​​Bonita Pryce-Green​

Preliminary Matters
Proceeding in private
1.     During the course of the Registrant’s evidence, she raised issues relating to her personal circumstances existing at the time of the conviction. As a consequence, the Panel considered whether or not those parts of her evidence should be heard in private. Ms Patel did not object to those parts of the Registrant’s evidence relating to her private life being heard in private.
2.     Having heard and accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor, the Panel was satisfied that any references to the Registrant’s sensitive and personal life should be heard in private. It was satisfied that such a course was justified in order to protect the Registrant’s private life.

Admissions
3.     On 23 March 2026, at the outset of the hearing, the Registrant made formal admissions to a number of the charges as set out below. She had also previously, on 19 May 2025, completed and signed the HCPC’s notice to admit those same charges as follows:
As a registered Occupational Therapist (OT82176):

1. On 11 February 2022 you were convicted at Bromley Magistrates’ Court of driving a motor vehicle after consuming so much alcohol that the proportion of it in your (C) breath, namely 63 (F) microgrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres of breath, exceeded the prescribed limit. Contrary to section 5(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and schedule 2 to the Road Traffic Offences Act 1988.

2. On 3 October 2023, you completed the application form to renew your registration with the Health and Care Professions Council (HCPC) and answered “no” in response to the question “change relating to good character?”.

3. You did not inform the HCPC as soon as possible that you had been charged with the offence set out in Particular 1 above.

4. You did not inform the HCPC as soon as possible that you had been convicted of the offence set out in Particular 1 above.

5. You did not inform your employer as soon as possible that you had been convicted of the offence set out in Particular 1 above.

4.     The Panel was satisfied that that although the Registrant was unrepresented, she understood the nature and consequences of the admissions that she was making and that her admissions were unequivocal. In light of this, the Panel was satisfied that it could accept those admissions and find those particulars proved, without the HCPC having to call evidence to prove them. The Panel therefore found particulars 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 proved.

Background

5.     The Registrant is a registered Occupational Therapist. She was employed by the Complete Education Solution Group (TCES) initially through an agency from 31 August 2021 to 30 September 2021, and subsequently as a direct employee from 1 October 2021 to 19 April 2024, when she left her employment.
6.     On or around 23 January 2022, the Registrant was arrested by the police on suspicion of driving with excess alcohol. She was subsequently charged and on 11 February 2022, the Registrant was convicted of driving a motor vehicle after consuming so much alcohol that the proportion of it in her breath, namely 63 microgrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres of breath, exceeded the legal limit, contrary to section 5(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and schedule 2 to the Road Traffic Offences Act 1988. The legal limit is 35 microgrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres of breath.
7.     In September 2023, the Registrant was asked by her employer to re-submit her Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) certificate. This process was asked of all employees at TCES every two years.
 
8.     On 3 October 2023, the Registrant renewed her registration with the HCPC as part of the registration renewal process which occurs every two years and did not disclose her conviction.
9.     On 13 October 2023, the Registrant’s employer received notification about a change on the Registrant’s DBS. It was then discovered that the Registrant had been arrested, charged and convicted between January to February 2022.
10. It is alleged that at no point did the Registrant disclose her conviction to her employer or the HCPC until she applied for a new DBS certificate as part of her employment.
11. On 1 November 2023, the Registrant made a self-referral to the HCPC.
Decision on Facts
12. In light of the Registrant’s admissions to particulars 1 to 5, the HCPC did not call any witnesses, but relied on the following witnesses and accompanying exhibits, which included:
·       Witness statement of DC, Head of Clinical and Therapy Services of TCES, who was the Registrant’s employer at the material time;
·       Witness statement of HM, an Operations Manager at the HCPC Registrations Department;
·       Witness statement of AU, an Operations Manager at the HCPC Fitness to Practise Department;
·       An extract of the HCPC guidance on making declarations, showing the hyperlinks for further information;
·       An extract of the HCPC guidance on making a self-referral, showing the hyperlinks for further information; and 
·       A copy of the Code of Conduct;

