Josep Bofill Blanch

Preliminary Matters
Service
1. The Panel had information before it that the Notice of Hearing was sent by email, dated 28 April 2025, to the Registrant’s email address on the HCPC Register. The Panel took into account the HCPTS Practice Note entitled “Service of Documents” and accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor.

2. The Panel was satisfied that service had been effected in accordance with Rules 3 and 6 of the Conduct and Competence (Procedure) Rules 2003 (“the Rules”).

Proceeding in absence
3. Mr Slack, on behalf of the HCPC, applied for the hearing to proceed in the Registrant’s absence, and referred the Panel to the bundle in respect of proceeding in the Registrant’s absence. The bundle contained trace reports related to both the Registrant’s Scottish and Spanish residence and various letters and email correspondence sent in an attempt to trace the Registrant. Mr Slack noted that the Registrant had a duty to maintain an effective address with which he could be contacted by his regulator. He pointed to the wider public interest in the hearing proceeding as scheduled, given the potential adverse impact on the memories of the witnesses of fact, if the hearing were adjourned. Mr Slack noted that the Registrant had not engaged with the HCPC and had as a result voluntarily absented himself from the hearing.

4. The Panel took into account the HCPTS Practice Note entitled “Proceeding in the Absence of the Registrant” and accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor.

5. The Panel took into account the fact that multiple attempts had been made to trace the Registrant, and the Registrant has not made contact with the HCPC since 2022. The Panel noted that the Registrant has a responsibility to maintain an effective address by which the HCPC can contact him. Further, the Registrant has a responsibility to engage with his regulator in response to concerns about his fitness to practise, and he accepted this responsibility when he registered. The Panel concluded that the Registrant had voluntarily waived his right to attend.

6. The Panel noted that there was no suggestion that an adjournment would secure the Registrant’s attendance. Further, if the Registrant had wished to attend and be represented at the hearing, he had been provided with ample time to secure such representation.

7. The Panel considered that it was in the public interest to proceed with the hearing as scheduled, it noted that the HCPC intended to call a number of witnesses and failing to proceed would be extremely disruptive to these witnesses and may impact their memory of events.

8. In all the circumstances, the Panel decided to proceed in the absence of the Registrant.

Application to amend the Allegation
9. Mr Slack on behalf of the HCPC applied to amend the allegation to include an additional particular alleging sexual motivation. He stated that the Registrant had been put on notice of the amendment, 5 days prior to the hearing. He noted that the amendment was required to reflect the conduct alleged and it had been identified following a review of this matter that the failure to amend the allegation may amount to an under prosecution of the case. In this regard Mr Slack relied on the case of R (on the application of Council for the Regulation of Health Care Professionals) v General Medical Council, Dr Mahesh Rajeshwar [2005] EWHC 2973 (Admin).

10. The Panel sought the Legal Assessor’s advice. She directed the Panel to the case of Ahmedsowida v. GMC [2021] EWHC 3466 (Admin), which also references the case of Professional Standards Authority v HCPC and Doree [2017] EWCA Civ 319. The Legal Assessor noted that subject to the requirements of fairness, the Panel had power to amend the allegation, and the lateness of the amendment did not necessarily mean the amendment was unjust. The Legal Assessor also referred the Panel to the case of Bittar v. Financial Conduct Authority [2017] UKUT 82 (TCC) noting the decision in that case was that it would be inappropriate to permit the charge to be amended, on the basis that it introduced a complex investigation into the present proceedings and as a result it would be potentially prejudicial.

11. The Panel considered any potential prejudice or unfairness caused to the Registrant by making the amendments. It further considered its duty to ensure that this matter is not under prosecuted.

12. The Panel considered that while the amendment introduced an additional allegation, it was clear from the evidence in this case that from the outset there were assertions that the conduct of the Registrant was sexually motivated. The Panel considered therefore that the amendment did not introduce a new complex matter which required further investigation. The Panel considered that the Registrant, had he attended the hearing, would have known from the evidence presented that sexual motivation was an aspect of the case which he would have to meet.

13. In all the circumstances and in line with the authority of Ahmedsowida the Panel determined that the amendments could be made without injustice.

14. The Panel considered that a failure to allow the application would mean that the case was under prosecuted and in line with the authority of Rajeshwar, the Panel considered that it was appropriate to amend the allegation.

Background
15. The Registrant is a registered Physiotherapist who was employed by NHS Grampian.

16. On 20 February 2021, the Registrant started working as a vaccinator in the MacDuff Vaccination Centre (the Centre). The Registrant worked every Friday between 8am and 2pm unless he was on annual leave.

17. On 13 October 2021, the HCPC received a referral from NHS Grampian which included concerns that the Registrant had breached professional boundaries in respect of Service User A. It was alleged that on 7 May 2021, having given Service User A a vaccination injection, he then contacted Service User A via social media on the same day.

18. It is alleged that the following day the Registrant then visited Service User A’s home address and attempted to give her a gift. He asked Service User A how she was and then left Service User A’s address.

19. It is the HCPC’s case that in order to visit Service User A’s home address the Registrant accessed Service User A’s personal data or otherwise obtained information enabling his visit to her home address.

20. The HCPC allege that the conduct of the Registrant was sexually motivated and conducted in pursuit of a future sexual relationship.

21. The Registrant was suspended by NHS Grampian on 14 May 2021, he resigned on 3 August 2021, prior to the completion of NHS Grampian’s investigation.

