Blake Morgan, solicitors acting on behalf of the HCPC.

104. The Panel noted the following:

• 26 July 2024 initial request to confirm name of employer and contact details;

• 29 July 2024 further request to confirm name of employer and contact details;

• 30 July 2024 response from Registrant “My new employers are aware of the situation, however, I do not want to disclose who they are.”;

• 31 July 2024 further request with reminder of obligation to co-operate under Standard 9.6 of the HCPC Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics;

• 6 August 2024 chasing email from Blake Morgan;

• 8 August 2024 further chasing email;

• 29 August 2024 further chasing email;

• 2 September 2024 further chasing email and advising that if the information is not provided by 4 September the issue will be raised with the HCPC;

• 3 September 2024 further chasing email and reminder that the issue will be raised with the HCPC if the information is not provided by 4 September.
105. The Panel found particular 23 proved by the documentary evidence.

Decision on Grounds:

Statutory ground of conviction

106. The Panel has found Particular 22 proved. This particular amounts to the statutory ground of conviction under Article 22(1)(a)(iii) of the Health Professions Order.

107. The Panel noted the facts underlying this conviction as set out in the Police MG5 report.

108. On 11 April 2024 the Registrant was undertaking her professional duties as a paramedic in the role of custody medic at Bury St Edmunds Police Investigation Centre. A police officer working alongside the Registrant smelt alcohol on the Registrant’s breath and raised this with his line manager. When she was questioned about this matter the Registrant declined to provide a voluntary breath test. The police officer suspected that the Registrant had driven to work and therefore he had the power to require a breath test. The Registrant provided a breath test and this was positive with a reading of 65 microgrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres of breath. The Registrant was then arrested and cautioned. The police officer reviewed the CCTV system and identified the arrival of the Registrant by car. The Registrant’s car was also located in the rear car park of the police station and there were two beer cans in the rear passenger side foot well.

109. The Panel noted the aggravating circumstances relating to the conviction were:

• the Registrant was carrying out her professional duties at the time of the offence;

• the alcohol in her breath was approximately two times over the alcohol drink drive limit;

• risk of harm to vulnerable service users in the Registrant’s care;

• damage to public confidence in the profession including the Registrant’s arrest for this offence while undertaking her professional duties.

Statutory ground of misconduct

110. The Panel considered whether the facts found proved in particulars 1-21 and 23 amounted to misconduct. It took into account its factual findings, together with the submissions made by Mr Anderson on behalf of the HCPC.

111. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor. No burden of proof applied and the Panel should consider whether the proven facts are sufficiently serious properly to be categorised as misconduct.

112. When considering whether the facts proved amounted to misconduct, the Panel noted that not all breaches of the HCPC’s “Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics” need amount to a finding of misconduct.

113. The Panel noted the advice provided in respect of Roylance v General Medical Council (No 2) [2000] 1 A.C. 311 and Nandi v GMC [2004] EWHC 2317 (Admin) in which the Court referred to Roylance and described misconduct as “a falling short by omission or commission of the standards of conduct expected among medical practitioners, and such falling short must be serious”.

114. The Panel considered that the Registrant’s conduct amounted to a breach of the HCPC’s “Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics” (2016) as follows:

• 9.1 You must make sure that your conduct justifies the public’s trust and confidence in you and your profession.

• 9.5 You must tell us as soon as possible if:

…

- you have had any restriction placed on your practice, or been suspended or dismissed by an employer, because of concerns about your conduct or competence.

• 9.6 You must co-operate with any investigation into your conduct or competence, the conduct or competence of others, or the care, treatment or other services provided to service users.

• 6.1 You must take all reasonable steps to reduce the risk of harm to service users, carers and colleagues as far as possible.

• 6.2 You must not do anything, or allow someone else to do anything, which could put the health or safety of a service user, carer or colleague at unacceptable risk.

115. The Panel noted that some of the particulars found proved were background facts linked to the finding of dishonesty, and it considered those particulars in conjunction with the related finding of dishonesty. The Panel addressed each allegation of dishonesty separately when considering whether it was sufficiently serious to amount to the statutory ground of misconduct.

