Dean Carter

Preliminary Matters 

Service of the Notice of Hearing
1. The Registrant was not present or represented at the hearing. The Panel was provided with documentary evidence that the Notice of this hearing (the Notice) was sent to the Registrant on 25 June 2025 by email to his registered email address; confirmation of electronic delivery to the Registrant’s registered email address was received. The Notice contained the dates and start times of the hearing, the purpose of the hearing and the fact that it would be held remotely via video conference.

2. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor in relation to Rules 3(1) and 6 of the HCPC (Conduct and Competence Committee) (Procedure) Rules 2003 (the Rules) and was satisfied that there had been proper service in this case.

Proceeding in the Absence of the Registrant
3. The Presenting Officer, on behalf of the HCPC, applied to proceed with the hearing in the Registrant’s absence pursuant to Rule 11. She informed the Panel that the Registrant has not engaged at all with the HCPC in relation to these regulatory proceedings. The Presenting Officer stated that the Registrant has not provided a reason for his non-attendance and submitted that he has voluntarily absented himself from the hearing. She submitted that the allegations relate to events in 2021; that the HCPC’s two witnesses are scheduled to attend today to give live evidence; that the Registrant has not requested an adjournment of the hearing; that he has waived his right to attend; and that it was in the public interest to proceed in the Registrant’s absence.

4. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor. The Panel referred to the HCPTS Practice Note called Proceeding in the Absence of the Registrant (August 2025) and to the guidance that a hearing panel should consider as provided by the cases of R v Jones (Anthony) [2004] 1 AC 1HL and GMC v Adeogba [2016] EWCA Civ 162. Applying that guidance, the Panel was careful to remember that its discretion to proceed in absence under Rule 11 is not unfettered and must be exercised with the utmost care and caution, with the fairness of the hearing at the forefront of its mind.

5. The Notice of Hearing informed the Registrant of the dates and details of this Conduct and Competence Committee hearing, and of his right to attend and be represented. He was also advised of the Panel’s power to proceed with the hearing in his absence if he did not attend and of how he could apply for a postponement of the hearing. The Registrant was informed of the sanction powers available to the Panel, should it find his fitness to practise to be currently impaired.

6. The Registrant had not requested a postponement or adjournment of today’s hearing, indeed there had been no communication from the Registrant or any representative at all in relation to the HCPC’s investigation, or these regulatory proceedings. Taking all the above circumstances into account, the Panel concluded that it was unlikely in all the circumstances that an adjournment would secure the Registrant’s attendance on a future date. The Panel took the view that the Registrant had voluntarily waived his right to attend and that adjourning this hearing would serve no useful purpose.

7. The Panel was mindful that it must also consider fairness to the HCPC, whose case was ready to proceed today. The HCPC’s witnesses were ready to give evidence at the hearing today. The Panel took account of the public interest in the expeditious resolution of regulatory allegations, the fact that the allegations in this case are four years old and the impact of cost and delay caused by an adjournment upon other cases. Following the guidance in the case of Adeogba, given that there was no good reason to adjourn the hearing, the Panel decided it was in the public interest to proceed in the Registrant’s absence.

8. The Panel considered that there was some disadvantage to the Registrant in proceeding in his absence as he would not be able to challenge the evidence put forward by the HCPC or give his own evidence. In the Panel’s judgment, however, this could be mitigated. The Panel was mindful that it could explore any inconsistencies in the evidence which it identified and should ask questions and consider points which might be in the Registrant’s interests and were reasonably apparent from the evidence. Furthermore, the limited disadvantage was the consequence of the Registrant’s decision not to engage at all with his regulatory proceedings, to absent himself from the hearing, waive his rights to attend and be represented.

9. In these circumstances, the Panel decided that it was fair to proceed in the absence of the Registrant.

Background
10. The Registrant is registered with the HCPC as a Paramedic. At the time of the events to which these proceedings relate, he was employed by the West Midlands Ambulance Service University NHS Foundation Trust (the Trust) as a Paramedic, where he had been employed since January 2016.

