Saint Joseph Ronaldo Austria

 

 

1. At the outset of the hearing Mr Bellis on behalf of the HCPC applied for part of the hearing to be conducted in private. Mr Bellis submitted that within the bundle the Registrant had disclosed matters which related to his private and family life that may be relevant to the Panel’s consideration of the allegation. He submitted it would be appropriate for these matters to be heard in private to protect the Registrant’s private and family life. 

 

2. The Registrant supported this application and stated that was his preference.

 

3. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor. The Panel noted that the Registrant was likely to make reference to personal and family matters during the course of his submissions and if he chose to do so during evidence to the Panel. The Panel was mindful of the principle of open justice and had regard to the HCPTS Practice Note ‘Conducting Hearings in Private’. The Panel determined to hold part of the hearing in private as the Panel was satisfied that this was necessary to protect the private life of the Registrant. 

 

 

4. The Registrant was employed by University Hospitals Derby and Burton NHS Foundation Trust [“the Trust”] as a Biomedical Scientist between 2008 and October 2020.

 

5. It is alleged that between December 2016 and January 2020, the Registrant amended/falsified a number of timesheets after they had been signed and authorised by a manager, but before they were processed by payroll. The Registrant took the signed timesheet and then photocopied it over an amended timesheet which he had completed to show that he had worked overtime, when he had not. It was estimated by the Trust that the Registrant obtained around £8,500 in overpayments as a result of his actions although some timesheets were no longer available for review.

 

6. The matter came to light after a query was raised by the finance department at the Trust that a photocopied timesheet had been submitted which appeared to have been altered and the hours did not seem to add up. The finance department then requested the original timesheet and confirmation of the overtime worked from the Registrant’s line manager. The Registrant’s line manager responded with a copy of the original timesheet and confirmed no overtime had been worked by the Registrant. This did not match the timesheet that had been submitted to the finance department. 

 

7. Following this discovery, the Registrant was interviewed by his employers about the discrepancies. At the interview the Registrant admitted his actions and explained that he had been overclaiming because he had been having significant personal and financial difficulties.

 

8. On 3 March 2020, the Registrant had a meeting with his senior manager about the concerns. It was discussed that his working pattern would need to be adjusted as a result of the ongoing investigation. It was agreed that the Registrant’s line manager would be informed that this change in working pattern was related to a request for flexible working arrangements to ensure confidentiality and not to affect the ongoing investigation. The Registrant immediately took an extended period of sick leave. A further meeting took place on 14 July 2020, whilst the Registrant was still on sick leave, and there was further discussion about redeployment within the Trust in an altered role.

 

9. The matter progressed to a local level disciplinary hearing on 16 October 2020, which the Registrant attended without representation. The allegations relating to the falsified time sheets were found to be substantiated and the Registrant’s employment was terminated. The outcome letter for this hearing is dated 21 October 2020.

 

10. The Registrant did not inform the HCPC in relation to the initial change to his duties, nor about his dismissal. The HCPC received a referral from the Trust in relation to the Registrant’s dismissal on 29 October 2020.

 

 

11. At the outset of the hearing the Registrant stated that he admitted Particular 1 of the Allegation. The Registrant did not admit the remaining particulars of the Allegation. 

 

12. On behalf of the HCPC the Panel heard live evidence from CJL who was the investigating officer for the Trust investigation, YG who was the Registrant’s line manager, ST who was the Pay and Pensions Manager at the Trust who first became aware of the issue with the photocopied timesheets, and CE, a Case Manager in the Fitness to Practice department at the HCPC who outlined that the HCPC systems showed there had been no self-referral by the Registrant. 

 

13. The Registrant confirmed to the Panel that he did not want to give evidence however, he wished to make oral submissions. The Panel received a case summary and a bundle of documents from the HCPC comprising of statements of the witnesses together with investigation reports and documents that were gathered as part of the investigation. Included in this bundle were notes of interviews with the Registrant and emails written by the Registrant to the HCPC in which he set out his response to the allegation. 

 

14. The Panel had regard to the submissions of Mr Bellis on behalf of the HCPC. He outlined the regulatory framework in relation to the burden and standard of proof, and he outlined the test for dishonesty and referred to the relevant case law. He submitted that the evidence was clear that all of the factual particulars could be found proved.

