Yuliyan S Dimov

Preliminary Matters

Service of Notice

1. The notice of this hearing was sent to the Registrant at his registered email address as it appeared in the register and by post on 18 November 2025 and to the prison address where the Registrant is being held. The notice contained the date and time of today’s hearing, confirming that it was to be held by video conference. A delivery confirmation dated 18 November 2025 has also been provided to the Panel.
2. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor and is satisfied that notice of today’s hearing has been served in accordance with Rule 6(1) of the Conduct and Competence Committee Rules 2003 (the “Rules”) including the Health and Care Professions Council (Coronavirus) (Amendment) Rules 2021.

Proceeding in the absence of the Registrant

3. The Panel then went on to consider whether to proceed in the absence of the Registrant pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules. In doing so, it considered the submissions of Ms Buckell on behalf of the HCPC.
4. Ms Buckell submitted that the HCPC has taken all reasonable steps to serve the notice on the Registrant and that correspondence had been sent to the Registrant in prison and to his home address. She further submitted that the Registrant was aware of the hearing and had voluntarily absented himself from the hearing, and he had not asked for an adjournment. The Registrant has not provided any reason for his absence.
5. She reminded the Panel that there was a public interest in this matter being dealt with expeditiously and that any adjournment would not secure the Registrant’s attendance at any future date.
6. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor. He advised that, if the Panel is satisfied that all reasonable efforts have been made to notify the Registrant of the hearing, then the Panel had the discretion to proceed in the absence of the Registrant. He advised that the discretion was to be exercised with the utmost care and caution as set out in the case of R v Jones [2002] UKHL 5.
7. The Legal Assessor also referred the Panel to the case of GMC v Adeogba and Visvardis [2016] EWCA Civ 162 and advised that the Adeogba case reminded the Panel that its primary objective is the protection of the public and of the public interest. In that regard, the case of Adeogba was clear that: “where there is good reason not to proceed, the case should be adjourned; where there is not, ... , it is only right that it should proceed….there is a burden on...all professionals subject to a regulatory regime, to engage with the regulator, both in relation to the investigation and ultimate resolution of allegations made against them. That is part of the responsibility to which they sign up when being admitted to the profession.”
8. The Panel was mindful to ensure that fairness and justice were maintained when deciding whether or not to proceed in a Registrant’s absence.
9. The Panel was satisfied that all reasonable efforts had been made by the HCPC to notify the Registrant of the hearing. It was also satisfied that the Registrant was aware of the hearing and that he had voluntarily absented himself.
10. In deciding whether to exercise its discretion to proceed in the absence of the Registrant, the Panel took into consideration the HCPC’s practice note entitled ‘Proceeding in the Absence of a Registrant’. The Panel weighed its responsibility for public protection and the expeditious disposal of the case with the Registrant’s right to a fair hearing.
11. In reaching its decision the Panel took into account the following:

• The Panel was satisfied that the Registrant had been sent Notice of this hearing together with all supporting documentation but that he had not confirmed that he wished for arrangements to be made to attend the hearing, albeit that that this would have to be done remotely from prison. The Panel notes that correspondence had been sent to the Registrant in prison and also to his home address. The Panel was therefore satisfied that the Registrant had voluntarily absented himself from this hearing;
• the Panel was not satisfied that any adjournment would secure the Registrant’s attendance;
• the Registrant has not made an application to adjourn today’s hearing; and
• there is a public interest that this matter proceeds expeditiously.

12. The Panel was therefore satisfied that the Registrant had voluntarily absented himself from the hearing. Having weighed the public interest for expedition in cases against the Registrant’s own interests, the Panel decided to proceed in the Registrant’s absence and that there was no unfairness or injustice in doing so.

Background

13. The Registrant is a registered Physiotherapist with the HCPC. At the time of the offences in question, the Registrant was acting as a masseuse for ‘Urban Massage’.
14. On 2 May 2024 the Registrant was convicted of three counts of “Assault a female 13 and over by penetration with part of body / a thing, eight counts of Sexual assault on a female, six counts of “Voyeurism – operating equipment to observe”, and two counts of “Voyeurism – Attempt to record a private act” at the Wood Green Crown Court.
15. The Registrant received a total custodial sentence of nine years and six months imprisonment. He was also made the subject of a Sexual Harm Prevention Order and a Restraining Order.
16. A copy of the certificate of conviction dated 3 October 2024 has been produced to the Panel.
17. At the time of sentencing, the Judge stated:

“They gave evidence, as in the course of massaging them you took advantage, when they were unaware that you were doing so, of photographing them without their consent; sexually assaulting them by brushing their vaginas and breasts; and in the case of two of them, you penetrated their vagina with your fingers and with your tongue. You took advantage of their vulnerability: their vulnerability being that they were alone; they were only partially clothed, just a towel covering them for most of the time, and their underpants; and, so for much of the time, also facing away from you, face down on the massage bench.