11. The HCPC received a referral from a Senior Manager at the Trust dated 6 May 2022. The referral stated that on 8 December 2021, the Registrant was stopped by West Mercia Police due to concerns about his driving. A roadside drug test was carried out by police officers due to their concerns that the Registrant was driving under the influence of drugs. The Registrant tested positive for drugs on the roadside swab. He was subsequently arrested and taken to Kidderminster Police Station to have blood taken for further drug analysis.

12. The Registrant was released from police custody without bail, pending further investigation and the results of the blood test.

13. It is said that the Registrant took sick leave from work and did not disclose to the Trust his arrest, the ongoing police investigation or any information in relation to his drug use.

14. On 29 April 2022 West Mercia Police informed the Trust that the results of the blood test confirmed that the Registrant had been driving under the influence of Benzoylecgonine (cocaine).

15. The Registrant had a meeting with Witness 1, an Operations Manager at the Trust, on 9 February 2022, during which he was informed that he was detached with immediate effect from his duties as a Band 6 Paramedic and, instead, would assist as a Band 2 vehicle preparation operative. It is Witness 1’s evidence that during the meeting, the Registrant would have been informed of the requirement to refer himself to the HCPC.

16. During the course of the HCPC’s investigation, the HCPC was provided with a notice of criminal charge dated 4 May 2022 which outlined that the Registrant was charged with an offence of driving a motor vehicle on 8 December 2021 with a proportion of a specified control drug above the specified limit.

17. The Registrant’s employment with the Trust was terminated with effect from 9 May 2022.

18. It is alleged that on 31 May 2022, the Registrant was convicted at Worcester Magistrates’ Court of driving a motor vehicle with a proportion of a specified controlled drug above the specified limit. The HCPC was later provided with a certified copy of the Certificate of Conviction which set out that the Registrant was convicted on 31 May 2022, after entering a guilty plea at Worcester Magistrates’ Court, and was sentenced to a 12-month driving disqualification and a financial penalty of £120.

19. It is further alleged that the Registrant did not inform the HCPC as soon as possible that he had been charged by the police; or indeed that he had been convicted of the offence of driving under the influence of drugs; or that the Trust had placed restrictions on his practice. It is the HCPC’s case that the Registrant’s conduct, in not informing the HCPC of these matters, was dishonest.

Decision on Facts
20. The Panel considered all of the evidence in this case and heard the submissions of the Presenting Officer. It gave careful consideration to the context in which these allegations arose. The Panel considered whether, on the totality of the evidence, the HCPC had discharged the burden of proving the factual particulars on the balance of probabilities and made the following findings.

21. The HCPC called two witnesses in support of its case, who provided sworn evidence to the Panel:

• Witness 1 – a Senior Operational Manager at the Trust
• Witness 2 – an Operational Manager at the HCPC

Particular 1
On 31 May 2022 you were convicted at Worcester Magistrates Court of driving a motor vehicle on 8 December 2021 when the proportion of a controlled drug, namely Benzoylecgonine, in your blood was not less than 55 micrograms.
22. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor that a criminal conviction and the facts on which the conviction is based may be proved by the certified copy of the certificate of conviction: Rule 10(1)(d) of the Rules.

23. A certified copy of the Certificate of Conviction dated 9 December 2024 was before the Panel, which set out the offence for which the Registrant was convicted, and the sentence imposed upon him. On the basis of this document, which the Panel determined to be reliable evidence of the conviction the Panel was satisfied that the HCPC had discharged the burden of proving that the conviction as set out at Particular 1 was recorded against the Registrant.

24. Accordingly, the Panel found Particular 1 proved.

Particular 2
You did not inform the Health and Care Professions Council (HCPC) as soon as possible that you had been charged with the offence as set out in particular 1.

25. The Panel heard sworn evidence from Witness 2, an Operational Manager at the HCPC, who said that he was aware of the HCPC’s investigation in this matter and had had oversight of the case. Witness 2 told the Panel that during the course of the HCPC’s investigation, the HCPC was provided with a notice of criminal charge dated 4 May 2022. It was Witness 2’s evidence, both in his witness statement and repeated in oral evidence, that he had reviewed the HCPC’s systems and could confirm that the Registrant did not inform the HCPC at any stage of the criminal charge. Witness 2 told the Panel that the Registrant “has not engaged at all with the HCPC during the investigation.”