 

15. The Panel also had regard to the submissions of the Registrant. He re-iterated his apology and remorse and explained he was profoundly ashamed and embarrassed by his actions. The Registrant submitted that although he had “done a dishonest act” he was not a dishonest person and the reasons for his conduct were because of his circumstances. He submitted that at the time his life was in turmoil. He told the Panel that his actions did not reflect his character or his identity. The Registrant submitted that he was not seeking to excuse his actions, and he took full responsibility for the consequences. The Registrant submitted that he never tried to hide his investigation or dismissal from anyone, and he assumed that the Trust would tell the HCPC, and he was not aware he had to do so. He submitted that in relation to his change in duties he was told that he should keep the investigation confidential and the change in duties would be described to others as a result of his request for flexible working. The Registrant submitted that he wanted a chance to “bounce back” and return to a job he loved. 

 

16. The Panel heard and accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor. In respect of the facts, the Panel understood that the burden of proving the disputed facts is on the HCPC. The Legal Assessor reminded the Panel to have regard to the HCPTS Practice Note relating to admissions and that it could find the allegations proved without receiving further evidence if it was fair and proper to do so. 

 

17. The Panel considered that the admission made on behalf of the Registrant was consistent with the evidence and consistent with the admissions made by the Registrant in his local interview with the Trust. In these circumstances the Panel accepted the admission in relation to Particular 1 and it finds this particular proved.

 

18. With regard to the disputed facts the HCPC will only be able to prove a particular fact if it satisfies the required standard of proof: namely the civil standard, whereby it is more likely than not that the alleged incident occurred. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor in relation to the test for dishonesty as outlined in the case of Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd [2017] UKSC67 and took into account the Practice Note “Making decisions on a registrant’s state of mind”.

 

 

19. The Panel noted the evidence contained in the record of the Registrant’s interview with the Trust on 3 March 2020. The Panel noted that when the concerns were first raised with the Registrant during that meeting, he was advised that an adjustment to his role was necessary because of the ongoing investigation. The Registrant was told “We will look at adjustment to duties so you can come back to work tomorrow in an adjusted role, are you happy with that?” and after the Registrant confirmed he was happy and was looking for flexible working in any event he was further advised, “We are going to look at your working pattern because of this ongoing investigation..” The Panel was satisfied that this was an accurate record of what was said, and it was not challenged by the Registrant. The Panel was satisfied that the Registrant was told and was aware that his duties would be adjusted. In addition, in his oral submissions to the Panel the Registrant confirmed that he was aware his duties would be adjusted.

 

20. The Panel also accepted the evidence of CE that the Registrant did not notify the HCPC of this change to his duties as a result of the investigation. The Registrant did not suggest that he ever did make a self-referral or told the HCPC about his change in duties. The Panel took into account that the Registrant was unrepresented, and it appeared to the Panel that his denial of the Particular was based on the fact that he was unaware he was required to make such a referral.

 

21. In all the circumstances, taking account of the evidence, the Panel was satisfied that the Registrant was told that his duties would be adjusted, and he did not notify the HCPC.    

 

 

22. For similar reasons the Panel considered that this particular was also proved. The Panel noted the dismissal letter sent to the Registrant on 21 October 2020 which confirmed the outcome of the disciplinary hearing held on the 16 October 2020 that the Registrant was dismissed.

 

23. The Panel accepted the evidence of CE that the Registrant did not notify the HCPC about his dismissal. The HCPC received a referral from the Trust on the 29 October 2020, and the registrant was notified of that referral on 2 December 2020.

 

24. Again, the Panel considered that it was clear as a fact that the Registrant was dismissed from his role and did not notify the HCPC. No alternative factual basis was put forward by the Registrant during the hearing. The Panel considered that the Registrant’s denial of this particular appeared to be based on his assumption that the Trust would notify the HCPC rather than his denial that the particular occurred as alleged.    

 

25. Having found the factual particulars proved the Panel went on to consider the dishonesty element in relation to each of the factual particulars. The Panel noted that the Registrant, in his local interview and in his submissions to the Panel accepted that the conduct was dishonest in relation to particular 1. The Panel noted that the Registrant stated that “he had done a dishonest act but was not a dishonest person.”. 

 

26. The Panel was in no doubt that the Registrant’s actions in falsifying timesheets to claim for hours worked that he had not done was dishonest. Further the Panel was satisfied that the Registrant knew his actions were dishonest which is why he took steps to conceal what he had done by taking the completed timesheets from his managers office during the night shift, so he was less likely to be discovered. The Panel considered that making fraudulent claims for money in this way would be considered to be dishonest by the standards of ordinary decent people. 

