Mr Vinod Ramachandran

Preliminary Matters

Service

1. The Panel noted the HCPC’s submissions on this issue and sought and accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor.

2. The Panel was aware that service of documents on a registrant can be by either post, to an address as it appears on the register, or by email, to an email address which a registrant has notified the HCPC as an electronic address for communications. In this instance, where the HCPC was aware that first, the Registrant may not be at his place or work or where he resides, and secondly able to access electronic communications, there has been both. By post on 31 July 2025 to HM Prison Maidstone, and by email to the person who at that time was his representative, on 1 September 2025.

3. The Panel noted the guidance set out at paragraph 11 of the Practice Note on ‘Proceeding in the Absence of the Registrant’, where reference is made to NMC v Jatta [2009] EWCA Civ
824 as authority that a panel is:

“entitled to proceed in absence where a registrant is no longer at their registered address and has failed to provide revised contact details. This applies even where the only address that the regulator has is one at which the panel knows the document would not have come to the registrant’s attention”.

4. The HCPC had submitted that the Panel could make a finding that there had been good service in accordance with the rules in that:

i. The notice of hearing dated 1 September 2025 which sets out the time, date and venue of the hearing was emailed to the Registrant on 1 September 2025.

ii. That email was to the Registrant’s email address as recorded on his certificate of registration;

iii. There is proof of delivery of the email within the delivery receipt dated 1 September 2025.

5. The Panel noted the further efforts made by the HCPC to ensure that the Registrant was aware of today’s hearing. Given the information before it the Panel concluded that there had been good service.

Proceeding in absence

6. The Panel having concluded that there is good service, the HCPC made an application to proceed in the Registrant’s absence and relied upon the Panel’s powers within Rule 11 of the Health and Care Professions Council (Conduct and Competence Committee)(Procedure) Rules 2003 (‘the Rules’) to do so. That Rule states:

“Where the registrant is neither present nor represented at a hearing, the Committee may nevertheless proceed with the hearing if it is satisfied that all reasonable steps have been taken to serve the notice of the hearing under rule 6(1) on the registrant”.

7. The HCPC also relied upon the decision in General Medical Council v Adeogba, General Medical Council v Visvardis [2016] EWCA Civ 162 in which it was held that:

i. the starting point is the consideration of the factors set in the criminal cases of R v Hayward [2001] QB 862 & R v Jones [2002] 1 AC 1;

ii. however, there is a distinction between criminal and disciplinary proceedings in that the latter must be guided by the context of its own statutory objective and in that regard “the fair, economical, expeditious and efficient disposal of allegations made against medical practitioners is of very real importance”;

iii. Fairness includes fairness to the Registrant but also to the regulator;

iv. Unlike in criminal proceedings, a regulator cannot enforce attendance;

v. Registrants ought not to be able to frustrate the process by deliberate non engagement. Where there is a good reason not to proceed, the case should be adjourned; where there is not it should proceed;

vi. There is a burden on practitioners subject to a regulatory regime to engage with their regulator both in relation to the investigation and the resolution of allegations.

8. The Panel was invited to have regard to the correspondence within the addendum bundle which provided a history of a request for a postponement which was refused by the HCPTS. The Panel’s attention was drawn to the terms of the Registrant’s handwritten letter attached to an email dated 30 September 2025, in which he states:

“[Reacted] so I am unable to attend the hearing. Kindly proceed in my absence”.

9. It was submitted by the HCPC that in these circumstances it is fair, just and appropriate to proceed:

i. The Registrant has invited the Committee to proceed in his absence;

ii. There is no renewed application to postpone/adjourn and so no indication that an adjournment would secure future attendance;

iii. There is a strong public interest in this matter being conducted expeditiously.

10. The Panel sought and accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor and took into account the terms of the guidance issued by the HCPTS. Having considered the HCPC representations and paid particular attention to the last stated position of the Registrant.

11. The Panel noted the limited information it had relating to the Registrant’s health and that such was not current information. It noted that the Registrant’s health condition was given as a reason for his decision to not attend. The Panel noted that whilst there had been a previous adjournment application which had been rejected, there had been no fresh adjournment application made on his inability to attend due to health, nor had there been any medical evidence to suggest that his health precluded his attendance and participation at the hearing. The Panel concluded that the Registrant offered his health as an explanation and which had informed his decision not to attend. The Panel noted in particular that the Registrant had not just confirmed his non-attendance but had recorded his wish that the hearing take place in his absence.

12. The Panel noted that there was nothing to indicate that the Registrant would be able or willing to attend at another date and that there was public interest in this matter proceeding without delay. Therefore the Panel decided to proceed in the absence of the Registrant.

Hearing in Private

13. Within the handwritten letter attached to the email of 30 September 2025, there is a request from the Registrant for the whole of the hearing to be in private. The basis for this request was related to consideration of the Registrant’s health, family life [Redacted]. The Panel noted that there were further references to the issue of health within a letter dated 8 August 2025.

14. The HCPC stated that the Panel had the discretion to hear a matter in whole or in part in private. Rule 10 (1) of the Rules states that:

“(a) the proceedings shall be held in public unless the Committee is satisfied that, in the interests of justice or for the protection of the private life of the registrant,116 the complainant, any person giving evidence or of any patient or client, the public should be excluded from all or part of the hearing”.