26. Witness 2 stated that the Registrant had a duty to be aware of the HCPC’s professional standards and was required to inform the HCPC of the criminal charge in accordance with paragraph 9.5 of the HCPC’s Standards of conduct, performance and ethics of 2016 (the Standards) which provides as follows:
9.5 You must tell us as soon as possible if:
- you accept a caution from the police or you have been charged with, or found guilty of, a criminal offence;
- another organisation responsible for regulating a health or social care profession has taken action or made a finding against you; or
- you have had any restriction placed on your practice, or been suspended or dismissed by an employer, because of concerns about your conduct or competence.

27. The Panel considered Witness 2’s evidence to be cogent and compelling. It accepted Witness 2’s evidence that the Registrant did not inform the HCPC at all of the criminal charge.

28. Accordingly, the Panel was satisfied that the HCPC had discharged his burden of proof in relation to this Particular and found Particular 2 proved on the balance of probabilities.

Particular 3
You did not inform the HCPC as soon as possible that you had been convicted of the offence as set out in particular 1.

29. Witness 2 told the Panel that during the course of the HCPC’s investigation, the HCPC was provided a certified copy of the Certificate of Conviction setting out that the Registrant was convicted on 31 May 2022. Witness 2’s evidence was that he had reviewed the HCPC’s systems and could confirm that the Registrant had not, any time, informed the HCPC that he had been convicted of the offence of driving under the influence of drugs. Witness 2 told the Panel that the Registrant “has not engaged at all with the HCPC during the investigation.” He referred again to paragraph 9.5 of the Standards and stated that the Registrant had a duty to inform the HCPC of a criminal conviction.

30. The Panel considered Witness 2’s evidence to be cogent and compelling. It accepted Witness 2’s evidence that the Registrant did not inform the HCPC at all of the criminal conviction.

31. Accordingly, the Panel was satisfied that the HCPC had discharged his burden of proof in relation to this Particular and found Particular 3 proved on the balance of probabilities.

Particular 4
You did not inform the HCPC of the restrictions placed on your practice by West Midlands Ambulance Service on 9 February 2022.

32. Witness 1 told the Panel that, on 9 December 2021, two police officers attended Trust premises and informed her that the Registrant had been arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence of drugs. She told the Panel that she held a meeting with the Registrant on 9 February 2022 and advised him that he would not be able to continue to perform operational duties as a Paramedic due to the seriousness of the allegations, but that the Trust would support him at the hub in a non-patient facing role, while the results of the Registrant’s blood test were awaited from the police. Witness 1 said that the Trust “took [the Registrant] off the road” and moved him to a Band 2 “vehicle preparation operative role.” It was Witness 1’s evidence that her “normal practice” would have been to ask the Registrant to update the HCPC in relation to his changed role, as the HCPC would need to know about the Trust’s investigation. She stated that it is the Registrant’s responsibility, in any event, to “self-refer” to the HCPC.

33. Witness 2 referred the Panel to paragraph 9.5 of the Standards and stated that the Registrant had a duty to inform the HCPC of the restrictions that the Trust had placed on his practice. Witness 2 stated that the Registrant did not notify the HCPC of the restrictions placed on his professional practice by the Trust.

34. The Panel considered Witnesses 1 and 2’s evidence to be cogent and credible. It accepted Witness 2’s evidence that the Registrant did not inform the HCPC at all of the criminal conviction.

35. Accordingly, the Panel was satisfied that the HCPC had discharged his burden of proof in relation to this Particular and found Particular 4 proved on the balance of probabilities.

Particular 5
Your conduct at particulars 2, 3 and/or 4 above was dishonest in that:
a) You knew you were required to notify the HCPC of your charge and/or your conviction and/or the restrictions on your practice; and/or
b) In failing to do so, you sought to conceal your charge and/or conviction and/or the restrictions on your practice from the HCPC.