 

27. In relation to the Registrant’s failure to notify the HCPC about his adjusted duties the Panel considered that there was no evidence that the Registrant had sought to actively conceal or hide the position from the HCPC. The Panel noted from the record of interview that the discussion about the Registrant’s adjusted duties was tied in with a request from the Registrant for flexible working. In addition, the Registrant was advised that his line manager would be told that the reason for his adjusted duties because of a flexible working request. The Panel considered that this was likely to have confused the position.

 

28. The Panel noted the Registrant’s submission that English was not his first language and at the time of the allegations being raised with the Registrant he had been experiencing significant personal difficulties [Redacted]. In these circumstances the Panel considered that it was likely that the Registrant was not thinking clearly about the impact of his adjusted duties and his obligations as a registered professional.

 

29. The Panel was not provided with any evidence that the Registrant was ever explicitly made aware that he was required to notify the HCPC of his adjusted duties and it also noted that the Trust did not make a referral to the HCPC at this point. 

 

30. The Panel noted the evidence that the Registrant was within his renewal window and so during this period there was no evidence that the Registrant falsely declared to the HCPC that there were no concerns about his conduct as part of his registration renewal. 

 

31. The Panel considered that the Registrant’s failure to notify the HCPC was more likely to have been because he had not given any thought to his obligations because of his difficult circumstances and not because he was deliberately trying to conceal matters. The Panel noted that the Registrant had maintained that he never tried to hide matters and there was no evidence that the Registrant had ever concealed the position. The Panel considered that this was likely to be an innocent and understandable oversight in the particular circumstances rather than a dishonest attempt to conceal matters from the HCPC.   The Panel did not consider ordinary decent people would consider the Registrant’s omission in these circumstances to be dishonest.   

 

 

32. For similar reasons the Panel considered that the HCPC had failed to discharge the burden of proof in relation to this particular. The Panel noted that the dismissal letter sent to the Registrant dated 21 October 2020 stated, “The Panel also confirmed that there will be a requirement to update the Counter Fraud Team of the outcome of this hearing and to make a referral to the HCPC.”

 

33. The Panel noted the evidence of CE that it would be expected that a self-referral should be made as soon as possible, and the internal guidance suggested a period of two weeks. The Panel noted that the Trust had made a referral on 29 October 2020, and it was raised with the Registrant on 2 December 2020.

 

34. There was no evidence before the Panel that the Registrant had attempted to hide his dismissal from the HCPC and there was no evidence that he had made any false declaration that there were no concerns about his conduct. 

 

35. The Panel considered that at this point the Registrant was in a very difficult situation having just lost his job and source of income. The Panel accepted that the Registrant would have been very upset and distressed by these events and that he did not have the benefit of professional representation or advice.   

 

36. The Panel considered that the Registrant’s failure to notify the HCPC in relation to his dismissal was more likely to have been because he considered that the Trust would do so as outlined in the dismissal letter, and he had not given any thought to his obligations because of his difficult circumstances. There was no evidence that the Registrant had tried to conceal matters. The Panel noted that the Registrant had maintained that he never tried to hide matters and that he was not dishonest about this aspect. The Panel considered that this was likely to be an innocent and understandable oversight in the particular circumstances rather than a dishonest attempt to conceal matters from the HCPC.  The Panel did not consider ordinary decent people would consider the Registrant’s omission in these circumstances to be dishonest.   

 

 

37. Mr Bellis for the HCPC submitted that the statutory ground of misconduct was made out and the Registrant’s fitness to practice was impaired both on the personal component and the public component. Mr Bellis submitted that the Panel had found that the Registrant had acted dishonesty and had failed to keep his regulator updated in relation to important matters relating to his conduct. He submitted that such conduct fell far below the standards expected of a registered professional and amounted to serious professional misconduct. Mr Bellis referred the Panel to the HCPC Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics January 2016 and in particular Standard 9 headed “Be honest and trustworthy” and Standard 9.1.