You, clearly, had a distorted and dangerous view of your role and your power, and an unjustified arrogance in assuming that you could do this to customers, and get away with it, because they would not know or they would not complain, or they would be grateful for what you were doing to them. They would not know, because they could not see what you were doing, and one complainant told us, that although she noticed that there were a large number of apparent pauses in the massage, she assumed that you were taking sips of water, not knowing, of course, that you were busy photographing her. Other customers, from your point of view, did not appear to have complained. Comments such as the complainant needing your inappropriate touching exemplified your attitude towards them and your own position. Comments such as, ‘You have the most beautiful legs’, negatived your claim not to have a sexual interest in them. As well as the gross abuse of position, the probation officer, in her report, also describes your behaviour as ‘thrill-seeking’ and ‘risk-taking’, and that was clearly evidenced by the fact that sometimes, these actions were done when other members of the victim’s family or friends, or in some cases, even children, were in another room in the same house. The evidence against you was overwhelming, from this large number of unconnected victims, who did not know each other, had no reason to make a false account.

Your account in respect of the voyeurism counts, was, frankly, a lie and a ridiculous one at that, that you had taken the pictures with consent for your Facebook business page; you wanted to show the pictures to your wife for advice to advertise on a website that you hoped to create. All the photographs were taken from behind the victims, and from the quality of the shots, quite clearly, they were taken surreptitiously. It is simply not true that you obtained consent. None of these women would have agreed to what you were doing. There was no discussion with them about the nature and purposes of the photographs. You did not offer to send them copies of the photographs afterwards, so that they could see them, or check them or confirm that they were content with them being used for public advertising purposes. And, then you sent them on to your friend, a [redacted], who was clearly not involved in the massage or physiotherapy business.

Quite apart from the similarity of the touching in each case, these complainants were unrelated, unconnected and could not have been making the same account against you, unless it was true. Words that described your behaviour included: ‘sneaky’, ‘sly’, ‘sleazy’, ‘manipulative’, as they described your movements towards their private parts, seeing just how far you could go, and in some cases, going as full as you could possibly go. No one called out, no one cried out or jumped up, but, for the most part, they froze in shock and fear, or terminated the session early, or, in one case, a complainant asked you to concentrate on a different part of her body, on her legs, rather than close to her genitalia as you appeared to have gone.

But, as far as you are concerned, none appeared to have made an official complaint, and so that, no doubt, that gave you the courage to become more brazen in your contacts, moving on, shockingly, to penetration with your finger and also your tongue. There was no explaining this away, and, so instead, you resorted to blaming the victims: , apparently wordlessly asked to be licked by you, and , I am giving just their initials, [redacted] , apparently so offended by your innocuous response to her. question as to how you liked England, your response that you were getting used to living in the UK, that she made up a serious allegation of sexual penetration by you. You had made sure, early in the encounter, to drop into conversation with her, information about your skill in martial arts. If your account was true, if you are as professional as you claimed to be, then all you had to say was, ‘No, I don’t do things like that’, if a woman ‘wordlessly’ as you have claimed, ‘pulls aside her pants to invite you to lick her exposed penis’[sic]. But, instead, your reply to the prosecutor in respect of this question, was that if you had not accepted the invitation to lick her vagina, she might have made a false claim of rape against you. That was the level of your explanation in respect of these counts.

And, in the background of this offending, and adding to the seriousness of the matter, was your notebook entries and your correspondence with [redacted], your friend, a property developer. There was no need to send him the pictures, you are an intelligent, experienced man who would know better than your wife or the property developer, what were and were not appropriate pictures for advertising websites. All you needed to do, was take a look at other businesses that were also advertising in the same area. But, your communication with the property developer was peppered with titillation and encouragement to each other, quite clearly getting sexual gratification and pleasure from your discussions. I mention this because it goes on in my consideration later on to dangerousness.

All this offending has had a serious impact on all the complainants. You have heard the prosecution read out their statements. I do not propose to read them out again. I only say this, that for all of them, the impact has been devastating and traumatising. It has also been humiliating in some circumstances.”

18. It was also alleged that the Registrant was suspended from his employment with his employer, Circle Health Group (“CHG”) following a notification from the Metropolitan Police, received by CHG, informing them that the Registrant was under investigation for allegations of sexual abuse and voyeurism.
19. It was alleged that the Registrant dishonestly failed to notify the HCPC of his suspension as soon as possible after having been suspended in breach of his obligation to do so as set out in the HCPC’s Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics.