36. Dishonesty was alleged in respect of factual Particulars 2, 3 and 4 in this case. In assessing this matter, the Panel accepted the guidance given by the Legal Assessor in relation to the case of Ivey (Appellant) v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd. t/a Crockfords (Respondent) [2017] UKSC 67. The Panel was advised that it should first establish the Registrant’s actual state of knowledge or belief as to the facts: a subjective test. A registrant’s actions will often be determinative on this issue. Having done this, the Panel should then undertake an objective test, establishing whether a member of the public would view the Registrant’s conduct as honest or dishonest. There is no requirement that the Registrant knew that their belief or knowledge would be considered dishonest by a member of the public.

37. The Legal Assessor also referred the Panel to the case of Soni v General Medical Council [2015] EWHC 364 in which the appeal judge opined that, before a panel could infer dishonesty, it would have to consider whether the evidence showed other possible explanations and, if so, whether it could safely conclude that those other explanations were less probable than deliberate dishonesty. In a case about dishonesty, where there is evidence of different explanations for why the Registrant might have done something, the question is which explanation is more likely?

38. In this regard the Panel took into account that prior to these incidents there was nothing known about the Registrant’s propensity to lie or be dishonest. The Panel has considered each of the alleged dishonest incidents individually.

39. The Panel first considered the Registrant’s actual state of mind at the time when restrictions were placed on his practice by the Trust, and then when he received his criminal charge and conviction. The Registrant has not engaged at all with the HCPC’s investigation and has provided no response to the allegations. As such, the Panel has nothing from the Registrant indicating what his state of understanding or belief on these matters. The Panel was in no doubt, however, that the Registrant knew that he had been moved to a non-registered role; and that he knew when he had received the notice of criminal charge from the police, and then when he had entered a guilty plea at the criminal court and received a conviction. The Panel further accepted the evidence of Witness 2 that the Registrant would have known about the requirements of him, as set out in the Standards, specifically in relation to paragraph 9.5 and the duty on him to inform the HCPC of a criminal charge or conviction, or of restrictions placed upon his practice. The Panel considered that by not notifying the HCPC, the Registrant was seeking to conceal each of the three linked matters from his regulator.

40. The Panel next asked itself whether ordinary, decent people would consider the Registrant’s behaviour in concealing such matters to be dishonest. The Panel considered that ordinary, decent members of the public would, given all the facts known to this Panel, categorise not informing the HCPC of a criminal charge, conviction and restrictions on his practice when he knew that he was required to do so, as dishonest behaviour.

41. The Panel has therefore concluded, on the balance of probabilities, that there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that the Registrant’s conduct in relation to Particulars 2, 3 and 4 was dishonest. Particular 5 is therefore proven in respect of each of Particulars 2, 3 and 4.

Decision on Statutory Grounds
42. In reaching its decisions on the statutory grounds of conviction and/or misconduct, the Panel has taken into account the submissions of the Presenting Officer and it has received and accepted legal advice.

Conviction
43. The Panel considered the nature, circumstances and gravity of the criminal offence concerned. It determined that the conviction and the conduct that led to it was sufficiently serious to go to the Registrant’s fitness to practise. Therefore, the statutory ground of criminal conviction has been established.

Misconduct
44. The Presenting Officer submitted that the Registrant’s dishonest behaviour fell far below the standards expected of a Registrant in the circumstances and would amount to misconduct. She referred the Panel to the HCPC Standards setting out the specific obligation on any registrant to tell the HCPC if restrictions are placed on his practice or if he is charged with, or found guilty of, a criminal offence. The Presenting Officer emphasised that the related dishonesty is a serious matter.

45. The Panel was mindful that the question of misconduct is a matter for the Panel’s professional judgement, there being no standard or burden of proof. The Panel has considered the HCPC Standards in relation to the proven factual particulars and concluded that the Registrant’s actions and omissions were a serious breach of the following:

9 Be honest and trustworthy
Personal and professional behaviour

9.1 - You must make sure that your conduct justifies the public’s confidence in you and your profession.

Important information about your conduct and competence
9.5 – You must inform the HCPC as soon as possible if…you have been charged with, or found guilty of, a criminal offence…or if you have had any restriction placed on your practice, or been suspended or dismissed by an employer, because of concerns about your conduct or competence.