22. It is alleged that the HCPC did not receive notification from the Registrant that he had been suspended, and as such it's alleged that in failing to notify the HCPC of his workplace suspension, the Registrant was acting dishonestly.
23. The HCPC relied on the evidence of the following witnesses who were called to give oral evidence under oath or affirmation.
• Person B
• Person F
• CJ, Case Manager in the Fitness to Practise department at the HCPC
• Person Q
• Person H
• Person C

24. The Panel noted the decision of the previous case management hearing in which it was determined that the hearsay evidence of Service User A and Person J was admissible.

25. At the close of the HCPC’s case, Mr Slack made submissions to the Panel on the facts and relied on a written factual matrix which set out the evidence relied upon by the HCPC in respect of each charge.

Legal Advice
26. The Panel accepted the Legal Assessor’s advice, which included the following areas:
• The burden of proof is on the HCPC, and the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. The correct approach to the balance of probabilities, where serious allegations are concerned, was considered in the case of Bryne v General Medical Council [2021] EWHC 2237 (Admin);
• Unchallenged documentary evidence is more reliable than witness’ recollection, and demeanour is not a reliable indicator of credibility in accordance with Suddock v NMC [2015] EWHC (Admin) 3612 and Dutta v GMC [2020] EWHC 1974;
• The weight to attach to hearsay evidence is a matter for the Panel;
• The Panel was directed in respect of the Registrant’s good character;
• The Panel was referred to the HCPTS Practice Notes in respect of ‘Making decisions on a registrant’s State of Mind’ and “Professional Boundaries”
• The Panel was referred to the cases of Basson v GMC [2018] EWHC 505 (Admin) and Haris v GMC [2021] EWCA Civ 763 on the meaning of ‘sexual motivation’
• The Panel was referred to the case of Ivey v Genting Casinos [2017] UKSC 67.

Decision on Facts
Particular 1(a) – Found Proved
27. The Panel took into account the oral evidence of Person C and Person F, as well as their witness statements. Both witnesses confirmed that the Registrant was working at the vaccination clinic on 7 May 2021 and had seen Service User A at the Clinic. Both witnesses also confirm that following this the Registrant sought to make further contact with Service User A.

28. Person F provided information to the Panel in respect of her interviews with the Registrant and Service User A. Person F confirmed that during their interview with the Registrant, the Registrant confirmed that he contacted Service User A via Facebook to ask if her arm was sore after her vaccination. The Registrant stated in interview with Person F that he was able to find Service User A on social media as he knew her first and last name and used her social media photograph to identify her. The Registrant also confirmed in interview that Service User A never read or responded to his message.

29. The Panel placed weight on the fact that the Registrant accepted in the local interview that he contacted Service User A via social media.

30. The Panel also noted that in Person F’s interview with Service User A, Service User A confirmed that the Registrant had contacted her via social media, and she found this strange. Service User A stated in interview “I thought it was strange and ignored it. You can find anyone online, but I thought it was inappropriate. If it was GP I would be concerned. He was in position of authority, and I felt he should not have done that.”.

31. While the Panel did not hear direct evidence from Service User A it took this hearsay evidence into account, on the basis that it was not sole and decisive and provided support to the evidence provided to the Panel by Person C and Person F.

32. The Panel considered that the actions of the Registrant breached professional boundaries, there was no clinical justification for the Registrant to seek to find Service User A on a social media platform and then message her.

33. In all the circumstances the Panel considered that the Registrant had breached professional boundaries by contacting Service User A on social media, following her attendance at a vaccination clinic.

34. The Panel therefore found Particular 1(a), proved.

Particular 1(b) – Found Proved
35. The Panel noted the evidence of Person C who confirmed that the Registrant had visited Service User A at her home address. Person C confirmed within her witness statement that at the Registrant’s suspension meeting the Registrant had said that he was “just being nice, he wanted to make sure that Service User A was okay”.

36. Person C in her witness statement recalls that the Registrant denied getting Service User A's address from the computer system. He stated that Service User A's address on the computer was wrong. Person C stated that she asked the Registrant how he obtained Service User A's contact information, and the Registrant had said that he knew the relative area that they lived in from talking to Service User A. He had said that he then drove to the area and spoke to Service User A's neighbour, he gave this neighbour Service User A's name, and the neighbour pointed him in the right direction of Service User A’s address.

37. The Panel noted the evidence of Person F, who confirmed that the Registrant in interview with her said that he felt that Service User A was upset during her vaccination and that he wanted to go to her address to ask her how she was feeling. Person F recalled the Registrant saying that when he attended Service User A’s address he brought a bottle of Kombucha to help her feel better and to help her with her arm. Person F confirmed that the Registrant had stated that the interaction was not long and that he dropped off the bottle of Kombucha and then left to collect his daughter. The Registrant stated that Service User A was outside the property when he arrived.

38. The Panel also noted that in Person F’s interview with Service User A, Service User A confirmed that the Registrant had attended her home address. Service User A stated “I drove home, I live very rural and isolated. In amongst barns. I did not see anyone there. I parked up after taking the dog to the vet. I never heard him approach but he appeared when I took the dog out the car. He was in a white car parked round the barn; I noticed it once he left. It was distressing for the children… It was quite a shock”.