15. The HCPC directed the Panel to the further guidance as to how to exercise its discretion which appears within the HCPTS Practice Note ‘Conducting Hearings in Private’.

16. The HCPC opposed the application for the entire hearing to be held in private for the following reasons:

i. The open justice principle creates a strong presumption that proceedings will be in public, evidence should be communicated publicly and that fair, accurate and contemporaneous reporting should not be prevented unless strictly necessary;

ii. The matters raised by the Registrant do not meet this test and, in any event, have not been sufficiently evidenced;

iii. The fact that the proceedings are embarrassing for the Registrant does not justify holding the proceedings in private;

iv. The fact of and detail of the convictions are a matter of public record;

v. The fact that this convictions came to light as a result of a journalist informing the HCPC of them illustrates the importance of these proceedings being held in public;

vi. The Registrant is a regulated professional who has been convicted of serious criminal offences. This brings the profession into disrepute and conducting proceedings in public ensures that public confidence is maintained.

17. The HCPC, however, had no objection to the Panel considering issues of the Registrant’s health in private in discrete portions of the hearing should the necessity to refer to those issues of health arise.

18. The Panel again sought and accepted the Legal Assessor’s advice which included reference to the open justice principle and the rights to a private life enshrined in Human Rights legislation.

19. The Panel noted the terms of the Practice Note which states:

“Doing so is not justified merely to save the registrant from embarrassment or to conceal facts which, on general grounds, it might be desirable to keep secret. The risk that a person’s reputation may be damaged because of a public hearing is not, of itself, sufficient reason to hear all or part of a case in private unless the panel is satisfied that the person would suffer disproportionate damage”.

20. The Panel considered that it was appropriate to hear this matter in an open forum unless and until there was a necessity to reference matters of a personal nature, at which point the Panel would go into private session for that discrete part of the proceedings. The Panel confirmed that it would produce a private and a public version of its written decision.

Amendment of the Allegations

21. The HCPC applied to amend the Allegations and confirmed that its intention to do so had been conveyed to the Registrant by way of a letter of notice sent to the Registrant [Redacted] (who was until recently representing the Registrant in these proceedings) by email dated 1 October 2025.

22. The HCPC reminded the Panel that there is no express provision within the Conduct and Competence Committee Rules for the amendment of allegations which have been referred to the Conduct and Competence Committee by a panel of the Investigating Committee. However, within this professional disciplinary arena committees may do so provided each party is given notice of the proposed amendments and that no injustice is caused.

23. In Support of this contention the HCPC referred the Panel to the dictum of Lindblom LJ’s judgment in the case of Professional Standards Authority v Health Care Professions Council and Doree [2017] EWCA Civ 319 at 54 where he observed:

“A professional disciplinary committee is entitled to make necessary amendments to the allegations before it, so as to avoid ‘undercharging’ (see, for example, the judgment of Otton L.J. in Gangar v General Medical Council [2003] H.R.L.R. 24, P.C., at paragraph 15, and the recent first instance decisions in R. (on the application of Ireland) v Health and Care Professions Council [2015] 1 W.L.R. 4643 and Professional Standards Authority for Health and Social Care v Nursing and Midwifery Council and Jozi [2015] EWHC 764 (Admin))”.

24. The two amendments which the HCPC wish to make are:

• First, to remove the reference to the ‘Crown Court’ and replace it with ‘Magistrates Court’.

• Secondly, in respect of Allegation 2, the HCPC wishes to alter the reference to conviction to accord with the terms of the HCPC Standards of Conduct Performance and Ethics
Standards which states that:

“9.5 You must tell us as soon as possible if: you accept a caution from the police or you have been charged with, or found guilty of, a criminal offence”.

25. In support of the first amendment, the HCPC directed the Panel to the certificate of conviction which records that the Registrant entered guilty pleas at Norwich Magistrates Court on 11 July 2024 and was then committed to Norwich Crown Court for sentence. Therefore, the conviction date was 11 July 2024, and he was convicted at Norwich Magistrates’ Court, not the Crown Court. This amendment is to correct an error and does not change the position as far as fairness to the Registrant is concerned.

26. In support of the second amendment the HCPC relied upon the evidence of Andrew Burke, Case Manager in the Fitness to Practise Department of the HCPC, who confirms that the HCPC had no record of the Registrant informing the HCPC about either the charge or the conviction. In fact, the HCPC was first made aware of the conviction by a member of its external PR company that dealt with press enquiries. That person had taken a call from the Deputy Features editor of the ‘Daily Mail’ on 14 August 2024. The fact of this media enquiry had been relayed to the HCPC by email dated 14 August 2024.

27. The HCPC submitted that the evidence supports the position that there was a failure to inform the HCPC as soon as possible of being charged by the Police as well as a failure to inform when the Registrant had been convicted on 11 July 2024. At this point the HCPC rely on the fact that the Registrant remained on bail pending sentence.

28. It is accepted by the HCPC that this amendment to Allegation 2 widens the date range of this Allegation. However, it is submitted that this does not cause any prejudice as the Registrant as he had been given notice of the proposed amendment and so has been given the opportunity to raise any objections but had not done so. Further, the charge remains of the same nature and is based on the same circumstances and evidence. It was also submitted that the HCPC would be prejudiced and at risk of under-prosecution if this Allegation were not amended.