46. The Panel was satisfied that the Registrant’s conduct in relation to Particulars 2, 3, 4 and 5 fell far below the high standards of behaviour to be expected of a Paramedic. The Panel considered that not informing the HCPC of, firstly, having restrictions placed on his practice by the Trust, then being charged with a criminal offence, and then of his criminal conviction is a serious matter. The purpose of this requirement is so that the regulator is made aware of the circumstances of the concerns, has the opportunity to investigate these and then take any steps necessary to protect the public. A regulator needs to ensure that registrants are not only safe to practise, but also that public confidence in their profession is maintained and standards of conduct and behaviour are upheld. Registrants need to behave in their personal and professional lives in a way which justifies the public’s trust and confidence in them and in their profession. The Panel concluded that by not informing his regulator of these serious matters, the Registrant disregarded the principles of honesty and transparency that are fundamental to his caring profession. The Panel determined that his conduct fell far below what would be expected of a Paramedic and that, by his omissions, the Registrant did not make sure that his conduct justifies the public’s trust and confidence in him and in his profession. Further, the Panel was in no doubt that the Registrant’s dishonesty in seeking to conceal the matters from the HCPC was serious and amounted to misconduct.

47. Accordingly, the Panel finds that the allegation of misconduct arising from the proven factual Particulars 2, 3, 4 and 5 is well founded.

Decision on Impairment
48. In reaching its decision on impairment, the Panel has had regard to the HCPTS Practice Notes “Finding that Fitness to Practise is Impaired” and “Conviction and Caution Allegations”. The Panel has taken account of the submissions of the Presenting Officer and has received and accepted legal advice. The Panel has borne in mind that the purpose of this hearing is not to punish the Registrant for past misdoings, but to protect the public against the acts and omissions of those who are not fit to practise without some sort of restriction.

49. The Presenting Officer submitted that, in driving under the influence of cocaine that resulted in a criminal conviction, and that by behaving dishonestly, the Registrant has brought the profession into disrepute.

50. In relation to the personal component, the Presenting Officer invited the Panel to assess the Registrant’s level of insight and to consider whether he had addressed the conduct that led to the criminal conviction or the underlying dishonesty and understands fully the impact of his actions. The Presenting Officer submitted that the Registrant has not provided any evidence of insight into his conviction, leading to a risk of repetition in this case.

51. The Presenting Officer also submitted that, in light of the criminal offending in this case, a finding that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is impaired was required to maintain confidence in the Paramedic profession and its regulator.

52. The absence of and lack of engagement by the Registrant meant that there were no submissions on impairment, or any references/testimonials, provided by him or on his behalf.

53. In coming to its decision on current impairment, the Panel adopted the approach formulated by Dame Janet Smith in her Fifth Report of the Shipman Inquiry by asking itself the following questions:

“Do our findings of fact in respect of the [Registrant’s] misconduct and/or conviction show that his fitness to practise is impaired in the sense that he:

a) has in the past acted and/or is liable in the future to act so as to put patient or patients at unwarranted risk of harm; and/or

b) has in the past brought and/or is liable in the future to bring the profession into disrepute; and/or

c) has in the past breached and/or is liable in the future to breach one of the fundamental tenets of the profession; and or

d) has in the past and/or is liable in the future to act dishonestly?”

54. The Panel concluded that limbs (b), (c) and (d) above were engaged in this case. It considered the Registrant’s conduct that led to the conviction to be serious. The Panel determined that by his actions, the Registrant had breached a fundamental tenet of the profession, namely that it is incumbent on him to ensure that his conduct justifies the public’s trust and confidence in him and his profession and not to transgress the laws of the land. The Panel determined that both the Registrant’s conviction, and his related dishonest conduct in not informing the HCPC, had clear implications in terms of the wider public interest in maintaining public confidence in the profession and brought his profession into disrepute.

55. The Panel took into account the guidance provided in Cohen v General Medical Council [2008] EWHC 581 (paragraph 65) and considered whether the Registrant’s actions giving rise to the conviction and to the misconduct established in this case are easily remediable; whether the conduct has been remedied; and whether it was highly unlikely to be repeated.

