Robert Lambert-Simpson

Preliminary Matters
Service
1. The Panel was provided with an unredacted service bundle which included a copy of the Notice of Hearing sent to the Registrant by email on 3 June 2025. The notice included the date and time of the hearing and invited the Registrant to participate, providing details of how to join the virtual hearing.

2. The HCPC Certificate of Registration confirmed the Registrant’s email address registered with the HCPC to which the notice email was sent.

3. The Panel was satisfied that proper service of notice of the hearing had been effected in compliance with Rule 6(1) of the HCPC (Conduct and Competence Committee) (Procedure) Rules 2003 (“the Rules”).

Application to proceed in the absence of the Registrant
4. Mr Micklewright, on behalf of the HCPC, made an application for the hearing to proceed in the absence of the Registrant. He referred the Panel to a chronology which set out the Registrant’s engagement with HCPC proceedings. He highlighted occasions on which the Registrant has blocked emails sent from Blake Morgan, solicitors instructed by the HCPC, and from HCPC case managers. He also referred to a bundle sent to the Registrant by post being returned to Blake Morgan (9 July 2025).

5. Mr Micklewright also invited the Panel to note that the Registrant had requested that the final hearing, originally scheduled to take place in March 2025 be heard in person, but that the Registrant had attended only a proportion of the hearing. Since the adjournment of that hearing Mr Micklewright submitted that the Registrant’s engagement has been minimal with no response to the case summary and no correspondence relating to this substantive hearing.

6. Mr Micklewright submitted that the Registrant has waived his right to be represented and to appear and that it was in the public interest that the case should proceed.

7. The Panel considered the submissions on behalf of the HCPC and accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor. Her advice included reference to the HCPTS Practice Note on proceeding in absence and to the cases of R v Jones [2004] 1 AC 1HL and GMC v Adeogba [2016] EWCA Civ 162. The Panel exercised its discretion with the utmost care and caution carefully balancing the Registrant’s interests and the public interest.

8. The Panel asked the Hearings Officer to confirm that she had received no contact or correspondence from the Registrant. She made enquiries and confirmed that the Registrant had not made contact with the HCPC. The Panel carefully considered the circumstances of the Registrant’s absence and the history of his engagement as summarised in the chronology. It considered the Registrant had voluntarily waived his right to be present or represented at this hearing and that an adjournment was unlikely to secure his attendance.

9. The Panel considered that although the Registrant had laid out the contours of his arguments in his response to the HCPC case summary, he would be subject to disadvantage if the case were to proceed in his absence. He would not be able to elaborate on his case or respond to the HCPC presentation. The Panel balanced this disadvantage against the public interest that the case should proceed and the requirement of fairness to the HCPC. The case involves a serious allegation of dishonesty and has previously been adjourned. The Panel considered that the public interest required that the case should proceed and be resolved as expeditiously as possible.

10. The Panel decided that in all the circumstances it was fair and appropriate to proceed with the hearing in the Registrant’s absence.

Jurisdiction of the Panel
11. In his written comments in response to the HCPC case summary the Registrant submitted that the Panel did not have jurisdiction to consider the Allegation. His submissions included reference to case law, but some of the cases and references were incorrect. Some of the cases that appeared to be important, such as “Health and Care Professions Council v Jackson” did not exist.

12. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor that the Panel has jurisdiction under Article 27 of the Health Professions Order 2001 to consider allegations referred to it by the Investigating Committee under Article 22. For the Panel to have jurisdiction, the Registrant must be on the HCPC register.

13. The Panel was satisfied that the requirements were satisfied. The Registrant is on the HCPC register and the Allegation has been referred to the Committee by a Panel of the HCPC Investigating Committee. The jurisdiction of the Panel is wide. It is not limited to matters relating to professional work and can extend to any matter which engages the HCPC overarching objective.

14. The Panel decided that it had jurisdiction to consider the Allegation. The matters referred to by the Registrant in his written submissions were considered by the Panel as they were potentially relevant to the facts.

Background
15. The Registrant is a registered Practitioner Psychologist. The HCPC alleged that from 7 October 2021 to date, the Registrant has been subject to an Interim Suspension Order and between 28 July 2022 and 12 May 2023 the Registrant was subject to a substantive suspension order in respect of a different matter.

16. Article 22(8) of the Health Professions Order 2001 provides as follows:
“While the registration of a registrant is suspended by virtue of a suspension order or an interim suspension order he shall be treated as not being registered notwithstanding that his name still appears in the register but this does not prevent action being taken in respect of such a person as appropriate under articles 22 to 32 of this order.”