13. The Registrant gave evidence to the Panel and had also provided personal statements dated 28 July 2024 and March 2026, as well as three character references.
14. The Panel heard and accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor. She advised that the burden and standard of proof was on the HCPC and that the standard of proof required was the civil standard, namely whether it was more likely than not that the alleged facts occurred. In relation to dishonesty, the Legal Assessor advised in accordance with the cases of Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd t/a Crockfords [2017] UKSC 67 (on appeal from [2016] EWCA Civ 1093), Barton and Booth v R [2020] EWCA Criminal 575 and Uddin v GMC [2012] EWHC 1763 (Admin). The Legal Assessor advised that the Registrant was entitled to modified good character advice, as although she had a conviction for driving with excess alcohol, it was not an offence of dishonesty.
15. The Panel considered all of the evidence, including the Registrant’s oral evidence on oath, as well as the closing submissions from both parties.

Particular 6
Your conduct in relation to Particular 2, 3, 4, and/or 5 was dishonest in that:
a. You knew you were required to inform the HCPC as soon as possible on being charged with and/or convicted of an offence;

16. The Panel finds particular 6.a not proved.
17. The Panel had regard to the objective HCPC evidence before it, which demonstrated that the Registrant had not informed the HCPC of her conviction for driving with excess alcohol until she made a self-referral to the HCPC on 21 November 2023. It noted that the Registrant was charged with the offence of driving with excess alcohol on 23 January 2022, and pleaded guilty to and was convicted of the offence on 11 February 2022. The Panel was satisfied that the Registrant’s self-referral was not made as soon as possible on being charged with and convicted of the offence.
18. In accordance with the legal advice, the Panel first considered the Registrant’s state of mind, in particular her knowledge and belief of the circumstances existing at the time. 
19. The Panel had regard to the Registrant’s evidence on oath. It considered her to be an honest witness who was trying her best to assist the Panel, albeit at times her evidence was confusing. This was particularly the case as she tried to articulate her understanding of her professional obligations at the time in contrast to her understanding of them now.
20. The Registrant described to the Panel the challenging personal circumstances that she was facing in her personal life at the time leading up to her committing the offence of drink driving and through to her being convicted of that offence. The Panel noted that there was some support for her account within the witness statement of Mr DC to the effect that the Registrant told him of challenging personal circumstances existing at the time. The Panel considered that this confirmed that the Registrant was not subsequently relying on circumstances which she had not raised at the time. The Panel accepted the Registrant’s evidence in this regard [redacted].
21. In relation to Particular 2 and completing the HCPC renewal form in May 2023, the Panel understood the Registrant’s position to be that, at the time, she did not appreciate that the road traffic offence of driving with excess alcohol was regarded as a criminal offence. She had thought, wrongly, that there was a distinction between road traffic offences and criminal offences and that such a conviction would not effectively mean a change to her character.
22. In relation to particulars 2 and 3, in not informing the HCPC of the charge or conviction as soon as possible, the Panel understood the Registrant’s position to be that until the DBS form came through, she had not understood that the conviction would appear on the DBS form as a criminal offence. The Registrant said she was surprised to see it recorded on the DBS form as such, but once she had seen it and spoken to her employer, that was when she became aware that the conviction was disclosable. Having been so advised by her employer, she then made the self-referral to the HCPC straightaway.
23. The Panel noted that the Registrant had qualified as an Occupational Therapist in 2020. The renewal form she completed in October 2023 was the first occasion on which she had completed a renewal form, albeit she would have completed the initial application form for registration. The Panel noted that the wording in the renewal form itself under “Professional Declaration” asked “Change relating to good character?” The Registrant had selected “No”. The Registrant’s evidence was to the effect that she did not consider that there had been a change to her character as she was a diligent practitioner trying to do the best for service users. The Registrant accepted that there was HCPC guidance on the website regarding making character declarations, but she had not taken the time to read it and had completed the form from a layman’s standpoint rather than that of a professional. The Registrant accepted that she should have taken more care in completing the form and to look on the hyperlinks. 
24. The Panel considered that the Registrant had not long qualified before she committed the offence and she herself accepted in evidence that she would have had lectures at university on her HCPC obligations. The Panel also considered that there would have been HCPC guidance available for the Registrant to access regarding her professional obligations and what may affect a registrant’s character and what needed to be disclosed to the HCPC.
25. In all the circumstances, the Panel was of the view that the Registrant should have been aware that the charge and subsequent conviction for driving with excess alcohol were matters which required declaring to the HCPC as soon as possible and that she should have answered the renewal form character declaration “yes” in answer to whether there had been a change to her character. 
26. However, the question for the Panel was not whether the Registrant should have known that she was required to inform the HCPC of the charge and conviction as soon as possible. The question for the Panel was whether the Registrant did, in fact, know that she was required to inform the HCPC of the charge and resulting conviction for driving with excess alcohol as soon as possible. The Panel noted that the case of Ivey v Genting Casinos (above) did not require the Registrant’s knowledge or belief to be reasonable, it required that the belief was genuinely held.
27. The Panel considered that the evidence demonstrated, and the Registrant accepted, that she had been careless about and ignorant of her professional obligations regarding required disclosures to the HCPC at the time. The Panel considered that the Registrant had been negligent in respect of finding out and following her professional obligations at the time, in part contributed to by her challenging personal circumstances at the time. Having considered the Registrant’s state of mind as to her genuine knowledge and belief of the facts, the Panel considered that the HCPC had not discharged the burden of proving that the Registrant knew she was required to inform the HCPC of the charge and subsequent conviction as soon as possible.
28. Given that the Panel was not satisfied that the Registrant’s actions were more than a negligent mistake as to her professional obligations, it did not consider that by the standards of ordinary and decent people, such a negligent mistake would be regarded as dishonest.