 

38. Mr Bellis submitted that the Panel should then go on to consider the issue of impairment and he referred the Panel to the relevant case law. He submitted that in considering whether the misconduct had been remedied and was unlikely to be repeated, the Panel should consider the degree of insight and remediation shown by the Registrant. Mr Bellis submitted that there was very limited evidence of insight and there was very little information for the Panel to conclude that the Registrant had taken steps to address matters. Mr Bellis submitted that dishonesty is very difficult to remediate, and the Registrant had not provided sufficient evidence to satisfy the Panel that he had addressed the risk of repetition. Further, he submitted that the need to uphold proper professional standards would be undermined if a finding of impairment were not made in this case.

 

39. The Registrant made submissions and told the Panel he accepted the decision in relation to facts. He told the Panel he had returned the money he had overclaimed in full. The Registrant submitted that over 5 years had passed since these events, and he was in a very different place. He submitted that he accepted he had made a mistake, and he was deeply sorry. The Registrant submitted that he wanted to accept his punishment and move forward with his life. He submitted that he was very much hopeful that he could continue in his career as he had worked for 20 years in the NHS and now, he was relating to his personal circumstances at the time. 

 

40. In answer to Panel questions the Registrant outlined his career history since leaving the Trust. He explained that he had first worked as a delivery driver and then secured a locum placement via an agency for a job as a Biomedical Scientist at Leicester Royal Infirmary. He told the Panel that the funding for this post ended after 18 months. The Registrant explained he then secured a role in a manufacturing company and also worked for 6 months as a telephone adviser at NHS 111. The Registrant explained he left that post as a 111 operator to take up a position as a Biomedical Scientist, but this offer of employment was withdrawn. The Registrant explained that it was difficult to secure posts with the ongoing fitness to practice proceedings. 

 

41. The Registrant also told the Panel that the repayment of the overpayment was made on the basis that no civil action would be taken. The Registrant told the Panel that he would access support if he was in a similar situation in the future, but he did not have any reflections or other information to produce regarding any learning from these events. However, the Registrant told the Panel that he had learned from this behaviour, and he was not a dishonest person and if he had a chance to return to work it would never be repeated.

 

 

42. The Panel then considered whether the facts found proved amounted to misconduct. Misconduct must be serious and not every falling short will give rise to a finding of misconduct. The Panel noted that in his submissions the Registrant did not appear to deny that his conduct in falsifying the overtime claims amounted to misconduct. The Registrant stated that he agreed with the submission of Mr Bellis in this regard. Nevertheless, the Panel has exercised its own judgement. 

 

43. The Panel has made findings in relation to the Registrant engaging in multiple overtime claims by falsifying his timesheets to obtain a monetary benefit over a significant period of time. In addition, the Panel has found that the Registrant failed to inform the HCPC about the change to his duties as a result of the initial investigation and of his dismissal. 

 

44. In engaging in the systemic dishonest behaviour of falsifying his timesheets the Panel considered that the Registrant’s conduct fell far short of the standards expected of a registered professional. The Panel notes the HCPC Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics January 2016 and in particular Standard 9 headed “Be honest and trustworthy” and Standard 9.1 “You must make sure that your conduct justifies the public’s trust and confidence in you and your profession.”. The Panel was in no doubt that this conduct was very serious and damaged the trust placed in the Registrant by his employer and damaged the reputation of the profession. The Panel considered that members of the profession and the public would be shocked and appalled to learn of the Registrant’s actions. The Panel considered this amounted to serious professional misconduct.

 

45. In relation to the failure to notify the HCPC about his change of duties and subsequent dismissal the Panel had regard to Standard 9.5 

 

 

46. The Panel considered that the failure to notify the HCPC about the change in duties was a breach of Standard 9.5. However, it reminded itself of its findings at the facts stage regarding the confusion about the change in duties being discussed at the same time as a flexible working request. The Panel also reminded itself that it had made a finding that this conduct did not amount to dishonesty and was an oversight at a time when the Registrant was feeling overwhelmed. The Panel considered that this failure was not so serious as to amount to misconduct. 

 

47. The Panel considered that the same reasoning did not apply to the Registrant’s failure to advise the HCPC about his dismissal. The Panel noted that the dismissal letter was clear that the Registrant had been dismissed for gross misconduct and the Trust was making a referral to the HCPC. By this point the Panel considered that the Registrant should have been in no doubt that this was a serious matter and as a registered professional he should have been aware of his obligations to inform his regulator. The Panel did not consider that the fact that the Trust had advised the registrant it was making a referral was sufficient to absolve the Registrant of his professional obligations. Although the Panel did not find the Registrant had been dishonest in failing to inform the HCPC, the Panel did consider that the Registrant’s conduct was a serious falling short of the standards expected of a registered professional and it considered that members of the profession would consider the Registrant’s actions to have been deplorable. The Panel noted the evidence of YG who stated that he was aware that he should report such matters to the HCPC and would have done so if he was in a similar position. The Panel considered that the Registrant took no steps to educate himself about his obligations in this situation and his failure to advice the HCPC about his dismissal amounted to serious professional misconduct.    