116. The Panel considered that each of the findings of dishonesty was sufficiently serious to amount to the statutory ground of misconduct. A finding of dishonesty is a serious finding that undermines public confidence in the Registrant and the profession. Each of the findings of dishonesty related to professional practice and involved lying to the Registrant’s employer or to the regulator.

• Particular 2 involved a deliberate lie to mislead the employer in relation to attendance at work. The deceit was for the Registrant’s personal gain and it related to attendance at work which was relevant to the Registrant’s professional responsibility to attend work when she is fit to do so in order to protect the public;

• Particular 4 also involved another lie to mislead the employer in relation to attendance at work. The deceit was again for the Registrant’s personal gain and related to attendance at work. The Registrant had the opportunity to retract her previous lie, and be open with her employer, but she did not do so.

• Particular 7 involved dishonesty towards the regulator. The Registrant had the opportunity to consider how she should complete the HCPC registration form, and she made a decision not to disclose information to the HCPC for her own benefit.

• Particular 9 involved the Registrant deliberately lying to her employer about the reason she had been placed on non patient-facing duties. This lie was in an email and the Registrant had the opportunity to consider and select her words. The email was for the Registrant’s personal gain because she was not enjoying her work at logistics and did not want to reveal the true reason for the restriction on her practice because of her embarrassment.

• Particular 11 involved the Registrant lying to her employer about the times she had worked on two dates. This lie was in an email and the Registrant had the opportunity to think about her answer. The lie was for her personal financial gain because she was not honest about the significantly fewer hours she had worked on both dates.

• Particular 13 involved dishonesty towards the regulator. The Registrant made a statement about her employment circumstances which she knew to be untrue. She sought to conceal that she had been dismissed for her own gain. The regulator relies on the integrity of registrants providing correct information to enable them to conduct their investigations which are for the purpose of protecting the public and maintaining confidence in the profession.

• Particular 15 was a lie to a prospective employer about relevant employment history. The question was asked in a formal context and MITIE placed its trust in the Registrant to provide correct information. The Registrant concealed the information for her own gain to avoid disclosing information which might be unhelpful to her within her interview.

• Particular 17 was similarly a lie to a prospective employer about relevant employment history. The lie was deliberate and for the Registrant’s personal gain.

• Particular 19 was a lie to a prospective employer about the ongoing HCPC investigation. The Registrant deliberately chose to conceal this information for her own benefit to avoid disclosing information which might be unhelpful to her.

• Particular 21 was a lie to the Regulator, seeking to mislead the Regulator into believing that the Registrant had informed her employer of the HCPC investigation. This lie was a deliberate deceit, and the Registrant intended to mislead the Regulator.

117. The Panel considered that Particular 5 was sufficiently serious to amount to misconduct. Although there was no evidence that the Registrant was under the influence of alcohol on 21 June 2023, the Panel considered that the Registrant’s conduct in attending work smelling of alcohol fell well below the professional standards. The consequence of the Registrant attending work smelling of alcohol was that her managers decided that she must be removed from front line duties in order to protect the public. This action reduced the number of paramedics available to attend to patients therefore, placing patients at potential risk of harm.

118. The Registrant’s conduct in particular 23 was also sufficiently serious to amount to misconduct. In refusing to provide information relating to her current employment the Registrant failed to co-operate with her regulator, as required under Standard 9.6 of the HCPC Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics. The regulator has a responsibility to conduct investigations in order to protect the public and to maintain public confidence in the profession and it relies on Registrants to provide information as part of its investigations. The Registrant replied to Blake Morgan on 30 July 2024 with a refusal to provide the requested information. The Registrant received multiple reminders and was informed of her duty to co-operate, but she persisted in her failure over a significant period of time between 26 July 2024 and 3 September 2024. The Registrant’s failure was deliberate and there was no good reason for the Registrant’s failure to co-operate with her Regulator.