Particular 6
Your conduct in relation to Particular 2, 3, 4, and/or 5 was dishonest in that:
b. You knew you were required to inform your employer as soon as possible on being convicted of an offence;

29. The Panel finds particular 6.b not proved.
30. The Panel had regard to the objective HCPC evidence before it, which demonstrated that the Registrant had not informed her employer of her conviction for driving with excess alcohol until after receipt of the DBS, in October 2023, detailing that the Registrant had been convicted on 11 February 2022. The employer’s witness statement stated that at that point a risk assessment was initiated and the Registrant was advised to make a referral to the HCPC, which she did on 1 November 2023. The employer’s witness statement stated that the Registrant was advised that if there was a reoccurrence of similar conduct, a formal disciplinary meeting would be held, but no further action was taken.
31. The Panel noted that the Registrant was charged with the offence of driving with excess alcohol on 23 January 2022. She pleaded guilty to and was convicted of the offence on 11 February 2022. The Panel was satisfied that the Registrant did not inform her employer as soon as possible on being charged with and convicted of the offence.
32. In accordance with the legal advice, the Panel first considered the Registrant’s state of mind, in particular her knowledge and belief of the circumstances existing at the time. 
33. The Panel again bore in mind the Registrant’s evidence regarding her challenging personal circumstances existing at the time. It also considered that she struggled to articulate and distinguish between what she understood she needed to inform her employer of at the time, and what she now appreciated she must inform her employer of. Although the Registrant confirmed that she had read her employment contract and the employer staff handbook at the time, the Panel was not provided with a copy of those documents so as to see the precise wording of what an employee was required to make an employer aware of.
34. The Panel again understood the Registrant’s position to be that she had not understood that the nature of the conviction for driving with excess alcohol was that of a criminal conviction and that her challenging personal circumstances had impacted on her decision making and diligence in informing herself of the disclosures which were required of her as an employee of TCES. 
35. In all the circumstances, the Panel was of the view that the Registrant should have been aware that the conviction for driving with excess alcohol was a matter which she was required to declare to her employer as soon as possible. However, the question for the Panel again, was whether the Registrant knew that she was required to inform her employer of the conviction for an offence of driving with excess alcohol.
36. The Panel considered that the evidence demonstrated, and the Registrant accepted, that she had been careless about and ignorant of the contractual requirements regarding disclosures to her employer at the time. The Panel considered that the Registrant had been negligent in respect of finding out and following her contractual requirements, in part contributed to by her challenging personal circumstances at the time. The Panel noted that the Registrant had been working within a school setting at the time and said she had told some staff informally, albeit she accepted that she had not informed her employer, TCES. Having considered the Registrant’s state of mind as to her genuine knowledge and belief of the facts, the Panel considered that the HCPC had not discharged the burden of proving that the Registrant knew she was required to inform her employer of the conviction as soon as possible.
37. Given that the Panel was not satisfied that the Registrant’s actions were more than a negligent mistake as to her disclosure obligations to her employer, it did not consider that by the standards of ordinary and decent people, such a negligent mistake would be regarded as dishonest.