 

 

48. The Panel went on to consider the issue of impairment by reason of the Registrant's misconduct. It had careful regard to all the evidence before it and to the submissions of Mr Bellis for the HCPC and those made by the Registrant. It accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor and had particular regard to the HCPTS Practice Note on “Fitness to Practise Impairment”.

 

49. The Panel first considered past impairment. It noted its findings that the Registrant had dishonestly made overtime claims by taking and falsifying timesheets for an extended period and obtaining a very significant amount of money. This conduct only ceased following discovery of his actions. In addition, the registrant had failed to report his dismissal for this matter to his regulator thereby affecting the integrity of the Register. The Panel had also found that the Registrant’s misconduct had breached key standards of the HCPC’s “Standards of conduct, performance and ethics” as set out above, had brought the profession into disrepute and had undermined confidence in the profession. 

 

50. The Panel went on to consider whether the Registrant’s fitness to practise is currently impaired by reason of his misconduct. In addressing the personal component of impairment, the Panel asked itself whether the Registrant is liable, now and in the future, to repeat misconduct of the kind found proved. In reaching its decision, the Panel had particular regard to the issues of insight and remediation.

 

51. The Panel noted that in the case of CHRE v NMC & Grant [2011] EWHC 927 (Admin) Mrs Justice Cox stated: “When considering whether or not fitness to practise is currently impaired, the level of insight shown by the practitioner is central to a proper determination of that issue.”

 

52. The Registrant submitted his response to the allegation in an email dated 24 July 2022 which the Panel considered contained some elements of reflection and outlined his remorse. The Panel has heard no evidence from the Registrant and has received no written reflection or other documents. However, the Registrant has expressed within the email and in his submissions to the Panel his apology and has explained that he feels shame, embarrassment and remorse. 

 

 

53. The Panel had careful regard to Silber J’s guidance in Cohen v GMC [2008] EWHC 581 (Admin) that Panels should take account of:

 

• Whether the conduct which led to the charge is easily remediable;

• Whether it has been remedied; and

• Whether it is highly unlikely to be repeated.

 

54. The Panel recognised that remediation of misconduct which involves dishonesty may be less easy than remediation of misconduct involving clinical failings. The Panel had regard to the context of the dishonesty and the fact that it occurred within the Registrant’s working life and whilst he was undertaking his duties as a Biomedical Scientist.

 

55. The Panel accepted the oral evidence of YG that the Registrant was a very good clinical practitioner and has had an extensive career. It considered that with the development of meaningful insight the Registrant’s misconduct is remediable. It noted the Registrant’s assurances that he has learned from this experience and his circumstances at the time it arose. The Panel considered that the Registrant’s judgement may have been affected by some of the difficult personal circumstances. 

 

56. The Panel also noted that the Registrant has continued to undertake some work as a Biomedical Scientist since the incidents in question, and that there has been no repetition. The Panel noted that the Registrant had repaid the overpayments to the Trust as part of a settlement arrangement. 

 

57. The Panel determined that the Registrant had not fully developed his insight into the reasons for his conduct. The Panel considered that there was little evidence of meaningful reflection from the Registrant. The Panel considered that in his submissions to the Panel, although remorseful, the Registrant was self-focussed and unable to grasp the impact his dishonesty had on the wider public and his colleagues. The Panel did not consider that the Registrant’s insight was sufficiently developed to enable him to fully explain how he had adequately identified or addressed the underlying reasons for his misconduct.  

 

58. The Panel accepted that the Registrant had been significantly affected by these proceedings and was remorseful and ashamed of his actions. However, the Panel considered that by itself this remorse did not assist in determining whether the Registrant posed a significant risk of repeating his dishonesty.  The Panel had no evidence of any embedded learning or effective strategies to prevent any repetition. The Panel only had the Registrant’s assertions that he had learned from his conduct, and it would not be repeated.