56. The Panel is of the view that the conduct leading to the conviction, the misconduct and related dishonesty in this case are, on the face of it, remediable. It considered that a registrant convicted of such a driving offence or who has sought to conceal his criminal matters from the HCPC could, with appropriate reflection, come to an understanding of why he had committed such offences and thereafter develop insight into his personality, together with appropriate strategies to prevent repetition.

57. In its consideration of the personal component the Panel found that, in the absence of any engagement at all by the Registrant in over three years, there is no material upon which the Panel could safely conclude that there is any insight on his part. On the information provided to it, the Panel concluded that the Registrant has taken no action to address his failings, or to avoid future repetition. There is no evidence of remediation or remedial steps taken by him. In the Panel’s view, a registrant who takes no or inadequate positive steps to acknowledge and address deficiencies in his behaviour is likely to pose an ongoing risk to the public. As such, the Panel concluded that a finding of current impairment was required on the personal component.

58. In relation to the public component the Panel was in no doubt that, given the nature and circumstances of the conviction and the misconduct in this case, public confidence in the Paramedic profession and its regulatory body would be undermined if there was no finding of impairment in this case. The Panel determined that by his conviction and his misconduct, the Registrant had breached a fundamental tenet of the profession, namely that it is incumbent on members of the profession not to transgress the laws of the land or to behave dishonestly. The Panel was in no doubt that the Registrant’s conviction related to a serious criminal offence and had clear implications in terms of the wider public interest in maintaining public confidence in the Paramedic profession. The Panel determined that other practitioners would be appalled by the Registrant’s actions – both by the conduct leading to his conviction and by his dishonesty - and that his conduct would attract public opprobrium. The Panel also considered that it would be failing in its duty to declare and uphold proper standards of conduct and behaviour in that profession if it did not make a finding of impairment. Accordingly, the Panel therefore finds, on the public component also, that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is impaired.

59. Therefore, the Panel has determined that the Registrant’s fitness to practise as Paramedic is currently impaired, on both the personal and public components, by reason of his conviction and his misconduct.

Decision on Sanction
60. Having determined that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is currently impaired, the Panel then considered what sanction, if any, should be imposed. It took into account the submissions of the Presenting Officer. As already noted by the Panel, the absence of the Registrant and lack of engagement by him meant that there were no submissions on sanction, or any references/testimonials, provided by him or on his behalf.

61. The Presenting Officer referred the Panel to the HCPC’s Sanctions Policy (SP) document and submitted that any sanction must be proportionate and that that the purpose of a sanction is not to punish the Registrant for a second time.

62. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor that, whilst the Panel was entitled to take into consideration the sentence that the criminal court imposed upon the Registrant, the criminal sentence was not necessarily a good indicator of the type of sanction that should be applied in this regulatory case. The Panel was reminded that a sanction is not to be punitive, although it may have a punitive effect, and bore in mind the principles of fairness and proportionality when determining what the appropriate sanction in this case should be. The Panel was aware that any sanction it imposes must be the least restrictive sanction that, in this case, is sufficient to protect the public and the wider public interest. As the finding is one of conviction and misconduct, the entire sanction range is available to the Panel.

63. The Panel was mindful of its over-arching duty to protect, promote and maintain the health, safety and wellbeing of the public; to promote and maintain public confidence in the professions regulated by the HCPC; and to promote and maintain proper professional standards and conduct for members of those professions.

64. The Panel had close regard to the SP document in reaching its decision on sanction, including paragraphs 56-58 of the SP dealing with “Serious cases” involving dishonesty. The Panel had close regard to the section on Dishonesty in the SP, particularly paragraphs 56 to 58. Paragraph 57 states: “Dishonesty, both in and outside the workplace, can have a significant impact on the trust placed in those who have been dishonest, and potentially on public safety. It is likely to lead to more serious sanctions…” Paragraph 58 goes on to provide that panels should bear in mind that “there are different forms and different degrees of dishonesty, that need to be considered in an appropriately nuanced way.”

65. The Panel did not identify any factors that could be said to be a mitigating feature in this case, in favour of the Registrant.