39. The Panel considered that the actions of the Registrant breached professional boundaries. The Panel determined that there was no clinical justification for the Registrant to go to the lengths that he did to ascertain Service User A’s address.

40. The Panel further determined that there was no clinical justification for the Registrant attending Service User A’s address. Further, the Panel considered that if the Registrant was concerned for Service User A’s welfare, this could and should have been escalated through appropriate channels at work and would under no circumstances have required him to attend Service User A’s address.

41. In all the circumstances the Panel considered that the Registrant had breached professional boundaries by seeking out the details of and attending at Service User A’s address.

42. The Panel therefore found Particular 1(b), proved.

Particular 1(c) – Found Proved
43. The Panel noted the evidence of Person C that the Registrant had stated in his suspension meeting that he visited Service User A as he was “just being nice and wanted to make sure that Service User A was okay”. He stated that in his culture, “when people are sick you would visit them to make sure they were okay, and bring them gifts like flowers, chocolates or other items they may like.”

44. Further, the Panel noted the evidence of Person F who recalled the Registrant saying that when he attended Service User A’s address he brought a bottle of Kombucha to help her feel better and to help her with her arm.

45. The Panel noted Service User A’s email of 9 May 2021 in which Service User A makes an initial complaint, in this email Service User A states “He had brought me a bottle of Kombucha as a gift.”

46. The Panel considered that there was no clinical justification for the Registrant to turn up to Service User A’s address with a gift and attempt to give it to her. In all the circumstances, the Panel considered that the Registrant had breached professional boundaries by attempting to give Service User A a gift.

47. While the Panel noted that the Registrant had stated that this was something that occurred in his own culture, and he was checking on Service User A. The Panel also noted that he provided an alternative explanation for attending to Person C, namely that he just wanted to make friends. The Panel considered that the various accounts given by the Registrant for his actions were inconsistent. The Panel noted that there was nothing within the evidence to indicate that there were any clear concerns about Service User A, following her vaccination appointment, further such concerns would not necessitate the giving of a gift.

48. The Panel considered its earlier conclusions, that if it genuinely was the case that the Registrant was concerned about Service User A, that there were other appropriate channels that the Registrant could have explored.

49. In all the circumstances the Panel determined that the explanations provided by the Registrant at the local interview stage were inconsistent and his conduct in attending Service User A’s address with a gift was highly inappropriate. The Panel considered that the Registrant ought to have been aware that his behaviour was inappropriate in the circumstances, and amounted to a clear breach of professional boundaries.

50. The Panel therefore found Particular 1(c), proved.

Particular 2(a) – Found Proved
51. The Panel took into account the oral evidence of Person C, Person F and Person H, as well as their witness statements.

52. Person H confirmed in her evidence that the Registrant had access to the Turas Vaccination (“Turas Vaccs”) system, a national system, hosted by NES, upon which vaccination records are held. The patient information available on Turas Vaccs is limited to vaccination details, vaccination records for patients, demographic data and data in relation to past vaccinations. Person H confirmed that the information pertaining to a patient’s address is included in the demographic data in Turas Vaccs.

53. The Panel were provided with detailed logs showing the Registrant’s access to Service User A’s records. The Panel considered that the logs demonstrated that the Registrant completed the records in respect of Service User A’s vaccination at 8.56am, however he then went on to view Service User A’s record on three further occasions at 10.07am, 11.08am and 11.10am. The Panel considered that this demonstrated that the Registrant continued to view Service Users A’s data long after she'd left the centre. The Panel heard evidence from Person C in respect of the justification for accessing a record, and following receipt of that evidence it considered that the Registrant had no valid reason or clinical justification for continuing to view the records.

54. The Panel noted the evidence of Person C who stated that the Registrant told her that Service user A’s address on the computer was not correct, but he knew a rough area where she lived through conversation with her, so he drove out to that area and asked a neighbour where she lived.

55. The Panel considered that even if this explanation by the Registrant was correct, the Registrant would have had accessed Service User A’s personal data and/or information inappropriately to ascertain her address was incorrect. The Panel came to this conclusion on the basis that there was clear evidence before it that it was the responsibility of administrative staff and not others (i.e. the Registrant) to record or review patient address details. Further the Panel considered that even if the Registrant’s explanation was correct this did not alter its view that the Registrant had used information obtained during the vaccination to find out Service User A’s address.

56. Nevertheless, the Panel considered the Registrant’s explanation in respect of Service User A’s address implausible. The Panel considered it unbelievable that the Registrant based purely on a short discussion with Service User A, would be able to drive to an area and find a neighbour who would them tell him the location of Service User A.

57. The Panel determined that it was more likely than not the Registrant used Service User A’s personal data and/or information to find out her home address, given the evidence it heard about his access to her records on the system after she had left the vaccination centre.

58. The Panel therefore found Particular 2(a), proved.

Particular 2(b) – Found Proved
59. The Panel considered its reasoning in respect of Particular 2(a) above. It noted its conclusions that the Registrant used Service User A’s personal data and/or information to find out her home address. The Panel further considered the evidence that the Registrant did attend Service User A’s address. The Panel also noted its previous conclusions in respect of the inappropriate nature of the visit to Service User A.

60. In all the circumstances and based on the Panel’s previous conclusions the Panel found that the Registrant used Service User A’s personal data and/or information to visit Service User A’s home address without a clinical reason to do so.