 

59. Further, the Panel considered that the Registrant had demonstrated no appreciation of his obligations as a professional to advise the HCPC of significant matters relating to his fitness to practice. The Panel considered that the Registrant had not been pro-active in educating himself about his responsibilities as a registered professional and did not appear to understand the significance of his failure. As such the Panel could not be satisfied that the Registrant would not again repeat his misconduct in relation to this aspect. 

 

60. In light of its findings in relation to insight and remediation, the Panel considered that there remained a risk that the Registrant would repeat matters of the kind found proved. For these reasons, the Panel determined that a finding of impairment is required.

 

61. The Panel then went on to consider whether a finding of impairment is necessary on public interest grounds.  In addressing this component of impairment, the Panel had careful regard to the critically important public issues identified by Silber J in the case of Cohen when he said:

 

 

62. The Panel considered that honesty and integrity is a cornerstone of the profession, and the public rightly expects professionals to act with honesty. The Panel considered that the public would be concerned to learn of the Registrant’s conduct in this matter. Further, the Panel had no doubt that the need to maintain public confidence in the profession, and to declare and uphold proper standards, would be undermined if a finding of impairment of fitness to practise was not made in the circumstances of this case. The Panel did not consider that a finding of misconduct alone would be sufficient. The Panel considered that this was not an isolated act in exceptional circumstances. 

 

63. For all the reasons set out above, the Panel determined that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is currently impaired on public interest grounds.

 

 

64. Having determined that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is currently impaired by reason of his misconduct, the Panel next went on to consider whether it was impaired to a degree which required action to be taken on his registration by way of the imposition of a sanction.

 

65. The Panel had regard to all of the evidence in the case and the submissions made by Mr Bellis on behalf of the HCPC and the submissions made by the Registrant. The Panel also had regard to all the submissions made by the Registrant at the earlier stages and revisited all of the material it had seen and heard.

 

66. Mr Bellis stated that the HCPC did not contend for a particular sanction and drew the Panel’s attention to the features he considered were relevant.

 

67. The Registrant submitted that he accepted the Panel’s decision in relation to misconduct and impairment and stated that he understood that his answers to Panel’s questions in relation to these matters was lacking. The Registrant stated that he was willing to do whatever was necessary and undertake any remedial action to demonstrate that there would be no repeat of his dishonesty. 

 

68. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor and exercised its independent judgement. The Panel had regard to the Sanctions Policy (the Policy) and considered the sanctions in ascending order of severity. The Panel was mindful and had at the forefront of its considerations that the purpose of a sanction is not to be punitive but to protect members of the public and to safeguard the wider public interest, which includes upholding standards within the profession, together with maintaining public confidence in the profession and its regulatory process.

 

69. The Panel first identified what it considered to be the principal aggravating and mitigating factors in this case.

 

 

70. The Registrant’s dishonesty persisted over three years and involved a systemic scheme of dishonesty in order to obtain a significant financial benefit. The claiming only came to an end after the Registrant’s actions were discovered by the Trust. 

 

71. The Panel considered that the Registrant has not demonstrated full insight and has not displayed any recognition of the extent of the impact of his dishonesty on patients, colleagues and the wider public.

 

 

72. The Registrant admitted the facts of the allegation at the outset when he was discovered and has admitted his dishonesty to this Panel.

 

73. The Panel noted the Registrant stated that he had repaid all the overclaimed money to the NHS although the Panel noted that this was because a civil claim would have been issued otherwise. 

 

74. There was some evidence from YG that the Registrant was an able practitioner and a good worker. The Panel noted that the Registrant had a lengthy career in the NHS. 

 

75. The Panel noted that there had been no repeat of the dishonest conduct, and the Registrant had been working as a Biomedical Scientist for a period of 18 months. However, the Panel reminded itself of its findings in relation to impairment and in particular the conclusion that the Registrant posed a risk of repeating his behaviour. 

 

76. The Panel considered that the Registrant had demonstrated consistent, genuine remorse for his action and the Panel acknowledged that the Registrant was experiencing difficult personal circumstances at the time of the events which may have clouded his judgement. 

 

77. The Panel considered the sanctions available, beginning with the least restrictive. The Panel did not consider the options of taking no further action, mediation, or the sanction of a Caution Order to be appropriate or proportionate in the circumstances of this case. In view of the limited insight demonstrated by the Registrant, none of these options would address the consequent risk of repetition which the Panel had previously identified, nor would they reflect the seriousness of the case. 