119. The Panel considered that each of the particulars, as considered above, were sufficiently serious to amount to misconduct, when considered individually. When considered collectively, the Panel considered that an aggravating feature was the pattern of repeated dishonesty over a significant period of time and within the professional context. The Registrant repeatedly lied for her own benefit, with apparent disregard for her professional responsibilities to be honest.

120. In the Panel’s judgment the Registrant’s conduct in particulars 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, and 23 was extremely serious and such that fellow professionals would regard it to have been deplorable. The Panel decided that the Registrant’s conduct was sufficiently serious to amount to misconduct.

Decision on impairment:

121. The Panel went on to decide whether the Registrant’s fitness to practise is currently impaired by reason of her misconduct.

122. The Panel had regard to all the evidence presented in this case, together with the submissions of Mr Anderson. Mr Anderson submitted that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is currently impaired on the basis of the personal component and the public component.

123. The Panel had regard to the HCPTS Practice Notes on “Fitness to Practise Impairment” and “Conviction and Caution Allegations”, and it received and accepted legal advice. The Panel bore in mind that the purpose of the hearing was not to punish the Registrant for past misdoings but to protect the public against the acts and omissions of those who are not fit to practise. The Panel assessed the Registrant’s fitness to practise at today’s date.

124. In relation to the personal component the Panel considered the documents provided by the Registrant. In her reflective statement the Registrant described that in the last several years she had experienced significant personal challenges.

125. The Registrant outlined that she has sought help to address these past issues and that she has received help.

126. The Registrant stated that she had “fully accepted responsibility for what has happened” and that her behaviour was “out of character”. Her reflective statement did not refer to the specific HCPC allegations.

127. The Registrant also provided information that she was working as a health care support worker at a hospital and that she was completing Nursing training.

128. The Registrant also provided character testimonials provided by work colleagues and family members.

129. The Panel did not consider that the background circumstances outlined in the Registrant’s reflective statement provided mitigation or explanation in relation to the findings of dishonesty. It noted that the Registrant continued to practise as a Paramedic, notwithstanding the background circumstances that she described. The reflective statement did not refer to the specifics of the HCPC allegation. It did not include any reference to the impact of the behaviour on the Registrant’s colleagues, service users, or the reputation of the profession.

130. The Panel did not consider that the Registrant had demonstrated any insight or remorse in relation to the findings of dishonesty, and that her insight in relation to her conviction was very limited.

131. The Panel was of the view that the dishonesty in this case is attitudinal in nature. It was deliberate dishonesty, for personal gain, sustained over a period of time between 28 November 2022 and 20 March 2024, and involved ten individual findings of dishonesty, involving two employers and the regulator. The Panel considered that the Registrant’s attitude is long-standing and deep-seated.

132. The Panel considered whether the misconduct in this case is remediable. It was of the view that it would be extremely difficult to remediate the deep-seated attitudinal issues which underlie the Registrant’s behaviour. The Registrant has not presented the Panel with evidence of remediation or reflection relating to dishonesty.

133. Given the very limited insight demonstrated by the Registrant and the absence of evidence of remediation of the underlying attitudinal matters, the Panel considered that there is a real risk of repetition of similar behaviour. If the Registrant were to repeat similar behaviour, there is a real risk of harm to members of the public including:

• The HCPC being unable to rely on information provided to the Registrant and consequently unable to perform its statutory functions;

• Employers being unable to rely on information provided by the Registrant and unable to trust the Registrant impacting on the effective management and quality of services;

• Impact of the Registrant’s lies on colleagues;

• The Registrant being removed from patient-facing duties due to smelling of alcohol or attending work whilst under the influence of alcohol;

• Damage to public confidence in the profession.

134. The Panel therefore decided that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is impaired on the basis of the personal component.

135. The Panel next considered the public component. It was of the view that its findings of fact, its conclusions on the statutory ground of misconduct and conviction, and its conclusions on the personal component of impairment demonstrated that the test for fitness to practise as recommended in the case of CHRE v Grant [2011] EWHC 927 was met.