61. The Panel therefore found Particular 2(b), proved.

Particular 3 – Found Proved
62. The Panel considered the evidence of CJ, Case Manager in the Fitness to Practise department at the HCPC. CJ confirmed that the Registrant was required to make a self-referral to the HCPC as soon as possible following his suspension from the Centre in accordance with 9.5 of the HCPC’s Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics.

63. CJ confirmed that there is no record of the Registrant making a self-referral between 14 May 2021 and 13 October 2021 to inform the HCPC that he had been suspended from his employment.

64. CJ confirmed if the Registrant had contacted the HCPC by phone, post, email or online to inform the HCPC of his suspension before 13 October 2021, there would be a record of this on the case management system.
65. CJ provided the Panel with a supplementary statement, after the 13 October 2021, dated 29 October 2024. Within this statement she confirmed that she had reviewed the HCPC’s case management system further and it remained the case that there is no record of the Registrant making a self-referral on or after 13 October 2021.

66. The Panel considered on the basis of CJ’s evidence that the Registrant failed to notify the HCPC of his suspension by his employer of 14 May 2021.

67. The Panel therefore found Particular 3, proved.

Particular 4 – Found Proved
68. In order to consider whether or not the Registrant’s failure to notify the HCPC of his suspension was dishonest the Panel first considered what the Registrant knew or believed as to the facts and circumstances in respect of the requirement to refer matters to the HCPC at the relevant time.

69. The Panel noted the evidence of Person F who confirmed that when interviewing the Registrant, he had been asked whether he had advised the HCPC that he had been suspended to which he replied no. He was then asked if he had checked the HCPC website and replied, “I was waiting to see the outcome of this meeting”.

70. The Panel considered the evidence of Person F who confirmed within her witness statement that on 30 August 2021, Person L wrote to the Registrant to confirm the final investigatory meeting that had been arranged for 31 August 2021. The Registrant responded to this, stating that he had resigned and did not wish to attend the final meeting. Person L then emailed the Registrant informing him that as a HCPC registrant he was “expected to cooperate with investigations”. The Registrant was asked to re-consider his decision. The Registrant was also informed that should his final decision be to not attend, the investigation would be completed and forwarded to Person D as commissioning manager, who would make the decision as to any outcome, noting that this may include referral to the HCPC. In response, the Registrant stated that he had “resigned”, “fully apologised” adding that “further communication from you will be regarded by me as harassment. The matter is ended”.

71. The Panel noted that within the Registrant’s interview with Person F he confirmed that he had read the HCPC’s Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics. The Panel considered on this basis he would have been aware of his obligation to self-refer in line with 9.5 of the HCPC’s Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics.

72. The Panel noted that within the Registrant’s resignation that he stated that he was taking another position as a Physiotherapist at a Hospital, therefore it was the Registrant’s intention after he resigned to remain in the profession and therefore remain bound by the HCPC’s Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics.

73. Having considered the knowledge of the Registrant at the relevant time the Panel went on to consider whether the Registrant’s conduct was dishonest by the standards of an ordinary decent person. The Panel considered that the conduct was dishonest. The Registrant was informed that he was expected to co-operate with the investigation due to his Registration, he was directly asked whether he had informed the HCPC of his suspension and he further confirmed that he had read the HCPC’s Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics. On this basis the Panel concluded that he ought to have known that he was required to self-refer and despite this knowledge he failed to do so.

74. The Panel considered that the ordinary decent person would think that the actions of the Registrant were dishonest, on the basis that he had knowledge of his obligation to self-refer yet failed to do so. He also went on to seek other employment in the profession, without making a referral. The Panel considered this to be dishonest in the circumstances.

75. The Panel therefore found Particular 4, proved.

Particular 5 – Found Proved
76. Having considered the Particulars of the Allegation found proved and their context, the Panel went on to determine whether the conduct of the Registrant was sexually motivated. The Panel considered the advice that it had received in respect of the case of Basson v GMC [2018] EWHC 505 (Admin) and Haris v GMC [2021] EWCA Civ 763. The Panel also noted the Practice Note provided by the HCPTS on ‘Making Decisions on a Registrant’s State of Mind’.

77. The Panel determined that the conduct of the Registrant amounted to conduct which was done in the pursuit of a future sexual relationship.

78. The Panel considered its findings in respect of the inappropriateness of the Registrant’s actions. The Panel considered that there was no clinical justification for any of the actions taken by the Registrant. The Panel also determined that the Registrant’s explanation for his behaviour was implausible.

79. The Panel placed weight on the evidence of Person B who noted that the Registrant had said “Service User A was very beautiful, that he had really enjoyed speaking to her and that he wanted to speak to her a lot more”. Person B confirmed in oral evidence that the Registrant didn't talk about anyone else in the same way that he spoke about Service User A.

80. The Panel also noted the hearsay evidence of Service User A in which she stated that the Registrant was being friendly and flirtatious during their interaction.

81. In the absence of any credible alternative explanation for the conduct, the Panel considered that the Registrant’s motive was to pursue a future sexual relationship with Service User A.

82. The Panel determined that the Registrant’s interactions with Service User A, his contacting of her via social media, his attempts to obtain her address and his attendance at Service User A’s address were all actions taken in an attempt to build an inappropriate rapport with Service User A, in the hope of pursuing a future sexual relationship.

83. Further, the Panel considered that the Registrant’s attempts to inappropriately provide a gift to Service User A, in the absence of a plausible explanation for such conduct were further supporting evidence of the Registrant’s motivation to pursue a future sexual relationship with Service User A.