 

78. The Panel next considered the imposition of a Conditions of Practice Order. The Panel was satisfied that this case did not raise any workplace concerns which may be appropriately addressed through conditions. The Panel was of the view that it was not possible to formulate workable or practicable conditions which would address the Registrant’s dishonesty. Further, the Panel considered that the case was too serious for a Conditions of Practice Order.

 

79. The Panel next considered a Suspension Order and applied the guidance in the Sanctions Policy, and it had particular regard to paragraph 121. The Panel concluded that this was the appropriate and proportionate sanction in the circumstances of this case. The Panel considered that a Suspension Order is required to maintain public confidence in the profession and to uphold professional standards. The Panel considered that the Registrant’s conduct undermined public trust in the profession and therefore a serious sanction of suspension was required. The Panel considered that the length of the Order should be for 12 months which is the maximum permitted. The Panel determined that the maximum period was required to uphold public confidence and to demonstrate to the wider profession that the Registrant’s misconduct was serious.

 

80. Although the Panel had found that the Registrant’s insight was limited at this time, it considered that a Suspension Order for 12 months would provide a further opportunity to the Registrant to reflect on his misconduct and to demonstrate that he had developed an appropriate level of insight.  

 

81. The Panel acknowledged that the Policy lists dishonesty as the type of case in which a Striking Off Order may be appropriate. The Panel considered this very carefully. The dishonesty, while serious, was not fundamentally incompatible with remaining in the profession. The Panel did not consider that the Registrant had displayed entrenched attitudinal dishonesty. The Panel noted that the Registrant had taken some steps to address his misconduct and had indicated to the Panel that he would be willing to take further steps. As the Panel had previously found, the dishonesty could be remediated with the development of insight. Having found that a Suspension Order would adequately protect the public and the public interest it considered that this was the least restrictive sanction and therefore proportionate. Taking account of all of the above the Panel was of the view that in these circumstances a Striking Off Order would be unduly punitive and would deprive the profession of a skilled practitioner. 

 

82. This Panel does not seek to fetter the discretion of a future reviewing Panel, but it considers that such a Panel may be assisted by any information which evidences a developed level of insight. This might include a detailed written reflective account which demonstrates an appreciation and understanding of the nature and extent of the dishonesty (for example the impact his actions had on the wider public and colleagues) and a fuller appreciation of the underlying reasons behind it. 

 

83. The Panel considered that a future panel may be assisted by evidence of any other steps the Registrant has taken to prevent a repetition of his conduct. This might include evidence of how he has addressed the underlying causes and any strategies he has in place such as access to support. 

 

84. This Panel considers that a future Panel would be further assisted by evidence of any courses or learning that the Registrant has undertaken relating to honesty and integrity. The Panel considered that an account from the Registrant about how he has embedded any personal learning relating to honesty and integrity may also be helpful.

 

85. The Panel noted that the order would prevent the Registrant from working as a Biomedical Scientist, however, it considered that a future Panel may be assisted by references and testimonials from individuals who can comment on the Registrants character and in particular, his integrity. The Panel considered that a future Panel may also be assisted by evidence of the steps the Registrant has taken to keep his knowledge and skills up to date. 

 

86. The Panel acknowledged that a Suspension Order will have an adverse impact upon the Registrant both personally and professionally. However, the Panel determined that the interests of protecting the public and maintaining public confidence in the profession outweigh the interests of the Registrant.

 

 

 

 

1. The Panel considered the application by the HCPC for an Interim Order to cover the appeal period. 

 

2. The HCPC’s application is made on the basis that it is in the public interest given the seriousness of the findings made and the risk of repetition identified.

 

3. The Registrant did not oppose this application and stated he did not intend to appeal.

 

 

4. The Panel makes an Interim Suspension Order under Article 31(2) of the Health and Social Work Professions Order 2001, the same being necessary to protect members of the public and being otherwise in the public interest. The Panel considered that to do otherwise would be inconsistent with its earlier findings having found very serious allegations proved and would not protect the public against the risk of repetition identified.

 

5. This order will expire: 

 

• if no appeal is made against the Panel’s decision and Order upon the expiry of the period during which such an appeal could be made; 

 

• if an appeal is made against the Panel’s decision and Order the final determination of that appeal, subject to a maximum period of 18 months to cover the length of any appeal.