Decision on Facts

Evidence received

20. The Panel did not hear any live evidence but it had sight of a number of documents and exhibits which included, but were not limited to:

• Statement of Lolita Eidukaite, Registrations Manager at the HCPC dated 29 September 2023;
• Statement of Rachel Murphy, Case Manager at the HCPC dated 13 January 2025; and
• Copy of the certificate of conviction; and
• The transcript of sentencing from the Crown Court.

21. No documents or representations were provided by the Registrant.

Particulars 1a, 1b, 1c and 1d

22. The Panel has been shown the certificate of conviction from the Wood Green Crown Court dated 3 October 2024 in relation to the Registrant. It sets out the offences for which the Registrant was convicted and the sentence imposed on him.
23. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor. It took into account Rule 10(1)(d) of the Rules which states that “where the registrant has been convicted of a criminal offence, a certified copy of the certificate of conviction….shall be admissible as proof of that conviction and of the findings of fact upon which it is based”. It has also taken into account the HCPC’s Practice Note on ‘Conviction and Caution Allegations’.
24. No submissions have been received by, or on behalf of the Registrant.
25. Accordingly, the Panel found the facts of the convictions proved.
26. The Panel therefore found the facts of Particulars, 1a, 1b, 1c and 1d proved.

Particular 2

27. Ms Eidukaite stated in her statement that the HCPC requires that a registrant to inform the HCPC “as soon as possible”, if they have had any restriction placed on their practice, or if they have been suspended or dismissed by an employer, because of concerns about their conduct or competence, or if they have been charged with a criminal offence. She stated that the HCPC does not provide a specific timeframe, however “as soon as possible” means the Registrant should make the HCPC aware at the soonest opportunity. This requirement is stated at section 9.5 of the HCPC’s Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics (“SCPE”), which states:

“Important information about your conduct and competence

9.5 You must tell us as soon as possible if:

– you accept a caution from the police or you have been charged with, or found guilty of, a criminal offence;

– another organisation responsible for regulating a health or social-care profession has taken action or made a finding against you; or

– you have had any restriction placed on your practice, or been suspended or dismissed by an employer, because of concerns about your conduct or competence.”

28. Ms Eidukaite stated that she had been informed by colleagues in the HCPC’s fitness to practise department and/or by Capsticks that, on 18 November 2022, the Registrant was suspended from his employment with his employer, Circle Health Group (“CHG”) following a notification from the Metropolitan Police, received by CHG, informing them that the Registrant was under investigation for allegations of sexual abuse and voyeurism. She was informed that on 16 June 2023, the Registrant was charged with eight offences under the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
29. She stated that having reviewed the HCPC’s registrations system, she could confirm that there was no record of the Registrant making a self-referral between 18 November 2022 and 24 March 2023.
30. Ms Murphy confirmed in her statement that on 18 November 2022, the Registrant was suspended from his employment with his employer, Circle Health Group (“CHG”), after they were informed by the Metropolitan Police that the Registrant was under investigation for allegations of sexual abuse and voyeurism. On 16 June 2023, Mr Dimov was charged with eight offences under the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
31. She also confirmed in her statement the obligation to inform the HCPC as set out above, and further confirmed that there was no record of the Registrant having self-referred to the HCPC.
32. No specific representations have been presented by, or on behalf of the Registrant.
33. In the circumstances the Panel was satisfied that on or after 18 November 2022, the Registrant was under an obligation to inform the HCPC as soon as possible that he had been suspended from his role as a Physiotherapist and that he failed to do so.
34. The Panel therefore found the facts of Particular 2 proved.

Particulars 3

35. Having found the facts of Particular 2 proved, the Panel then went on to consider whether the Registrant had been dishonest as alleged.
36. In considering whether the Registrant acted dishonestly, the Committee has applied the test for dishonesty as set out in Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd t/a Crockfords [2017] UKSC 67:

“When dishonesty is in question the fact-finding tribunal must first ascertain subjectively the actual state of the individual’s knowledge or belief as to the facts. The reasonableness or otherwise of his belief is a matter of evidence (often in practice determinative) going to whether he held the belief, but it is not an additional requirement that his belief must be reasonable; the question is whether it is genuinely held. When once his actual state of mind as to knowledge or belief as to facts is established, the question whether his conduct was honest or dishonest is to be determined by the fact-finder by applying the objective standards of ordinary decent people. There is no requirement that the defendant must appreciate that what he has done is, by those standards, dishonest.”