17. The HCPC’s case is that while suspended the Registrant could not properly claim to be a registered practitioner psychologist. In respect of the matters in Particular 1 it is alleged that the Registrant undertook expert witness work while representing that he was a HCPC registrant and in the knowledge that he was prohibited from doing so.

18. In respect of Particular 3, the HCPC case is that the Registrant did not disclose that he was subject to a suspension in the circumstances when he was instructed to prepare expert reports as particularised in 3(a) to 3(c). Although not requisite to proof of Particular 3 the Panel was also invited by Mr Micklewright to make findings as to whether the Registrant was under a positive duty to disclose that he was subject to a suspension. The HCPC alleges that the Registrant acted dishonestly, because he acted deliberately to conceal the fact of his suspension from the solicitors instructing him, and from the Court.

Decision on Facts
19. The Panel was aware that the burden of proving the facts was on the HCPC. The Registrant did not have to prove anything and the individual particulars of the Allegations could only be found proved if the Panel was satisfied on the balance of probabilities.

20. In reaching its decision the Panel took into account the documentary evidence contained in the HCPC Final Hearing bundle. The Panel heard oral evidence from two HCPC witnesses, MN and AH.

21. At the relevant time MN was the Operations Manager at MEWA Expert witness agency (MEWA). Expert witness work was contracted to the Registrant through MEWA. MN told the Panel that all psychologists registered with MEWA are registered with the HCPC. A psychologist would not be accepted onto the panel of expert witnesses unless they were HCPC registered. This would be part of the initial requirements which would also include other matters such as evidence of indemnity insurance and the requisite training.

22. MN’s expectation was that MEWA would be informed if an individual on the expert panel was to be suspended. This expectation arose because of the requirement that MEWA experts are of a certain standard and meet the standards set by registration bodies. MN also referred to the terms and conditions of MEWA which were sent to the Registrant with each instruction. MN’s understanding was that psychologists were required to be HCPC registered.

23. MN explained the process by which a MEWA expert would be instructed. MEWA would send a set of CVs to the solicitor, the solicitor would select the expert and MEWA would act as an intermediary between the solicitor and the selected expert.

24. MN confirmed that the content of the report prepared by the expert was entirely the responsibility of the expert. There was no template. MEWA added a logo and footer to the report, but made no other changes. Thus, the text and the signature on the expert reports catalogued in Particular 1 were generated by the Registrant himself.

25. MN described a conversation with the Registrant that took place when MEWA had received contact from a solicitor who brought the Interim Suspension Order to MEWA’s attention. MN could not remember the date of this conversation, except that it took place in March 2022. MN told the Panel that the Registrant said that the Interim Suspension Order was “nothing to worry about”. Although he took the Registrant’s statements about the Interim Suspension Order at face value, MN informed the Registrant that MEWA would be obliged to inform solicitors of his suspension by the HCPC so that those who were currently instructing him, as well as those who made enquiries in the future, could make an informed decision as to whether to continue with or engage his services as an expert witness. It was determined that a supplementary paragraph would be added to the Registrant’s CV, as it was presented to the solicitors that came through MEWA, to include reference to the Interim Suspension Order.

26. AH is a Solicitor and Director of AH Children Law Limited. AH confirmed the content of her witness statement. The Registrant had been instructed to prepare a report in relation to care proceedings and was instructed by the local authority to conduct a psychological assessment in relation to Person L. The Registrant’s report in relation to L was dated 31 May 2022. On 11 July 2022 the court directed a report in relation to M and this referral necessitated an addendum report in relation to L. AH sent a letter of instruction dated 11 July 2022 in relation to the addendum report to the Registrant through his company, Expert Witness Direct.

27. AH confirmed that a link to Practice Direction 25 (the Court Practice Direction relating to expert evidence) was sent to the Registrant with her instructions.

28. AH confirmed that at the time she commissioned him to act as an expert witness the Registrant did not inform her of his suspension from the HCPC register.
29. AH told the Panel that she would have expected the Registrant to have informed her of his registration status as part of his professional accountability and in accordance with his Code of Conduct as a psychologist. She also referred to her understanding of the requirements of Practice Direction 25B, that in family proceedings an instructed psychologist who is registered with a regulatory body should hold a licence to practise. AH told the Panel that she would assume that an expert witness who had made a declaration of compliance with Practice Direction 25 would be able to practise in that capacity. It would not be for the solicitor to investigate, and she would expect a professional expert witness to abide by their professional Code of Conduct.

30. AH explained that the consequences of the discovery that the Registrant was suspended was that the parties agreed that his report could not be used because of the lack of confidence in the Registrant when the concerns came to light. The Court would be considering making draconian decisions and therefore the evidence had to be fair for the parents and the children.