Particular 6
Your conduct in relation to Particular 2, 3, 4, and/or 5 was dishonest in that:
c. You sought to conceal your charge and/or conviction from the HCPC and/or your employer.

38. The Panel finds particular 6.c not proved.
39. The Panel had regard to its decision and reasons on particulars 6.a and 6.b, to the effect that it was not satisfied that the HCPC had discharged the burden of proving that the Registrant’s actions were more than a negligent mistake as to her disclosure obligations to either the HCPC or her employer. In such circumstances, the Panel was not satisfied that the Registrant had actively sought to conceal the charge or conviction from either the HCPC or her employer.
40. In light of this, the Panel did not consider that the Registrant’s actions would be considered dishonest by the standards of ordinary and decent people.

Decision on Grounds
Statutory ground of conviction
41. The Panel was satisfied that the conviction for driving with excess alcohol amounted to the statutory ground of conviction by which a registrant’s fitness to practise may be impaired.
Statutory ground of misconduct
42. Ms Patel, on behalf of the HCPC, submitted that the admitted facts found proved at particulars 2, 3, 4 and 5 were sufficiently serious to amount to the statutory ground of misconduct. She submitted that although the Panel had not found the Registrant’s conduct to be dishonest, the non-disclosure of the conviction to both her employer and the HCPC was nevertheless serious. She submitted that the Registrant had breached Standards 9.1, 9.2 and 9.5 of the HCPC Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics 2016 (the Standards) and Standards 2.2 and 3.1 of the HCPC Standards of Proficiency in force for Occupational Therapists at the time (2013).
43. The Registrant, having previously admitted to failing to disclose the conviction to her employer and the HCPC, did not advance any argument that the admitted conduct did not amount to misconduct.
44. The Panel heard and accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor. In relation to misconduct, she advised the Panel in respect of a number of cases, including Roylance v GMC (No. 2) [2000] 1 AC 311. The Legal Assessor advised that for conduct to amount to misconduct, it must fall short of what would be expected in the circumstances and that such a falling short must be serious and fall far below the expected standards. The Legal Assessor advised that the question of whether or not the facts found proved amounted to misconduct as alleged, was a matter for the Panel’s professional judgement.
45. The Panel considered that particulars 2, 3, 4 and 5 were closely interlinked as they related to the non-disclosure of required relevant information to the Regulator and the employer. The Panel considered that they involved serious acts of negligence regarding the Registrant’s duty and responsibilities as a registered professional. The Panel bore in mind its findings at the fact finding stage, that the Registrant had been careless, ignorant and negligent about her professional obligations, which in the Panel’s judgement fell far below what is expected of a registered professional.
46. The Panel accepted the challenging personal circumstances experienced by the Registrant at the time. Nevertheless, the Panel did not consider that they negated the responsibilities on a Registrant to know and understand her professional obligations and to be open and transparent about any changes to her character with both her employer and her Regulator.
47. The Panel considered that the Registrant’s failures to disclose spanned a considerable period of time and were serious because they deprived both the Regulator and the employer respectively of the opportunity to undertake relevant risk assessments, based on accurate information about the Registrant’s character, to ensure that she was capable of safe and effective practice and did not pose a risk to service users. In the Panel’s judgement, such risk assessments are necessary because of the high level of trust which service users and the public place in registered professionals. In addition, the Panel was of the view that non-disclosure to the Regulator has the potential to undermine public confidence in the reputation of the profession itself and in the regulatory system, if the Regulator is not provided with accurate information so as to be able to conduct risk assessments in respect of a Registrant’s character.
48. In the Panel’s judgement, the Registrant’s conduct had breached the following Standards and Standards of Proficiency:

Standards (2016)
9.1 – you must make sure that your conduct justifies the public’s trust in you and your profession.
9.5 – You must tell us as soon as possible if:
– you accept a caution from the police or you have been charged with, or found guilty of, a criminal offence;
Standards of Proficiency (2013)
2 – be able to practise within the legal and ethical boundaries of their profession
2.2 – understand what is required of them by the Health and Care Professions Council
3 – be able to maintain fitness to practise
3.1 – understand the need to maintain high standards of personal and professional conduct
49. The Panel was satisfied that each of the instances of failing to disclose the conviction to either the employer or the HCPC was so serious that both individually and collectively they amounted to misconduct.

Decision on Impairment  

50. The Panel considered whether the Registrant’s fitness to practise is currently impaired as a consequence of her conviction and/or misconduct.
51. Ms Patel, on behalf of the HCPC, effectively submitted that the Registrant’s fitness to practice was impaired by reason of both statutory grounds. She drew the Panel’s attention to the HCPTS Practice Note on Impairment and to the relevant case law of Council for the Regulation of Health Care Professionals v GMC and Grant [2011] EWHC 927 (Admin).
52. The Registrant accepted that it was her responsibility to understand and follow the required standards and apologised for her actions, in particular her failure to disclose. She explained that she had learnt, from 2023 to date the importance of being open and transparent and was now mindful of the public interest and the vulnerability of service users with whom she worked. She acknowledged that transparency was fundamental to the profession and understood why the public interest was integral to the profession.
53. The Panel heard and accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor, It had regard to the HCPTS Practice Note on Convictions and Cautions. It also had regard to the HCPTS Practice Note on Impairment, and in particular the two elements of impairment, namely the personal component and the public component.
Impairment by reason of conviction
54. The Panel bore in mind that the offence and conviction had occurred some four years ago in 2022. It noted that once the employer had become aware of the conviction and had undertaken its own risk assessment, it had not taken any further action save to warn the Registrant that a formal disciplinary meeting would be held if there was a recurrence of similar conduct. 
55. In respect of the personal component, the Panel was satisfied that the conduct leading to the Registrant’s conviction was capable of remediation. However, the Panel was not satisfied that the Registrant had remediated it. The Panel noted that the Registrant still talked about the conviction in terms of a road traffic offence, and the Panel was of the view that the Registrant was minimising its seriousness. The Panel did not consider that the Registrant had demonstrated that she had the level of insight and understanding of how her conscious decision to drive a car whilst almost twice over the legal limit, even if only for a short distance, presented a clear and dangerous risk of causing serious injury or worse to other members of the public. The Panel considered that the Registrant appeared to be so focused on her own challenging personal circumstances at the time, that she had deflected away the serious potential consequences that her decision to drive could have had on other road users, pedestrians or other members of the public.
56. The Panel was of the view that the Registrant had not particularly addressed her offence and resulting conviction in either her written statement or oral evidence. It noted that she had attended the drivers’ awareness course with the consequence that her disqualification had been reduced. However, the Panel did not consider that it had information before it regarding what the Registrant had learnt from that course or that she understood the potential consequences of her decision to drive on others. In addition, the Panel did not consider that the Registrant had demonstrated that she understood the seriousness of the offence and conviction or how such a conviction may impact upon the public’s trust and confidence in the profession.
57. Furthermore, the Panel did not consider it had information regarding whether the Registrant had reflected on: (a) what steps she could have taken instead of driving while over the limit; (b) whether she had effective strategies in place to prevent a recurrence; and (c) what her decision-making process [redacted] in the future. 
58. In the absence of such information about the Registrant’s reflections and understanding regarding the conviction and the offence underpinning it, the Panel was not satisfied that the risk was sufficiently reduced to assess the risk of repetition as low. In the Panel’s judgement, there remained a risk that the Registrant may repeat such poor decisions in the future, if faced with similar [redacted] in her private life.
59. Accordingly, the Panel concluded that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is currently impaired on the personal component by reason of her conviction.
60. In relation to the public component, the Panel considered that the conviction was for a serious offence, which had exposed other road users to risk, and public confidence in the profession would be undermined if no finding of current impairment were made in respect of the conviction. The Panel was satisfied that a finding of impairment was required to uphold public confidence in the reputation of the profession and the regulatory system, as well as to declare and uphold professional standards. Accordingly, the Panel concluded that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is currently impaired on the public component by reason of her conviction.