29. In its representations to the Panel at the hearing, the HCPC brought to the Panel’s attention the fact that the Notice relating to the change to the wording of the Allegation had been sent to the Registrant on 1 October 2025. There was within the addendum bundle copies of emails which identify that the recipient of those emails had received the password but not the documentation it referred to. It was therefore unclear that the Notice letter had been successfully opened. A further copy of the Notice had been sent and successfully received on 9 October 2025.

30. The Legal Assessor confirmed that the case of Doree gave the Panel a wide power to amend and that to do so was in the public interest to ensure that there is no under prosecution. The Panel should note the period of notice that had been given to the Registrant and consider whether this was a reasonable period for notice.

31. The Panel gave the matter careful consideration and after referencing the documentary evidence. There is documentary evidence that supported the amendment from ‘Crown’ to ‘Magistrates’ in Allegation 1 and the Panel approved this amendment.

32. In relation to the proposed amendment of Allegation 2 the Panel considered that thirteen days’ notice by email was sufficient but had concerns that, in reality, the Registrant had been given only four days in which to make representations to those proposed changes.

33. The Panel was concerned about the shortness of the period of notice given and the fact that this amendment would widen the date and nature of this Allegation. The Panel after careful consideration came to the conclusion that it would approve the application. First, it was required in the interests of the public and to ensure no under prosecution by the HCPC. Secondly it considered that there was good reason to amend the wording so that it fully reflected the terms of the Registrant’s duties as identified in the Standard, the terms of which should have been well known to the Registrant.

Background

34. This is a case in which the HCPC allege that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is impaired by reason of conviction and/or misconduct: namely convictions for inappropriate conduct with an underage female contrary to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and misconduct arising from a failure to report the charges and convictions to the HCPC.

35. The issues which form the basis for the HCPC Allegations came to the attention of the HCPC on the 14 August 2024 when the HCPC was contacted by a journalist. That contact identified that the Registrant had been the subject of criminal proceedings which to that date he had not notified to the Registrar’s Department of the HCPC.

36. After further investigation the HCPC established the details of those criminal proceedings and from the sentencing notes of the Judge at the Crown Court the extent and nature of the offences which arose from the Registrant entering into a conversation between the 2 and 16 October 2022 with someone he believed to be known as Lily Jones who was 12 years old, but was in fact an adult Police Officer.

37. Further details taken from the Judge’s sentencing notes are set out in the HCPC’s submissions on facts set out below.

Decision on Facts

HCPC submissions

38. In relation to Allegation 1 a. – d, Rule 10 (1) (d) of the Rules provides that:

“where the registrant has been convicted of a criminal offence, a certified copy of the certificate of conviction (or, in Scotland, an extract conviction) shall be admissible as proof of that conviction and of the findings of fact upon which it was based”.

39. The HCPC took the Panel to the decision in Achina v GPhC [2021] EWHC 415 (Admin), where Mr Justice Lane considered the wording of rule 24(4) of the GPHC’s rules, which is materially the same as Rule 10(1)(d), in that it states that a certified certificate of conviction “is admissible as conclusive proof of that conviction and the findings of fact on which it was based". Lane J stated that the remarks of the sentencing judge are where you can find the findings of fact upon which a conviction is based. Therefore, a conviction certificate proves both the fact of the conviction and the underlying conduct. This position is supported by the guidance within the HCPTS Practice Note, ‘Conviction and Caution Allegations’ dated September 2024.

40. The certificate of conviction sets out that on 11 July 2024 the Registrant, upon entering guilty pleas, was convicted at the Norwich Magistrates Court and committed to the Norwich Crown Court for sentence in respect of the following offences:

i. Adult attempt to engage in sexual communication with a child, contrary to section 15A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (‘charge 1’).

ii. Attempt to cause / incite a female child aged under 13 to engage in sexual activity - no penetration, contrary to section 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (‘charge 2’).

iii. Arrange / facilitate commission of a child sex offence - sexual activity – no penetration, contrary to section 14 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (‘charge 3’).

iv. Adult attempt to meet a girl under 16 years of age following grooming, contrary to section 15 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (‘charge 4’).

41. On 12 August 2024 the Registrant was sentenced by Her Honour Judge Moore as follows:

i. In respect of charge 1, 9 month’s imprisonment;

ii. In regard to charge 2, 9 month’s imprisonment;

iii. In relation to charge 3, 24 month’s imprisonment;

iv. In respect of charge 4, 14 month’s imprisonment.

42. The sentences were concurrent with each other and so the total period of imprisonment was 24 months.

43. There were also two ancillary orders made:

i. to register with the police in accordance with the Sexual Offences Act 2023, for a period of 10 years;

ii. The Registrant was also made the subject to a Sexual Harm Prevention Order (‘SHPO’) for a period of 10 years. The terms of the SHPO are set out in both the certificate of conviction and the judge’s sentencing remarks.

44. The facts which underlie the offences were set out within the Judge’s sentencing remarks of which the following extracts were relied upon by the HCPC:

“Between the 2nd and the 16th of October 2022, you were in communication with an online profile, ostensibly that of 12-year-old Lily Jones but in fact, operated by an adult.

The charges that you face arise out of all of that activity. The first offence, pursuant to section 15A of the Sexual Offences Act is an attempt to engage in sexual communication with a child for your own sexual gratification. It was of course an attempt by virtue of the fact that there was no 12-year-old girl.