84. The Panel noted its previous conclusions in respect of the inconsistencies in the Registrant’s account of why he attended upon Service User A, namely being concerned about Service User A and in the alternative wanting to be friends. The Panel considered that the lengths that the Registrant went to contact Service User A went way beyond an expression of concern or an attempt to build a friendship.

85. In all the circumstances, the Panel considered that the actions of the Registrant were sexually motivated in that his conduct was done in pursuit of a future sexual relationship.

86. The Panel therefore found Particular 5, proved.

Grounds and Impairment
HCPC Submissions
87. Mr Slack referred the Panel to the meaning prescribed to misconduct in the case of Roylance v General Medical Council (No 2) [2000] 1 A.C. 311, in which it was said:
“Misconduct is a word of general effect, involving some act or omission which falls short of what would be proper in the circumstances. The standard of propriety may often be found by reference to the rules and standards ordinarily required to be followed by a practitioner in the particular circumstances...”

88. Mr Slack submitted that the facts found proved amounted to failings that fell far short of the standards expected of a registered Physiotherapist. He submitted that the Registrant’s conduct amounted to misconduct.

89. Mr Slack invited the Panel to conclude that the Registrant had committed breaches of the HCPC’s ‘Standards of Conduct, Performance, and Ethics’ (2016) as follows:
“Treat service users and carers with respect
1.1 You must treat service users and carers as individuals, respecting their privacy and dignity.

Maintain appropriate boundaries
1.7 You must keep your relationships with service users and carers professional.

Social media and networking websites
2.7 You must use all forms of communication appropriately and responsibly, including social media and networking websites.

Using information
5.1 You must treat information about service users as confidential.

Personal and professional behaviour
9.1 You must make sure that your conduct justifies the public’s trust and confidence in you and your profession

Important information about your conduct and competence
9.5 You must tell us as soon as possible if:
You have had any restriction placed on your practice, or been suspended or dismissed by an employer, because of concerns about your conduct or competence.”

90. Mr Slack invited the Panel to consider current impairment and have regard to the personal and public components of impairment.

91. Mr Slack referred the Panel to the cases of Cohen v General Medical Council [2008] EWHC 581 (Admin) and Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence v (1) Nursing and Midwifery Council (2) Grant [2011] EWHC 927 (Admin). He submitted that all four limbs identified in Grant were relevant to this case.

92. He submitted the Panel were obliged to consider all relevant factors known to it at this stage, which included the Registrant’s previously unblemished record and whether or not the conduct is easily remediable.

93. Mr Slack submitted that the Registrant’s sexually motivated conduct towards Service User A, combined with his dishonesty, was such that the Panel should find that the Registrant’s fitness to practise was impaired on both the personal and public components of impairment.

94. Mr Slack submitted that sexual misconduct and dishonesty are not easily remediated, and the Registrant’s conduct involve a patient and appeared to cause serious distress. Mr Slack stated that notwithstanding that the Registrant had some level of insight in admitting the factual basis of the allegations in the local interview, he did so through a process of caveats, in that he stated his actions were well meaning.

95. Mr Slack submitted that there has been a lack of remediation in this case such that not only has there been actual harm psychologically to a service user, but there continues to be a risk of future harm. Mr Slack submitted that both dishonesty and sexually motivated conduct, without any clear evidence of remediation, must bring the profession into disrepute and breached fundamental tenets of the profession.

96. Mr Slack submitted that the sexually motivated conduct indicated a serious attitudinal concern that much like dishonesty is difficult to remediate. Mr Slack therefore submitted that the panel should find impairment both on the public and personal components in this case.

Decision on Misconduct
97. On the basis of the facts found proved, the Panel went on to consider whether the Registrant’s conduct amounted to misconduct. It took into account all the evidence received together with the submissions made by Mr Slack on behalf of the HCPC.

98. The Panel heard and accepted advice from the Legal Assessor. In considering this matter, the Panel exercised its own judgement. The Panel were advised to adopt a two-stage process in its consideration. Firstly, the Panel should consider whether the facts found proved amounted to misconduct. Secondly, and only if the facts proved were found to amount to misconduct, should the Panel go on to consider whether the Registrant’s fitness to practise is currently impaired as a result of that misconduct.

99. The Panel were advised to take into account the public interest, which includes protection of the public, maintenance of public confidence in the profession, and the declaring and upholding of proper standards of conduct and behaviour.

100. When considering whether the facts found proved amounted to misconduct, the Panel noted that not all breaches of the HCPC’s 'Standards of Performance, Conduct and Ethics' need amount to a finding of misconduct.

101. The Panel noted the advice provided in respect of the authority of Roylance v General Medical Council (No.2) [2000] 1 A.C. 311 and Nandi v GMC [2004] EWHC 2317 (Admin) in which the Court referred to Roylance and described misconduct as “a falling short by omission or commission of the standards of conduct expected among medical practitioners, and such falling short must be serious” such that it would be “regarded as deplorable by fellow practitioners”.

102. The Panel considered that the Registrant’s conduct amounted to a breach of the HCPC’s 'Standards of Conduct, Performance, and Ethics' (2016) as follows;
“Treat service users and carers with respect
1.2 You must treat service users and carers as individuals, respecting their privacy and dignity.