Impairment by reason of misconduct
61. In relation to the personal component, the Panel considered that the Registrant’s misconduct was capable of remediation and that the Registrant had taken steps to remediate her misconduct. In terms of practical steps, it appeared that the Registrant had declared her conviction to her current employer, with each of the authors of the Registrant’s references being aware of the conviction itself as well as these current HCPC proceedings. One of the Registrant’s referees, Ms CR, the Senior Assistant Head of the SEN School in which the Registrant currently worked, had attended this hearing throughout in support of the Registrant. The Panel also noted that that the Registrant would also have since submitted a further HCPC renewal form and there was no suggestion that the conviction and ongoing proceedings had not been declared within that form.
62. It was evident to the Panel that the Registrant was remorseful for her failures in not disclosing her conviction. In terms of insight, the Panel was satisfied from the Registrant’s written and oral evidence that she fully accepted that it was her responsibility to understand and follow the correct procedures and that she understood that the HCPC expects its registrants to declare relevant character issues promptly. The Panel accepted that she had taken time to reflect on her responsibilities as a registrant and had reviewed and aligned her practice with the HCPC’s expectations surrounding fitness to practise, including the duty to manage her own standards, manage risk and take accountability for issues affecting her practice. 
63. The Panel was satisfied that the Registrant now properly understood her professional obligations, in particular those obligations around making relevant disclosures to the HCPC and her current or prospective employers, so that those organisations could conduct their own risk assessments as to her character and whether changes to it may affect whether she is capable of safe and effective practice.
64. In all the circumstances, the Panel was satisfied that the Registrant had sufficiently remediated her misconduct through practical steps and developing a good level of insight, such that the risk of repetition was low. Accordingly, in the Panel’s judgement, the Registrant’s fitness to practise was not currently impaired on the personal component.
65. In relation to the public component, the Panel considered that the misconduct had impacted on the employer’s and the Regulator’s ability to conduct relevant risk assessments to determine whether the Registrant was capable of safe and effective practice, notwithstanding the change to her character. The Panel considered that not being able to conduct such risk assessments based on accurate information may, in turn, impact on public protection. Consequently, the misconduct was serious. In the Panel’s judgement, the public would be concerned if no finding of current impairment were made in respect of a Registrant who had not been open and transparent about her conviction and who had not upheld professional standards. The Registrant had been careless, ignorant and negligent of her professional obligations and that was not acceptable for a professional. The Panel was satisfied that a finding of impairment was required to uphold public confidence in the reputation of the profession and the regulatory system, as well as to declare and uphold professional standards. Accordingly, the Panel concluded that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is currently impaired on the public component by reason of her misconduct.