Offence 2, pursuant to section 8 of the Sexual Offences Act, is drafted as an attempt to cause or incite a girl under 13 to engage in sexual activity, in essence, by watching a pornographic video or – or movie via a link that you sent to her.

Offence 3, pursuant to section 14 is described as intentionally arranging an act you intended to do which would involve the commission of an offence pursuant to section 9 of the Sexual Offences Act, sexual activity with a child not involving penetration. I don’t see the word attempt there in the charge but plainly there was no real child and that is to be reflected in the sentence on this as indeed, on everything else.

Offence 4, pursuant to section 15 reflects your attempt to meet Lily Jones following sexual grooming. You went to the place arranged with chocolate for her, no doubt, planning to following through on what had been arranged…

Your initial conversation was over Facebook Messenger and was ostensibly proper, at least in large part. You warned her of the dangers of the internet. However, you provided your number for her, inviting her to chat with you on WhatsApp, privately.

Your conversation became increasingly sexual. You solicited photographs and discussed meeting. You said she had a sexy figure. You asked her for another photograph. She’d sent – well, you first asked for a long photograph and then later you asked her for another photograph, asking her to focus on her chest. There had been some communication between you about her chest, her breasts. She said she wasn’t large, up top, and you said that you preferred small.

You made it perfectly clear to her that you were sexually excited by her. You planned to meet on a Sunday saying you’d be heartbroken if you didn’t see her. She made – or the profile operator made excuses for – for one date for meeting but you persisted. You said what you wanted to do when you met her. You were going to cuddle and then kiss. You asked her if you could do anything else. You asked what she’d be wearing, so you would be able to feel everything if it was easy access clothing.

You went on to observe, ‘You’re 12. I’ll be screwed if someone finds out we are together. I’ll end up in jail. Please don’t inform the police’. You made it clear that you would start with cuddling. There’d be lots of kisses. You would show her your penis so she could touch and hold it. She could suck it if she wanted, you offered.

You told her that you wished she was older so that you could have sex. You asked if she’d watched a porn movie. When she said no, you suggested what she could Google and when she said she couldn’t view the site, you explained what intercourse was and you offered to show her your penis.

As a whole, the communications do show grooming. Though they start ostensibly properly and soon become something quite different. It’s worthy of note that your initial communication was for a profile that didn’t bear your own name and I’ve already highlighted your awareness that you could get in a lot of trouble and your expression to the person you believed to be 12, that she shouldn’t say anything to the authorities.

The communications were via message and via voice call. Certainly, you, on occasions, used video call. Come the 16th of October, these communications had gone on from the 2nd to the 16th or thereabouts. Come the 16th of October 2022, you went to meet Lily.

You turned up at the place arranged near the Open Academy on Salhouse Road in Norwich. There, to be detained by a group of people pending the arrival of the police”.

Charge 1

“The attempted sexual communication is culpability A because you solicited images. But this is not a case in which it said that sexual images were sent or received.

I need to deal with that because on the face of the papers, a different view might be gleaned. Insofar as anything suggests that you sent images of parts of your body, that is incorrect. You did send a picture of a trophy of a gold coloured penis, plainly a sexual reference there or a reference to a penis but in context of this case, that is not, in my judgment, properly to be equated with the sending of sexual images and I’ve had the advantage of – of looking at a photograph or a copy of the image that you sent.

The image sent from the count – the account purportedly operated by Lily is perhaps, unsurprisingly, given it’s a decoy account, not an image properly to be described as sexual. And, again, I’ve had the advantage of seeing it and seeing it in the context”.

Charge 2

“The attempted section 8 offence is narrowly particularised as I’ve said already, it relates to your instruction to the person you believed to be 12-year-old Lily, to watch a pornographic video on Google and telling her what she should search for”.

Charge 3

“The third offence of arranging the commission of a child sex offence is particularised as relating to non-penetrative activity pursuant to section 9. Namely, sexual activity of kissing, cuddling, touching breasts and having 12-year-old Lily touch your penis. These being the acts you intended to do upon meeting her as arranged”.

Charge 4

“The final charge is the attempt to meet, following sexual grooming. Initially, it had been suggested that there was no raised harm or raised culpability. Although this poses a – a slight difficulty when the guidelines are considered because the previous communication did make reference to a number of types of sexual activity, including penetrative sexual activity.

You’ve spoke about wanting or wishing to have sex with her if she was old enough and you said, if she wanted, she could suck your penis. It – it would be raised culpability if the communication indicated that penetrative sexual activity had been intended. Well, as opened, arguably, it – it fell short of that being intended on the facts.

It’s also somewhat inconsistent with the way the Crown puts the case on charge 3 which is confined to non-penetrative activity and. Accordingly, with some hesitation, though I really take the view that it is more appropriate for you to be dealt with on the basis that this is an offence without raised harm or raised culpability, falling, therefore, into category 3. Albeit, what was said in terms of penetrative activity and indeed all – all that went on during this fortnight period in October 2022, makes the meeting particularly serious and would justify an elevation within the range…

You are of course entitled to a reduction because 12-year-old Lily Jones did not exist and therefore your actions did not harm her. However, the reduction can be but modest because your culpability is entirely undiminished. In fact, you were committed to this offending. Your persistence over the fortnight took you from ostensibly appropriate contact, in terms of the words used, through to sexualised communication, to arranging a child sex offence. And, indeed, to attending to meet the person you believed to be Lily, armed, as I say, with gifts of chocolate. She’d told you she liked chocolate and you said you would take some for her. So, at no point did you voluntarily desist”.