31. The Panel took into account the Registrant’s written submissions and the submissions made by Mr Micklewright on behalf of the HCPC.

32. The Registrant submitted that the HCPC had no jurisdiction because he had not used a protected title.
“With respect to the central issue in this case, it is our contention that the Health and Care Professions Council (HCPC) lacks jurisdiction when a professional is not practicing under a protected title. The core argument to be considered is the notion of misrepresentation and dishonesty on the part of a professional. Our client did not use any “protected” title when on suspension, and therefore, was not wilfully misleading the public or colleagues about their registration status, thus insulating the defendant from charges of dishonesty”.
33. The issue of “protected title” was raised by the Registrant when he was first asked about his registration status in or around March 2022. In March 2022, as part of his discussions with MN and the subsequent amendment to the Registrant’s CV, the Registrant provided a document called “Protected Title Document” (undated). That document listed the HCPC protected titles for psychologists and continued with the following extract:
“The term ‘Chartered Psychologist’ refers to a grade of membership of the British Psychological Society (BPS). The Society is authorised to confer that title by its Royal Charter. Use of the title is legally restricted. It is granted only to psychologists who have achieved and maintain appropriate professional qualifications and experience and have been vetted by the Society.
Registration by the HCPC and Chartered Membership of the BPS requires that the psychologist:
- has appropriate qualifications and experience,
- is in active practice according to the current professional standards, and has undertaken appropriate Continuous Professional Development (CPD).
However, a person does not need to be registered with the Health Professions Council if they do not use one of the protected titles.
A person does not need to be a member of the British Psychological Society if they do not use the title “Chartered Psychologist”.
Further, neither the HCPC nor the BPS is authorised to protect the basic title ‘psychologist’. Therefore, a person does not need to be in any way qualified in psychology to use the title ‘psychologist’.
That unqualified people can and do refer to themselves as ‘psychologists’ may create confusion for the public, other professionals and the legal system. But unless such people cross other boundaries, such as laws concerning misrepresentation of qualifications, deception and fraud, they can continue to use the title legally and without hindrance.
Neither registration with the Health and Care Professions Council (HCPC) nor membership of the British Psychological Society (BPS) is mandatory for professional applied psychologists in the United Kingdom.”

34. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor. It had regard to the HCPTS Practice Note “Making decisions on a Registrant’s state of mind”.

Particular 1 – Found Proved
35. The Panel found Particular 1 proved by the documentary evidence and the witness evidence of MN.

36. The Panel found that the HCPC has proved to the requisite standard that the Registrant was subject to an Interim Suspension Order between 20 December 2021 and 1 April 2022. The Panel was provided with a redacted copy of the Interim Order Application Decision dated 7 October 2021. This Order suspended the registration of the Registrant for a period of 18 months.

37. The HCPC has proved to the requisite standard that the Registrant completed each of the reports in 1(a) to 1(k) and that he was responsible for the provision of the entire report, including his signature.

38. The Panel was also satisfied that the Registrant held himself out as a psychologist with HCPC registration and therefore that he practised as a Practitioner Psychologist when he completed each of the expert witness reports at 1(a) to 1(k).

39. The Registrant signed each report with the following signature “Dr R Lambert-Simpson, PsyD. CPsychol (416597) AFBPsS, HCPC registered PYL34515”. In doing so, the Registrant held himself out as a psychologist with HCPC registration. Any reader of the report would be in no doubt that the Registrant was registered with the HCPC because of his reference to the HCPC and his registration number. A psychologist registered with the HCPC and presenting an expert report with such a signature is regarded as practising in the professional capacity of a Practitioner Psychologist, regardless of whether they use the protected title or not.

40. The Registrant’s references to protected title are immaterial because the Registrant plainly held himself out as an HCPC registrant.

Particular 2 – Found Proved
41. The Panel considered the legal test of dishonesty as set out within the case of Ivey v Genting Casinos [2017] UKSC 67 and the HCPTS Practice Note “Making decisions on a registrant’s state of mind”.

42. The Panel first considered what the actual state of the Registrant’s knowledge or belief was as to the facts in which the alleged dishonesty arose. The Panel then went on to consider whether the conduct was honest or dishonest by applying the standards of ordinary decent people.

43. The Panel noted that the Registrant has made no comment in relation to his signature on the expert reports at Particulars 1(a) to 1(k). He has not suggested any reason for the inclusion of his HCPC registration number in his signature. The Panel inferred the following as to the Registrant’s knowledge and beliefs:
a) At the material time, he knew he was subject to an Interim Suspension Order.
b) As an experienced Practitioner Psychologist and an experienced expert witness, having produced over 1,000 expert reports, he knew the consequences of an Interim Suspension Order: that he was not registered and was prohibited from holding himself out as registered with the HCPC or to practising as a Practitioner Psychologist registered with the HCPC.
c) Knowing and understanding the importance of his registration status following the imposition of an Interim Suspension Order, the Registrant was unlikely to have overlooked his signature. The Panel therefore inferred that he knew he was making a false representation.