37. In considering the question of dishonesty, the Committee was mindful that, following the principle derived from the case of Ahmedsowida v GMC [2021] EWHC 3466 (Admin), recklessness cannot be equated with dishonesty.
38. In reaching its decision, the Panel was mindful that the Registrant was an experienced practitioner who would have been aware of his professional obligations to self-refer to the HCPC as set out above. It noted that the Registrant failed to notify the HCPC of his suspension despite a significant period of time having elapsed when he had the opportunity to do so, before the HCPC was eventually notified of his suspension many months later by his former employer.
39. The Panel noted that the Registrant attempted to conceal his conduct from service users, for example by photographing them from a position where he could not be seen. In addition, the sentencing Judge recognised that the Registrant’s behaviour had been described as ‘risk-taking’.
40. The Panel concluded that it was a proper inference to draw that, in all the circumstances, it was more likely than not that the Registrant failed to self-refer to the HCPC as alleged to intentionally conceal the fact of his suspension from his regulator when he knew he was required to do so.
41. The Panel concluded that by failing to self-refer in those circumstance, to conceal his suspension, would be considered dishonest by ordinary decent people.
42. The Panel therefore found that the Registrant behaved dishonestly as alleged and therefore found the facts of particular 3 proved.

Decision on Statutory Ground:

Conviction

43. The Panel next considered this statutory ground. The Panel heard and accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor.
44. The Panel has had regard to Article 22 of the Health Professions Order which states that:

This article applies where any allegation is made against a registrant to the effect that:

(a)      his fitness to practise is impaired by reason of—

(i)       ….,

(ii)      ….,

(iii)       a conviction or caution in the United Kingdom for a criminal offence, or a conviction elsewhere for an offence which, if committed in England and Wales, would constitute a criminal offence,

45. Because this is a conviction case in part, and the Panel has been provided with the memorandum of conviction, and has found the fact of the convictions proved, the Panel found this statutory ground is made out.

Decision on Impairment

46. The Panel then went on to consider whether those matters found proved at Particulars 2 and 3 amounted to misconduct, and if so, whether the Registrant’s fitness to practise is currently impaired by reason of his misconduct and convictions.

HCPC Submissions

47. The Panel was referred to the HCPTS’s Practice Note ‘Fitness to Practise Impairment’ and, in particular, to the personal and public components set out within the note.
48. Ms Buckell invited the Panel to conclude that the Registrant had breached standards 9, 9.1 and 9.5 (set out above) of the HCPC “Standards of conduct, performance and ethics” (2016):

Standard 9: Be honest and trustworthy;

Standard 9.1: You must make sure that your conduct justifies the public’s trust and confidence in you and your profession.

Personal component

49. Ms Buckell submitted that the Registrant’s conduct amounted to a serious falling short of the standard expected of him, and invited the Panel to have regard to the impact the Registrant’s conduct had had on the relevant service users. Such conduct, she submitted, had clearly caused patient harm and further, that his convictions would undoubtedly undermine public confidence in the profession.
50. Ms Buckell submitted that there was no evidence before the Panel in relation to the Registrant’s insight or remedial action that he has taken. As such, she submitted, the risk of the Registrant repeating his criminal behaviour was extremely high.
51. Ms Buckell also submitted that in relation to the Registrant’s dishonesty, given the lack of demonstrable insight, remorse or remediation, there was a similarly high risk of repetition of his dishonest conduct in the future.
52. For these reasons, she submitted that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is impaired on the personal component of impairment both in relation to his convictions and his misconduct.

Public component

53. In relation to the public component, Ms Buckell submitted that the nature of the Registrant’s criminal behaviour presented a significant risk to service users and colleagues.
54. She submitted that the Registrant displayed an attitudinal concern which could place patients at risk of harm in the future. Given the underlying facts and the lack of demonstrable insight or steps towards remediation, the nature of the harm could be severe as evidenced in the Judge’s sentencing remarks.
55. Ms Buckell therefore submitted that the Registrant is impaired on both the personal and public components of impairment in relation to both his convictions and his misconduct.

Registrant’s submissions

56. No submissions have been received by or on behalf of the Registrant.

Panel’s decision on impairment

57. In reaching its decision, the Panel had regard to all the evidence before it. It took account of the submissions of Ms Buckell on behalf of the HCPC and the Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor.
58. On the basis of the facts found proved at Particulars 2 and 3, the Panel went on to consider whether the Registrant’s conduct amounted to misconduct. It took into account all the evidence received together with the submissions made by Ms Buckell on behalf of the HCPC.
59. In considering this matter, the Panel exercised its own judgement. The Panel also took into account the public interest, which includes protection of the public, maintenance of public confidence in the profession, and the declaring and upholding of proper standards of conduct and behaviour.
60. When considering whether the facts found proved at Particulars 2 and 3 amounted to misconduct, the Panel noted that not all breaches of the HCPC’s “Standards of performance, conduct and ethics” need amount to a finding of misconduct. However, any instance of dishonesty was likely to impair a registrant’s fitness to practise and it would be unusual where this is not found to be the case.
61. The Panel heard and accepted the advice of the Legal Assessorwho reminded the Panel of the meaning prescribed to misconduct in the case of Roylance v General Medical Council (No 2) [2000] 1 A.C. 311, in which it was said:

“Misconduct is a word of general effect, involving some act or omission which falls short of what would be proper in the circumstances. The standard of propriety may often be found by reference to the rules and standards ordinarily required to be followed by a … practitioner in the particular circumstances. The misconduct is qualified in two respects. First, it is qualified by the word ‘professional’ which links the misconduct to the profession ... Secondly, the misconduct is qualified by the word ‘serious’. It is not any professional misconduct which will qualify. The professional misconduct must be serious.”

62. In Nandi v GMC [2004] EWHC 2317 (Admin) the Court referred to Roylance where the Court described misconduct as “a falling short by omission or commission of the standards of conduct expected among medical practitioners, and such falling short must be serious” such that it would be “regarded as deplorable by fellow practitioners”.
63. The Panel adopted a two-step process in its consideration. Firstly, the Panel considered whether the facts found proved amounted to misconduct. Secondly, and only if the facts proved were found to amount to misconduct, the Panel would go on to consider whether the Registrant’s fitness to practise is currently impaired as a result of that misconduct.
64. Given the Panel’s findings in relation to the facts found proved, relating as they did to findings of dishonesty, it concluded that the Registrant breached standards 9, 9.1 and 9.5 of the HCPC’s “Standards of conduct, performance and ethics”.
65. Physiotherapists are expected at all times to act in a professional manner. They must make sure that their conduct at all times justifies both service users’ and the public’s trust in the profession.
66. However, the Panel was mindful that a finding of misconduct did not necessarily follow as a result.
67. The Panel carefully considered the seriousness of the Registrant’s failings. In doing so, it identified that the Registrant acted dishonestly to his regulator to conceal his alleged wrongdoing by failing to self-refer to the HCPC when required to do so. Such dishonest concealment had the potential to undermine the HCPC’s ability to carry out its regulatory function.
68. Having heard and accepted the advice received from the Legal Assessor and for the reasons set out above, the Panel concluded that the matters found proved and subsequent breaches of the HCPC’s “Standards of conduct, performance and ethics”, were sufficiently serious departures from the standards expected of a Physiotherapist as to amount to misconduct.
69. The Panel therefore found that the Registrant’s conduct as found proved at Particulars 2 and 3 amounted to misconduct. Honesty is a fundamental quality expected of registered Physiotherapists and any failing to adhere to that principle is likely to have a significant detrimental effect on public confidence in the profession.
70. In relation to the Registrant’s convictions, the Panel was mindful that its role was not to go behind the conviction nor was it to seek to retry the criminal case. Rather, its task was to determine whether the Registrant’s fitness to practise is impaired, based upon the nature, circumstances and gravity of the criminal offence concerned. The Panel considered whether the Registrant’s actions had brought the Physiotherapist profession into disrepute or had undermined public confidence in that profession.
71. The Legal Assessor also advised the Panel that it should bear in mind the principle of public protection in its broadest sense. The Panel was advised that it could take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the criminal convictions.
72. The Panel has had regard to the sentence imposed, but has also borne in mind that the sentence imposed is not necessarily a good indicator of the seriousness of the offence when considered in a regulatory context in terms of maintaining public confidence in the profession. This is because the prime consideration of regulatory tribunals is the protection of the public and of the wider public interest. As Dame Janet Smith noted in the Fifth Shipman Inquiry Report,

“The fact that the court has imposed a very low penalty or even none at all should not lead the [regulator] to the conclusion that the case is not serious in the context of [its own] proceedings The role of the [regulator] in protecting [service users] involves different considerations from those taken into account by the criminal courts when passing sentence. What may well appear relatively trivial in the context of general criminal law may be quite serious in the context of [professional] practice.”

73. In considering the above case law, the Panel was mindful that both the sentence and the Judge’s sentencing remarks reflected serious offending by the Registrant.
74. The Panel then went on to consider whether the Registrant’s fitness to practise was impaired by reason of his convictions and misconduct.
75. In considering whether the Registrant’s fitness to practise is currently impaired, the Panel adopted the approach formulated by Dame Janet Smith in her Fifth report of the Shipman inquiry by asking itself the following questions:

“Does the Registrant’s conviction, and the facts relating to the conviction show that his fitness to practise is impaired in the sense that he:

1. has in the past acted and/or is liable in the future to act so as to put a patient or patients at unwarranted risk of harm; and/or
2. has in the past brought and/or is liable in the future to bring the profession into disrepute; and/or
3. has in the past breached and/or is liable in the future to breach one of the fundamental tenets of the profession and/or
4. has in the past acted dishonestly and/or is liable to act dishonestly in the future”

76. The Panel considered the personal component of impairment and considered the issues of insight and remediation. It noted that the Registrant has not provided any evidence of demonstrable insight or steps he has taken to address his offending and dishonest conduct. In any event, the Panel considered that the Registrant’s behaviour, relating as it did to repeated instances of sexual assault, voyeurism and also dishonesty is extremely difficult to remediate, and there was no evidence before the Panel that he has done so.
77. Such failures had to be viewed in the context of premeditated, deliberate sexual assaults towards a number of females who had placed their trust in the Registrant to provide legitimate massage services. The Panel noted the significant emotional impact that the Registrant’s behaviour had on the females involved. The Panel concluded that his criminal behaviour was demonstrative of a deep-rooted attitudinal behavioural issue which took place within his clinical practice with vulnerable service users.
78. The Panel therefore concluded that the Registrant posed an ongoing risk of harm to members of the public. The Registrant had breached fundamental tenets of the profession, namely that it is incumbent on members of the profession to behave lawfully and honestly. By failing to do so, his behaviour also brings the profession into disrepute.
79. Given the nature and extent of the Registrant’s offending relating as it did to serious sexual assaults which included penetration, the Panel found that paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) are all relevant in this case. In relation to Particulars 2 and 3, the Panel also found that paragraph (d) was additionally engaged, noting the absence of demonstrable evidence of the Registrant’s contrition, insight or remediation of his dishonest behaviour.
80. The Panel therefore determined that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is currently impaired by reason of his convictions and misconduct on the personal component of impairment.
81. The Panel then considered the public component of impairment.
82. The Panel has borne in mind the overarching objective of fitness to practise proceedings in that it should consider, not only the need to protect the public, but the need to uphold the reputation of the profession and to declare and uphold proper standards of conduct and behaviour. In doing so, the Panel has borne in mind the comments of Mrs Justice Cox in the case of CHRE v NMC and Grant [2011] EWHC 927 (Admin) where Mrs Justice Cox noted:

“In determining whether a practitioner’s fitness to practise is impaired by reason of misconduct, the relevant panel should generally consider not only whether the practitioner continues to present a risk to members of the public in his or her current role, but also whether the need to uphold professional standards and public confidence in the profession would be undermined if a finding of impairment were not made in the particular circumstances.”

83. Given the nature and seriousness of the offences committed by the Registrant as set out above, and those features identified by the sentencing Judge, the Panel concluded that the Registrant’s conduct fell far below the standard expected of him. The Panel considered that a right-minded member of the public, hearing all of the circumstances and evidence of the case, relating to deliberate and repeated sexual assaults, and then dishonestly concealing his suspension from work from his regulator, would consider that this case necessitated a finding of current impairment if public confidence in the profession and in the regulatory process is to be maintained.
84. The Panel therefore determined that the serious nature of the convictions, together with his dishonest misconduct, was such that the need to uphold professional standards and public confidence in the professions would be seriously undermined if a finding of impairment were not made. Therefore, the Panel determined that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is also currently impaired by reason of his convictions and misconduct on the public component of impairment.

Decision on Sanction

Submissions

85. Ms Buckell drew the Panel’s attention to the HCPC’s Sanctions Policy (“Sanctions Policy”) which contains particular sections on dishonesty, sexual misconduct and criminal convictions. Ms Buckell made no specific submission as to which was the appropriate sanction to impose, but stated that it remained a matter for the Panel.
86. Paragraph 85 of the Sanctions Policy refers to registrants on the sex offender’s register, saying ‘A panel should normally regard it as incompatible with the HCPC’s obligation to protect the public to allow a registrant to remain in or return to unrestricted practice while they are on the sex offenders’ database.’
87. She referred to paragraph 130 of the Sanctions Guidance which indicated that a sanction of a striking off order may be appropriate for cases of criminal convictions for serious offences and dishonesty.
88. She referred the Panel to the case of CHRE v GDC and Fleischmann [2005] EWHC 87 (Admin) reminding the Panel that it did not amount to a test to be applied.
89. In addition, when considering which sanction to impose in this case, she invited the Panel to consider the following aggravating factors:

• The Registrants criminal behaviour amounted to a significant abuse of his position of trust, relating to premeditated and repeated sexual assaults which became increasingly more brazen;
• The deliberate nature of the Registrant’s dishonesty;
• The Registrant has not provided any evidence of reflection, remorse remediation or insight for his actions.