45. In relation to Allegation 2, the HCPC reminded the Panel of the terms of Standard 9.5, relating to the duty to inform the HCPC “as soon as possible” if they are “charged with, or found guilty of a criminal offence”. The evidence of Mr Burke is to the effect that the HCPC had no record of the Registrant informing the HCPC about either the charge or the conviction. In fact, the HCPC was first made aware of the conviction by Tabitha Adams dealing with on 14 August 2024 informing them that she had had a call about it from the Deputy Features editor of the ‘Daily Mail’.

46. In its oral representations to the Panel the HCPC acknowledged that the date upon which the Registrant had been charged was unknown. It had to be assumed that it was between the 16 October 2022 when his criminal activity was exposed and 11 July 2024 when he was convicted.

47. It is submitted that all the evidence supports the HCPC position that there was a duty to inform the HCPC about both the charge and the conviction and that no such notifications were made or received and therefore this Allegation should be found proved in its entirety.

Panel Decision

48. The Panel received and accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor and took note of the guidance with in the relevant HCPTS Practice Notes. Having been furnished with the Judge’s Sentencing Remarks in full and the statements and live testimony from a member of the Registrar’s Department, the Panel considered that it had sufficient appropriate information relating to both Allegations.

49. In relation to Allegation 1, by virtue of the documentation placed before it the Panel accepted the fact of the matters alleged had been made out in accordance with the rules and to the requisite standard.

50. In relation to Allegation 2, the Panel noted and accepted the live and written evidence of the Registrar’s staff. The evidence produced from the HCPC register and copies of email communications identify the details of how the convictions came to light and the lack of any self-referral. The Panel accepted this as proof of the fact of non-notification. The Panel therefore considered that the HCPC had discharged its burden of proof.

51. In addition, the Panel noted that within the Registrant’s correspondence with the HCPC he states that he did not know that he had a duty to report. This further confirms that there had not been any notification of the charges or the conviction by the Registrant.

Decision on Grounds

HCPC Submissions on Grounds

52. Conviction is a statutory ground and the certificate of conviction proves that statutory ground of conviction. The Panel is therefore able to find the statutory ground established.

53. In relation to the issue of misconduct, for which there is no statutory definition, the HCPC took the Panel to the relevant case law, namely, Roylance and General Medical Council (No.2) [2000] 1 A.C. 311, and R (on the application of) Remedy UK v General Medical Council [2010] EWHC 1245.

54. The Panel may also take account of any breaches of the HCPC ‘Standards of Conduct Performance and Ethics’, but appreciate that such breaches do not automatically of themselves result in a finding of misconduct.

55. The HCPC submitted that the failure to inform the Registrar of the charges and/or convictions is a very serious matter and so crosses the threshold into misconduct for the following reasons:

i. There is a clear breach of Standard 9.5;

ii. Being charged with criminal offences such as these is clearly a matter about which the HCPC ought to have been made aware in order that it could consider what, if any, action to take, including interim measures. The effect of this failure is that the Registrant was able to practise without the HCPC having the opportunity to consider whether public protection or the wider public interest required any investigation and/or interim measures. This prejudiced the HCPC’s ability to perform its statutory function of protecting the public and the wider public interest;

iii. In respect of the conviction, the fact that this matter was brought to the HCPC’s attention by a journalist illustrates the mischief of this failure;

iv. The failure is likely to be considered deplorable.

56. In the HCPC representation to the Panel at the hearing the HCPC emphasised that during the period from whatever date the Registrant was charged until his incarceration he had been at liberty to work. It is unknown to the HCPC as to whether the Registrant had in fact worked during the period 16 August 2022 to 14 August 2024 but without the protection of an Interim Order prohibiting him from doing so he had posed a threat to members of the public. Had the journalist not contacted the HCPC it may have never known of these facts.

Panel Decision

57. The Panel took into account the HCPC’s submissions and the guidance issued by the HCPTS. The Legal Assessor reminded the Panel that at this stage in the hearing there is no onus upon the HCPC, and it is a matter for the Panel’s judgment as to whether the threshold for misconduct has been reached in this case.

58. The Panel accepted that the certificate of conviction was proof of the statutory ground as set out in Article 22(1)(a)(iii) of the Order.

59. In relation to the issue of misconduct as identified within Article 22(1)(i) of the Order, the Panel noted the HCPC’s representations. The Panel also took into account the Registrant’s statements that he was not in a position to inform the HCPC and further that he was unaware that he had to so inform.

60. In relation to his inability to make a referral the Panel noted that there had been three periods when he could have given an indication to the HCPC of his involvement in criminal activity. First, when he was arrested. Secondly after being charged. Thirdly after being convicted and before being sentenced. The facts both of being charged and then being convicted in each case gave rise to a duty for the Registrant to inform the HCPC.

61. The Panel noted and took into account the Registrant’s statement about his [Redacted] emotional state at that time but noted that other practitioners in similar circumstances have, as expected of them, self-referred.