Decision on Sanction

66. Having determined that the Registrant’s fitness to practise is currently impaired by reason of conviction and misconduct, the Panel went on to consider whether it was impaired to a degree which required action to be taken on her registration.
67. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor and exercised its independent judgement. It had regard to the HCPTS Sanctions Policy (the Policy) and considered the sanctions in ascending order of severity. The Panel was aware that the purpose of a sanction is not to be punitive but to protect members of the public and to safeguard the public interest which includes upholding standards within the profession, as well as maintaining public confidence in the profession and its regulatory process.
68. The Panel took account of all the information previously provided to it, together with the submissions from both parties.
69. The Panel was mindful that at the impairment stage, when considering the risk of repetition of the offence and resulting conviction, it had been concerned about the Registrant’s understanding and appreciation of the seriousness of the conviction and the offence which underpinned it. At that stage, the Panel had been concerned that the Registrant had not addressed the conviction in either her written statements or her oral evidence. Consequently, the Panel had concluded that the Registrant had minimised its seriousness and had not recognised the significant risk she had exposed other road users to, or the detrimental impact such a conviction would have on public confidence in the profession. The Panel, in particular, bore in mind that it had been unable to assess the risk of repetition in respect of the conviction as low, given the absence of information as to whether or not the Registrant had reflected on:
(a) what steps she could have taken instead of driving while over the limit; (b) whether she had effective strategies in place to prevent a recurrence; and (c) what her decision-making process would be if faced with a similar stressful situation in the future. 
70. In the Registrant’s submissions at sanction stage, she did set out for the Panel what she had learnt in the drivers’ awareness course and her understanding of the dangers of alcohol. She also expressed her appreciation of the dangers she had exposed other road users to and her recognition that the laws are designed to protect the public. The Registrant also outlined the alternative travel arrangements that she could have adopted and that she now used. [redacted].
71. The Panel bore in mind that the Registrant had responded to the Panel’s determination on impairment. The question for the Panel was whether this was genuine insight, or whether it had come too late in the day and was merely expressing what she thought the Panel wished to hear. The Panel bore in mind that the Registrant was unrepresented and not well versed in the hearings process as to what to articulate and at what stage. The Panel noted that it had been of the view, at the fact finding stage, that the Registrant was an honest witness doing her best to assist the Panel. The Panel was satisfied that the Registrant had demonstrated genuine and developing insight, and was reassured that she was able to respond to the concerns which the Panel had outlined. In light of this, the Panel revised its conclusion from the impairment stage, and considered that the risk of repetition in respect of the conviction was lower than the Panel had previously assessed.
72. Before going on to consider the individual options open to the Panel in respect of sanction, it considered the relevant mitigating and aggravating features in this case.
73. The Panel considered the following to be the relevant mitigating factors:
·       The Registrant has shown a good level of insight into her misconduct and developing insight into her conviction and the offence underpinning it;
·       The Registrant has apologised and demonstrated remorse for her actions;
·       The Registrant made early admissions, including pleading guilty at the Magistrates’ Court as well as admitting the factual particulars at the outset of this hearing;
·       The Registrant was experiencing challenging personal circumstances at the time;
·       The Registrant has the benefit of highly positive testimonials attesting to her professionalism and integrity within the workplace; and
·       The Registrant has no previous regulatory findings against her.
74. The Panel considered the following to be the relevant aggravating factors:
·       The misconduct occurred over a prolonged period of time, during which she remained unaware of her professional obligations.
75. The Panel first considered whether a sanction was necessary. It was of the view that this case was too serious to take no action, in particular given its findings of misconduct and impairment, where it identified the risk of undermining public confidence in the regulatory process through non-disclosure of relevant character information to the Regulator. The Panel concluded that such a course would send the wrong message to the public and that some form of sanction was necessary to maintain public confidence in the profession and to declare and uphold proper standards of conduct and behaviour.
76. The Panel next considered whether to impose a Caution Order. It had regard to paragraph 147 of the Policy which states:

A caution order is likely to be an appropriate sanction for cases in which: 

·       the issue is isolated, limited, or relatively minor in nature; 

·       there is a low risk of repetition; 

·       the registrant has shown good insight; and

·       the registrant has undertaken appropriate remediation.