44. The Panel considered that the ordinary decent person would consider the actions of the Registrant to be dishonest. The Panel considered that the ordinary decent person would consider that the Registrant had sought to mislead MEWA, the instructing solicitor and the Court into believing that he was registered with the HCPC.

45. The Panel therefore found Allegation Particular 2 proved.

Particular 3 – Found Proved
46. The Panel found Particular 3 proved by the documentary evidence and the witness evidence of AH.

47. The Panel noted that the bundle included a letter of instruction from AH dated 11 July 2022 in relation to Particulars 3(b) and 3(c). There was no letter of instruction in relation to Particular 3(a), but the Panel accepted the evidence of AH that the Registrant was instructed to and had prepared a report in relation to Person L, having been instructed by the Local Authority.

48. The Panel was satisfied that between March 2022 and July 2022 the Registrant was subject to an Interim Suspension Order.

49. The Panel was also provided with a redacted copy of a Substantive Order Decision, but the HCPC has not discharged the burden of proving that this Order took effect at the material time. The Order was made on 28 July 2022 and all other parts of the decision have been redacted.

50. The HCPC has therefore proved that the Registrant was subject to an Interim Suspension Order, but has not proved that he was subject to a Suspension Order.

51. The Registrant had not disclosed within the body of any of the expert reports in respect of Person L or Person M that he was subject to an Interim Suspension Order. AH confirmed that she had no knowledge of the Registrant’s suspension until she was notified by the Local Authority on 15 August 2022. The Panel accepted her evidence which was clear and was consistent with the contemporaneous documents.

52. The Panel therefore found Particular 3 proved in respect of the Interim Suspension Order.

53. The Panel were also invited to make additional factual findings relating to Particular 3 and considered it appropriate to do so.

54. The Panel found that the Registrant was under a responsibility to disclose his suspension to those who instructed him to prepare reports in relation to Persons L and M.

55. The Registrant had a professional responsibility under the HCPC Code of Conduct to make sure that his conduct justified the public’s trust and confidence in himself and his profession. The Registrant, as an experienced expert witness, understood the high duties placed on an expert witness to candidly disclose matters that might be relevant to the confidence placed in his expert opinion. As explained by AH in her evidence, it is not the responsibility of a solicitor instructing an expert to make inquiries about the professional status of an expert. The solicitor relies upon the expert’s professionalism and their overriding duty to the Court in making the necessary disclosures.

56. If the Registrant had for a period not fully understood that his suspension was relevant and/or that it was necessary for him to disclose his status with the HCPC to enable solicitors to make an informed decision about whether to retain or commission his services as an expert witness, any doubts would have been dispelled by his discussion with MN in March 2022. Following that discussion, the Registrant understood the importance and relevance of amending his CV to include a reference to his suspension. The Registrant therefore knew that solicitors would need to be informed of his interim suspension, and this thereby triggered a duty of disclosure on his part.

57. The Registrant had also made a declaration within his reports for Person L and Person M that he was “aware of my duty and requirements as an expert pursuant to part 25 and Practice Direction 25B”. This statement was accompanied by a statement of truth.

58. Practice Direction 25B includes an annex which contains “Standards for Expert Witnesses in Children Proceedings in the Family Court”. Standard 5 states as follows:

“If the expert’s current professional practice is regulated by a UK statutory body (See appendix 1) they are in possession of a current licence to practice”.

59. The Registrant had declared that he was aware of this requirement. Although there are circumstances in which a psychologist not registered with the HCPC may give expert evidence to a Court, Standard 5 applied to the Registrant because he was subject to regulation by the HCPC.

60. The Registrant’s failure to declare that he was subject to an Interim Suspension Order was incompatible with his declarations in respect of Practice Direction 25B and his statement “I have given details in this report of any matters that might affect the validity of this report.”
Particular 4 – Found Proved
61. The Panel considered the legal test of dishonesty as set out within the case of Ivey v Genting Casinos [2017] UKSC 67 and the HCPTS Practice Note “Making decisions on a registrant’s state of mind”.

62. The Panel first considered what the actual state of the Registrant’s knowledge or belief was as to the facts in which the alleged dishonesty arose. The Panel then went on to consider whether the conduct was honest or dishonest by applying the standards of ordinary decent people.