90. Ms Buckell identified, in relation to mitigating factors, that the Registrant has no previous regulatory findings.

Registrant’s submissions

91. No submissions have been received by or on behalf of the Registrant.

Decision

92. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor. He advised the Panel that the full range of sanctions is available to it as this was a case involving a criminal conviction, and he reminded the Panel that it was not to go behind the conviction. He advised the Panel that it should bear in mind its duty to protect members of the public and also the public interest which includes maintaining and declaring proper standards of conduct and behaviour, maintaining the reputation of the profession, and maintaining public confidence in the profession and the regulatory process.
93. He advised that, whilst the Panel was entitled to take into consideration the sentence that the Criminal Court imposed upon the Registrant, the sentence imposed is not necessarily a good indicator of the seriousness of the matter in the context of regulatory proceedings. That was because the prime considerations that apply in regulatory proceedings were:
    1. Protection of the Public;
    2. Reputational harm to the profession;
    3. Public confidence in the profession and the regulatory process; and
    4. Relevant professional standards of behaviour and the seriousness of any departure from those standards.
94. The Legal Assessor drew the Panel’s attention to the case of CHRE v GDC and Fleischmann (2005) EWHC 87 and the general principle that where a practitioner had been convicted of a serious criminal offence, he should not be permitted to resume [his] practice until [he] has satisfactorily completed his sentence. The Legal Assessor advised the Panel that as such, it should take into consideration the facts of the offence in question and determine whether or not it was a serious criminal offence. He advised that the seriousness of a criminal offence is not necessarily determined by the type of sentence imposed, but can also be determined by the circumstances of the offending behaviour. These are factors that can affect the reputation of the profession.
95. The Legal Assessor advised the Panel that it was entitled to take into consideration factors that it considered to be aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the criminal offence when deciding what sanction would be sufficient in the public interest.
96. The Legal Assessor advised the Panel that any sanction it imposes must be the least restrictive sanction that is sufficient to protect the public and the public interest. It should take into consideration the aggravating and mitigating factors in the case. He reminded the Panel that the purpose of a sanction is not punitive, although it may have that effect. He advised the Panel that it should consider any sanction in ascending order and to apply the least restrictive sanction necessary to protect the public and the public interest.

Panel’s consideration and determination

97. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor and had due regard to the Sanctions Policy with particular reference to those paragraphs on dishonesty, breach of trust, convictions and sexual misconduct. The Panel has considered any aggravating and mitigating factors and has borne in mind the principle of proportionality.
98. The Panel identified the following aggravating factors:
    • the Registrant had been convicted of 19 serious criminal offences in relation to sexual assault, including by penetration and voyeurism in relation to multiple service users, which the Panel concluded represented significant predatory behaviour;
    • the offences were deliberate and premeditated and amounted to a significant breach of trust;
    • the Registrant’s offending caused significant emotional harm to the service users involved as reflected in the Judge’s sentencing remarks; and
    • the Registrant has not demonstrated any meaningful remorse, insight into his behaviour since his convictions and there is no evidence before the Panel that the Registrant has remediated his behaviour or addressed his discovered conduct.
99. The Panel identified the following mitigating factor:
    • The Registrant has a previous good regulatory history but attached minimal weight to this in light of the significant aggravating factors identified.
100. The Panel reminded itself that if a registrant has been convicted of serious criminal offences and is still serving his sentence at the time the matter comes before a panel, normally the Panel should not permit the registrant to resume their practice until that sentence has been satisfactorily completed CHRE v GDC and Fleischmann (2005) EWHC 87. The Panel noted that the Registrant is still subject to a prison sentence and remains subject to registration on the sex offenders’ register. The Panel could not therefore see any good reason to depart from the above principle.
101. The Panel first considered taking no action but concluded that, given the seriousness of the criminal offences committed, and the nature of his dishonest misconduct, this would be wholly inappropriate and inadequate given the wider public interest of maintaining confidence in both the profession and the regulatory process. Such an outcome was therefore neither appropriate nor proportionate in the circumstances.
102. The Panel next considered mediation, but having had due regard to the circumstances of this case, such an outcome was inappropriate to address the issues identified in this case. It therefore concluded that this was not an appropriate outcome.
103. The Panel then considered whether to impose a Caution Order and had regard to paragraphs 99 - 102 of the Sanctions Policy as to when such an order might be appropriate. The Panel determined that the circumstances of the criminal offences and misconduct are such that a Caution Order is also not appropriate to meet the public interest concerns identified for the same reason as set out above.
104. The Panel next considered the imposition of a Conditions of Practice Order and had regard to paragraphs 105 - 117 of the Sanctions Policy. The Panel has had regard to the fact that there are no concerns with the Registrant’s practice or competency as a Physiotherapist. However, the nature and seriousness of the criminal offences makes a Conditions of Practice Order inappropriate as a sanction. A Conditions of Practice Order, which focusses on the need to remedy practice deficiencies, would not be appropriate or relevant to the facts of this case. In any event, such a sanction would be wholly unworkable and impracticable given the Registrant’s lack of engagement with the regulatory process and his current lengthy term of imprisonment.
105. The Panel then considered whether a period of suspension would be a sufficient and proportionate response. It had regard to paragraphs 118-121 of the Sanctions Policy.
106. The Panel bore in mind the findings it had already made, namely that the Registrant has been convicted of serious criminal offences, and has acted dishonestly towards his regulator, and has identified the need to protect the public and public interest. There was no demonstrable evidence before the Panel that the Registrant has developed insight or remediated his failings and the Panel has concluded that there remains a significant risk of his behaviour being repeated. Having done so, it concluded that such a sanction would be inadequate to protect the public and maintain a proper degree of confidence in the profession and the regulatory process, and to declare and maintain proper standards among fellow professionals.
107. The Panel therefore went on to consider striking the Registrant’s name off the HCPC Register of Physiotherapists. It had regard to paragraphs 127-132 of the Sanctions Policy. The Panel took into account the impact that such an order would have on the Registrant in terms of his finances and his reputation, noting that the Registrant is currently serving a lengthy prison sentence.
108. In reaching its decision, the Panel had particular regard to paragraphs 82 and 85 of the Sanctions Policy.