77. The Panel noted its findings at the impairment stage that the risk of repetition of the misconduct was low, and its revised findings at this sanction stage that the risk of repetition in relation to the conviction was considerably lowered as a result of having been provided with more information from the Registrant. The Panel further noted its findings at the impairment stage that the Registrant had shown good insight into her misconduct, and its revised findings at this sanctions stage that the Registrant had shown developing insight in relation to the conviction. The Panel also noted its findings to date, that the Registrant had undertaken practical steps to remediate her misconduct. Therefore, on its face, the Panel considered that three of the factors indicating that a Caution Order may be appropriate appeared to be present in this case.
78. However, the Panel did not consider that the issues in this case could properly be classed as isolated, limited or relatively minor in nature. The Panel considered that the case encompassed two statutory grounds and that the misconduct had been over a prolonged period of time. The Panel carefully considered whether this ruled out the prospect of a Caution Order as the appropriate and proportionate sanction in all the circumstances of the case. In doing so, it considered the next sanctions in the hierarchy. 
79. In relation to a Conditions of Practice Order, the Panel noted that the conviction and misconduct appeared to meet many of the factors which may make a Conditions of Practice Order appropriate. However, the Panel struggled to identify suitable conditions which would address the conviction and misconduct, and as such it did not consider that appropriate, proportionate, realistic and verifiable conditions could be formulated. The Panel bore in mind that the character references attested to the Registrant practising to a high standard and the reality was that there were no clinical concerns to be addressed.
80. In relation to a Suspension Order, the Panel considered that such a sanction would be unduly punitive, especially as it considered that the risk of repetition was low in respect of the misconduct and relatively low in respect of the conviction. The Panel noted that the Registrant had been punished by the criminal courts for the offence which had occurred some four years ago and her then employer had taken no action following a risk assessment. The Panel also bore in mind the positive references and that there is a public interest in keeping an otherwise safe practitioner in the workplace.
81. The Panel also had regard to paragraph 148 of the Policy which states:
A caution order should be considered in cases where the nature of the allegations means that there is no risk to public protection that has to be addressed by a more restrictive sanction or that meaningful practice restrictions cannot be imposed, but a suspension order would be disproportionate. 
82. The Panel was of the view that the situation envisaged in paragraph 148 was one that applied in this case. Having considered both a Conditions of Practice Order and a Suspension Order and having concluded that neither was appropriate in the circumstances of this case, the Panel again considered a Caution Order. In the Panel’s judgement, the particular circumstances of this case are such that the appropriate and proportionate sanction is that of a Caution Order. 
83. The duration of the Caution Order will be for the maximum period of five years. A shorter period would not, in the Panel’s view, be sufficient to mark the seriousness of the misconduct. The Panel did not view a Caution Order as a lenient sanction. It would appear on the Register for five years. In the Panel’s view, it would serve to appropriately mark the case in respect of the public interest considerations in this case.

ORDER: The Registrar is directed to annotate the entry on the Register of Bonita Pryce-Green with a Caution Order for a period of five years.

Right of Appeal
You may appeal to the High Court in England and Wales against the Panel’s decision and the order it has made against you.

Under Article 29(10) of the Health Professions Order 2001, any appeal must be made within 28 days of the date when this notice is served on you. The Panel’s order will not take effect until the appeal period has expired or, if you appeal, until that appeal is disposed of or withdrawn.

History of Hearings for ​​Bonita Pryce-Green​