66. The Panel considered the aggravating factors in this case to be:
• the Registrant has shown no insight or remorse in respect of the gravity of his actions;
• there is no evidence of any remediation and, as such, there is an ongoing and significant risk of repetition;
• the Registrant’s repeated dishonesty in failing to notify the HCPC;
• the Registrant has not engaged at all with the HCPC.

67. The Panel considered what sanction, if any, should be applied, and considered its powers in ascending order of seriousness. The starting point for the Panel was that the Registrant’s criminal conviction and dishonest conduct were serious; on the information before the Panel today, is it not apparent that the Registrant has taken steps to address the matters.

68. The Panel first considered mediation or taking no action, but concluded that, given the seriousness of the criminal offence and the dishonest conduct in not notifying the HCPC of the related matters, this would be inappropriate and insufficient to declare and affirm proper standards of conduct and behaviour, or to maintain public confidence in the profession.

69. The Panel then considered whether to make a Caution Order and considered paragraph 101 of the SP which states as follows:
“A caution order is likely to be an appropriate sanction for cases in which:
• the issue is isolated, limited, or relatively minor in nature;
• there is a low risk of repetition;
• the registrant has shown good insight;
• and the registrant has undertaken appropriate remediation."

70. The Panel concluded that, having not heard at all from the Registrant, none of the bullet points above had been satisfied. The Panel considered the conduct to be very serious and that a Caution Order would not be appropriate or sufficient to address the public interest.

71. The Panel next considered a Conditions of Practice Order. The Sanctions Policy provides that Conditions are “unlikely to be suitable in cases in which the registrant has failed to engage with the fitness practise process” and are also “less likely to be appropriate in more serious cases, for example those involving dishonesty.” The Panel was satisfied that, in light of the dishonesty found proved, there are no conditions of practice that would address the identified behaviour in this case. The Panel further concluded that such an Order is not appropriate because the history of the Registrant’s total lack of engagement in this fitness to practise process did not give the Panel the necessary degree of confidence that, even if conditions of practice could be formulated, they would be complied with. It was clear to the Panel that Conditions of Practice were not an appropriate sanction in this case.

72. The Panel then considered whether a period of suspension would be an appropriate and proportionate response. It had regard to paragraph 121 of the SP which states as follows:

“A suspension order is likely to be appropriate where there are serious concerns which cannot be reasonably addressed by a conditions of practice order, but which do not require the registrant to be struck off the Register. These types of cases will typically exhibit the following factors:
• the concerns represent a serious breach of the Standards of conduct, performance and ethics;
• the registrant has insight;
• the issues are unlikely to be repeated; and

• there is evidence to suggest the registrant is likely to be able to resolve or remedy their failings.”

73. The starting point for the Panel is its finding that the Registrant’s actions were serious and deliberate. In addition, the dishonesty found proved requires a serious sanction as a matter of principle. The Panel has found that the Registrant has not shown any insight or taken steps towards remediation. It was of the view that a Suspension Order might be thought to be appropriate for a case such as this, were there to be substantial grounds for believing that the Registrant would engage in the process and be offered an opportunity to demonstrate full insight and remediation in respect of his conviction, his past misconduct and his dishonesty. The Panel, however, having given careful thought to the combination of the severity of the Registrant’s behaviour, the numerous aggravating features it had identified, and the fact of his total lack of engagement, decided that the imposition of a Suspension Order was neither appropriate nor proportionate. The public interest would not be served, and public confidence would not be advanced, by the making of a suspension order that would have no positive effect.

74. Having rejected a Suspension Order, the Panel considered paragraph 130 of the SP in relation to a Striking Off Order and noted that “this is a sanction of last resort for serious, persistent, deliberate or reckless acts involving (this list is not exhaustive): dishonesty…” and is likely to be appropriate where the registrant lacks insight or is unwilling to resolve matters. Each of those issues identified is prevalent in this case. The shortcomings identified are very serious, are liable to be repeated with an ongoing risk of harm and, in the absence of any desire by the Registrant to address them in the future, the Panel had no confidence that the risks would be diminished. The Panel concluded that, due to the nature of the conviction in this case, together with the dishonesty and lack of insight, the only appropriate and proportionate sanction consistent with the SP in this case is a Striking Off Order.