63. The Panel inferred the following as to the Registrant’s knowledge and beliefs:
a) At the material time he knew he was subject to an Interim Suspension Order.
b) As an experienced Practitioner Psychologist and an experienced expert witness, having produced over 1,000 expert reports, he knew the consequences of an Interim Suspension Order: that he was not registered and was prohibited from holding himself out as registered with the HCPC or practising in the professional capacity of a Practitioner Psychologist registered with the HCPC.
c) The Registrant knew that solicitors would see him as under a requirement to declare that he was subject to a Suspension Order. He knew that this information would or might be relevant to the degree of confidence in his opinion and consequently the decision to instruct him. He knew this from his experience as an expert witness and/or from his discussion with MN in March 2022.
d) The Registrant knew that prior to his Interim Suspension Order he had been practising in the professional capacity of a forensic psychologist and that, following the imposition of an Interim Suspension Order, there had been no substantive change in the nature of his work. Following the Interim Suspension Order the only change was that the Registrant was not using the protected title of Forensic Psychologist.
e) The Registrant knew and understood the purpose of the Interim Suspension Order – that it was to prohibit him from carrying out the substantive work undertaken by a forensic psychologist.
f) As an expert witness with a duty to the Court, the Registrant knew and understood the high duty of candid disclosure.
g) The Registrant believed that disclosure of the Interim Suspension Order was likely to have a detrimental impact on his workstream, because solicitors would be less likely to choose to instruct or continue to instruct him.

64. In addition to the above the Registrant also believed that he could circumvent the Interim Suspension Order if he did not use a “protected title”. However, this belief was not inconsistent or incompatible with (a) to (g) above. Notwithstanding his beliefs relating to the protected title, the Panel inferred that the Registrant did understand his professional obligation to candidly disclose the change in his registration status to AH and to the Court. In failing to make the required disclosure, the Registrant sought to conceal that he was subject to the Interim Suspension Order.

65. The Panel considered that an ordinary decent person would consider the actions of the Registrant to be dishonest. The Panel considered that an ordinary decent person would consider that the Registrant had sought to circumvent the Interim Suspension Order, knowing that it was wrong to do so.

Decision on Grounds
66. The Panel considered whether the facts found proved in Particulars 1-4 amounted to misconduct. It took into account its factual findings, together with the submissions made by Mr Micklewright on behalf of the HCPC and the Registrant’s written submissions. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor.

67. When considering whether the facts proved amounted to misconduct, the Panel noted that not all breaches of the HCPC’s “Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics” need amount to a finding of misconduct.

68. The Panel noted the advice provided in respect of Roylance v General Medical Council (No 2) [2000] 1 A.C. 311 and Nandi v GMC [2004] EWHC 2317 (Admin) in which the Court referred to Roylance and described misconduct as “a falling short by omission or commission of the standards of conduct expected among medical practitioners, and such falling short must be serious”.

69. The Panel considered that the Registrant’s conduct in Particulars 1-4 amounted to a breach of the HCPC’s “Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics” (2016) as follows:

Standard 2.6 You must share relevant information, where appropriate, with colleagues involved in the care, treatment or other services provided to a service user.

Standard 9.1 You must make sure that your conduct justifies the public’s trust and confidence in you and your profession.

Standard 9.2 You must be honest about your experience, qualifications and skills.

70. The Panel considered that the Registrant’s conduct in respect of Particulars 1 and 2, fell far below professional standards. The Registrant’s behaviour demonstrated a lack of respect for the Interim Suspension Order imposed on him and was demonstrative of conduct that fundamentally undermines the public’s trust in both the Registrant and in the profession generally. The Panel considered that the Registrant breached a fundamental tenet of the professions, namely the professional duty of candour.

71. The Panel considered that the Registrant’s conduct in Particular 1 and the related dishonesty in Particular 2 involved a number of aggravating features:

• Repetition of dishonest behaviour over a period of time;

• Conduct was planned and pre-meditated;

• Risk of adverse impact on the administration of justice;

• Breach of trust placed in the Registrant by MEWA and those solicitors instructing him.

72. The Panel concluded that the Registrant’s dishonest conduct in holding himself out as a psychologist with HCPC registration and practising as a Practitioner Psychologist while he was subject to an Interim Suspension Order was sufficiently serious to amount to misconduct.

73. The Panel also considered that the Registrant’s dishonest conduct in not disclosing that he was subject to an Interim Suspension Order (Particulars 3 and 4) fell far below professional standards. The Registrant’s conduct demonstrated a lack of respect for the Interim Suspension Order, and a lack of respect for his professional responsibilities towards AH and the Court. The Panel considered that the Registrant breached a fundamental tenet of the professions, namely, the professional duty of candour. By its nature, the Registrant’s conduct undermined public confidence in himself and the profession.