Maintain appropriate boundaries
1.7 You must keep your relationships with service users and carers professional.

Social media and networking websites
2.7 You must use all forms of communication appropriately and responsibly, including social media and networking websites.

Using information
5.1 You must treat information about service users as confidential.

Personal and professional behaviour
9.1 You must make sure that your conduct justifies the public’s trust and confidence in you and your profession

Important information about your conduct and competence
9.5 You must tell us as soon as possible if:
You have had any restriction placed on your practice, or been suspended or dismissed by an employer, because of concerns about your conduct or competence.”

103. The Panel considered that the public should quite rightly be entitled to expect, that service users should not be subject to inappropriate and unsolicited contacts or visits by a registered professional. A service users personal information should not be obtained for improper purposes and service users should not be subjected to inappropriate contact via social media, visits or gifting.

104. The Registrant’s course of conduct was persistent in his pursuit of a future sexual relationship with Service User A. At the relevant time he failed to consider the fact that his conduct significantly breached professional boundaries.

105. The Panel considered that the Registrant’s behaviour was demonstrative of conduct that fundamentally undermines the public’s trust in both the Registrant and in the profession generally. The Panel considered the seriousness of the Registrant’s failings. In doing so, it identified that the Registrant engaged in a persisted course of unwanted sexually motivated conduct towards Service User A.

106. Further, the Registrant has breached a fundamental tenant of the profession in failing to notify the HCPC of his suspension. The Panel noted its conclusions that he was aware of his obligation to notify the HCPC of his suspension, and despite this knowledge, he failed to inform his regulator of his suspension and continued to seek work in the profession.

107. The Panel concluded that all of the individual factual particulars which have been found proved fell far below the standards required of the Registrant, and as such individually constituted misconduct. Consequently, the Panel also considered that the factual particulars taken together also constituted misconduct.

108. The Panel therefore found that the Registrant’s conduct as found proved amounted to misconduct.

Decision on Impairment
109. The Panel went on to decide whether, as a result of his misconduct, the Registrant’s fitness to practise is currently impaired.

110. The Panel had regard to all of the evidence presented in this case, including the submissions of Mr Slack.

111. The Panel also heard and accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor and took into account the HCPTS Practice Note on ‘Fitness to Practise Impairment’.

112. The Panel considered the judgement of in the case of Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence v (1) Nursing and Midwifery Council (2) Grant [2011] EWHC 927 (Admin) in reaching its decision. In paragraph 74, Mrs Justice Cox said:
“In determining whether a practitioner’s fitness to practise is impaired by reason of misconduct, the relevant panel should generally consider not only whether the practitioner continues to present a risk to members of the public in his or her current role, but also whether the need to uphold proper professional standards and public confidence in the profession would be undermined if a finding of impairment were not made in the particular circumstances”.

113. The Panel considered the test formulated by Dame Janet Smith in the 5th Shipman Report, which was revisited by Mrs Justice Cox in the case of Grant at Paragraph 76 as follows:
“Do our findings of fact in respect of the doctor’s misconduct, deficient professional performance, adverse health, conviction, caution or determination show that his/her fitness to practise is impaired in the sense that s/he:
a. has in the past acted and/or is liable in the future to act so as to put a patient or patients at unwarranted risk of harm; and/or
b. has in the past brought and/or is liable in the future to bring the medical profession into disrepute; and/or
c. has in the past breached and/or is liable in the future to breach one of the fundamental tenets of the medical profession; and/or
d. has in the past acted dishonestly and/or is liable to act dishonestly in the future”.

114. On the basis of the Panel’s findings, the Panel considered that all four limbs of the test were engaged. The Panel, as set out in its finding on misconduct, found that the Registrant’s sexually motivated behaviour caused physiological harm to Service User A, his behaviour brought the profession into disrepute. The Panel also concluded that acting in this way breached a fundamental tenet of the profession. Further the Panel noted its findings in respect of dishonesty.

115. The Panel carefully considered the Registrant’s responses in the local investigation interview with Person F. While the Registrant expressed some insight, that he may not have acted appropriately, this was heavily caveated with his justifications that he was looking out for Service User A.

116. The Panel considered that the Registrant showed limited insight into the actual misconduct of this case. There was no demonstration of an understanding that his behaviour was upsetting and distressing for Service User A. Nor was the Panel provided with any reflection or response from the Registrant to demonstrate that the Registrant had any understanding that his dishonest behaviour, in failing to notify the HCPC of his suspension, had an impact on the profession’s reputation as a whole.

117. There has been no evidence provided by the Registrant of any meaningful reflection or any steps taken by him to address the misconduct or attitudinal concerns, which led to the misconduct. The Panel has not been provided with any evidence of training or education. The Panel have not been provided with any evidence of reflection or training to address or demonstrate an understanding of the professional boundaries which he should have adhered to, why they are important, and how to avoid such conduct in future. The Panel could not identify on the material before it any meaningful acceptance by the Registrant of the need to change his thinking and behaviours.

118. As such, the Panel decided that there was very limited insight and no remediation demonstrated by the Registrant. Consequently, the Panel decided that there was a real risk that the Registrant could repeat his actions and thus cause harm or damage to the reputation of the profession in the future.

119. The Panel was, therefore, of the view that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is currently impaired on the basis of the personal component.