62. The Registrant’s claimed lack of knowledge of the requirement to make a self-referral was unacceptable. Registrants are expected to know the extent of their responsibilities to their regulator.

63. The Panel considered that the failure to inform the HCPC at any point between being charged and 14 August 2024 was unacceptable and a serious departure from the standards expected of a registrant. Further, the way in which his regulator was informed by a member of the media reflected badly on the HCPC. The Panel therefore concluded that the Registrant’s omission to inform the HCPC amounts to misconduct.

Decision on Impairment

HCPC Submissions on Impairment

64. It is submitted by the HCPC that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is impaired on both the personal and public component. In support of that contention the HCPC referenced the cases of Cohen v GMC [2008] EWHC 581 (admin) and CHRE v (1) NMC and (2) Grant [2011] EWHC 927 (Admin). The HCPC took the Panel to relevant parts of those judgments as follows:

“It must be highly relevant in determining if a doctor’s fitness to practise is impaired that first his or her conduct which led to the charge is easily remediable, second that it has been remedied and third that it is highly unlikely to be repeated…

In determining whether a practitioner’s fitness to practise is impaired by reason of misconduct, the relevant panel should generally consider not only whether the practitioner continues to present a risk to members of the public in his or her current role, but also whether the need to uphold professional standards and public confidence in the profession would be undermined if a finding of impairment were not made in the particular circumstances”.

65. The HCPC submitted that the facts of the conviction reveal behavioural issues of the utmost gravity, and that such conduct is highly unlikely to be remediable. In particular, it is apparent that the Registrant’s insight into his conduct is very limited:

i. Within the sentencing remarks the judge stated that “You have expressed some remorse for your actions and I do attach what weight I can to that. Plainly, you feel the shame keenly, although, in my judgment, you have yet to accept your sexual interest in children that underpins this offending”.

ii. Further, “You made some admissions in interview but because you denied that you had any sort of sexual intention or were seeking any sort of sexual gratification, denied that you were speaking to a child”.

iii. Further, “I have a degree of scepticism as to whether there is a realistic prospect of rehabilitation, given your unwillingness to acknowledge a sexual interest in young girls”.

iv. Within the handwritten letter received by the HCPC on 11 April 2025 the Registrant sets out a number of challenges he was experiencing around the time of the offending and states that he was isolated and that “…the only entertainment was my phone. I ended up in the wrong place and put my family into struggle. I can say I never went looking for any underage person… in the chat I mentioned it can’t be a child the way they were communicating. I wanted distraction and kill time [sic]. I wanted to prove the truth but my solicitor said it is not possible to prove and advised me to plead guilty to avoid more damage and [illegible] time of separation with family”.

66. It is submitted that this demonstrates a continuing lack of insight into the underlying reasons for the Registrant’s conduct. Further, the HHJ Moore stated within her sentencing remarks that:

i. “There is a pre-sentence report, a helpful document that has been prepared on your behalf. It describes in general terms you being as someone as low likelihood of reconviction but that there is a medium risk of sexual offending, both contact and non- contact”.

ii. “As far as the sexual harm prevention order is concerned, I remind myself that a court may only make such an order if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so for the purpose of protecting the public or any particular members of the public from sexual harm from you. And I do take the view that it is necessary to do that because you picked up a computer or a device, went online, began chatting with a stranger, swiftly moved the conversation to matters sexual, having provided the means of contacting you privately. Thereafter, arranged the commission of a – what would have been, had the child been real, a child sex offence and indeed, physically went to meet the person you believed to be a child”.

67. It is submitted that the Registrant poses an obvious risk of repetition and so poses a risk of harm to the public. Whilst this conduct took place outside of his professional practice, it is submitted that the risk extends to his work as a radiographer where he is likely to come into contact with underage females.

68. Further, it is submitted that the wider public interest requires a finding of impairment:

i. Although the Registrant has been released on licence the licence period does not expire until August 2026. He has, therefore, not completed his sentence.

ii. The Registrant will remain on the sex offenders register until August 2034;

iii. The Registrant is subject to a Sexual Harm Prevention Order (‘SHPO’) until August 2034.

iv. The gravity and nature of the offending is such that public confidence in the profession and the regulator would be undermined if no finding of impairment was made.

Panel Decision

69. The Panel sought and accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor and took into account the terms of the guidance issues by the HCPTS in relation to current impairment. The Panel noted the HCPC’s written and oral submissions. The Panel appreciated that it was required to make a finding on both the personal and public components of its decision impairment.

70. In relation to the personal component the Panel considered that it was doubtful whether this criminal conduct could be successfully remediated and, as identified by the HCPC, there would have to be extensive and robust evidence of such remediation.

71. The Panel appreciated that it was assessing the Registrant fitness to practise as of today. It noted that the last communication which references the Registrant’s acts and omissions is dated 11 April 2025. There is therefore nothing further before this Panel relevant to his current understanding of his criminal conduct or his breach of his duties to his regulator. Further, there is nothing to indicate that the Registrant acknowledges and accepts that there is a need and requirement to undertake such remediation.

72. The Panel noted that there is an unspent conviction in that the Registrant is out of prison on licence, and this will not come to an end until 14 August 2026. The entry on the Sex Offenders’ Register and the SHPO will not come to an end till August 2034.