74. The Panel considered that the Registrant’s conduct in Particular 3 and the related finding of dishonesty in Particular 4 involved a number of aggravating features:

• Repetition of dishonest conduct over a period of time;

• Conduct was planned and pre-meditated;

• Conduct was financially motivated;

• Delay to Family Court proceedings due to requirement to obtain alternative expert report;

• Risk of adverse impact on administration of justice;

• Risk of harm to members of the public including young and vulnerable individuals.

75. The Panel concluded that the Registrant’s dishonest conduct in not disclosing that he was subject to an Interim Suspension Order when instructed to prepare reports in relation to Persons L and M was sufficiently serious to amount to misconduct.

76. The Panel considered that the Registrant’s conduct was at the higher end of the spectrum of seriousness of misconduct due to the aggravating features.

Decision on Impairment
77. The Panel went on to decide whether the Registrant’s fitness to practise is currently impaired by reason of his misconduct.

78. The Panel had regard to all the evidence presented in this case, together with the submissions of Mr Micklewright and the Registrant’s written submissions.

79. The Panel had regard to the HCPTS Practice Note on “Fitness to Practise Impairment”, and it received and accepted legal advice. The Panel bore in mind that the purpose of the hearing was not to punish the Registrant for past misdoings but to protect the public against the acts and omissions of those who are not fit to practise. The Panel assessed the Registrant’s fitness to practise at today’s date.

80. At this stage of its determination the Panel was provided with an unredacted copy of the decision of an HCPC Conduct and Competence Panel on 25-28 July 2022. This decision was at the very end of the period covered by Particular 3 of the Allegation. The Registrant was found to have posted inappropriate comments and/or posts on his social media account and at least one of those comments was found to be racially motivated.

81. The Panel noted that the Registrant was not of unblemished character, in that there are previous regulatory findings against him. It also noted that although misconduct was of a different nature from the dishonesty findings in this case, the 28 July 2022 panel had concerns about underlying attitudinal issues and the level of insight demonstrated by the Registrant.

82. Although the 28 July 2022 decision added to the concerns about the Registrant’s character, the Panel was of the view that even without that additional matter, the findings in this case were of a nature and seriousness that a finding of current impairment was required, for the reasons explained below.

83. In relation to the personal component, the Panel considered that the Registrant had put members of the public at risk of harm. The Panel referred to its conclusion on misconduct and the aggravating features it had identified. In particular, the Registrant’s conduct had caused a delay to Family Court proceedings and it had the potential to harm young and vulnerable members of the public who were the subject matter of the Registrant’s expert reports.

84. The Panel then considered whether the Registrant’s misconduct had brought the profession into disrepute. The Registrant breached the trust placed in him by MEWA and by AH. The Registrant’s dishonesty in relation to holding himself out as a registered HCPC psychologist when he was subject to an Interim Suspension Order, and not disclosing his suspension to AH, undoubtedly brought the profession into disrepute.

85. The Panel was also satisfied that the Registrant had breached one of the fundamental tenets of the profession, which requires him to be honest and trustworthy in his personal and professional behaviour.

86. The Panel also considered whether, looking forward, the Registrant was liable to put service users at risk of harm, bring the profession into disrepute, breach one of its fundamental tenets, or act dishonestly. In reaching its conclusion, the Panel considered evidence of insight, remorse, reflection, and the likelihood of repetition of the misconduct.

87. The Panel considered that the dishonesty in this case would be very difficult to remediate. The dishonesty was repeated over a period of time, and the Registrant was motivated by financial gain. This indicates an attitudinal issue, which is not easily remediable.

88. Although he is entitled to deny dishonesty, there was no evidence before the Panel that the Registrant has demonstrated any level of understanding of the impact of his misconduct on L, M and other family members, solicitors including AH, MEWA, or the wider profession. There has been no indication from the Registrant that he understands the seriousness of the Allegation, if it were proved. In his written submission, the Registrant focussed on his argument that he was not using a protected title, and there was no evidence that he had reflected on any other view that might be taken of the circumstances. The Panel concluded that the Registrant has not demonstrated insight into his misconduct.

89. There was no evidence before the Panel of any remedial action undertaken by the Registrant.

90. In his written submissions, the Registrant submitted that there is not a current risk to the public because he does not live in the UK and is not currently practising as a psychologist. The Panel did not consider that these matters were relevant to its assessment of current risk. The Panel is assessing the risk to the public if the Registrant were to practise in the professional capacity of a practitioner psychologist and rely on his HCPC registration. The Registrant may return to the UK at any time, and he may also rely on his HCPC registration if he were to practise as a practitioner psychologist outside the UK.