120. The Panel next considered the wider public interest.

121. With regard to the misconduct, the Panel was of the view that it was serious. The registrant breached professional boundaries by engaging in sexually motivated behaviour towards a Service User, causing them distress and upset. Further, the Registrant acted dishonestly in failing to disclose his suspension following the investigation of these matters to the HCPC. In these circumstances, the Panel decided that the need to uphold proper standards of conduct and performance, and the need to maintain confidence in the profession would be seriously undermined if no finding of impairment were made.

122. The Panel, therefore, found the Registrant to be impaired on the basis of both the personal component and the public components.

Sanction
HCPC submissions
123. Mr Slack on behalf of the HCPC drew the Panel’s attention to the HCPC’s Sanction Policy and noted the section within the policy in respect of sexual misconduct and dishonesty. Mr Slack highlighted the mitigating and aggravating factors of the case; he submitted the question of sanction was ultimately a matter for the Panel.

Decision on Sanction
124. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor who referred it to the Sanction Policy. She reminded the Panel that it should consider any sanction in ascending order and apply the least restrictive sanction necessary to protect the public and the public interest. The Panel should also consider any aggravating and mitigating factors and bear in mind the principle of proportionality. The Legal Assessor reminded the Panel that the primary purpose of imposing a sanction was protection of the public and the public interest and that there was a need to balance those interests with the interests of the Registrant.

125. In reaching its decision on whether to impose a sanction, and if so, which one, the Panel has reminded itself of its conclusions in relation to the seriousness of the Registrant’s misconduct as set out in its determination on misconduct and impairment.

126. The Panel has concluded that the Registrant continues to pose a risk to the public and to the reputation of the profession, and that there remains a real risk of repetition of his misconduct. As such, the Panel considered that any sanction it imposed should reflect the need to uphold the public interest and mark the seriousness of the misconduct found proved.

127. In that regard, the Panel has had due regard to paragraphs 76-77 of the Sanctions Policy, noting the impact of sexual misconduct on public confidence, this states:
“Sexual misconduct is a very serious matter which has a significant impact on the public and public confidence in the profession. It includes, but is not limited to, sexual harassment, sexual assault, and any other conduct of a sexual nature that is without consent, or has the effect of threatening or intimidating someone The misconduct can be directed towards:
• service users, carers and family members;
• colleagues; and
• members of the public.

Because of the gravity of these types of cases, where a panel finds a registrant impaired because of sexual misconduct, it is likely to impose a more serious sanction. Where it deviates from this approach, it should provide clear reasoning”.

128. The Panel also had regard to paragraphs 56-58 of the Sanctions Policy, noting the impact of dishonesty on trust and confidence in the profession.

129. The Panel noted the evidence it was provided in respect of Service User A and the fact that she found the actions of the Registrant to be distressing and shocking.

130. The Panel considered all the information before it. In doing so, the Panel identified the following mitigating factors:
i) The Registrant does not have any previous regulatory findings recorded against him and no prior or subsequent complaints have been made;

131. The Panel identified the following aggravating factors:
i) The Registrant’s misconduct, although taking place over a short period of time, was persistent in nature in that he initially asked Service User A’s colleagues about where she worked and information about her break times. He then went to great lengths to contact Service User A including via social media and through accessing her personal data which culminated in the visit to her home.
ii) The Registrant failed to acknowledge and stop his persistent breaches of professional boundaries;
iii) The Registrant’s conduct caused emotional harm to Service User A;
iv) The conduct represented an abuse of a position of trust;
v) The Registrant has not demonstrated that he has remediated his failings;
vi) The Registrant has demonstrated limited insight into his failings;
vii) There has only been a limited expression of regret and a limited apology, which failed to acknowledge the seriousness of the conduct itself.

132. The Panel considered the Registrant’s sexual motivated behaviour to be at the lower end of the spectrum of sexual misconduct. The Panel considered the Registrant’s behaviour amounted to persistent and intensified unwanted attention, he did not deliberately target Service User A based on a vulnerability, and there was no sexual abuse. However, the Panel considered that the Registrant’s actions represented a serious breach of professional boundaries which would fall at the top end of the scale. In respect of this the Panel considered that the Registrant’s conduct represented a deep-seated attitudinal concern, and it was evident from the Registrant’s conduct that he placed his needs in the pursuit of a future sexual relationship, above the wellbeing and privacy of a service user.

133. With respect to the Registrant’s dishonesty, the Panel noted that the Registrant had knowledge of the requirement to report his suspension to his regulator and despite this failed to do so and at the same time expressed a desire to continue to pursue job opportunities within the profession and told a colleague he was going to apply for roles as a Physiotherapist. The Panel considered dishonest conduct involving the regulator to be very serious.

134. The Panel approached the issue of sanction starting with the least restrictive first, bearing in mind the need for proportionality and to take into account the Registrant’s interests. Having done so, it concluded that referring the matter for mediation or taking no further action would not reflect the nature and gravity of the misconduct. The Panel concluded that this was not a case suitable for mediation. Further, the Panel considered taking no action would not be adequate to protect the public or the wider public interest of maintaining confidence in both the profession and the regulatory process given the risks identified. Such outcomes are neither appropriate nor proportionate in the circumstances.

135. The Panel then considered whether to impose a Caution Order and had regard to paragraphs 99-104 of the Sanction Policy. The Panel concluded that this was also not an appropriate outcome for the following reasons;
i) the Registrant’s misconduct is not minor in nature;
ii) the Registrant’s misconduct relates both to sexual motivation and dishonesty;
iii) the Registrant has demonstrated limited insight;
iv) there remained a real risk of repetition given the lack of effective remediation and the Registrant’s lack of insight into his failings.