• The Registrant has in the past acted and is liable in the future to act so as to put a patient or patients at risk of harm;

• The Registrant has in the past brought and/or is liable to bring the profession into disrepute;

• The Registrant has in the past brought and is liable in the future to breach the fundamental tenet of the profession to be honest;

• The Registrant has in the past acted dishonesty and is liable to act dishonesty in the future.

136. The Panel considered the seriousness of the misconduct and conviction, noting the factors set out in paragraph 15 of the HCPTS Practice Note “Fitness to Practise Impairment”. It considered that the following factors were relevant:

• Serious departure from expected professional conduct and standards;

• Serious impact on maintaining public confidence in the profession, due to the Panel’s conclusions that the dishonesty is due to a deep-seated attitudinal issue and the aggravating features relating to the conviction;

• Risk of harm to patients, particularly the risk of harm to patients resulting from the Registrant attending work when approximately two times over the excess alcohol drink drive limit;

• Impact of the Registrant’s conduct on managers and the HCPC and consequent impact on protection of the public;

• Repeated conduct;

• Vulnerable patients in the custody suite;

• Dishonest behaviour;

• Very limited insight;

• Absence of remediation of underlying attitude and real risk of repetition.

137. The Panel was of the clear view that a finding of current impairment is required to uphold professional standards. The Registrant’s conduct fell very far below the required standards of the profession and a finding of impairment is required to mark the gravity of the Registrant’s conviction and her misconduct. In its decision on statutory grounds and its decision on impairment the Panel identified a number of aggravating features relevant to the overall gravity of the conviction and misconduct.

138. The Panel also considered that a finding of current impairment was required to uphold and maintain public confidence in the profession. The Registrant’s dishonest conduct was in a professional context, it involved a pattern of behaviour, and the Panel has identified an underlying attitudinal issue. The Registrant’s misconduct had an impact on her managers and on the HCPC, who were engaging professionally with the Registrant in accordance with the public interest. Dishonest behaviour is regarded as particularly serious by members of the public and in this case the dishonest behaviour is at the top end of the spectrum of seriousness. The Registrant’s conviction was also very serious, particularly given the background circumstances and the risk to the vulnerable service users within the custody suite. The Panel considered that public trust and confidence in the profession and the HCPC as its regulator would be undermined if a finding of impairment were not made in the circumstances of this case.

139. The Panel therefore concluded that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is impaired on the public component.

140. Accordingly, the Panel found, on both the person and public component, that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is impaired.

Decision on Sanction:

141. The Panel took account of the submissions made by Mr Anderson on behalf of the HCPC. Mr Anderson’s submissions included reference to the HCPC Sanctions Policy. He informed the Panel that the HCPC was adopting a neutral position with regard to the appropriate sanction.

142. In her email dated 7 December 2025 the Registrant made a request “I would like to ask that when comes to the final outcome I will offer to withdraw myself from the register”. This was not an option open to the Panel.

143. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor and referred to the HCPC Sanctions Policy.

144. In considering sanction, the Panel was mindful that a sanction is not intended to be punitive. However, a sanction may be necessary in the public interest, and may have a punitive effect. The Panel bore in mind that any sanction must be proportionate, that is, it must only restrict the Registrant’s right to practise to the extent necessary to protect the public and the public interest.

145. The Panel bore in mind that the HCPC’s overriding objective is to protect the public. A panel must consider the risk the Registrant may pose in the future and decide what degree of public protection is required. The Panel must also give appropriate weight to the public interest, which includes the maintenance of public confidence in the profession and the regulatory process.

146. The Panel considered that the aggravating factors were:

• Repeated dishonesty over a period of time;

• No insight in relation to the findings of dishonesty and no remorse in relation to any of the facts found proved;

• No evidence of remediation of dishonesty;

• A deep-seated and long-standing attitudinal issue;

• Dishonesty in a professional context and for personal gain;

• The context of the conviction, involving attending work when under the influence of alcohol;

• Registrant took an active role in the dishonesty;

• Dishonesty involved a diverse range of circumstances, and included providing false information in a job interview and dishonesty to the regulator.