73. In relation to the issue of repetition the Panel the Judge identified with the aid of a pre-sentencing report her concerns that there was a continuing underlying interest in young girls. The Panel noted the level of insight demonstrated by the Registrant. There has been some level of remorse but the communications from the Registrant display little or no understanding of his actions in terms of the potential impact on the young girl he believed he was speaking to. The Registrant has continually focused upon the personal impact on him, his loss of his job and the repercussions for his family. There is little to support the view that the Registrant has undertaken any meaningful reflection on his actions. There is nothing to demonstrate true remorse, apology or regret for his actions. The Panel noted the Registrant’s continued denial of his initial intentions to seek out a young girl and there is no evidence that this position has changed. There is nothing to suggest that there would not be a repetition of this conduct again.

74. The Panel has therefore concluded that on the personal component of its decision the Registrant’s fitness to practise is impaired.

75. In relation to the public component, the Panel appreciated that the seriousness of the Registrant’s actions fell at the highest end of matters that would cause the public concern. The fact of four convictions under the Sexual Offenders Act involving enticement of a girl under thirteen would be matters of considerable concern to the public and had warranted the attention of the ‘Daily Mail’ at the time. If no mark of public censorship were made in such circumstances the public would be rightly alarmed. The fact of the matter coming to the HCPC’s attention by the media would have adversely affected the public’s confidence in the regulator. Not to make a finding of impairment would further undermine the public confidence in the HCPC as a regulator. The Panel therefore finds that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is impaired on the public component as well as the personal.

Decision on Sanction

HCPC Submissions

76. The HCPC invited the Panel to note the following:

• The published ‘Sanctions Policy’ issued by the HCPTS which is designed to assist panels with how to approach the issue of sanction.

• That the purpose of a sanction is not to be punitive, although it may have that effect. Its purpose is to protect the public from harm, to maintain public confidence in the profession and to declare and uphold standards within the profession.

• Any consideration of sanction must take into account the public interest and a registrant’s own interest. A panel is entitled to give greater weight to the public interest factors over the impact any sanction will or might have on a registrant.

• A panel must apply the principle of proportionality and so any sanction must be the least onerous available which achieves the stated aims of sanction. Therefore, a panel must approach the exercise by considering the lowest sanction first and only ascend the sanction ladder if protection of the public and the public interest cannot be met by that sanction.

77. In respect of mitigating factors, the HCPC considered the following to be relevant:

i. Admission at the Magistrates’ Court;

ii. No FTP history.

78. In respect of Aggravating factors, the HCPC identified the following:

i. Nature of offences;

ii. lack of insight;

iii. Ongoing sentence.

79. The HCPC drew the Panel's attention to the case of CRHP v GDC and Fleischman [2005] EWHC 87 Admin in which Mr Justice Newman held that:

“as a general principle where a practitioner has been convicted of a serious criminal offence or offences, he should not be permitted to resume his practice until he has satisfactorily completed his sentence. Only circumstances which plainly justify a different course should permit otherwise”.

80. The ‘Sanctions Policy’ sets out at paragraphs 78 and 79:

“Sexual abuse of children

Sexual abuse of children involves forcing or persuading them to take part in sexual activities and includes both physical contact and online activity. Each of the four countries has legislation which protects children from sexual abuse. Further details can be found on the NSPCC website.

Sexual abuse of children, whether physical or online, is intolerable, seriously damages public safety and undermines public confidence in the profession. Any professional found to have participated in sexual abuse of children in any capacity should not be allowed to remain in unrestricted practice”.

81. That Policy also states at paragraph 85:

“Sex offender

Although inclusion on the sex offenders’ database is not a punishment, it does serve to protect the public from those who have committed certain types of offences. A panel should normally regard it as incompatible with the HCPC’s obligation to protect the public to allow a registrant to remain in or return to unrestricted practice while they are on the sex offenders’ database”.

82. At paragraph 86 it further states:

“Where the panel deviates from this approach, it should provide clear reasoning”.

83. It is submitted that the only order which would both protect the public and the wider public interest is a Striking Off Order. The HCPC expanded on this at the hearing by reminding the Panel of how its decisions to date, relating to the lack of insight and the degree that the Registrant’s conduct, had undermined the public confidence in the profession and the regulatory process.

Panel Decision

84. The Panel noted those submissions by the HCPC on the issues it should consider at this stage in the proceedings.

85. The Panel noted the Legal Assessor’s advice that at this stage the HCPC representations on the level of sanction are persuasive in nature only and it is a matter for the Panel.

86. The Panel started its deliberations as advised by identifying all mitigating and aggravating factors.

87. In relation to mitigating factors:

• The Panel accepted, as identified by the HCPC, that there had been guilty pleas entered at the Magistrates Court hearing. For reasons given below under aggravating factors the Panel placed limited weight upon this element.

• There was no previous HCPC history.

• Whilst the Panel acknowledges that a registrant has a duty to engage with his regulator, it is worth noting that during the HCPC hearing process the Registrant has so engaged, although he did not attend the hearing.

88. In terms of aggravating factors:

• The seriousness of the offences involving an individual purporting to be a young girl under thirteen.

• [Redacted]

• Continued denials of underlying sexual intent which was not supported by the evidence, and which raises the potential for repetition of the conduct in the future. The pre-sentencing report identified that there was “in general terms you being as someone as low likelihood of reconviction but that there is a medium risk of sexual offending, both contact and non-contact”.