“82. Where a registrant has been convicted of a serious criminal offence, and is still serving a sentence at the time the matter comes before a panel, normally the panel should not allow the registrant to resume unrestricted practice until that sentence has been satisfactorily completed.

85. Although inclusion on the sex offenders’ database is not a punishment, it does serve to protect the public from those who have committed certain types of offences. A panel should normally regard it as incompatible with the HCPC’s obligation to protect the public to allow a registrant to remain in or return to unrestricted practice while they are on the sex offenders’ database.”
86. Having done so, it concluded that the Registrant’s dishonesty and convictions were for conduct that was fundamentally incompatible with remaining on the register. The Panel concluded that the nature and gravity of the Registrant’s convictions, and aggravating factors identified, was such that only a Striking Off Order would be sufficient to protect the public and maintain and declare proper standards of conduct and behaviour, to maintain the reputation of the profession, and to maintain public confidence in the profession.
87. In the light of the above, the Panel is satisfied that the appropriate and proportionate sanction is a Striking-Off Order.

Order:  That the Registrar is directed to strike the name of Mr Yuliyan Dimov from the Physiotherapist part of the Register on the date this order comes into effect.

Interim Order:

1. Ms Buckell made an application for an Interim Suspension Order for the maximum period of 18 months to cover the 28 day appeal period and the time that might be required to conclude any appeal. She reminded the Panel of its powers pursuant to Article 31(2) of the Health Professions Order 2001.
2. The application was made on the basis of the serious nature of the Registrant’s offending and in light of the Panel’s finding of dishonesty. She submitted that an interim order should be put in place as it was necessary to protect the public and that it was otherwise in the public interest. She submitted that the appropriate interim order to be imposed was one of an interim suspension order.
3. Having accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor who made reference to the case of Sanusi v General Medical Council [2019] EWCA Civ 1172, the Panel decided that it was fair and appropriate to proceed and hear the application in the absence of the Registrant. The Registrant was advised in the Notice of Hearing dated 18 November 2025 that an application for an interim order might be made. There was nothing to indicate that the Registrant wished to make submissions in relation to this application, and the Panel concluded that it was in the public interest to proceed in the Registrant’s absence and that there was no unfairness or injustice to the Registrant in doing so.
4. Having heard submissions from Ms Buckell, on behalf of the HCPC and having taken advice from the Legal Assessor, the Panel determined that for the reasons set out in its determination on impairment and sanction, and the ongoing risks identified, that an interim order was necessary to protect the public and was otherwise in the public interest.
5. The Panel did not consider that the risks in this case could be addressed by an Interim Conditions of Practice Order because of its earlier conclusions that conditions would not be appropriate or sufficient to protect the public or the public interest.
6. The Panel therefore imposed an Interim Suspension Order, for a period of eighteen months under Article 31(2) of the Health Professions Order 2001, the same being necessary to protect members of the public and being otherwise in the public interest. An 18 month Interim Suspension Order was required to cover the appeal period, should this decision be appealed.
7. This order will expire: (if no appeal is made against the Panel’s decision and Order) upon the expiry of the period during which such an appeal could be made; (if an appeal is made against the Panel’s decision and Order) the final determination of that appeal, subject to a maximum period of 18 months.

History of Hearings for Yuliyan S Dimov