75. The Panel was mindful of the significant impact that such an Order may have on the Registrant in terms of financial, personal and professional hardship. However, the Panel determined that the protection of the public and the wider public interest outweigh the interest of the Registrant in this regard.

ORDER: The Registrar is directed to strike the name of Mr Dean Carter from the Register on the date this Order comes into effect.

Right of Appeal
You may appeal to the High Court in England and Wales against the Panel’s decision and the order it has made against you.
Under Article 29(10) of the Health Professions Order 2001, any appeal must be made within 28 days of the date when this notice is served on you. The Panel’s order will not take effect until the appeal period has expired or, if you appeal, until that appeal is disposed of or withdrawn.

Interim Order
The Panel makes an Interim Suspension Order under Article 31(2) of the Health Professions Order 2001, the same being necessary to protect members of the public and being otherwise in the public interest. This order will expire: (if no appeal is made against the Panel’s decision and Order) upon the expiry of the period during which such an appeal could be made; (if an appeal is made against the Panel’s decision and Order) the final determination of that appeal, subject to a maximum period of 18 months.

Reasons for making the Interim Order:
1. The Panel heard an application from the Presenting Officer to cover the appeal period by imposing an 18-month interim suspension order on the Registrant’s registration. She submitted that such an order is necessary to protect the public and is otherwise in the public interest.

2. The panel heard and accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor. It had careful regard to Paragraphs 133-135 of the SP and to Paragraphs 48-53 of the HCPTS Practice Note on Interim Orders (September 2024), which offers guidance on interim orders imposed at final hearings after a sanction has been imposed.

3. The Panel first considered whether it was appropriate to consider the HCPC’s application for an interim order in the absence of the Registrant.

4. The Panel concluded that it was appropriate to consider the application in the absence of the Registrant for the following reasons:

• The Registrant was informed by the Notice of this final hearing dated 25 June 2025 that, in the event of the Panel imposing a sanction that restricts his right to practise (which would include making a Striking Off Order), it may also impose an interim order which would suspend or otherwise restrict his right to practise with immediate effect.

• The Panel concluded that the information contained in the Notice of hearing afforded the Registrant an opportunity of appearing and being heard on the issue whether an interim order should be made. Accordingly, Article 31(15) of the Health Professions Order 2001 was satisfied and, subject to concluding that the matter was appropriate to be considered in the Registrant’s absence, the Panel had jurisdiction to consider the matter.

• As has been noted in the body of this determination, the Registrant has not responded to any communications from the HCPC.

• In these circumstances the Panel concluded that the clear public interest in permitting the HCPC to make an application for an interim order outweighed the absence of the Registrant, with the effect that the substance of the matter should be considered at the present time.

5. The Panel approached the application by acknowledging that the default position provided for by the relevant legislation is that there will be no restriction on a Registrant’s ability to practise while their appeal rights against the making of a substantive sanction remain outstanding. It follows that positive reasons are required to justify the making of an interim order.

6. The Panel decided to impose an interim order under Article 31(2) of the Health Professions Order 2001. It has had regard to the nature and gravity of the conduct it has found proved. In the judgment of the Panel, the risk of repetition identified in the substantive decision and the associated risk of harm that could result from repetition mean that an interim order is necessary to protect members of the public. It is also required in the wider public interest. The Panel was in no doubt that public confidence in the profession and the regulatory process would be seriously undermined were the Registrant allowed to remain in practice as a Paramedic during the appeal period.

7. The Panel considered whether there were Interim Conditions of Practice that could be imposed on an interim basis that would sufficiently address the identified public protection and public interest considerations. The conclusion of the Panel was that Interim Conditions of Practice would be neither appropriate nor workable for the same reasons as set out in the substantive determination.

8. The Panel determined that an Interim Suspension Order is required with immediate effect. The period of this order is for 18 months to allow for the possibility of an appeal to be made and determined. If no appeal is made, then the interim order will be replaced by the Striking Off Order 28 days after the Registrant is sent the decision of this hearing in writing.

History of Hearings for Dean Carter