147. The Panel carefully considered that the mitigating factors were:

• No previous regulatory findings.

148. The Panel considered that this mitigating factor bore very little weight, given the gravity and nature of the Registrant’s misconduct and her conviction.

149. The Panel noted the testimonial evidence provided by the Registrant as to her good character. However, having decided that the Registrant had repeatedly been dishonest due to a deep-seated attitudinal issue, the Panel could not consider that the Registrant was of good character or take such evidence into account as a mitigating factor.

150. The Panel considered the statement provided by the Registrant in which she described the challenging personal events. The Registrant did not suggest that these difficulties explained or were connected with the lies she had told to her employers or the HCPC. The Panel did not consider that the Registrant’s reflective statement presented mitigation which was relevant to the Panel’s findings of dishonesty or to her failure to co-operate with her regulator.

151. As set out in its decision on current impairment, the Panel’s view was that the Registrant’s dishonest conduct was at the top end of the spectrum of seriousness for dishonesty. This assessment includes the aggravating features, and the absence of mitigating circumstances, other than the absence of previous regulatory findings, which bore very little weight.

152. The Panel considered the sanctions in ascending level of severity in order to ensure that its approach was proportionate.

153. The Panel decided that neither mediation nor taking no action would be appropriate. The Panel decided that due to the nature and seriousness of the misconduct and conviction a sanction was necessary.

154. The Panel considered the factors in the Sanctions Policy in relation to a Caution Order. It concluded that the issues in this case were not isolated, limited or relatively minor. The Registrant has not shown insight, and the Panel has found that there is a real risk of repetition. A Caution Order would not restrict the Registrant’s ability to practise and would not be sufficient to protect the public or be sufficient to address the wider public interest.

155. The Panel concluded that a Caution Order was not sufficient or appropriate in the circumstances.

156. The Panel next considered a Conditions of Practice Order. The Panel was unable to formulate conditions of practice which could address the risk that the Registrant would repeat dishonest conduct. Given the finding of dishonesty, the Panel had insufficient confidence that the Registrant would comply with conditions of practice. The case also involved dishonesty and conditions of practice are only suitable in such cases where the Registrant’s conduct was minor, out of character, capable of remediation, and unlikely to be repeated. Those circumstances do not apply.

157. The Panel was also of the view that a Conditions of Practice Order would not be sufficient to maintain public confidence in the profession and to uphold standards for members of the profession. In reaching this conclusion it bore in mind the guidance in paragraphs 56 – 58 and 80-84 of the Sanctions Policy. This case involves dishonesty and a criminal conviction which had an impact on fitness to practise. Such cases are more likely to result in more serious sanctions, and in this case there were no significant mitigating circumstances.

158. The Panel concluded that a Conditions of Practice Order was not sufficient to protect the public and was insufficient to address the wider public interest.

159. The Panel carefully considered whether an order of suspension would be sufficient to protect the public and address the public interest concerns in this case.

160. The Panel referred to paragraph 121 of the Sanctions Policy. The concerns represent serious breaches of the HCPC’s Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics, but the Registrant has not demonstrated insight, there is a real risk of repetition and there was no evidence to suggest that the Registrant is likely to be able to address her failings.

161. The Panel considered that a Suspension Order would be insufficient to mark the seriousness of the Registrant’s departure from professional standards and the impact of her behaviour on public confidence in the profession. It would not send a sufficiently clear message to other Registrants and to members of the public that such behaviour is entirely unacceptable for Paramedics. The Panel was of the view that a Suspension Order, which provides the prospect of rehabilitation to the register, would not sufficiently protect the public, given that there is a real risk that the Registrant would repeat similar behaviour and that the underlying reason for her behaviour is a deep-seated attitudinal problem.