136. The Panel next considered whether a Conditions of Practice Order was appropriate. It had regard to paragraphs 105-117 of the Sanctions Policy. The Panel concluded that such a sanction would neither be appropriate, nor proportionate, to address the public interest concerns identified. The Panel concluded that workable and appropriate conditions could not be formulated that would meaningfully address the attitudinal concerns identified in relation to the Registrant’s sexual misconduct and dishonesty. The Panel noted that the Registrant has failed to engage with the Regulator and therefore it could not be confident that the Registrant would comply with conditions. In any event, the Panel concluded that the nature of the misconduct found proved was too serious for such a sanction. The Panel therefore concluded that imposing a Conditions of Practice Order was not appropriate in the circumstances.

137. The Panel next considered the sanction of suspension. It had regard to paragraph 121 of the Sanction Policy. The Panel has borne in mind that this would be an appropriate sanction to impose if, even though the Allegation is serious, the conduct was not fundamentally incompatible with the Registrant remaining on the register, the Registrant had insight and that the issues were unlikely to be repeated, factors that the Panel concluded were absent in this case.

138. In all the circumstances and given the real risk of repetition of the Registrant’s misconduct, the Panel concluded that the imposition of a Suspension Order was neither the appropriate, nor proportionate, sanction to impose. The Panel considered that the Registrant’s breaches of professional boundaries, his persistent sexually motivated behaviour towards Service User A and his dishonest conduct was behaviour that is fundamentally incompatible with remaining on the register.

139. The Panel therefore considered whether a Striking Off Order was appropriate and in doing so, took account of paragraphs 130–132 of the Sanctions Policy. The Panel concluded that the Registrant had failed to engage, shown limited insight and has provided no evidence of steps taken to remediate.

140. The Panel considered that the Registrant has provided no evidence of steps taken to engage in remediation in order to address his deep-seated attitudinal concerns and has not engaged with the regulatory process. In all the circumstances the Panel considered that the Registrant had shown no willingness to resolve matters.

141. The Panel considered in order to protect the public and the public interest, any sanction less than a Striking Off Order would not be appropriate.

142. The Panel determined that given the nature and gravity of the matters found proved and the real risks identified, a lesser sanction would lack the necessary deterrent effect and would undermine public confidence in the profession and the regulatory process.

143. The Panel therefore concluded that a Striking Off Order was the appropriate sanction to impose because:
i) The matters found proved, as set out in the Panel’s determination on misconduct, represented serious breaches of the Standards in relation to unwanted sexually motivated conduct, breaching of professional boundaries and dishonesty;
ii) The Registrant has demonstrated limited insight into his conduct.
iii) The Registrant has demonstrated through his lack of engagement a clear unwillingness to resolve matters

144. The Panel has considered the Registrant’s interests. However, in light of its findings, the Panel considered that the need to protect the public and the public interest by sending a clear message upholding and declaring proper standards of conduct and behaviour, outweighed the Registrant's interests.

145. The Panel accordingly determined to impose a Striking Off Order.

The Registrar is directed to remove the name of Mr Josep Bofill Blanch from the Register on the date this order comes into effect.

Right of Appeal
You may appeal to the High Court in England and Wales against the Panel’s decision and the order it has made against you.

Under Article 29(10) of the Health Professions Order 2001, any appeal must be made within 28 days of the date when this notice is served on you. The Panel’s order will not take effect until the appeal period has expired or, if you appeal, until that appeal is disposed of or withdrawn.

Interim Order
1. As the Strike Off Order cannot take effect until the end of the 28-day appeal period, the Panel has considered whether an Interim Order is required in the specific circumstances of this case. It may only make an Interim Order if it is satisfied that it is necessary for the protection of the public, is otherwise in the public interest or in your own interest until the sanction takes effect. The Panel heard and accepted the advice of the legal assessor.

Submissions on Interim Order
2. The Panel took account of the submissions made by Mr Slack. He submitted that an Interim Order was necessary to address the risk to public and to uphold the confidence in the profession. He informed the Panel that the sanction which it has imposed would not take effect for 28 days. He submitted that an 18-month Interim Suspension Order would address the risks identified by the Panel and cover any potential period of appeal.

Decision on Interim Order
3. The Panel carefully considered the submissions on behalf of the HCPC. The Panel was satisfied that an Interim Order is necessary for the protection of the public and is otherwise in the public interest. The Panel had regard to the seriousness of the facts found proved and the reasons set out in its decision for the Substantive Order in reaching the decision to impose an Interim Order.

4. The Panel concluded that an Interim Conditions of Practice Order would not be appropriate or proportionate in this case, due to the reasons already identified in the Panel’s determination for imposing a Strike-Off.

5. The Panel makes an Interim Suspension Order for 18 months to cover any potential period of appeal under Article 31(2) of the Health Professions Order 2001, the same being necessary to protect members of the public and being otherwise in the public interest.

6. This Order will expire: (if no appeal is made against the Panel’s decision and Order) upon the expiry of the period during which such an appeal could be made; (if an appeal is made against the Panel’s decision and Order) the final determination of that appeal, subject to a maximum period of 18 months.

History of Hearings for Josep Bofill Blanch