• The Registrant has shown limited remorse and not expressed any form of apology, nor has there been any demonstration of regret for his actions.

• The Registrant has shown only the most limited degree of insight into his behaviour, and his representations to the HCPC have focused upon the impact on himself. The Panel noted that the Registrant stated that his decision to plead guilty had been influenced by the advice of his Barrister. It therefore appeared to the Panel that his denial of the matters had continued.

• The Registrant’s licence period will continue till August 2026 and he will remain on the Sex Offenders Register till 2034.

• The terms of the SHPO prohibit the Registrant from having contact with females under 16 years of age without a parent or guardian present and so this will limit the extent to which the Registrant could perform his duties as a Radiographer.

• By his own admission, the Registrant had a woeful lack of understanding of the extent of his duties to his regulator. Not notifying the HCPC when he was charged exposed service users to potential harm in the intervening period.

• There is nothing from the Registrant to indicate any degree of willingness to address his previous behaviour.

89. As advised, the Panel started its consideration of the proportionate and appropriate sanction from the bottom of the range. It therefore started by considering whether this was a matter in which it could take no action; offer mediation; or impose a Caution Order. Given the seriousness of the Registrant’s criminal activities the Panel concluded that these measures would not be appropriate as they provide no level of service user protection.

90. The Panel next considered whether it was able to construct any conditions of practice that would adequately address the seriousness of the Registrant’s conduct and concluded it could not. Any sanction which allowed the Registrant to return to practice as a Radiographer would be contrary to the principles established in the Fleishman decision and therefore contrary to the wider public interest. The Panel was also mindful that the terms of the SHPO imposed restrictions on contact with under sixteen-year-old girls and this restriction does not come to an end until August 2034. Accommodating that restriction would make the imposition of conditions impracticable. Further, in the Panel’s view, conditions would not be sufficient to guard against the potential risk of harm should the conduct be repeated and also would be insufficient to denote the seriousness of the Registrant’s misconduct.

91. The Panel referred to paragraph 121 of the ‘Sanctions Policy’ and noted that in relation to the imposition of a Suspension Order the guidance states that this level of sanction would be appropriate where there was insight; no likelihood of repetition; and evidence that the Registrant is likely to be able to resolve or remedy their failings. Within its decision on impairment, the Panel identified that those three elements were missing in this case. The Panel has therefore concluded that the imposition of a Suspension Order would serve little or no purpose in this case. Additionally, the Registrant’s conduct has undermined the public confidence in him, his profession and the regulatory process and so would not be sufficient in regard to the wider public interest.

92. The Panel noted that a Striking Off Oder was appropriate where there were issues involving sexual abuse of children; there was a lack of insight; and no evidence of willingness to resolve matters as in this instance. The Panel has therefore concluded that a Striking Off Order is the only sanction that would adequately address the seriousness of the Registrant’s conduct and be in the wider public interest.

93. In imposing this Striking Off Order the Panel took into account the professional and financial impact this would have on the Registrant but considered in this instance that personal interest is outweighed by the need for service user protection and the need to maintain public confidence.

 

Order: The Registrar is directed to strike the name of Vinod Ramachandran from the Register on the date this Order comes into effect.

Interim Order

Proceeding in absence

1. The HCPC, made an application for the hearing, in relation to the imposition of an Interim Order, to proceed in the Registrant’s absence for the reasons outlined previously.

2. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor and took into account the guidance as set out in the HCPTS Practice Note ‘Proceeding in Absence’.

3. The Panel was satisfied that the Registrant had been warned in the Notice of Hearing, dated 31 July 2025 by post and 1 September 2025 by email, that there was a real prospect that an Interim Order application would be made by HCPC, should a substantive finding be made by the Panel.

4. The Panel was therefore satisfied that it was reasonable to conclude that the Registrant’s non-attendance was still a voluntary decision and therefore a deliberate waiver of his right to attend and participate in person. The Panel determined that it remained in the public interest to proceed with the hearing for the reasons which it has previously outlined.

Application

5. The HCPC made an application for an Interim Suspension Order for the maximum period of eighteen months. The maximum period was sought to ensure that it covered any possible appeal period. The HCPC maintained that it was required on the two grounds of public protection and in the wider public interest.

6. The HCPC maintained that this would be consistent with the Panel’s substantive decision to strike the Registrant from the Register. A failure to impose an Interim Order would expose the public to the potential of harm and would fail to maintain the public confidence in the regulatory process.

Decision

7. The Panel makes an Interim Suspension Order, for a period of 18 months, under Article 31(2) of the Health Professions Order 2001. For the same reasons given in its determination on sanction, the Panel concluded that an Interim Conditions of Practice Order would not be appropriate. The Panel was of the view that to make no order in this case would be inconsistent with its findings. The Panel concluded that an Interim Order was necessary for the protection of the public and was also necessary in the public interest. The Panel therefore determined that an 18 month Interim Suspension Order is appropriate and proportionate pending the expiration of an appeal period.

The Panel makes an Interim Suspension under Article 31(2) of the Health Professions Order 2001, the same being necessary to protect members of the public and being otherwise in the public interest.

 

History of Hearings for Mr Vinod Ramachandran

Date	Panel	Hearing type	Outcomes / Status
13/10/2025	Conduct and Competence Committee	Final Hearing	Struck off