91. Accordingly, the Panel concluded that there was a high risk of repetition. In these circumstances, the Panel concluded that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is impaired on the basis of the personal component.

92. In relation to the public component the Panel was satisfied that, given the nature and seriousness of the Registrant’s dishonesty, public confidence in the profession and the HCPC would be undermined if there were no finding of impairment in this case.

93. The Panel was also of the view that it would be failing in its duty to declare and uphold proper standards of conduct and behaviour in the profession if it did not find impairment in this case. It considered that a reasonable and informed member of the public would be surprised and very concerned if there was no finding of impairment in a case where the Registrant has been found to have repeatedly been dishonest and the dishonesty involves a breach of the trust placed in the Registrant by solicitors and the Court.

94. The Panel therefore concluded that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is impaired on the public component.

95. Accordingly, the Panel found, on both the personal and public component, that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is impaired.

Decision on Sanction
100. The Panel took account of the submissions made by Mr Micklewright on behalf of the HCPC and noted the content of the Registrant’s written submissions. Mr Micklewright’s submissions included reference to the HCPC Sanctions Policy. Mr Micklewright submitted that the appropriate and proportionate sanction was a Striking Off Order.

101. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor and referred to the HCPC Sanctions Policy.

102. In considering sanction, the Panel was mindful that a sanction is not intended to be punitive. However, a sanction may be necessary in the public interest, and may have a punitive effect. The Panel bore in mind that any sanction must be proportionate, that is, it must only restrict the Registrant’s right to practise to the extent necessary to protect the public and the public interest.

103. The Panel bore in mind that the HCPC’s overriding objective is to protect the public. A panel must consider the risk the Registrant may pose in the future and decide what degree of public protection is required. The Panel must also give appropriate weight to the wider public interest, which includes the maintenance of the public confidence in the profession and the regulatory process.

104. The Panel had found that there were future risks in this case that the Registrant would repeat dishonest conduct.

105. The Panel considered that the aggravating factors were those set out within its decision on the statutory ground of misconduct. It noted the actual harm in the delay to the Family Court Proceedings and the risk of harm to members of the public including vulnerable adults and children in Family Court proceedings. In addition, the Panel noted the absence of evidence of insight, remorse, apology or remediation.

106. The Panel carefully considered whether there were any mitigating factors, but it was unable to identify any. The Panel had noted that within the decision of the Panel on 28 July 2022 there was a brief reference to the Registrant’s health condition. In his written submissions for this hearing the Registrant made no reference to a health condition, and there was no medical evidence or any other references to the Registrant’s health within the documents provided to the Panel. There was therefore no material upon which the Panel could conclude that the Registrant’s health was relevant.

107. In relation to the dishonest conduct, the Panel was aware that dishonesty can take different forms, and that dishonesty should be considered in a nuanced way. In this case the dishonesty was of a serious nature, given that it occurred on multiple occasions, took place over a period of time, was planned and pre-meditated, and the Panel has not identified any mitigating factors.

108. The Panel considered the sanctions in ascending level of severity in order to ensure that its approach was proportionate.
109. The Panel decided that neither mediation nor taking no action would be appropriate. The Panel decided that due to the gravity and seriousness of the misconduct a sanction was necessary.

110. The Panel considered the factors in the Sanctions Policy in relation to a Caution Order. It concluded that the issues in this case were not isolated, limited or relatively minor. The Registrant has not shown good insight or undertaken appropriate remediation and there is not a low risk of repetition. A Caution Order would not restrict the Registrant’s ability to practise and would not be sufficient to protect the public or be sufficient to address the wider public interest.

111. The Panel concluded that a Caution Order was not sufficient or appropriate in the circumstances.

112. The Panel next considered a Conditions of Practice Order. The Panel was unable to formulate conditions of practice which could address the risk that he would repeat dishonest conduct. The case was also serious, involving dishonesty, and conditions of practice are only suitable in such cases where the Registrant’s conduct was minor, out of character, capable of remediation, and unlikely to be repeated. These circumstances do not apply. The Panel was also of the view that conditions of practice would be inappropriate in circumstances where the Registrant has not engaged with the hearing and the information provided to the Panel was that he is living in Australia and not practising as a psychologist.

113. The Panel concluded that a Conditions of Practice Order was not sufficient to protect the public and insufficient to address the wider public interest.

114. The Panel carefully considered whether a Suspension Order would be sufficient to protect the public and address the public interest concerns in this case.

115. The Panel referred to paragraph 121 of the Sanctions Policy. The concerns represent serious breaches of the HCPC’s Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics. The Panel has found that the Registrant has not demonstrated insight and that there is a risk of repetition. The Panel considered that the tone of the Registrant’s written submissions was indicative of a dismissive and defiant attitude towards the regulator. There was no evidence before the Panel to suggest that the Registrant was likely to be willing or able to resolve or remedy the misconduct.