162. The Panel was of the view that the Registrant’s misconduct and her conviction were fundamentally incompatible with her continued registration as a Paramedic. The Panel considered that the guidance in paragraph 130 for the imposition of a Striking Off Order applied. The Registrant’s behaviour was serious, persistent and deliberate. It involved dishonesty, and a criminal conviction that had an impact on the Registrant’s fitness to practise. The Registrant lacks insight into her dishonesty and her failure to co-operate with the HCPC. The Panel was of the view that any lesser sanction would be insufficient to protect the public and to maintain public confidence in the profession and its regulator, given the nature and gravity of the Registrant’s conduct as outlined within the Panel’s decision on misconduct and current impairment.

163. The Panel considered that there were no mitigating circumstances in this case which would indicate that a Striking Off Order would be disproportionate. The only mitigating circumstance the Panel has identified is the absence of previous regulatory findings and the Panel considered that this factor bore very little weight.

164. The Panel bore in mind that a Striking-Off Order is a sanction of last resort, but it considered that the sanction of a Striking Off was proportionate. The Panel has little information about the Registrant’s current circumstances and the potential impact of a Striking Off Order. The imposition of such an order may have a significant negative impact on the Registrant, but the Panel was of the view that it was the only order which would provide a sufficient measure of public protection. The imposition of a Striking Off Order sends a clear message to the Registrant and to other members of the profession that such dishonesty and such criminal behaviour is entirely unacceptable for members of the profession.

165. The Panel concluded that the appropriate and proportionate sanction in this case was a Striking Off Order.

The Registrar is directed to strike the name of Natalie Twomey from the Register on the date this order comes into effect.

 

Right of Appeal:

You may appeal to the High Court in England and Wales against the Panel’s decision and the order it has made against you.

Under Article 29(10) of the Health Professions Order 2001, any appeal must be made within 28 days of the date when this notice is served on you. The Panel’s order will not take effect until the appeal period has expired or, if you appeal, until that appeal is disposed of or withdrawn.

Interim Order:

Application

166. Mr Anderson made an application for an Interim Suspension Order for up to eighteen months, to cover the appeal period before the Striking Off Order becomes operative and the time that any appeal might take to be concluded.

Panel decision:

167. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor and had regard to the guidance in the HCPTS Practice Note on Interim Orders.

168. The Panel was satisfied that the Registrant had been informed in the Notice of Hearing that an application for an interim order may be made and that it was fair and appropriate to consider this application in the Registrant’s absence.

169. The Panel considered whether an order was necessary for the protection of the public, otherwise in the public interest, or was in the Registrant’s own interests. It applied the principle of proportionality, balancing the Registrant’s interests against the need to protect the public.

170. The Panel considered whether to impose an interim order. In its findings on impairment the Panel concluded that there is a need to protect the public from the risk of harm. The Panel decided that it would be wholly incompatible with those earlier findings and the imposition of a Striking Off Order to conclude that an Interim Suspension Order was not necessary for the protection of the public and to maintain public confidence in the profession.

171. The Panel took into account the Registrant’s interests, but decided that her interests were outweighed by the need to protect the public and the wider public interest. The Panel concluded that an Interim Suspension Order should be imposed on public protection and public interest grounds.

172. The Panel decided that it was appropriate to impose the Interim Suspension Order for a period of eighteen months to cover the appeal period. When the appeal period expires this Interim Order will come to an end unless there has been an application to appeal. If there is no appeal the substantive Suspension Order shall apply when the appeal period expires.

Interim Suspension Order:

The Panel makes an Interim Suspension Order under Article 31(2) of the Health Professions Order 2001, the same being necessary to protect members of the public and being otherwise in the public interest.

This order will expire: (if no appeal is made against the Panel’s decision and Order) upon the expiry of the period during which such an appeal could be made; (if an appeal is made against the Panel’s decision and Order) the final determination of that appeal, subject to a maximum period of 18 months.

 

History of Hearings for Natalie Twomey

Date	Panel	Hearing type	Outcomes / Status
08/12/2025	Conduct and Competence Committee	Final Hearing	Struck off