116. The Panel also had regard to the aggravating features and considered that a Suspension Order would be insufficient to uphold and maintain professional standards and to maintain confidence in the practitioner psychologist profession.

117. The Panel concluded that a Suspension Order would not be sufficient to protect the public and the wider public interest.

118. The Panel concluded that the only appropriate and proportionate sanction in this case was a Striking Off Order. The Panel had regard to paragraphs 56-58 of the Sanctions Policy. The Panel reminded itself that dishonesty undermines public confidence in the profession, that it can impact public safety, and had the potential to do so in this case, and that it can have a significant impact on the trust placed in the Registrant.

119. The Panel also considered paragraph 130 of the Sanctions Policy. A Striking Off Order is the sanction of last resort for serious, persistent, deliberate or reckless acts and this may involve dishonesty.

120. The Panel also considered 131 of the Sanctions Policy. This was a case where the Registrant lacks insight, the misconduct was repeated and the Panel has concluded that the Registrant is unwilling to resolve matters.

121. Given the gravity of the Registrant’s misconduct together with the absence of evidence of insight, the Panel considered that the Registrant’s dishonesty was fundamentally incompatible with registration on the HCPC register.

122. The Panel bore in mind the requirement that the sanction it imposes must be proportionate. The Panel had little information about the Registrant’s current circumstances. The information provided in his written submissions is that he was living in Australia and not practising as a psychologist. The Panel acknowledged that a Striking Off Order may have a negative impact on the Registrant’s financial and professional interests. However, the Panel concluded that any lesser sanction would be insufficient to uphold and maintain public confidence in the practitioner psychologist profession and the regulatory process. The Panel therefore decided that the public interest outweighed the Registrant’s interests.

123. The Panel concluded that the appropriate and proportionate order was a Striking Off Order.

The Registrar is directed to strike the name of Robert Lambert-Simpson from the Register on the date this Order comes into effect.

Right of Appeal
You may appeal to the High Court in England and Wales against the Panel’s decision and the order it has made against you.

Under Article 29(10) of the Health Professions Order 2001, any appeal must be made within 28 days of the date when this notice is served on you. The Panel’s Order will not take effect until the appeal period has expired or, if you appeal, until that appeal is disposed of or withdrawn.

Interim Order
Interim Order Application
1. Mr Micklewright made an application for an Interim Suspension Order for up to eighteen months, to cover the appeal period before the Striking Off Order becomes operative and the time that any appeal might take to be concluded.

2. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Adviser and first considered whether it was fair and appropriate to consider this application in the absence of the Registrant. The Panel was satisfied that the Registrant was notified that such an application might be made within the Notice of Hearing dated 3 June 2025. The Panel decided that it would be fair and appropriate to hear the application in the Registrant’s absence. The Panel considered that an adjournment would serve no purpose and that there was a public interest in the expeditious disposal of the application for an Interim Order. The reasons set out within the Panel’s decision on proceeding in the Registrant’s absence continued to apply, and the public interest in expedition was reinforced by the Panel’s decision on current impairment and sanction.

3. The Panel next considered whether an Interim Order was necessary for the protection of the public, otherwise in the public interest, or was in the Registrant’s own interests. It applied the principle of proportionality, balancing the Registrant’s interests against the need to protect the public.

4. The Panel considered whether to impose an Interim Order. In its findings on impairment the Panel concluded that there is a need to protect the public from the risk of harm. The Panel decided that it would be wholly incompatible with those earlier findings and the imposition of a Striking Off Order to conclude that an Interim Suspension Order was not necessary for the protection of the public and to maintain public confidence in the profession.
5. The Panel took into account the Registrant’s interests, but decided that his interests were outweighed by the need to protect the public and the wider public interest. The Panel concluded that an Interim Suspension Order should be imposed on public protection and wider public interest grounds.

6. The Panel decided that it was appropriate to impose the Interim Suspension Order for a period of eighteen months to cover the appeal period. When the appeal period expires this Interim Order will come to an end unless there has been an application to appeal. If there is no appeal the substantive Suspension Order shall apply when the appeal period expires.

Interim Order
7. The Panel makes an Interim Suspension Order under Article 31(2) of the Health Professions Order 2001, the same being necessary to protect members of the public and being otherwise in the public interest.

8. This order will expire: (if no appeal is made against the Panel’s decision and Order) upon the expiry of the period during which such an appeal could be made; (if an appeal is made against the Panel’s decision and Order) the final determination of that appeal, subject to a maximum period of 18 months.

History of Hearings for Robert Lambert-Simpson